Doe v. Roe School District CA2/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/23/24 Doe v. Roe School District CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JOHN DOE, B335004
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22PSCV01999)
v.
ROE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed.
Arias Sanginetti Wang & Team, Mike Arias, Sahar Malek
and Matthew J. Kita for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, Shiva E. Stein and Montana L.
Massone for Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant John Doe (appellant) alleges Fred Contreras, his
now deceased former English teacher, sexually harassed,
assaulted and abused him in 1978 when appellant was 14 years
old. In 2022, appellant sued respondent Roe School District
(district) and Roes 1-100 for negligence and negligent
supervision, training, hiring, and retention, among other things,
pursuant to the California Child Victims Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 340.1, subd. (a).)1
The district demurred to appellant’s complaint, asserting
appellant’s causes of action for negligence and negligent
supervision were so uncertain and ambiguous that the district
could not reasonably respond. The district argued appellant’s
essential allegations of material fact were conclusory, pointing
out pleading standards are higher for government entities,
requiring every material fact be pleaded with particularity.
(Citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40
Cal.3d 780, 795 (Lopez).)
The trial court sustained the district’s demurrer, but
granted appellant leave to amend. In response to appellant’s
amended complaint, the district filed a motion to strike and a
demurrer. Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the amended complaint
without leave to amend.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of dismissal, arguing
the trial court misapplied C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High
School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861 (C.A.). The sole issue in this
1 Appellant also brought causes of action for sexual battery,
assault, violation of civil rights, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Only the negligence causes of action are at
issue in this appeal.
2
appeal is whether appellant sufficiently alleged the district knew,
or should have known, of Contreras’s abuse. Because our review
of the complaint reveals the allegations are insufficient to allege
a cause of action for negligence against the district, we affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Appellant is a male, born in 1964, and was approximately
14 years old when he was sexually harassed, assaulted and
abused by his English teacher, Fred Contreras, an employee or
agent of the district. As a result of the sexual harassment and
abuse by Contreras, appellant suffered extensive physical,
psychological and emotional damages.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant initiated this action on November 22, 2022, by
filing a complaint against the district. On December 30, 2022,
appellant filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging seven
causes of action against the district, including negligence and
negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention.
On May 30, 2023, the district filed a demurrer and motion
to strike appellant’s FAC. The trial court sustained the demurrer
to the negligence causes of action due in part to the requirement
that claims against the district be pled with particularity. The
trial court granted appellant leave to amend.
On July 31, 2023, appellant filed his second amended
complaint (SAC), asserting two causes of action against the
district: negligence and negligent supervision, training, hiring,
and retention. Appellant generally alleged, on information and
belief, the district knew or should have known Contreras engaged
in unlawful sexually related conduct with minors in the past. He
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also alleged “[a]fter numerous instances of abuse, [appellant]
summoned the courage to report [Contreras] to employees of [the
district], including the principal of the school at the time. The
complaints fell on deaf ears and [appellant] was subjected to
remaining in school and accessible to [Contreras] thereafter.” On
August 30, 2023, the district filed a demurrer and motion to
strike. In the motion to strike, the district argued the allegations
of negligence in the first and second causes of action continued to
be vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, and failed to state sufficient
facts in support of the claims. The district maintained appellant
continued to fail to meet the pleading standards against public
entity defendants.
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral argument,
the trial court sustained the district’s demurrer without leave to
amend, and determined its motion to strike was moot.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial on November 6, 2023.
Appellant alleged the court erred in dismissing the entire action
because he had stated facts sufficient to constitute claims for
negligence and negligent supervision. He also argued he should
have been granted leave to amend.
The court denied appellant’s motion, noting the allegations
must plead specific facts supporting the public entity’s liability.
The court found appellant failed to plead specific facts concerning
the required element that the district knew, or should have
known, of Contreras’s propensity to commit sexual assault prior
to the time he assaulted appellant.
The court referenced an exchange with appellant’s counsel
at the hearing, where the court inquired as to whether “sexual
abuse occurred after it was brought to the attention of whomever
at the school.” Appellant’s counsel could not provide a definitive
answer, stating, “he has gone back and forth on whether or not it
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happened afterwards. [W]e’re not positive yet.” (Boldface
omitted.) Based on this exchange, the court stated, “[Appellant’s]
facts were unclear and remain unclear, perhaps even unknown.
The possibility that someday (notably after one year of filing of
the complaint) the facts to allege a [cause of action] may be
learned is insufficient to meet a party’s request for leave to
amend.” (Fn. omitted.) The court concluded it had not erred in
requiring appellant to plead specific facts regarding whether the
district knew of Contreras’s unlawful sexual conduct prior to his
sexual assault of appellant, and rightfully denied leave to amend.
The court concluded, “[appellant] has not pled facts to support
the [causes of action]/continuously is changing facts/does not
know of the facts.”
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint. In
reviewing the trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer, “‘[w]e
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be
judicially noticed.’” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Ibid.) When a
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be
cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its
discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of
discretion and we affirm.” (Ibid.) The burden of proving a
reasonable possibility of amendment “is squarely on the
plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
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Pleading requirements against a public entity, such as the
district, are more stringent than pleading requirements against a
private entity. “[B]ecause under the Tort Claims Act all
governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule
that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity
is applicable. Thus, ‘to state a cause of action against a public
entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory
liability must be pleaded with particularity.’” (Lopez, supra, 40
Cal.3d at p. 795.)
A school district may be vicariously liable under
Government Code section 815.2 “for the negligence of
administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and
retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a
student.” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 879.) The district may be
subject to such liability if the district “is proven to have breached
that duty by negligently exposing [a] plaintiff to a foreseeable
danger of molestation.” (C.A., supra, at p. 865.) Because the
district’s liability is premised on the foreseeability of the abuse,
appellant must include allegations that his harassment or abuse
came from “foreseeable sources, including any teachers [the
district] [knew] or [had reason to know were] prone to such
abuse.” (Id. at p. 871.) Such allegations must be pleaded with
particularity. (Lopez, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 795.)
II. Analysis of appellant’s allegations
In order to establish the district’s vicarious liability for its
supervisory employees’ negligent hiring, supervision or retention
of Contreras, appellant was required to allege a breach of school
personnel’s “protective duty of ordinary care” “by negligently
exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation . . . ,
resulting in his injuries.” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865-
866.)
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As set forth in C.A., school employees have a “‘duty to
“supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school
grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to
their protection.”’” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 869.) “‘Either a
total lack of supervision . . . or ineffective supervision . . . may
constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible
for student supervision. Under section 815.2, subdivision (a) of
the Government Code, a school district is vicariously liable for
injuries proximately caused by such negligence.’” (Ibid.) “In
addition, a school district and its employees have a special
relationship with the district’s pupils, . . . arising from the
mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive
control over students exercised by school personnel . . . .” (Ibid.)
“Because of this special relationship, . . . the duty of care owed by
school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to
protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third
parties acting negligently or intentionally.” (Id. at p. 870.) Based
on these principles, the district had a duty to take reasonable
steps to protect appellant from foreseeable harm. Thus, the
question of the district’s duty to protect appellant in this matter
is not at issue.
The inadequacy in appellant’s complaint is the failure to
sufficiently allege foreseeability. Appellant’s SAC contains
numerous vague and conclusory allegations, on information and
belief, the district “knew or should have known that
CONTRERAS had engaged in unlawful sexually-related conduct
with minors in the past, including students at [the district],
and/or was continuing to engage in such conduct with students at
[the district], including [appellant].” Appellant’s general
allegations the district “knew or should have known” that
Contreras “had sexually abused or caused harm, and other
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injuries to minors, including [appellant]” do not provide sufficient
particularity for the district to understand the facts upon which
its liability is based. The essential element of foreseeability must
be pleaded with particularity, and appellant has failed to allege
particular facts that form the basis for the district’s prior
knowledge of Contreras’s alleged propensities.
Appellant alleged he informed the district’s employees,
including the principal of his school, of the alleged abuse.
Specifically, he alleged “After numerous instances of abuse,
[appellant] summoned the courage to report CONTRERAS to
employees of [the district], including the principal of the school at
the time. The complaints fell on deaf ears and [appellant] was
subjected to remaining in school and accessible to CONTRERAS
thereafter.” These allegations do not specify whether abuse
continued after appellant notified the district. The allegation
appellant had to remain in school and continued to be “accessible”
to Contreras do not establish the required prior knowledge
element of this type of negligence. Appellant did not allege the
abuse continued after he informed school officials.2
2 In his reply letter, appellant combines allegations from
various paragraphs to make it appear he alleged the
foreseeability element. Appellant asserts: “Appellant’s Second
Amended Complaint specifically alleged that he personally
complained to the principal at [the district’s] school about the
perpetrator’s inappropriate conduct, that ‘the complaints fell on
deaf ears,’ and that the perpetrator ‘continued to engage in such
conduct with students at [the district]—including [appellant].’”
These allegations are from different paragraphs. Appellant did
not specifically allege Contreras continued to engage in the
inappropriate conduct after the principal was informed. In
earlier paragraphs, appellant made general allegations, on
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Appellant asserts he pleaded allegations consistent with
the allegations at issue in C.A.3 Appellant states he pleaded
“identical causes of action and alleged identical facts to those
alleged by the plaintiff in C.A.” Appellant argues the trial court
interpreted C.A. in a manner that directly contradicts the
Supreme Court’s holding in that case.
We disagree. C.A. sued the William S. Hart Union High
School District (HUHSD) through a guardian ad litem. The
alleged abuse took place in 2007, when C.A. was 14 to 15 years
old. C.A.’s claims against HUHSD included the assertion that
HUHSD failed to properly train, hire, and supervise the alleged
assailant. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 867.)4 In addition to
general allegations, on information and belief, that HUHSD
“‘knew or should have known and/or were put on notice’” of the
perpetrator’s past sexual abuse of minors (C.A., supra, at p. 866),
C.A. specifically alleged he based his belief on “‘personnel and/or
school records of Defendants [that] reflect numerous incidents of
inappropriate sexual contact and conduct with minors by
information and belief, that the district “knew or should have
known that CONTRERAS had engaged in unlawful sexually-
related conduct with minors in the past, including students at
[the district], and/or was continuing to engage in such conduct
with students at [the district], including [appellant].” Appellant’s
merger of these allegations in his reply letter is misleading and
inappropriate.
3 We denied appellant’s request for judicial notice of the
complaint in the C.A. case.
4 At the pleading stage, C.A. was not required to identify, by
name or position, HUHSD’s “‘employees, administrators and/or
agents’ who allegedly failed to ‘properly hire, train and supervise
[the perpetrator].’” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.)
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teachers, staff, coaches, counselors, advisors, mentors and others,
including incidents involving [the perpetrator], both on and off
the premises of Defendants.’” (Id. at pp. 866–867.) Thus, in
contrast to the matter before us, C.A. alleged with particularity
the basis for the school district’s knowledge of the perpetrator’s
propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual conduct. Appellant,
in contrast, alleges no basis for the school district’s knowledge,
and provides only vague and conclusory allegations regarding the
district’s knowledge. As the C.A. court emphasized, the district’s
liability “must be based on evidence of negligent hiring,
supervision or retention, not on assumptions or speculation.” (Id.
at p. 878.)5 Appellant has failed to allege anything more than
assumptions and speculation regarding the district’s knowledge.
Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s footnote in its
written decision explaining its denial of appellant’s motion for
new trial. There the trial court clarified that while the cause of
action for negligent hiring and supervision was properly based on
the district’s vicarious liability, appellant had “incorrectly
repeatedly stated that it has pled duties by pleading
[Government Code] Sections 815.2 and 820 because those
statutes do not provide duties.” We need not address this issue,
5 Appellant points out that this quote was taken from a
discussion regarding liability, to assuage HUHSD’s concern that
allowing the plaintiff’s case to move forward would eventually
lead to, among other things, “the diversion of needed funds from
the classroom to cover claims.” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 878.) However, as explained above, appellant was required to
plead the elements of its negligence cause of action against the
district with particularity, requiring appellant to provide more
than just vague and conclusory allegations regarding the
foreseeability element.
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as the duty element is not at issue in this lawsuit—only the
element of foreseeability. Because appellant did not adequately
plead the foreseeability of Contreras’s actions, we affirm the trial
court’s decision to sustain the district’s demurrer to the SAC.
III. Leave to amend
Appellant presents no arguments in his opening brief
regarding the trial court’s denial of leave to amend. In his reply
letter, appellant makes the following conclusory argument:
“Because the California Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
that a trial court abuses its discretion if it denies leave to amend
when ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be
cured by amendment,’ and because the trial court only afforded
[appellant] one previous opportunity to amend his complaint, the
same result should follow here.” (Fns. omitted.)
The burden of proving a reasonable possibility of
amendment “is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) As appellant has failed to meet this
burden, we affirm the trial court’s denial of leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs
of appeal.
___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
_______________________________ ___________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.
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