Santa Clarita Organization for Planning etc. v. County of L.A.10/21/24 CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/21/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SANTA CLARITA B331779
ORGANIZATION FOR
PLANNING THE (Los Angeles County
ENVIRONMENT et al., Super. Ct. No. 22STCP01433)
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent;
WILLIAMS HOMES, INC.,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Advocates for the Environment and Dean Wallraff for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Starr Coleman,
Assistant County Counsel, and Thomas R. Parker, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent County of Los
Angeles.
Cox, Castle & Nicholson, David P. Waite, Alexander M.
DeGood, Kenneth B. Bley, and Eric J. Cohn for Real Party in
Interest and Respondent Williams Homes, Inc.
__________________________
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment
and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) appeals
from a judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles and
Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) following the trial court’s grant
without leave to amend of Williams’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings on SCOPE’s petition for writ of mandate. SCOPE’s
lawsuit challenged the County’s approval of a conditional use
permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map for
a proposed residential housing development in an unincorporated
area of the Santa Clarita Valley (the Project).
The trial court found Government Code section 66499.371 of
the Subdivision Map Act (SMA; Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.)
barred SCOPE’s causes of action for violations of the SMA and
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub.
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) because SCOPE failed to serve a
summons on the County and Williams within 90 days of the
County’s approval of the vesting tentative tract map.
Section 66499.37 requires service of a summons within 90 days of
approval of a project for any action challenging a decision of a
legislative body, advisory agency, or appeal board “concerning a
subdivision” or “the reasonableness, legality, or validity of any
condition attached” to an approval of a subdivision or tentative or
final map.
On appeal, SCOPE contends section 66499.37 does not
apply to the first cause of action under CEQA because its CEQA
claims do not “concern a subdivision” within the meaning of
section 66499.37. SCOPE is partially correct in that there must
be some connection to the SMA: Section 66499.37 applies to
claims that arise from or involve a controversy under the SMA,
could have been brought under the SMA, or overlap with an SMA
claim. Section 66499.37 also applies to an action challenging the
reasonableness, legality, or validity of a condition imposed as
part of approval under the SMA of a subdivision or tentative or
final map. In this case, section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE’s
CEQA claims to the extent the petition alleges procedural
violations of CEQA (for example, lack of adequate notice of the
mitigated negative declaration) and the County’s failure to
analyze and disclose the Project’s environmental impacts, all of
which are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought
under the SMA. However, to the extent the petition challenges
the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting
tentative tract map (here, specific mitigation measures adopted
3
as a condition of approval), the limitations period under
section 66499.37 applies.
Given the complexity of the question whether a CEQA
challenge to approval of a vesting tentative tract map for a
subdivision is subject to the summons requirement under the
SMA, petitioners challenging approval of a tentative or final map
proceed at their peril if they fail to obtain and serve a summons
within 90 days of the approval. SCOPE could have avoided entry
of a judgment against it had SCOPE obtained and served a
summons on the County and Williams within 90 days, which
obligation is not onerous given the requirement under CEQA that
the petitioner serve the petition within 30 days after the County
files a notice of determination. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167,
subd. (b).)
Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings must
dispose of the entire cause of action, however, the trial court
erred in granting the motion as to the CEQA cause of action
because only a portion of the cause of action is barred by the SMA
limitations period. We reverse the judgment and remand for the
trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment
on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for
violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the
second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and
planning law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Project Approval
In 2018 Pico Canyon, LLC sought approval from the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Board) of a conditional use
4
permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map for
the Project that would subdivide 94.38 acres of open space into
45 lots for development of 37 single-family homes, six public
facilities, and two open spaces in an unincorporated area of the
Santa Clarita Valley. Prior to the Board’s public hearing on the
Project, the staff of the County Department of Regional Planning
prepared an initial study under CEQA to assess the Project’s
potential environmental impacts. The staff determined the
Project “could have a significant effect on the environment” but a
mitigated negative declaration (MND) was the appropriate
document to address the Project’s environmental impacts. The
Board found the mitigation measures contained in the mitigation
monitoring and reporting program prepared for the Project
(Mitigation Program) would ensure the Project would not have a
significant effect on the environment.
On March 15, 2022 the Board approved the permits and the
vesting tentative tract map with conditions, including compliance
with the Mitigation Program,2 adopted the MND, and certified
the MND complied with CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines (Cal.
2 “A subdivider may file a ‘vesting tentative map’ whenever
the Subdivision Map Act requires a tentative map. [Citation.]
The vesting tentative map statute was enacted to ‘establish a
procedure for the approval of tentative maps that will provide
certain statutorily vested rights to a subdivider’ (§ 66498.9,
subd. (a)) and to ‘ensure that local requirements governing the
development of a proposed subdivision are established in
accordance with Section 66498.1 when a local agency approves or
conditionally approves a vesting tentative map.’ (§ 66498.9,
subd. (b).)” (Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 243, 254, fn. omitted.)
5
Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.).3 In early 2022 Williams
purchased the property from Pico Canyon, LLC. The March 22,
2022 notice of determination for the Project identified both Pico
Canyon, LLC and Williams as the Project applicants.
B. The Petition for Writ of Mandate
On April 20, 2022 SCOPE filed a verified petition for writ of
mandate against the County, Williams, and Pico Canyon, LLC.4
The first cause of action alleged the approval of the MND violated
CEQA because it “failed to disclose, analyze, and mitigate many
of the Project’s significant environmental impacts.” SCOPE
alleged there were environmental impacts related to fire hazards,
wildlife habitat connectivity, mountain lions, rare and threatened
plant species, hydrology and water supply, open space and trails,
air quality, transportation, greenhouse gases, and noise. SCOPE
further alleged there was substantial evidence these
environmental impacts may be significant, requiring preparation
of an environmental impact report (EIR). In addition, “[s]ome of
the approved mitigation measures are vague, deferred, or
inadequate to truly mitigate the Project’s impacts.” Specifically,
SCOPE alleged the mitigation measures in the Mitigation
Program with respect to wildfire impacts, mountain lions, rare
plant species, wetlands, and noise were inadequate.
SCOPE also alleged the County violated five procedural
CEQA requirements: (1) failure to provide notice of intent to
3 Further citations to the CEQA Guidelines are to title 14 of
the California Code of Regulations.
4 At SCOPE’s request, on March 6, 2023 the trial court
dismissed Pico Canyon, LLC from the action with prejudice.
6
adopt the revised MND at a May 19, 2021 regional planning
commission hearing; (2) failure to provide the May 12, 2021
version of the MND to CEQAnet;5 (3) failure to recirculate the
MND following the August 2021 discovery of a mountain lion at
the Project site; (4) misleading and confusing the public and
decision makers by using different numbers to identify the
mitigation measures in the MND and the Mitigation Program;
and (5) failure to consult with the Santa Monica Mountains
Conservancy.
The second cause of action for “violation of planning and
zoning law” (capitalization and boldface omitted) alleged the
Project was inconsistent with (1) Los Angeles County Code
section 21.24.020, which imposes limits on the number of
dwelling units for projects that have only a single route of access
from a street system to a highway; (2) the Antelope Valley Area
Plan’s limitations on density for areas designated as very high
fire hazard severity zones; and (3) the Los Angeles County
General Plan policies discouraging urban sprawl and
development in areas with high environmental resources and
severe fire and other safety hazards. The petition also alleged
the Project violated three sections of the SMA, including
section 66474.02, which prohibits approval of a tentative map
unless the subdivision and lots comply with regulations adopted
for forestry and fire protection.
SCOPE requested a peremptory writ of mandate
(1) directing the County to set aside and vacate adoption of the
5 CEQAnet is “the California State Clearinghouse’s
searchable online” database of CEQA documents. (El Morro
Community Assn. v. California Dept. of Parks & Recreation
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1358.)
7
MND for the Project; (2) directing the County to set aside and
vacate all approvals of the Project, including the vesting tentative
tract map, the conditional use permit, and the oak tree permit;
(3) ordering the County to prepare and certify a legally adequate
EIR; and (4) ordering the County and Williams to “cease any and
all activity related to the Project that may result in a physical
change to the environment until the Project is re-approved
following the certification of a legally sufficient EIR for the
Project.”
On February 14, 2023 SCOPE filed an opening brief
challenging the County’s adoption of the MND on the basis it
failed to analyze and mitigate the Project’s environmental
impacts. The brief also argued the Project did not comply with
the fire-access requirements of Los Angeles County Code
section 21.24.020 that limited the number of dwelling units to
75 houses with a single route of access to a highway, because
adding 37 houses under the Project would result in 77 houses
using one route. SCOPE did not otherwise address the second
cause of action for planning and zoning law and SMA violations.
SCOPE requested that the trial court order the County to set
aside its approvals of the MND and the Project and to prepare an
EIR for the Project.
C. Williams’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On March 16, 2023 Williams filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Williams argued dismissal of the petition was
mandatory because SCOPE failed to serve a summons on
Williams or the County within 90 days of the County’s approval
of the vesting tentative tract map as mandated by
section 66499.37. Williams maintained both the SMA and CEQA
8
causes of action were barred under section 66499.37 because the
petition challenged the County’s approval of the Project and the
vesting tentative tract map, and therefore, each cause of action
“concerns a matter addressed by the SMA.” Moreover, the CEQA
claims could have been brought under the SMA and were
intertwined with the SMA claims.
In its opposition, SCOPE argued it did not obtain a
summons when it filed its CEQA petition for writ of mandate
because a summons is not required for an administrative
mandamus proceeding, and instead, service of the petition
confers jurisdiction. SCOPE asserted section 66499.37 did not
apply to its CEQA claims because the claims did not arise under
the SMA and could not have been brought under the SMA. With
respect to the second cause of action for violations of planning
and zoning law and the SMA, SCOPE argued that only
paragraphs 129 to 131 of the petition (identified as “sub-claims”)
alleged violations of the SMA. SCOPE asserted as to these sub-
claims that they “were not briefed in the Opening Brief, so they
have been abandoned. In fact, the entire second claim was not
briefed.” SCOPE requested that if the trial court granted the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, it should allow SCOPE
leave to amend.
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling and Judgment
On April 12, 2023 the trial court held a hearing on
Williams’s motion, and, following argument from the attorneys,
the court took the matter under submission. On May 26, 2023
the court granted the motion without leave to amend. The court
found the County’s approval of the vesting tentative tract map
“necessarily required a finding of CEQA compliance”; the
9
Mitigation Program was a condition of approval of the [vesting
tentative tract map]”; and “even though styled as a CEQA claim,
the proceeding is an attempt to set aside . . . the County’s
decision concerning a subdivision.”
On June 27, 2023 the trial court entered judgment in favor
of the County and Williams and against SCOPE on the two
causes of action. The judgment dismissed the petition with
prejudice, denying leave to amend.
SCOPE timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“‘A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is
appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the
same de novo standard of review.’” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac
Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777; accord,
Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 24, 31.) “‘“We treat the pleadings as admitting all
of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein.”’”
(Tarin v. Lind (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395, 403-404; accord,
Starlight Cinemas, at p. 31.)
“The application of the statute of limitations on undisputed
facts is a purely legal question” subject to de novo review. (Aryeh
v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191;
accord, AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. City of Los Angeles (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 322, 331.) Further, “when the issue is one of
10
statutory interpretation, it presents a question of law that
we review de novo.” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022)
12 Cal.5th 651, 658; accord, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, at
p. 331 [“‘De novo review is also appropriate where, as here, the
appeal involves a question of statutory interpretation.’”].)
“‘Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’” (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd.
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170; accord, McHugh v. Protective Life
Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227.) “‘We first consider the words
of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the most
reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose.’” (Prang, at
p. 1170; accord, McHugh, at p. 227.) “‘We consider the ordinary
meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in
other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory
scheme.’” (Prang, at p. 1170; accord, McHugh, at p. 227.) “If the
relevant statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, we look to appropriate extrinsic sources, such as
the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”
(Prang, at p. 1170; accord, McHugh, at p. 227 [“If the relevant
statutory language is ambiguous, we look to appropriate extrinsic
sources, including the legislative history, for further insights.”].)
B. Section 66499.37 Does Not Bar the CEQA Cause of Action
1. CEQA Review
“CEQA was enacted to (1) inform the government and
public about a proposed activity’s potential environmental
impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, those impacts;
(3) require project changes through alternatives or mitigation
measures when feasible; and (4) disclose the government’s
11
rationale for approving a project.” (Protecting Our Water &
Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020)
10 Cal.5th 479, 488 (Protecting Our Water); accord, Union of
Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1171, 1184-1185.) “CEQA prescribes how governmental
decisions will be made whenever an agency undertakes,
approves, or funds a project.” (Protecting Our Water, at p. 488;
accord, Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, at p. 1185.)
“If the project is discretionary and does not qualify for any
other exemption, the agency must conduct an environmental
review.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 488;
accord, Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1186.) As the Supreme Court
explained in Protecting Our Water, at pages 488 to 489, “The
agency conducts an initial study to assess potential
environmental impacts. (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002,
subd. (k)(2), 15063, subd. (a).) If there is no substantial evidence
that the project may significantly affect the environment, the
agency prepares a negative declaration, and environmental
review ends. ([Pub. Resources Code,] § 21080, subd. (c)(1); CEQA
Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(2), 15063, subd. (b)(2), 15070,
subd. (a).) If potentially significant environmental effects are
discovered, but the project applicant agrees to changes that
would avoid or mitigate them, the agency prepares a mitigated
negative declaration ([Pub. Resources Code,] § 21080, subd. (c)(2);
CEQA Guidelines, § 15070, subd. (b)), which also ends CEQA
review. [Citation.] Finally, if the initial study reveals
substantial evidence that the project may have a significant
environmental impact and a mitigated negative declaration is
inappropriate, the agency must prepare and certify an
12
environmental impact report (EIR) before approving the project.
([Pub. Resources Code,] § 21080, subd. (d); CEQA Guidelines,
§§ 15002, subd. (k)(3), 15063, subd. (b)(1); [citation].)”
“[I]f a lead agency is presented with a fair argument that a
project may have a significant effect on the environment, the lead
agency shall prepare an EIR even though it may also be
presented with other substantial evidence that the project will
not have a significant effect.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15064,
subd. (f)(1); accord, Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of
Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1111-1112; Save Agoura Cornell
Knoll v. City of Agoura Hills (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 665, 674.)
“‘The fair argument standard thus creates a low threshold for
requiring an EIR, reflecting the legislative preference for
resolving doubts in favor of environmental review.’” (Save
Agoura Cornell Knoll, at p. 676; accord, Dunning v. Clews (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 156, 170.)
2. The Subdivision Map Act
“The Subdivision Map Act is ‘the primary regulatory
control’ governing the subdivision of real property in California.
[Citation.] The Act vests the ‘[r]egulation and control of the
design and improvement of subdivisions’ in the legislative bodies
of local agencies, which must promulgate ordinances on the
subject. (§ 66411.) The Act generally requires all subdividers of
property to design their subdivisions in conformity with
applicable general and specific plans and to comply with all of the
conditions of applicable local ordinances.” (Gardner v. County of
Sonoma (2003) 29 Cal.4th 990, 996-997, fn. omitted; accord,
Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 798-799.) “Ordinarily, subdivision under
13
the Act may be lawfully accomplished only by obtaining local
approval and recordation of a tentative and final map pursuant
to section 66426, when five or more parcels are involved, or a
parcel map pursuant to section 66428 when four or fewer parcels
are involved.” (Gardner, at p. 997; accord, Pacific Palisades Bowl
Mobile Estates, at p. 799.)
“The local entity’s enforcement power is directly tied to its
power to grant or withhold approval of a subdivision map.”
(Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 799; accord, Guerrero v. City of
Los Angeles (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1103.) “The agencies
exercise their authority by reviewing maps of a proposed
subdivision. A tentative map must, among other things, be
consistent with either the general local plan or an existing
specific plan. (§§ 66473.5, 66474.)” (City of Goleta v. Superior
Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 270, 276.) “The subdivision process
begins with submission to the city or county of an application,
including a map depicting the proposed lots. The application and
map are first reviewed for completeness. They are next reviewed
for technical feasibility, which may require consultation with
other agencies. [Citation.] The process typically involves one or
more hearings. Thus, ‘[g]enerally, a public hearing is scheduled
and conducted only after city and county staff have deemed the
map complete, approved the technical feasibility of the map, and
prepared an appropriate environmental analysis. The public
hearing may be before an advisory agency that is authorized to
approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove tentative maps
. . . . After the required public hearing or hearings, the tentative
map can be approved.’” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates,
at p. 799.)
14
3. Section 66499.37’s 90-day limitations period
Section 66499.37 provides, “Any action or proceeding to
attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of an
advisory agency, appeal board, or legislative body concerning a
subdivision, or of any of the proceedings, acts, or determinations
taken, done, or made prior to the decision, or to determine the
reasonableness, legality, or validity of any condition attached
thereto, including, but not limited to, the approval of a tentative
map or final map, shall not be maintained by any person unless
the action or proceeding is commenced and service of summons
effected within 90 days after the date of the decision. Thereafter
all persons are barred from any action or proceeding or any
defense of invalidity or unreasonableness of the decision or of the
proceedings, acts, or determinations. The proceeding shall take
precedence over all matters of the calendar of the court except
criminal, probate, eminent domain, forcible entry, and unlawful
detainer proceedings.”
When the Legislature enacted section 66499.37 in 1974, the
statute contained the same language (except for the reference to
approval of a tentative or final map), but it set a 180-day
limitations period for commencement of the action and service of
the summons. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1536, p. 3511.) In 1980 the
Legislature amended section 66499.37 to shorten the limitations
period from 180 days to 90 days. (Stats. 1980, ch. 1152, § 14,
p. 3799.) The legislative history reflects that the limitations
period was reduced to 90 days because “[s]maller developers have
stated that they are often unwilling to proceed with
developments until the 180 day period has expired because of the
costs they might incur if the development approval were
challenged.” (Assem. Com. on Housing and Community
15
Development, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2320 (1979-1980 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 1980, p. 4.)
In 2007 the Legislature amended section 66499.37 to
specify that the 90-day limitations period applies to any action to
attack or set aside a decision, determinations made prior to the
decision, or to determine the reasonableness, legality or validity
of any attached condition, adding, “including, but not limited to,
the approval of a tentative map or final map.” (Stats. 2007,
ch. 612, § 9, p. 5358; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 763 (2007-2008 Reg. Session) as amended May 31, 2007,
p. 7 [“This bill would clarify that the 90-day time limitation to
attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a
legislative body concerning a subdivision applies to, but is not
limited to, the approval of a tentative map or final map.”].)
C. Section 66499.37 Bars Only a Portion of the CEQA Cause of
Action
1. Applicable law
On appeal, SCOPE challenges only the dismissal of its
CEQA cause of action.6 Relying on Friends of Riverside’s Hills v.
City of Riverside (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 743, 755-756 (Friends),
SCOPE contends the CEQA cause of action does not “concern a
subdivision” within the meaning of section 66499.37 because
6 SCOPE acknowledges it did not brief the second cause of
action for violations of the planning and zoning law and the SMA
in the trial court, and therefore it has abandoned or forfeited
those claims. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603
[“‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal’”]; Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores
California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1243-1244 [same].)
16
none of the CEQA claims could have been brought under the
SMA. Williams and the County, by contrast, argue SCOPE’s
CEQA claims are barred under the plain language of
section 66499.37 because the statute applies to any action to set
aside the decision of a legislative body “concerning a subdivision,”
or to determine the reasonableness or validity of a condition of
approval of a tentative or final map.
We do not read section 66499.37 to apply to any action
challenging a decision “concerning a subdivision,” even absent a
connection to the SMA. Although the statute refers to a decision
concerning a subdivision, the legislative history of the 1980
amendment to section 66499.37 (which reduced the limitations
period from 180 days to 90 days) reflects the Legislature’s intent
that section 66499.37 apply to actions brought under the SMA
(which in turn, applies to subdivisions). (Sen. Com. on Local
Government, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2320 (1979-1980 Reg.
Sess.), as amended May 5, 1980, p. 4, italics added [“Statute of
limitations for legal actions brought under the Map Act: The law
now provides that any legal action to overturn a map approval by
a local agency must occur within 180 days of the decision of such
agency. AB 2320 would reduce that time period to 90 days.”];
Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2320 (1979-1980 Reg.
Sess.), as amended Apr. 7, 1980, p. 4 [“Present law establishes a
180-day statute of limitations for purposes of bringing judicial
actions under the Subdivision Map Act. This bill would revise
this to 90 days after the decision.”]; see Hensler v. City of
Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 23 (Hensler) [“‘The “patent
legislative objective” of [section 66499.37] is to ensure that
judicial resolution of Subdivision Map Act disputes occurs “as
expeditiously as is consistent with the requirements of due
17
process of law.”’ [Citation.] . . . . [S]ection 66499.37 applies by its
terms to any action involving a controversy over or arising out of
the Subdivision Map Act.”].)
The Supreme Court in Hensler made clear that, although
the Legislature’s focus in section 66499.37 was on challenges to
decisions made under the SMA, the form of the action is not
controlling. (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 23.) The court
explained, “To determine the statute of limitations which applies
to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the
cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action.
[Citations.] ‘[T]he nature of the right sued upon and not the form
of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of
the statute of limitations under our code.’” (Id. at pp. 22-23.) The
court continued, “[S]ection 66499.37 applies by its terms to any
action involving a controversy over or arising out of the
Subdivision Map Act. Therefore, if this is a claim arising out of
application of a land use regulation authorized by that act,
section 66499.37 applies.” (Id. at p. 23.)
In Hensler, the plaintiff brought an inverse condemnation
action alleging an ordinance enacted by the City of Glendale
under the SMA, which prohibited construction on major
ridgelines, was a regulatory taking because the ordinance
precluded him from developing 40 percent of his property.
(Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 8.) The Supreme Court held the
90-day limitations period under section 66499.37 governed the
action because, although the lawsuit sought only compensation
for the alleged taking, the constitutional validity of the ordinance
adopted under the SMA needed to be determined before
compensation could be ordered, to afford the city an opportunity
to rescind the ordinance or exempt the developer’s property
18
instead of paying compensation. (Hensler, at p. 7.) The court
concluded, “The gravamen of plaintiff’s [inverse condemnation]
cause of action is . . . a claim that the Glendale ordinance
[enacted under the SMA] is invalid on its face or as applied . . . .”
(Id. at pp. 26.)
More recently, the Courts of Appeal in Friends, supra,
168 Cal.App.4th at pages 746 and 751 and Legacy Group v. City
of Wasco (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311 and 1313-1314
(Legacy Group) expanded on the holding of Hensler in concluding
that section 66499.37 applies to a claim if it overlaps with an
SMA claim or could have been brought under the SMA. We agree
with this statutory construction and apply it here. SCOPE is
correct that most of the CEQA claims in the first cause of action
are not barred because they could not have been brought under
the SMA and do not overlap with an SMA claim. But to the
extent the CEQA claims challenge the adequacy of mitigation
measures in the Mitigation Program imposed as a condition of
the County’s approval of the Project, including the vesting
tentative tract map, the claims are barred.
The analysis in Friends, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at
pages 747 to 748 is instructive. There, the Court of Appeal
analyzed the application of section 66499.37 to the CEQA cause
of action in a case where the plaintiff (Friends) alleged causes of
action under both CEQA and the SMA. (Friends, at pp. 755-756.)
Friends alleged the city violated CEQA by failing to require the
project applicant to implement mitigation measures regarding
open space that were required by the applicable specific plan.
(Id. at p. 755.) Friends’s three other causes of action alleged
violations of the SMA and the municipal code and, like the first
cause of action for violation of CEQA, alleged the city failed to
19
require as a condition of approval the mitigation measures
regarding open space adopted as part of the specific plan. (Id. at
pp. 755-756.) The court concluded the 90-day limitations period
under section 66499.37 barred Friends’s CEQA cause of action,
reasoning, “[T]he CEQA cause of action was merely another
vehicle for challenging the City’s failure to require the applicant
to implement open space and other mitigation measures that
were part of the Project’s conditions of approval and of the
Specific Plan. Friends not only could have brought this claim
under the SMA rather than CEQA, it in fact did, in causes of
action two through four.” (Id. at p. 756.) Accordingly, “Friends
was required to comply with the 90-day summons requirement
for the CEQA cause of action, because it both overlapped with the
SMA causes of action and could have been (and was) brought
under the SMA.” (Ibid.)
In Legacy Group, the Court of Appeal concluded
section 66499.37 did not apply to the developers’ breach of
contract claim asserted against the city for breach of the
development agreements for a subdivision (by withdrawing
funding for infrastructure acquisition), rejecting the city’s
argument that section 66499.37 applied because the developers’
cause of action attacked or reviewed a decision of the city
“‘concerning a subdivision.’” (Legacy Group, supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1310-1311, 1313.) The court explained,
“[W]e are reluctant to extend section 66499.37 to breach of
contract claims unless the gravamen of the claim concerns acts
that could have been challenged as a violation of the SMA. This
exception [for acts that could have been challenged under the
SMA] precludes the parties from avoiding the application of
section 66499.37 to decisions arising under the SMA simply by
20
restating as contractual covenants the responsibilities imposed
on local government by the SMA.” (Id. at p. 1313.)
By contrast, the developers’ separate breach of contract
claim that the city breached the development agreements by
refusing to approve the final tract maps was barred by the SMA
limitations period. The court reasoned, “When a breach of
contract claim overlaps with or concerns acts by the city council
that could have been challenged under the SMA, then the shorter
statute of limitations set forth in section 66499.37 will apply.
Accordingly, Developers’ attack on the failure to approve maps,
even though pled as a breach of contract, should have been
brought within the 90-day period of limitation.” (Legacy Group,
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
Williams and the County focus on the language in Hensler
that if a claim arises from the SMA, it is subject to the SMA
limitations period “regardless of the title attached to the cause of
action or the remedy sought.” (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 26.)
Thus, they contend, the CEQA cause of action is subject to
section 66499.37 because it challenges the County’s approval of
the vesting tentative tract map under the SMA. They point to
similar language in Presenting Jamul v. Board of Supervisors
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 665 (Jamul) that “[t]he broad language the
Legislature employed within section 66499.37 was specifically
designed to include any challenge, regardless whether procedural
or substantive in character, to any subdivision-related decision of
either a legislative or advisory entity, or any of the necessary
precedent proceedings, acts or determinations pursued before the
making of the challenged decision.” (Id. at p. 671, italics added.)
The Jamul court continued, “[R]egardless of the nature of or label
attached to the action challenging the legislative body’s
21
subdivision-related decision, the action is governed by
section 66499.37.” (Ibid.) Although the Jamul court referred to a
“subdivision-related decision,” the case involved the plaintiff’s
request to toll the expiration date of a tentative subdivision map
for a proposed development, which the court characterized as a
“Subdivision Map Act controvers[y].” (Ibid.) The holding in
Jamul does not mean section 66499.37 applies to any
subdivision-related decision. Rather, Jamul held that
section 66499.37 governs any subdivision-related decision
involving a controversy under the SMA regardless of the label
placed on that decision.
Hensler teaches that the SMA limitations period applies to
any action that arises from or involves a controversy under the
SMA7 or challenges a condition imposed as part of an approval of
a subdivision or tentative or final map under the SMA, regardless
of the form of the action—in Hensler, an inverse condemnation
7 The Supreme Court in Hensler listed nine appellate
decisions (including Jamul) that considered the limitations
period “in a case involving a controversy related to a subdivision,”
all of which held that section 66499.37 applied “no matter what
the form of the action.” (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 26-27.)
Each case directly involved an SMA controversy or arose from an
approval under the SMA. (See, e.g., Hunt v. County of Shasta
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 442 [action for declaratory relief that
subdivision parcels complied with SMA]; Griffis v. County of
Mono (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 414, 419 [petition for writ of
mandate seeking rescission of approval of final map and
declaration that tentative map had expired]; Timberidge
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873,
886 [action to invalidate city’s resolution imposing school impact
fees as condition of city’s approval of plaintiff’s subdivision
maps].)
22
action arising from application of an ordinance adopted under the
SMA; and in Jamul, a writ petition and declaratory relief action
attacking the county’s denial of the owner’s request to toll the
expiration date of the tentative map. (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at pp. 6-7, 22-23; see Jamul, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 666.)
Accordingly, to the extent SCOPE’s CEQA cause of action asserts
a claim that arises from or involves a controversy under the SMA
or challenges the reasonableness, legality, or validity of a
condition of approval under the SMA of the vesting tentative
tract map for the Project, section 66499.37 applies. As the
Friends and Legacy Group courts elaborated, a CEQA claim is
also barred if it overlaps with a claim for violation of the SMA or
could have been brought under the SMA.8 (Friends, supra,8 Williams and the County also rely on our decision in AIDS
Healthcare Foundation v. City of Los Angeles, supra,86 Cal.App.5th at page 327, in which we addressed the 90-day
limitations period in section 65009, which applies to challenges to
specified land use and zoning decisions. We concluded
section 65009 applied to bar the injunctive relief action filed by
AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) under the Political Reform
Act of 1974 (PRA; § 81000 et seq.) to set aside the project and
permit approvals by the city based on alleged bribes accepted by
two council members on the city’s planning and land use
management (PLUM) committee. (AIDS Healthcare Foundation,
at pp. 327, 353.) We explained, relying on Hensler, supra,8 Cal.4th at pages 22 to 23, “While AHF may challenge
corruption under the PRA, the gravamen of AHF’s action is an
attack on, or review of, the PLUM committee’s decisions related
to permitting and real estate project approvals. Section 65009
applies directly to that challenge. AHF cannot escape the
statutory time bar by couching its claim as ‘necessarily
dependent on a finding of a violation of the PRA’ when the
23
168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 755-756; Legacy Group, supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1313-1314.)
2. Most of SCOPE’s CEQA claims are not barred
Here, unlike the plaintiffs in Friends, SCOPE alleged five
procedural CEQA violations by the County: (1) failure to provide
notice of intent to adopt the revised MND at a May 19, 2021
regional planning commission hearing; (2) failure to provide the
May 12, 2021 version of the MND to CEQAnet; (3) failure to
recirculate the MND following the August 2021 discovery of a
mountain lion at the Project site; (4) misleading and confusing
the public and decision makers by using different numbers to
identify the mitigation measures in the MND and the Mitigation
Program; and (5) failure to consult with the Santa Monica
Mountains Conservancy. These procedural violations are unique
to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA.
SCOPE also alleged the County failed to adequately analyze and
disclose the Project’s environmental impacts with respect to fire
hazards, wildlife habitat connectivity, mountain lions, rare and
threatened plant species, hydrology and water supply, open space
and trails, air quality, transportation, greenhouse gases, and
noise. SCOPE further alleged an EIR is required because there
violation itself involves challenging the PLUM committee’s
project approvals.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation, at p. 353.)
Here, in contrast to AIDS Healthcare Foundation, SCOPE’s
allegations regarding the County’s procedural violations of CEQA
and its failure to analyze and disclose the Project’s environmental
impacts are limited to the failure to comply with CEQA,
including preparation of an EIR, and not a challenge under the
SMA.
24
is substantial evidence that these environmental impacts may be
significant. Like the allegations relating to the CEQA procedural
violations, these allegations assert CEQA claims that do not arise
from the SMA or involve any controversary under the SMA.
Williams and the County contend section 66499.37 governs
the entire CEQA cause of action because the Board’s approval of
the vesting tentative tract map was “inextricably linked” to the
Project’s CEQA review and mitigation measures. Williams and
the County point to finding 58 with respect to the vesting
tentative tract map that “[a]fter consideration of the MND and
[Mitigation Program], together with the comments received
during the public review process, the Board finds, on the basis of
the whole record before it, that there is no substantial evidence
that the Project, as conditioned, will have a significant effect on
the environment.” Finding 62 likewise states, “The Board finds
that the [Mitigation Program], prepared in conjunction with the
MND, identifies in detail how compliance with its measures will
mitigate or avoid potential adverse impacts to the environment
from the Project. . . . The mitigation measures were circulated to
State agencies for comment and review and made publicly
available in accordance with CEQA statutes and guidelines.”
Although these findings were made with respect to the
vesting tentative tract map, they were made by the Board to
comply with CEQA, not the SMA. And, based on the findings,
the Board “[c]ertifie[d] that the MND for the Project was
completed in compliance with CEQA and the State and County
CEQA Guidelines related thereto.” The County’s approval of the
vesting tentative tract map was required to comply with CEQA.
(See Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (a) [“this division
[under CEQA] shall apply to discretionary projects proposed to be
25
carried out or approved by public agencies, including, but not
limited to, . . . the approval of tentative subdivision maps unless
the project is exempt from this division”].) The fact that the
County’s approval had to comply with CEQA does not transform
a cause of action for violation of CEQA into a claim that arises
under the SMA or overlaps with an SMA claim. Likewise,
SCOPE’s claims that the County failed to adequately analyze and
disclose the Project’s environmental impacts in the MND arise
under CEQA, not the SMA, and SCOPE could not have brought
these claims under the SMA.
By contrast, we agree with Williams and the County that
SCOPE’s claims within the CEQA cause of action challenging the
adequacy of the mitigation measures in the Mitigation Program
fall within the scope of section 66499.37 because they challenge
conditions of the County’s approval of the vesting tentative tract
map under the SMA. Condition 14 of the County’s approval of
the vesting tentative tract map provided that the subdivider
(Williams) “shall comply with all mitigation measures identified
in the [Mitigation Program], which are incorporated by this
reference.” And condition 15 specified that “[w]ithin 30 days of
the date of final approval of this grant by the County, Subdivider
shall record a covenant and agreement, which attaches the
[Mitigation Program] and agrees to comply with the mitigation
measures imposed by the MND for this Project, in the office of the
Recorder. . . . As a means of ensuring the effectiveness of the
mitigation measures, Subdivider shall submit annual mitigation
monitoring reports to Regional Planning, or at greater intervals,
if required. The reports shall describe the status of Subdivider’s
compliance with the required mitigation measures.”
26
As discussed, section 66499.37 applies to any action “to
determine the reasonableness, legality, or validity of any
condition attached [to an approval of a subdivision], including,
but not limited to, the approval of a tentative map or final map.”
Because SCOPE in its CEQA cause of action challenges the
reasonableness (and adequacy) of the mitigation measures under
the Mitigation Program with respect to wildfire impacts,
mountain lions, rare plant species, wetlands, and noise, this
portion of the CEQA cause of action is barred for lack of
compliance with the limitations period under section 66499.37 for
service of the summons.9
9 SCOPE contends issue preclusion bars Williams and the
County from asserting that SCOPE’s failure to comply with
section 66499.37’s summons requirement barred the CEQA cause
of action. SCOPE argues our unpublished opinion in Friends of
Highland Park v. City of Los Angeles (Nov. 4, 2015, B261866)
[nonpub. opn.]) is a final adjudication of the same litigated issue
(whether section 66499.37 applies to a CEQA cause of action) and
issue preclusion applies because the County is in privity with the
City of Los Angeles. SCOPE forfeited the issue by failing to raise
it in the trial court. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles
County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 215; Cabatit v.
Sunnova Energy Corp. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 317, 322.) Even if it
was not forfeited, SCOPE’s contention fails because issue
preclusion only applies “‘(1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in
the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the
first suit or one in privity with that party.’” (Samara v. Matar
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 327.) SCOPE has failed to show the County
of Los Angeles is in privity with the City of Los Angeles (the
respondent in the Friends of Highland Park case), and Williams
27
SCOPE argues it should have been granted leave to amend
to remove the allegations that are barred under section 66499.37,
including its request that approval of the vesting tentative tract
map be set aside. Williams and the County urge us to affirm the
trial court’s grant of Williams’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings without leave to amend. Neither side has it quite
right.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer,
cannot be granted as to only a portion of a cause of action.
(Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
849, 861-862; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452 [a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, like a general demurrer, “does not lie as to a portion of
a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly
pleaded, the demurrer will be overruled [or motion for judgment
on the pleadings denied]”]; see Southern California Pizza Co.,
LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Llyod’s, London (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 140, 154 [“‘[a] demurrer must dispose of an entire
cause of action to be sustained’”].) Therefore, because a portion of
the CEQA cause of action was not barred under section 66499.37,
the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
was not a party to the Highland Park case. Moreover, the cases
involve different projects and different alleged violations.
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is to enter a new
order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the
first cause of action and granting the motion as to the second
cause of action. Santa Clarita Organization for Planning
Environment and Advocates for the Environment shall recover
their costs on appeal from Williams Homes, Inc. and the County
of Los Angeles.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
29