People v. Correa CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/24/24 P. v. Correa CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082602
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD290802)
MOISES ARTHUR CORREA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Spolin & Dukes, Aaron Spolin and Caitlin Dukes for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Moises Arthur Correa appeals the denial of a motion to sever two
counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; counts 2 & 3) from one count of assault
with a deadly weapon on a police officer (§ 245, subd. (c); count 1). He claims
the trial court abused its discretion because joinder was improper based on
three relevant prejudice factors. Specifically, he claims (1) evidence of the
different charges would not have been cross-admissible in separate trials,
(2) the assault charge inflamed the jury and compelled conviction on the
robberies, and (3) the stronger assault evidence compelled conviction on the
robberies despite weaker evidence. We disagree and affirm.
I.
On June 26, 2021, Correa carried a black handgun into a gas station
store, robbed the kiosk, and fled with several dozen packs of cigarettes and
cash. On June 29, Correa committed a similar robbery at a discount store,
but this time he threatened to shoot the clerk and fled with only a stolen tote
bag. Surveillance footage from the gas station robbery showed Correa
wearing a black baseball cap and brand-name shoes with “checkers”
patterned sides.
On July 8, a police officer initiated a traffic stop on a speeding black
car. The car at first pulled over, but when the officer dismounted his
motorcycle and took “one or two steps towards” the car, it “drove off.” The
officer returned to his motorcycle and a chase ensued.
After entering a dead-end road and turning around, the car “slamm[ed]
on the brakes,” “quickly accelerat[ed]” in reverse, and struck the officer. The
officer and his motorcycle slid several feet across the road, causing lasting
injury to the officer’s leg. During the chase, the officer saw Correa in the
driver’s seat of the car, and he later identified Correa in court.
Although the car initially drove away from the scene, the car’s owner
was quickly identified because the officer had seen the license plate.
Investigators contacted the car’s owner and learned Correa was in possession
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of the car. The next day, investigators received a concerned citizen’s
surveillance video showing Correa exiting the same car with a handgun.
Police began patrolling the area where the video was recorded. They
briefly spotted the car in traffic, then about five minutes later they found
Correa walking nearby with a companion. After another pursuit, Correa
eventually ran into a house and was found hiding in the attached garage.
A search of the garage produced several packs of cigarettes and a black
replica handgun consistent with the items stolen or used during the
robberies. In the black car, investigators found two pairs of brand-name
shoes matching the robber’s. On Correa’s social media accounts,
investigators found videos of him wearing the same shoes and a black
baseball cap matching the robber’s. Correa’s physical build was described as
consistent with the robber’s.
The trial court denied Correa’s motion to sever, and he was convicted of
all counts. The jury was instructed to consider each count separately.
II.
Penal Code section 954 provides that one “accusatory pleading may
charge . . . two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or
offenses” under separate counts. Because Correa does not claim the statutory
requirements for joinder were unmet, he must show clear prejudice to
establish the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever.
(People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122–123.)
Reviewing courts assess prejudice by considering four factors, only
three of which are relevant here: (1) whether evidence would be cross-
admissible in separate trials; (2) whether any charge is likely to “unusually
inflame” the jury against the defendant; and (3) whether a weak case has
been joined with a strong case or another weak case. (Alcala v. Superior
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Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220–1221.) Even if the trial court correctly
denies a motion to sever, a reviewing court may reverse if “‘the joint trial
resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due process violation.’”
(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 77.)
A.
1.
Correa argues the evidence is not cross-admissible because the counts
lack a connection that would “demonstrate motive or common plan under
California Evidence Code Section 1101(b).” We disagree.
Cross-admissibility need not be complete—in other words, go both ways
between separate trials. (Alcala, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221.) Here, evidence of
the robberies was cross-admissible to show motive and intent for the assault
count. Correa, who robbed two businesses in the two weeks prior to the
officer pulling him over, had reason to fear the shoes in his car could tie him
to the robberies. We agree with the People that the incriminating shoes
could show Correa struck the officer “not inadvertent[ly] or accidental[ly]” but
rather “specifically to disable and escape” from the officer. Thus, evidence of
the robberies would be admissible to show motive and intent at the time of
the assault. (People v. Daly (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 56; Evid. Code,
§ 1101(b).)
Although cross-admissible evidence generally is sufficient to show
absence of prejudice and justify joinder, we address Correa’s other two
arguments. (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 968.) Neither,
however, persuades us.
2.
Correa claims his assault on an officer would “so inflame the jury” that
conviction on the robberies was a “foregone conclusion.” The principal
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concern underlying this factor is that “strong evidence of a lesser but
inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution” of a greater
crime. (Simon, 1 Cal.5th at p. 124 [cleaned up].) The bar for what is
inflammatory is high, however; even attempted murder of a police officer is
not necessarily unduly prejudicial when joined with robbery charges. (Daly,
8 Cal.App.4th at p. 56.)
Here, the lesser robbery crimes were also the less inflammatory.
Regardless, we do not agree with Correa that the “evidence of the robberies
was weak.” His two pairs of shoes, hat, and physical build all linked him to
the robberies, as did the cigarettes and replica handgun found where he was
hiding when arrested. On this record, Correa has not shown the robbery
evidence was so weak, or the assault charge so inflammatory, that joinder
improperly influenced the jury to convict him on the robbery counts.
3.
The same analysis applies to Correa’s claim that, because the officer
identified him in court, the assault evidence was stronger and thus compelled
the jury to convict on the weaker robbery evidence. To the extent the
identification was stronger than the video and physical evidence of the
robberies, a “mere imbalance” of evidence between counts does not indicate
prejudice. (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 781.) If relatively weaker
evidence is strong enough for a jury to consider and convict on separately,
joinder is not improper. (O’Malley, 62 Cal.4th at p. 969.) As discussed above,
we conclude the evidence of the robberies was sufficiently strong.
In sum, because none of the factors indicate prejudice, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Correa’s motion to sever.
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B.
We must also consider “whether events after the court’s ruling
demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness’ amounting to
a denial of defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law.”
(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 46.) A judgment may be reversed on
this ground only if it is reasonably probable joinder influenced the jury. (Id.
at p. 49.)
Correa does not assert joinder influenced the jury beyond the
arguments addressed above. He raises no subsequent developments in his
case that reasonably could have changed the court’s calculus in denying the
severance motion, and nothing in the record overcomes the presumption that
the jury followed the court’s instructions to consider each count separately.
(Merriman, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 47–49.) We therefore conclude joinder unlikely
influenced the jury, so no constitutional violation occurred.
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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