Noyes v. Davis CA1/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/22/24 Noyes v. Davis CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
HENRY S. NOYES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167787
v.
STANLEY D. DAVIS, et al., (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
No. SCV-267919)
Defendants and Appellants.
More than 100 years ago, neighboring landowners in Healdsburg
created an express easement for right of way that ran with the land and that
allowed the benefitted neighbors to travel over and across the property of the
burdened neighbors to reach a county road. In this quiet title and
declaratory relief action, plaintiff Henry S. Noyes, who owns property that
was once part of the benefitted neighbors’ land, asserts this express easement
for right of way is appurtenant to and benefits his property. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Noyes, and judgment was entered.
Appellants (defendants below) do not dispute that an easement for
right of way exists, but they contend the trial court ignored the issues and
claims framed by the pleadings and evidence and erred in finding the
evidence establishes that the easement at issue benefits Noyes’s property.
We find no error and affirm.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
“[A]n easement is a nonpossessory ‘ “interest in the land of another that
gives its owner the right to use the land of another or to prevent the property
owner from using his land.” ’ ” (Kazi v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (2001)
24 Cal.4th 871, 880.) “An easement may be appurtenant or in gross. It is
appurtenant when it is attached to the land of the owner”; an easement “is in
gross [when it] is not attached to any particular land, but belongs to a person
individually.” (Cushman v. Davis (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 731, 735 (Cushman).)
“The land to which an easement is attached is called the dominant tenement;
the land upon which a burden or servitude is laid is called the servient
tenement.” (Civ. Code, § 803, italics added.)
The following facts are undisputed. Over a century ago, Lottie Ewing
and her husband A.M. Ewing owned a parcel of about 26 acres on Fitch
Mountain (Ewing Property), and George and Margaret Stretter owned about
62 acres adjacent to the Ewing Property (Stretter Property).
By written easement agreement executed in 1912, the Stretters
conveyed to the Ewings and “ ‘their heirs and assigns forever’ ” “ ‘a right of
way for the purpose of passing and repassing on foot or with horses, beasts of
burden, wagons, carts, motor cars, or other vehicles or carriages whatsoever’ ”
to and from the Ewing Property “ ‘to the main County Road’ ” over and across
a portion of the Stretter Property. (The parties here refer to this variously as
the Ewing Road Easement or Ewing Easement, as do we.) Thus, the Stretter
Property was the servient tenement burdened by the easement, and the
Ewing Property was the dominant tenement that benefitted from the
easement. The easement agreement between the Stretters and the Ewings
was recorded in the official records of Sonoma County in December 1912.
2
Since the creation of the Ewing Road Easement in 1912, the 26-acre
Ewing Property and the 62-acre Stretter Property have been divided, and
portions of the properties have been conveyed to others. Plaintiff Noyes
currently owns certain parcels that were once part of the Ewing Property
(Noyes Property), about 8.47 acres in all.1 Appellants own property that was
part of the original Stretter Property.
Douglas Oakes and Margaret Oakes, like Noyes, also own property that
was part of the Ewing Property (Oakes Property).2 In the deed transferring
the Oakes Property to the Oakes, the description of the property includes,
“That certain 20 foot right of way and all easements and privileges granted
thereunder as granted in the deed from George Stretter and Margaret A.
Stretter his wife, to Lottie L. Ewing and A.M. Ewing, her husband by Deed
dated December 9, 1912 and recorded in Liber 306 of Deeds, page 32, Sonoma
County Records.”
The deeds to the Noyes Property, however, do not describe or refer to
the Ewing Road Easement.
Complaint
Noyes filed a verified complaint alleging he brought “this action to
quiet title and confirm his interest in the easement which he and his
predecessors-in-interest have used as their sole means of vehicular access to
real property located on South Fitch Mountain Road in Healdsburg,
1 According to the verified complaint, the Noyes Property was acquired
from the Ewings by Noyes’s grandmother and his great-great grandmother,
through a series of separate recorded transactions between 1920 and 1926, as
well as a small .004 acre parcel that Noyes’s grandmother acquired
separately in 1956.
2 Noyes named the Oakes as defendants in his complaint, but no
judgment was entered against them, and they are not parties to this appeal.
3
California, since the early 1920s.” He further alleged, “The subject easement
has existed in the Sonoma County real property records since at least 1912,
when it was recorded in Book 306 of Deeds, page 32. That easement
originally benefitted a 26-acre parcel owned by . . . [the Ewings] and
burdened an adjacent 62-acre parcel owned by George Stretter and Margaret
Stretter.”
Noyes sought “[a]n order quieting title in favor of Plaintiff in the Ewing
Road Easement” and “[a] declaration that Plaintiff is the owner of a dominant
tenement by implication over the Ewing Road Easement, that Defendants’
properties, and each of them, are the servient tenements of the Ewing Road
Easement, that Plaintiff’s use of the Ewing Road Easement for access and
utilities purposes will not unduly burden the servient tenements or said
easement; and that said easement is appurtenant to Plaintiff’s property.”
Summary Judgment Motion
Noyes moved for summary judgment. Based on the premise that the
Ewing Road Easement exists and is attached to all of the land of the original
Ewing Property, he argued the Ewing Road Easement therefore benefits his
property because (1) the Noyes Property is composed of parcels from the
original Ewing Property and (2) there is no evidence the Ewing Road
Easement was ever extinguished or terminated. In his opening brief in
support of his motion, Noyes asserted his rights in the easement “arose by
the Stretters’ express grant of the Ewing Easement to the Ewings in 1912.”
Opposing the motion, appellants did not dispute that the Ewing Road
Easement exists and did not dispute most of Noyes’s factual assertions.
Appellants argued an implied easement would be contrary to the express
intent of the parties since “the prior owners of [Noyes’s] parcels did not
convey an easement for access to any of his parcels.” They also asserted the
4
Oakes Property was “situated at the very end of the Ewing Easement,”
“anyone purchasing a property on the Ewing Easement would and could
assume that development in the area was confined, and that the extent of use
and traffic on the road ended with the Oakes,” and “[g]iven changes in
planning, zoning, and regulations in the area, any use by Plaintiff of an
implied easement over [the] Ewing Easement would necessitate a dramatic
change in the character of that road.”3
Trial Court Ruling
In a written ruling, the trial court granted Noyes’s motion for summary
judgment. It found no dispute that an express easement was created in 1912
with the Ewing Property as the dominant tenement which benefitted from an
easement for right of way on the Stretter Property (the servient tenement).
The court quoted Civil Code section 807, which generally provides that
when land with an appurtenant easement is divided into parcels, the benefit
of the easement is apportioned among the parcels.4 It reasoned: “Subsequent
3 Appellants also introduced evidence of written communication
between the Oakes and Noyes’s predecessors in interest (his grandmother
and father) in the Noyes Property, which they asserted showed “Plaintiff’s
predecessors were well-aware they did not have access rights to the Noyes
Parcel” as “they would seek permission to use the roadway to reach their
parcels during rare and sporadic visits.” But this is beside the point for the
issue before us because the Oakes Property was part of the Ewing Property
(which benefitted from the Ewing Road Easement), not the Stretter Property
(which was burdened by the easement). That Noyes’s predecessors in
interest may have sought permission to pass over the Oakes Property in no
way suggests Noyes’s predecessors did not have rights over the Ewing Road
Easement, which burdens portions of the Stretter Property only.
4 Civil Code section 807 provides in full, “In case of partition of the
dominant tenement the burden must be apportioned according to the division
of the dominant tenement, but not in such a way as to increase the burden
upon the servient tenement.”
5
conveyances of the Ewing Property may have failed to mention the status of
the Ewing Property as the dominant tenement, but that fact alone is
insufficient to extinguish the rights under the 1912 Conveyance, as dominant
tenement deeds do not have to mention the existence of appurtenant
easements for the easement to be effectively conveyed. Moylan v. Dykes
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 561, 568. Plaintiff has shown the creation of the
express easement, and its subsequent recordation. This is adequate to show
the existence of the express easement at summary judgment. Defendant
have not provided any evidence that the Easement was extinguished at any
time . . . .” The court noted appellants “offered no evidence of . . . increased
burden on the Easement.”
On January 26, 2023, judgment was entered in favor of Noyes and
against appellants, all of whom, as we have noted, own land that was part of
the Stretter Property.
DISCUSSION
A. Claim of Procedural Irregularity
Appellants contend the trial court erred in this case by “ignor[ing] both
the issues and claims as framed by the pleadings and Appellants’ evidence”
when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment. (Capitalization omitted.)
Appellants complain that Noyes’s complaint alleged an implied easement, but
the trial court determined Noyes had an express easement, thereby going
beyond the scope of the pleadings.5 We find no error.
5 Easements are express when “created by express words, by grant or
reservation, usually by deed.” (Cushman, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 735.)
“[A]n ‘easement will be implied when, at the time of conveyance of
property, the following conditions exist: 1) the owner of property conveys or
transfers a portion of that property to another; 2) the owner’s prior existing
use of the property was of a nature that the parties must have intended or
6
“ ‘The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party
to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be
tried because they are not in dispute.’ [Citation.] ‘The function of the
pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.’ ” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
367, 381.) In deciding a summary judgment motion, “[t]he trial court must
first ‘ “ ‘ “identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these
allegations to which the motion must respond.” ’ ” ’ ” (Jameson v. Desta
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1162–1163.)
“No error or defect in a pleading is to be regarded unless it affects
substantial rights.” (Buxbom v. Smith (1944) 23 Cal.2d 535, 542.) “The
primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may
prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly
notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of
Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240; see Shah v. Skillz Inc. (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 285, 312–313 [rejecting claim that a jury’s award for damages
should have been reduced because the plaintiff “did not ‘properly’ plead a
breach of” a particular contract where the operative complaint “provided
more than sufficient notice to [the defendant] that [the plaintiff] was seeking
damages for breach of the” contract at issue].)
believed that the use would continue; meaning that the existing use must
either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have been so
obviously and apparently permanent that the parties should have known of
the use; and 3) the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of
the quasi-dominant tenement.’ ” (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420.)
7
Here, Noyes clearly alleged he had “rights to and interest in” an
existing, written (that is, express) easement. In his complaint, he sought to
“confirm his interest in” an easement, which he alleged “existed in the
Sonoma County real property records since at least 1912, when it was
recorded in” county records. (Italics added.) Further, Noyes attached and
incorporated by reference “a copy of the recorded document creating the
Ewing Road Easement.” (Italics added.) He alleged, “the Ewing Road
Easement exists over the property of Defendants” and it “is appurtenant to
and benefits the Noyes property.” These allegations put appellants on notice
that Noyes sought an interest in the express easement created in 1912 by the
Ewings and the Stretters.6
Appellants’ contention that the trial court went beyond the issues
framed by the pleadings when it found the Ewing Road Easement was an
express easement appurtenant to the Noyes Property therefore fails.
B. The Merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment
Next, appellants claim the trial court erred when it ruled Noyes has an
express easement.
6 At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, appellants
apparently raised the claim that the pleadings only gave notice that Noyes
was seeking an implied easement. (The reporter’s transcript of the hearing is
not in the appellate record, but the trial court mentioned appellants’
argument in its written ruling.) The trial court reached the same conclusion
that we do, finding “The easement alleged by Plaintiff in the complaint is
clearly express, despite his inclusion of implied easements in the body of the
pleading.” “Defendants had more than adequate notice that an express
easement was at issue,” given the factual allegations and exhibits attached to
the complaint.
8
1. Standard of Review
A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “A plaintiff . . . has met his or her burden of showing
that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each
element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of
action. Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists
as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id., subd. (p)(1).)
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.)
2. Analysis
There is no dispute that the Ewings and the Stretters created an
express easement in 1912 that burdened the Stretter Property and benefitted
the Ewing Property; this is the Ewing Road Easement. Nor is there any
dispute that the Ewing Road Easement is appurtenant, meaning it is
attached to the land. Indeed, appellants acknowledge in their opening brief
that if the Ewings had sold their 26-acre property, “the easement rights
would have run with the land to” the Ewings’ assigns.
The question is what happened to the easement when the Ewing
Property was divided and transferred to new owners. Civil Code section 807
provides the answer: “In case of partition of the dominant tenement the
burden must be apportioned according to the division of the dominant
tenement, but not in such a way as to increase the burden upon the servient
tenement.” Our Supreme Court explained in 1894, “The general principle is
‘that, if an easement becomes appurtenant to an estate, it follows every part
9
of the estate, into whomsoever hands the same may come by purchase or
descent.’ [Citation.] [¶] And, where the owner of land to which a right of way
is appurtenant sells or devises it in separate parcels to different persons, it is
held that each of such persons acquires a right of way as appurtenant to his
particular part of the land.” (Currier v. Howes (1894) 103 Cal. 431, 436,
italics added.)
Consequently, when parts of the Ewing Property were sold in separate
parcels to different persons, the owners of each such parcel (including Noyes’s
predecessors in interest in the Noyes Property) acquired the Ewing Road
Easement “as appurtenant to [their] particular part[s] of the land.” (Currier
v. Howes, supra, 103 Cal. at p. 436.)
Appellants agree that when portions of the Ewing Property have been
parceled and sold, the Ewing Road Easement continued to exist and could
properly attach to the parcels sold to new owners. As they note, the Oakes
acquired rights to the Ewing Road Easement when they purchased land that
was part of the Ewing Property.
However, appellants appear to take the position that the deeds
transferring portions of the Ewing Property to new owners were required to
expressly provide that the Ewing Road Easement was being transferred
along with the land in order to preserve the appurtenant easement. In other
words, appellants seem to believe that an easement appurtenant to land is
extinguished as to land that is transferred to another unless the transfer
expressly provides that the appurtenant easement is transferred with the
land. But the law is to the contrary.
Civil Code section 1084 provides in relevant part, “The transfer of a
thing transfers also all its incidents, unless expressly excepted . . . .” (Italics
added.) “Incidents” under the statute refer to “fixtures and appurtenances.”
10
(Drake v. Martin (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 984, 994.) “Easements, for example,
are incidents which pass with the transfer of title to real property within the
meaning of Civil Code section 1084.” (Ibid.) Thus, when property with an
appurtenant easement is divided into lots, the easement “attaches to each lot
of the . . . property and passes to the grantee of each lot regardless of whether
it is described in the deed.” (Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60
Cal.App.3d 462, 467, italics added.)7
In this case, the transfer of title to portions of the Ewing Property to
Noyes’s predecessors in interest transferred the appurtenant Ewing Road
Easement by operation of law as there is no evidence that the Ewing Road
Easement was expressly excepted. Given the evidence and the law, we
conclude the trial court correctly found the Ewing Road Easement exists, it is
appurtenant to the Ewing Property, and Noyes acquired a right to the Ewing
Road Easement when he became the owner of portions of the Ewing Property.
Appellants argue that the rule of Civil Code section 1084 does not apply
here because “no ‘thing’ was transferred—eight new things[8] were created
and transferred, and an old thing was retained.” This argument is
unconvincing. The Ewing Road Easement “follows every part of” the Ewing
Property, and when the Ewing Property was divided and parcels were
transferred to others, the easement was likewise divided and appurtenant to
each “particular part of the land.” (Currier v. Howes, supra, 103 Cal. at p.
436; see Civ. Code, § 807.)
7 We note that appellants acknowledge the law provides, “ ‘[t]he
conveyance of the dominant tenement transfers all appurtenant easements to
the grantee, even though the easements are not specifically mentioned in the
deed,’ ” quoting Moylan v. Dykes, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at page 568.
8 The “eight things” refers to the fact that Noyes owns eight parcels
that were part of the Ewing Property.
11
Finally, appellants suggest in their reply brief that the trial court failed
to undertake an inquiry into the burden on the servient tenements. (See Civ.
Code, § 807.) We reject this argument as the trial court considered the issue,
observing that although appellants have “waxed apocalyptic,” they have
“offered no evidence of . . . increased burden on the Easement.” We note that
appellants filed a response to Noyes’s separate statement of undisputed
material facts in support of his motion for summary judgment, in which they
included six of their own “additional undisputed facts” based on their
evidence, and these six statements do not raise a triable issue of fact
regarding burden on the servient tenements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Noyes shall recover his costs on appeal.
12
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A167787, Noyes v. Davis
13