People v. Banuelos CA6 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/23/24 P. v. Banuelos CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051445
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR02861)
v.
ANNE MARIE BANUELOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Anne Marie Banuelos1 was charged with three counts of assault with a
deadly weapon, a knife (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(1)) after stabbing three people,
including two juveniles. After the trial court denied her motion for mental health
diversion (§ 1001.36) on the basis that she presented an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if treated in the community, she pleaded guilty to one count of assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and was placed on probation.
1
We refer to appellant using her last name as it appears in her briefing in this
court and in her notice of appeal. Banuelos is also referred to as Anne Marie Cheney in
some documents in the record.
2
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Banuelos contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
her motion for mental health diversion because the record does not support the court’s
finding that she presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Facts and Charges
On July 10, 2022, about 1:00 a.m., Officer Salvador Luna of the Santa Cruz Police
Department responded to a report of vandalism on Broadway in Santa Cruz. The caller
reported Banuelos was throwing things at the caller’s residence. While responding to the
reported vandalism, Officer Luna heard yelling coming from the vicinity of a
convenience store nearby on Ocean Street and reported it over the radio.
When Officer Luna and other officers arrived at the convenience store, Craig B.
approached Officer Luna and stated Banuelos had stabbed his sister (Mariah T.), his
stepfather (Michael Y.), and his girlfriend (Kayley G.).4 Craig, Mariah, and Kayley were
juveniles at the time of the incident.
While the group was walking to the convenience store, they saw Banuelos hitting
a sign in front of a hotel on Broadway. Members of the group laughed at her. In
response, Banuelos followed the group to the convenience store and began to argue with
them. Michael attempted to deescalate the situation, but Banuelos lunged at and stabbed
Kayley in the back, causing an approximately one-inch wound. While Craig pulled
Kayley away, Banuelos continued swinging the knife towards the group. Mariah tried to
intervene, and Banuelos cut Mariah’s right hand and then swung the knife towards
Mariah’s stomach, which cut Mariah’s sweater but did not injure Mariah. Michael
3
These facts are drawn from the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The parties
stipulated to the facts as set forth in the preliminary hearing.
4
To protect the victims’ and their relatives’ privacy, we refer to them by their full
first names and last name initials and, subsequently, by their first names only. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)
2
attempted to stop Banuelos’s attack by pushing her away. Banuelos stabbed him twice,
once in his right forearm and once in his left tricep.
On November 21, 2022, Banuelos was charged by information with three counts
of felony assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
B. Psychological Evaluation
Dr. Carolyn Murphy, a clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological evaluation
of Banuelos and reviewed Santa Cruz Police Department reports of the July 10, 2022
incident, as well as Banuelos’s criminal history and behavioral health, hospital, and jail
mental health records.5 Dr. Murphy diagnosed Banuelos with bipolar II disorder, severe
alcohol use disorder, moderate cannabis use disorder, and severe opioid use disorder.
In her report, Dr. Murphy noted that Banuelos “has a significant history of
substance use that includes abuse of alcohol, cannabis, heroin, and prior use of
methamphetamine, cocaine, KJ, LSD, huffing paint and glue, PCP, and mushrooms.”
She stated that Banuelos reported experiencing childhood trauma stemming from parental
separation, witnessing domestic violence, physical and sexual abuse, and familial
substance abuse, mental health issues, and criminality, which led to Banuelos developing
“significant substance abuse issues.” Banuelos also reported to Dr. Murphy that she “has
significant struggles with alcohol, and will drink until the middle of the month (when her
money runs out), and then she has to sell things for money.”
In discussing the July 10, 2022 incident, Dr. Murphy stated that Banuelos had
“again relapsed and/or stopped her medication such that she decompensated and behaved
5
Banuelos’s prior criminal record consisted of the following offenses: (1) a
conviction in April 1991 of two counts of receipt of stolen property (§ 496), for which
she was sentenced to one year of probation and 91 days in jail; (2) a conviction in August
1992 for petty theft (§§ 484, 488), for which she was sentenced to two years of probation
and nine days in jail; and (3) a conviction in January 2000 of spousal battery (§ 243,
subd. (e)(1)), for which she was sentenced to three years of probation. On April 30,
2002, probation was terminated unsuccessfully and Banuelos was ordered to serve one
year in jail.
3
in an extremely aggressive manner” and that her “state of decompensation [] was heavily
influenced by the disinhibiting effects of alcohol.” Dr. Murphy noted that, while
Banuelos “recognizes her substance abuse issues,” she “stops her medication so that she
can drink” and “admitted that this was most recently the case.”
Dr. Murphy observed that Banuelos “does not present with violent attitudes or
beliefs except when intoxicated (per a review of mental health records that show that
pattern),” and that “Banuelos can behave erratically when intoxicated and emotionally
triggered, as seen [during the July 10, 2022 incident], but this appears to be the first time
she has been arrested for violent conduct. She is not seemingly violent by nature, but is
one who suffers from severe mental health difficulty and concurrent substance abuse
instead.” She concluded that Banuelos “appears to be in the moderate to moderate-high
range for risk for violence” (italics omitted) and she “does not appear to be at imminent,
significant risk for violence, and once involved in treatment that specifically targets her
coping skills, mental illness, and addiction issues, her risk should in fact be reduced over
time.”
Dr. Murphy added a caveat to her conclusion regarding Banuelos’s risk for
violence: “Medication compliance and abstinence will need to be assured, however.”
She noted that Banuelos has struggled with treatment compliance and “has not been
managing her mental health or her substance abuse concerns well in the community.” Dr.
Murphy’s report indicated that Banuelos had undergone rehabilitation programs at Janus
(approximately 10 times, according to Banuelos), lived in a sober living environment
(SLE), and attended a program at The Camp Recovery Center. Dr. Murphy concluded
that any treatment program would need to be “intensive” and recommended, among other
aspects of her treatment, stable housing, appointments, a tracking plan, regular
communications with doctors, and compliance training, in light of Banuelos’s difficulties
managing her symptoms in the community.
4
C. Procedural Background
On February 7, 2023, Banuelos filed a request for mental health diversion pursuant
to section 1001.36, to which she attached the psychological evaluation by Dr. Murphy.
Banuelos argued that, based on Dr. Murphy’s evaluation, she met the requirements
for mental health diversion: she had been diagnosed with qualifying conditions, namely
bipolar II disorder, alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, and opioid use disorder;
her mental health diagnoses were a significant factor in the charged offense; and she did
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. With respect to the last
requirement, Banuelos cited her nonviolent criminal history (consisting primarily of theft
and drug arrests), her cooperation with law enforcement officers, and Dr. Murphy’s
opinion that Banuelos “does not present with violent attitudes or beliefs except when
intoxicated,” as grounds to conclude that Banuelos would not pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if granted mental health diversion.
In opposition, the District Attorney conceded that Banuelos met the qualifying
factors for mental health diversion. However, he opposed diversion “on the grounds it
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The District Attorney
argued that Banuelos “violently assaulted three individuals (two of them juveniles)”
“[w]ithout any physical provocation,” and maintained that “the potential for greater
bodily harm, or death,” including the super strike of attempted homicide, “was entirely
possible based on” Banuelos’s actions. He further argued that the trial court should be
“wary of [Banuelos]’s ability to abstain from the use of alcohol or controlled substances
while on pretrial diversion” in light of her repeated participation in rehabilitation
programs and time at an SLE: “Defendant is asking the court to believe that despite all
these failed, previous attempts at intervention, this situation will be different. This is
coupled with the risk that if [Banuelos] is unable to abstain from the use of alcohol, or
fails to follow her medication regimen, the nature in which she acts out is incredibly
violent and aggressive.”
5
In reply, Banuelos argued that her charged offense was not a “ ‘super strike’ ” and
that Dr. Murphy’s evaluation “did not at all indicate anywhere” that Banuelos was at risk
for committing murder “if she did not take her medication and avoid substance use.” She
also relied on Dr. Murphy’s opinion that Banuelos “is ‘not seemingly violent by nature’ ”
and her lack of history of violence prior to the July 10, 2022 incident to bolster her
contention that there is “[n]o evidence” that she “would commit the crime of murder if
she were to fail to follow her mental health diversion treatment plan.”
On March 15, 2023, the trial court held a mental health diversion determination
hearing. During the hearing, Banuelos reiterated the arguments in her request for mental
health diversion and her reply and testified that she’s not a violent person by nature, had
blacked out due to an escalation in her alcohol consumption, and “didn’t come from
violent people.” She testified that, in the past, she chose not to accept offered help
because she was drinking and felt ashamed, but that she was willing to cooperate with a
treatment plan, including taking medication to help her abstain from alcohol.
On March 22, 2023, the trial court denied mental health diversion on the ground
that Banuelos posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court
acknowledged Banuelos had had a difficult life, and experienced challenges “both
because of her mental health and also her addiction.” However, the trial court expressed
concern over Banuelos’s “significant history of substance use” and the “quite extensive”
range of substances used, Banuelos’s prior struggles with treatment and lack of success in
a variety of treatment programs, the “violent” and “traumatic” nature of the offense, and
the fact that “using a knife, stabbing someone in the back” could have resulted in
homicide. The court distinguished the instant case from People v. Whitmill (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1138 (Whitmill)—a case on which Banuelos relied in her moving papers—in
which the defendant fired a shot in the air, away from the victims. The court stated,
“This was actual impact, personal contact with a knife on another person. And actually
three people. . . . [T]his is so serious, I don’t think it needs to rise to the mass public
6
event of [People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207] for us to be really concerned.”
The court suggested that working with the Behavioral Health Court6 would be more
helpful to Banuelos than mental health diversion because it believed Banuelos “would do
well being directly case managed and having a clinician assist her” and that the
Behavioral Health Court could provide “really good support” and community, “especially
for the women that feel all alone in their addictions and their mental health.”
On April 21, 2023, county behavioral health assessed Banuelos, and she agreed to
engage in mental health services and treatment. The trial court made Banuelos releasable
for placement in the treatment program under the supervision of county behavioral health
and subject to certain conditions, including prohibitions against owning or possessing any
firearm, ammunition, and/or any other dangerous weapon; prohibitions against
possessing controlled substances (without a prescription), drug paraphernalia, alcohol,
and marijuana; submission to controlled substances and alcohol testing; and compliance
with prescribed medication.
On August 2, 2023, Banuelos pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). On September 15, 2023, the trial court sentenced Banuelos
to a stipulated sentence of two years of formal probation, subject to certain conditions,
including taking any and all medications prescribed by medical professionals, compliance
with county mental health directives, abstention from nonprescribed substances and
alcohol, and completion of the treatment program at Casa Pacific. The District Attorney
6
The Behavioral Health Court in Santa Cruz County uses a “collaborative team-
based approach” in which “[t]he [j]udge, [p]robation, [b]ehavioral [h]ealth staff, District
Attorney, [d]efense [c]ounsel, and service providers all work together” during the
participant’s involvement in the program “to ensure that [the participant] receive[s] the
support and services [] need[ed] to accomplish [the participant’s] goals and stay on
track.” (Super. Ct. Santa Cruz County, Collaborative Court’s Office, Behavioral Health
Court Information Sheet, <https://www.santacruz.courts.ca.gov/system/files/supcr-1137-
behavioral-health-court-information-sheet_1.pdf> [as of Oct. 22, 2024], archived at:
[https://perma.cc/C5GZ-CLMD].)
7
requested the trial court also issue stay away orders that require Banuelos to stay away
from the three victims as part of the conditions of her probation. Banuelos agreed to the
probation terms.
Banuelos timely filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s denial of her mental
health diversion request. The trial court granted Banuelos’s request for a certificate of
probable cause.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Banuelos contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
her request for mental health diversion by relying on factual findings—namely, that
Banuelos poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety—not supported by
substantial evidence.7 She argues that she does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety because (1) while her charged offenses are “ ‘serious’ felonies,” they are
not “ ‘super strikes’ ”; (2) she has “no past violent prior arrests or convictions”; and (3)
Dr. Murphy’s psychological evaluation indicated Banuelos was “ ‘not seemingly violent
by nature.’ ”8
7
The parties do not appear to contest Banuelos’s eligibility or suitability for
mental health diversion under the other factors set forth in section 1001.36, subdivisions
(b) and (c), respectively.
8
In her reply brief, Banuelos raises two arguments for the first time. She argues
that “ ‘[i]t is logically inconsistent to deny mental health diversion on the ground that
[defendant] was likely to commit a super-strike offense, while simultaneously finding
[she] was not likely to inflict great bodily injury on persons in the community’ ” and
grant probation on those grounds. (Quoting People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
450 (Moine).) She further argues that the trial court should have considered “the
underlying purposes of the [mental health diversion] statute and explain why diversion
would not meet those goals.” (Quoting Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 882, 893.)
Banuelos did not make these arguments either before the trial court or in her
opening brief on appeal. Arguments not presented in the trial court are forfeited on
appeal. (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 592, fn. 6 (Oneal).) Additionally,
they are “ ‘untimely because [they are] asserted for the first time in the reply brief.’ ”
(Ibid.; see also Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“[W]e do not
8
A. Applicable Law
“Section 1001.36 creates a ‘pretrial diversion’ program for certain defendants who
suffer from a diagnosed and qualifying mental disorder.” (People v. Weaver (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 1103, 1114.) “The statute defines ‘ “pretrial diversion” ’ as ‘the
postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the
judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to
allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment,’ subject to multiple restrictions.”
(Id. at p. 1115; see also People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626 (Frahs).)
The stated purpose of mental health diversion “is to promote all of the following:
[¶] (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the
individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public
safety. [¶] (b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development
and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a
continuum of care settings. [¶] (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental
health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35; see
also Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 626.)
A trial court “may, in its discretion,” grant pretrial mental health diversion to a
defendant charged with the commission of a misdemeanor or felony (excluding certain
offenses not at issue here) if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements and the
court determines that diversion is suitable after considering certain factors. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (a); People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079 (Gerson).)
consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause
for the failure to present them earlier. [Citations.] This rule is based on considerations of
fairness—withholding a point until the closing brief deprives the opposing party of the
opportunity to file a written response unless supplemental briefing is ordered.”].)
Therefore, we do not consider these arguments from Banuelos’s reply brief.
9
The only factor at issue in this appeal is whether Banuelos is “suitable” for pretrial
diversion because she “will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in [s]ection 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Section 1170.18 defines “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” as “an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony” within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (Id., subd. (c).) That provision of
section 667 sets forth eight categories of offenses that are colloquially referred to as
“super strikes,” including “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide
offense, defined in [s]ections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV);
Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449 [noting that the “ ‘ “super strikes” ’ ” include
murder and attempted murder].)
When ascertaining whether the defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the
defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment
plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any
other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4); Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.)
“ ‘Ultimately, however, diversion under section 1001.36 is discretionary, not
mandatory, even if all the [statutory] requirements are met.’ ” (People v. Qualkinbush
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887 (Qualkinbush); see also Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1147; Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 588.)
B. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion for abuse
of discretion. (Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 887; Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; People v. Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213 (Pacheco).)
We likewise review a trial court’s determination of dangerousness for “abuse of
discretion, given that the court is statutorily required to determine dangerousness ‘in its
10
discretion.’ ” (People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242 (Jefferson), quoting
§ 1170.18, subd. (b); Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
“ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious
decision’ ” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147) that “exceeds the bounds of
reason” (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 213; Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at
p. 588), “ ‘appl[ies] the wrong legal standard [citation], or bases its decision on express or
implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Whitmill, at
p. 1147.)
“ ‘Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its
exercise of that discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] The abuse of
discretion standard ‘involves abundant deference’ to the court’s ruling.” (Jefferson,
supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242–243.) “ ‘It is appellant’s burden on appeal to establish
an abuse of discretion and prejudice.’ ” (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 213.)
We review a trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (Whitmill,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147) and “[w]e will uphold the trial court’s factual findings
if supported by substantial evidence.” (Oneal, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
“ ‘On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People
and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Although we must ensure the
evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or
falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.’ ” (Gerson, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.)
11
C. Analysis
Banuelos contends that she does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying mental health diversion on that
basis because substantial evidence did not support such a factual finding.
Banuelos argues that, unlike the defendants in People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
1255 and Jefferson, who had lengthy criminal records replete with violent felony
convictions, her criminal history prior to the present incident does not include any arrests
or convictions for violent offenses.
We are not persuaded that Banuelos’s past lack of violent conduct is dispositive of
her risk of future dangerousness. Under section 1001.36, “[t]he court may consider the
opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may
consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,
the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(4).) We take into consideration multiple factors, including “the totality of
appellant’s behavior and criminal history” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153),
which encompasses “the current charged offense[s]” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4); Moine,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450), when considering the likelihood that Banuelos could
commit a super strike offense in the future.
Banuelos’s present offenses, namely three counts of assault with a deadly weapon
(a knife), do not themselves qualify as super strikes under section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv). Nevertheless, they are serious felonies. Banuelos does not dispute the trial
court’s description of her attack on the victims as “very, very sudden, very surprising,
violent [], and traumatic” or the court’s observation that “using a knife, stabbing someone
in the back” “could have been a homicide situation for sure.” The record indicates that
Banuelos stabbed the first victim, a minor, in the back, and then stabbed two others, one a
minor, when they tried to intervene. This conduct constitutes substantial evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that Banuelos posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
12
public safety on the basis of the present offenses. In addition, Banuelos was previously
convicted of spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)).
We acknowledge Dr. Murphy’s conclusions regarding Banuelos’s propensity for
violence but observe that Dr. Murphy nevertheless rated Banuelos’s risk for violence as
being in the “moderate to moderate-high range.” (Italics omitted.) Dr. Murphy’s
evaluation stated that, on the night of the incident in question, Banuelos’s
decompensation “was heavily influenced by the disinhibiting effects of alcohol” and led
to Banuelos “behav[ing] in an extremely aggressive manner.” Dr. Murphy later reiterated
that Banuelos “does not present with violent attitudes or beliefs except when intoxicated
(per a review of mental health records that show that pattern)” and that “Banuelos can
behave erratically when intoxicated and emotionally triggered.” (Italics added.)
In addition, Dr. Murphy stated that her conclusions regarding the level of risk
Banuelos poses to public safety were subject to Banuelos’s compliance with treatment
programs, and she expressed concern about Banuelos’s ability to adhere to and complete
such programs. Dr. Murphy noted Banuelos’s self-reported struggles with treatment
compliance—referring to Banuelos’s treatment at Janus (approximately 10 times), stint at
an SLE, and participation in a program at The Camp—and “significant struggles with
alcohol,” which lead Banuelos to drink until she runs out of money and to “stop[] her
medication so that she can drink.”9 Dr. Murphy observed that Banuelos has struggled
with treatment compliance and has not “manag[ed] her mental health or her substance
9
In addition, Banuelos’s probation report noted her past mixed performance on
probation. It stated that, although Banuelos kept in contact with her probation officer and
participated in rehabilitative services while supervised, “she struggled through her time
on probation with substance use and behavioral health issues” and was hospitalized at
least once pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. That statute provides
in pertinent part that “[w]hen a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger
to others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled,” they may be taken into custody “for
assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment
in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 5150, subd. (a).)
13
abuse concerns well in the community.” As a result, she recommended an “intensive”
treatment program involving greater oversight, accountability mechanisms, and education
to help Banuelos manage her symptoms.
Given Banuelos’s pattern of “extremely aggressive,” “erratic,” and “violent”
behavior when under the influence of alcohol—including during the July 10, 2022
incident—coupled with her difficulties with treatment compliance and admitted
“significant struggles with alcohol,” the trial court concluded that “the public can’t be
assured that [Banuelos] can be successful in the treatment in order to be able to think
clear enough to not pose this level of risk.” As a result, the court determined that
Banuelos would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community.
We perceive no error in that finding based on the substantial evidence in the
record supporting it. That evidence includes Dr. Murphy’s evaluation of Banuelos
(including her discussion of Banuelos’s struggles with treatment compliance), Banuelos’s
criminal record, the circumstances and nature of the current charged offenses, and
information contained in Banuelos’s probation report describing her past lack of
compliance with conditions of probation.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banuelos’s
request for mental health diversion.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
14
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.
____________________________________
Wilson, J.
H051445
People v. Banuelos