Ojai Valley Inn and Spa v. Samaguey CA2/6 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/23/24 Ojai Valley Inn and Spa v. Samaguey CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
OJAI VALLEY INN AND 2d Civil No. B333281
SPA, (Super. Ct. No. 56-2022-
00570154-CU-PT-VTA)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
JORGE ARROYO
SAMAGUEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Jorge Arroyo Samaguey appeals from the order
granting a workplace violence restraining order requested by
respondent Ojai Valley Inn and Spa (the Inn). He contends the
trial court denied him due process by denying his pretrial
discovery request and making other evidentiary rulings. He also
contends the restraining order was not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Restraining order petition
In 2022, Antonio Avalos, one of the Inn’s maintenance
employees, was working on the Inn’s golf course. Avalos
complained to his supervisor that Samaguey was “not doing his
duties.” The supervisor informed Samaguey of the complaint.
Samaguey confronted Avalos and was angry, cursed at Avalos,
and threatened to shoot him after work. A coworker, Luis
Becerra, declared that he witnessed Samaguey cursing at and
threatening to shoot Avalos. Then-assistant human resources
director, Vanessa Jimenez, declared that Avalos reported
Samaguey’s threatening conduct to her and the Inn investigated
the report. After the investigation, the Inn terminated
Samaguey’s employment. Samaguey denied threatening Avalos.
The Inn petitioned for a workplace violence restraining
order and attached the declarations of Avalos, Becerra, and
Jimenez in support of its petition. The court granted a temporary
restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.
Discovery request
Samaguey served the Inn with a notice of deposition of
Jimenez. The court and the Inn advised Samaguey there was no
discovery allowed in restraining order proceedings pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure1 section 527.8. However, Samaguey did
not withdraw the notice for deposition. The Inn filed an
objection. Samaguey filed a motion to compel the deposition.
The trial court denied Samaguey’s motion to compel,
finding no statutory provision allowing discovery in civil
harassment restraining order proceedings. Samaguey petitioned
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2
for a writ of mandate in this court, seeking an order vacating the
denial of his motion to compel. We summarily denied the
petition. The trial court later granted the Inn’s request for
$4,450 in sanctions pursuant to section 2023.030, subdivision (a).
Evidentiary hearing
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over the course
of two days with both parties represented by counsel. The Inn’s
witnesses included Avalos, two of the Inn’s human resources
employees, and the Inn’s director of golf and membership.
Samaguey’s witnesses included himself and another Inn
employee. The court admitted the declarations of Avalos,
Jimenez, and Becerra, which were the same declarations
attached to the petition. Samaguey did not object to their
admission. Jimenez and Becerra did not testify at the hearing,
and they were not subpoenaed by the parties.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the
permanent workplace violence restraining order, finding “there
was a credible threat of violence made by Mr. Samaguey against
Mr. Avalos.” The court resolved conflicts of evidence against
Samaguey. It also found that Samaguey “was not being
truthful.”
The restraining order expires in September 2025, protects
Avalos and Becerra, and orders Samaguey to stay away from
them and the Inn.
DISCUSSION
Discovery ruling
Samaguey contends the trial court deprived him “due
process” by denying his pretrial discovery request for the
deposition of Jimenez. We disagree.
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Litigants do not have a pretrial discovery right in
workplace violence restraining proceedings under section 527.8
because the expedited nature of such proceedings leaves
“insufficient time in which to conduct discovery. [Citation.]”
(Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 650, fn. 11
(Thomas); compare Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805,
811 (Byers) [civil harassment restraining orders under § 527.6
provides a quick and truncated procedure that is in contrast to
normal injunctive procedures which allow time for research and
discovery]; CSV Hospital Management, LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 117, 122 (CSV) [proceedings under § 527.8 parallel
those under § 527.6, which are procedurally truncated, expedited,
and intended to provide quick relief to victims of civil
harassment].) Allowing pretrial discovery would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the expedited process, which is to allow the
victim of harassment quick relief and protection.
Samaguey argues the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et
seq.) permits discovery in all cases, including workplace violence
restraining order proceedings, absent a statute to the contrary.
He cites to the recent enactment of Family Code section 6309,
which states a court may grant a request for discovery in
domestic violence cases “only upon a showing of good cause.”
(Fam. Code, § 6309, subd. (c)(1).) He argues that had the
Legislature intended to limit discovery in civil harassment
proceedings, it would have expressly done so; “[o]therwise, there
would be no need to make a separate statute under the [F]amily
[C]ode.” We are not persuaded.
Family Code section 6309 involves domestic violence
restraining orders under a different statutory code enacted with
the goal of protecting domestic violence survivors without delay.
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Nothing about the enactment of Family Code section 6309
suggests that, except for domestic violence restraining orders, all
other civil restraining order proceedings allow for discovery.
Rather, existing caselaw supports there is no right to pretrial
discovery for expedited proceedings under section 527.8. (See
Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 650, fn.11; Byers, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) Samaguey has not cited any authority to
the contrary.
Admission of hearsay evidence
Samaguey contends the trial court erred in admitting
“unlimited hearsay” evidence. The Inn argues Samaguey
forfeited this contention because he did not object to the Inn’s
evidence. The record reflects that Samaguey either stipulated to
or withdrew his objection to much of the Inn’s hearsay evidence.
Specifically, Samaguey withdrew his objection to a police report
(Inn’s exhibit 1), an email from Jimenez to other human
resources employees (exhibit 5), an email from a human
resources employee summarizing her conversation with
Samaguey (exhibit 7), and notes taken by a human resources
employee during Samaguey’s termination conversation (exhibit
11). Samaguey also did not object to the declarations of Jimenez,
Becerra, and Avalos (exhibits 2-4) and timekeeping records
(exhibit 12).
Because Samaguey did not object on due process grounds to
this hearsay evidence, we conclude he has forfeited the argument.
(See San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
550, 574 (Geoffrey S.).)
Forfeiture aside, we reject Samaguey’s contention that the
admission of hearsay evidence violated his due process rights.
The admission of hearsay evidence is not a violation of due
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process per se, particularly when the defendant had the
opportunity to subpoena the hearsay declarant but does not do so.
(In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1243-1244; Geoffrey S.,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 575.) We review rulings on the
admissibility of hearsay for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.)
Section 527.8, subdivision (j) provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, the trial court “shall receive any testimony
that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry.” (Italics
added.) “The plain language of this provision suggests that the
Legislature intended to permit a trial court to consider all
relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when deciding
whether to issue an injunction to prevent workplace violence
pursuant to section 527.8.” (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v.
Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550, 557 (Kaiser).) “The language
that the Legislature used reflects an intention to give trial courts
wide latitude in determining what evidence to credit when
considering a request for an order to protect employees from
workplace violence. Hearsay evidence clearly may be relevant,
and if hearsay evidence is relevant, section 527.8 requires that
the court receive it.” (Id. at p. 558.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because
the hearsay evidence is relevant and admissible pursuant to
section 527.8. (Kaiser, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 557-558.)
The evidence is relevant to whether Avalos “suffered unlawful
violence or a credible threat of violence from” Samaguey.
(§ 527.8, subd. (a).) The court also indicated it was aware of the
inherent unreliability of hearsay evidence, and it repeatedly
indicated it was “not going [to give] much” weight to such
evidence. (Kaiser, at p. 557 [trial judges are “particularly aware
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of potential unreliability of hearsay evidence, and are likely to
keep this in mind when weighing all of the evidence presented”].)
Samaguey does not demonstrate reversible error in the admission
of the hearsay evidence.2
Character evidence
Samaguey contends the trial court erred in denying his
request to introduce character evidence, including character
witnesses and evidence of his work habits. (Evid. Code, § 1101.)
We conclude the contention is forfeited.
Samaguey did not make an offer of proof by providing the
names of his proposed character witnesses nor describe in detail
the content of their proposed testimony. An offer of proof must be
specific in its indication of the purpose of the testimony, the
witness’s name, and the content of the answer to be elicited. An
offer of proof may be rejected if it is general or vague and does not
specify the evidence to be presented. (Semsch v. Henry Mayo
Newhall Memorial Hospital (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 162, 167-168.)
“Failure to make an adequate offer of proof precludes
consideration of the alleged error on appeal.” (In re Mark C.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 433, 444.)
Even if Samaguey made an adequate offer of proof, we
conclude the trial court did not err. “[E]vidence of a person’s
character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of
2 We reject Samaguey’s claim that he was deprived of a fair
hearing because he did not receive the Inn’s exhibit or witness
lists prior to the hearing. Because Samaguey did not raise this
objection below, we conclude it is forfeited. And because he does
not cite to any legal authority, we treat the argument as waived.
(Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 943, 948.)
7
an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (a).) We review the trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.)
There was no abuse of discretion here when the trial court
concluded Samaguey’s proposed character evidence was
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a).
The character evidence included Samaguey’s good work reviews
and the testimony of coworkers, who would “testify to his
character.” But such character evidence is prohibited under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). To the extent
Samaguey argues this evidence was admissible under subdivision
(c) to support his credibility, we will not consider this argument
because it was raised for the first time on appeal. (Nordstrom
Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583.)
Substantial evidence
Samaguey contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the restraining order. We disagree.
“To obtain a workplace violence restraining order, an
employer must prove its employee has suffered unlawful violence
or a credible threat of violence from an individual in the
workplace. (§ 527.8, subds. (a), (e).) The employer ‘must
establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that [the
individual] engaged in unlawful violence or made credible threats
of violence, but also that great or irreparable harm would result
to an employee if a prohibitory injunction were not issued due to
the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur in the
future.’ [Citation.]” (CSV, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) We
8
review the order for substantial evidence, resolving all factual
conflicts and issues of credibility in favor of the prevailing party
and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (Id. at p. 123.) We also do not reweigh credibility.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
ruling. Avalos testified that Samaguey insulted him and wanted
to fight. Samaguey told him he had a gun in his car and was
going to use it. Other witnesses and evidence corroborated
Avalos’s testimony. The court resolved conflicts of evidence
against Samaguey and found that he “was not being truthful.” It
also found there was a “reasonable probability that something
might happen in the future but for a restraining order,” given
that it was a “small community” and it appeared the “situation
hasn’t been resolved yet.”
We also reject Samaguey’s claim that the trial court shifted
the burden of proof onto him or placed too much weight on
“weaker and less satisfactory evidence” because the record does
not support it.
Discovery sanctions
Samaguey also contends the discovery sanctions award
should be reversed. We again disagree.
“The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that
one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process . . . pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by
anyone as a result of that conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) A
trial court has broad discretion in imposing discovery sanctions,
and its order will not be reversed in the absence of a manifest
abuse of discretion that exceeds the bounds of reason. (Pratt v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 165, 183.)
Samaguey does not demonstrate the trial court abused its
9
discretion in awarding $4,450 in sanctions to the Inn. As the
trial court explained, Samaguey was advised by the Inn and the
court that there was “no legal authority that allows the taking of
a deposition in a workplace violence [restraining order]
proceeding.” Nonetheless, Samaguey pursued a motion to compel
which resulted in the Inn incurring expenses to defend the
motion. We will not disturb the sanctions order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Rocky J. Baio, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Laurie Peters & Associates and Laurie Peters for
Defendant and Appellant.
Folger Levin, Andrew J. Davis and Sherri M. Hansen for
Plaintiff and Respondent.