In re Samantha V. CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/23/24 In re Samantha V. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re SAMANTHA V. et al., B328568
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02643)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LUIS V.,
Defendant and Appellant;
LILIAN O.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lucia J. Murillo, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________
Appellant Luis V. (father) and respondent Lilian O.
(mother) have three children: Samantha V. (born in 2011),
Rocio V. (born in 2016), and Santiago O. (born in 2017). The
juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over the three
children because mother and father have a history of engaging in
violent altercations in the presence of the children, father has a
history of substance abuse, and mother failed to protect the
children from father. The court later granted mother’s request
for a restraining order against father that included the children
as protected parties and terminated jurisdiction with a juvenile
custody order that awarded joint legal custody of the children to
both parents, sole physical custody to mother, and monitored
visitation to father.
On appeal, father contests the evidentiary sufficiency of the
portion of the restraining order naming his children as protected
persons and the order restricting him to only monitored visits
with the children. We reject his challenge to the restraining
order because there is substantial evidence that father exposed
his children to the risk of physical harm from his acts of domestic
violence against mother in their presence. Father’s claim of error
regarding the monitored visitation order fails because the
2
transcript of the restraining order hearing belies father’s
assertion the juvenile court believed it lacked authority to
consider his request to have unmonitored visits. Rather, the
court merely found visitation had been determined at a prior
review hearing, and that the only matter before it was mother’s
request for a restraining order. Lastly, father has not shown the
juvenile court erred in declining to reconsider its prior decision to
grant him only monitored visitation with the children. We thus
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history
pertinent to our disposition of this appeal. We address facts
relevant to father’s appellate claims in Discussion, parts A–B,
post.
On July 8, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) filed a
dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2
1 In describing the underlying dependency proceedings, we
rely in part on admissions made by the parties in their appellate
briefing and on assertions made by respondents that father
does not contest in his reply. (See Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”]; Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 773–774 [concluding that the appellants
“tacitly concede[d]” a point raised in the respondents’ brief by
“failing to dispute it in their reply”].)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
section 300. The agency alleged dependency jurisdiction over
Samantha, Rocio, and Santiago was proper because mother and
father had a history of engaging in violent altercations and father
had a history of substance abuse. At the initial hearing held on
July 22, 2022, the juvenile court detained the children from
father, released them to mother, and authorized father to have
monitored visits.
On August 26, 2022, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father pleaded no contest to an
amended version of the dependency petition that averred the
following: “The children Samantha V[.], Rocio V[.], and Santiago
[O.]’s mother . . . and father . . . have a history of engaging in
violent altercations. On 04/18/2021, . . . father chased . . . mother
with a rake, in the presence of the children Rocio and Santiago.
On a prior occasion in 2021, . . . father slapped . . . mother’s face.
Father has a history of substance abuse, including alcohol, and is
a recent user of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and alcohol,
which renders . . . father incapable of providing regular care of
the children. . . . [M]other failed to protect the children by
allowing . . . father to reside in the children’s home and to have
unlimited access to the children. Such violent conduct on the
part of . . . mother and . . . father, substance use by . . . father,
and . . . mother’s failure to protect the children create a
detrimental home environment, and place the children at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, [and] danger.”
The juvenile court sustained the amended petition,
declared the children dependents of the court, removed them
from father’s custody, maintained them in mother’s custody,
ordered the parents to participate in services, and granted father
4
monitored visitation with the children but gave DCFS discretion
to liberalize father’s visits.
In October 2022, DCFS permitted father to have
unmonitored visitation with the children.
The juvenile court scheduled a section 364 review hearing
for February 24, 2023.3 On that date, mother filed a request for a
restraining order against father. At the February 24, 2023
hearing, the juvenile court granted mother a temporary
restraining order with an expiration date of March 17, 2023,
scheduled the permanent restraining order hearing for
March 17, 2023, and continued the section 364 review hearing to
February 27, 2023.4
At the section 364 review hearing held on
February 27, 2023, the juvenile court decided to terminate
dependency jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order awarding
3 “Section 364 governs review hearings for dependent
children who have not been removed from one or both parents.”
(In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459, 469.) “At a section 364
review hearing, ‘[t]he court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless
the social worker or his or her department establishes by a
preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which
would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300,
or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741,
755, fn. 10.)
4 “We use the term ‘permanent’ to distinguish a
restraining order issued after notice and hearing from a
[temporary restraining order] issued ex parte. [Citations.] Such
an order is not permanent in the sense that it remains in force
indefinitely, as permanent orders cannot exceed three years in
length.” (In re A.P. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1141, fn. 2
(A.P.).)
5
the parents joint legal custody of the children, granting mother
sole physical custody, and allowing father monitored visitation.
The court stayed termination of dependency jurisdiction pending
receipt on March 24, 2023 of a proposed juvenile custody order
reflecting the court’s rulings on custody and visitation. The court
noted that the permanent restraining order hearing scheduled for
March 17, 2023 remained on calendar, and remarked, “We’ll come
back for the restraining order hearing, but, otherwise, the case
is—will be closed a week after once we receive the proposed
family law orders.”
At the March 17, 2023 permanent restraining order
hearing, father requested unmonitored visitation, which request
the juvenile court denied. (See Discussion, part B, post.) The
court granted mother’s request for a permanent restraining order
on the ground that “father’s conduct has put [mother’s] safety . . .
and the children’s physical and emotional safety at risk of harm.”
The permanent restraining order expires on March 17, 2026, and
the order protects mother and the three children from father,
requires father to stay 100 yards away from the children’s school,
but allows father to have telephone calls with the children at
certain designated times and monitored visitation with them.
On March 24, 2023, the juvenile court terminated
dependency jurisdiction and issued a juvenile custody order
conferring upon mother and father joint legal custody of the
children, awarding mother sole physical custody, and granting
father monitored visitation.
Father timely appealed from the permanent restraining
order and the juvenile custody order.
6
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Section 213.5, subdivision (a) permits a juvenile court to
issue an order ‘enjoining any person from . . . attacking,
striking, . . . threatening, . . . harassing, . . . coming within a
specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the child [or any
parent] . . . .’ ‘Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5
does not require “evidence that the restrained person has
previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted,
stalked, or battered the child.” [Citation.] Nor does it require
evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460,
1466.) A restraining order under the statute may be issued if
“ ‘ “failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the
[protected persons].” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re S.G. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 654, 673 (S.G.), second bracketed insertion
added.) For instance, a parent’s perpetration of acts of domestic
violence against the other parent in the presence of a child may
constitute “sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a
restraining order protecting [the child].” (See In re B.S. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193–195.) Additionally, “[m]onitored
visitation of a child is not incompatible with a restraining order”
protecting the child from the parent. (See N.L., at p. 1466.)
“When ‘the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile
court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.’ (§ 362.4, subd. (a).)
‘When making a custody determination in any dependency case,
the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the
best interests of the child.’ [Citations.]” (In re N.M. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094 (N.M.).)
7
“ ‘[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence
standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the
factual findings in support of a [section 213.5] restraining order
and the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the
court properly issued the order.’ [Citation.]” (S.G., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.) “We review a custody (or ‘exit’) order
pursuant to section 362.4 for abuse of discretion . . . .” (N.M.,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[S]ubstantial evidence . . . is . . . evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact. [Citation.] In making this determination, all
conflicts [in the evidence and in reasonable inferences from the
evidence] are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and
issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact.
[Citation.]’ ” . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . . [Citation.]” (In re Cole Y.
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451–1452 (Cole Y.).) The ruling
“should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the
[juvenile] court might have reached a different result had it
believed other evidence.’ [Citations.]” (See In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Put differently, “ ‘[w]e must accept the
evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the
unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be
accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See Cole Y.,
at p. 1452.)
“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is . . . focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.’ ” (A.P.,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143.) “ ‘ “ ‘The appropriate test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds
of reason. . . . . [Citation.]’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (N.M., supra,
8
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) Whether “ ‘ “a discretionary order [is]
based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal
assumptions[,]” ’ ” however, “ ‘ “is a question of law [citation]
requiring de novo review [citation].” ’ [Citation.]” (See S.G.,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 673.)
“The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct,
and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’
[Citations.]” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 (J.F.).) To
discharge this “burden of establishing reversible error,” the
appellant “ ‘ “must provide argument and legal authority for the
positions taken.” . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See id. at pp. 79–80.)
DISCUSSION
A. Father Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court
Erred In Including the Children in the Restraining
Order
Father does not claim the juvenile court erred in issuing a
permanent restraining order protecting mother from him.
Instead, father argues the court erred in “includ[ing] the children
in the restraining order” because “[t]here was no substantial
evidence presented that [he] was in any way aggressive or
inappropriate toward his children at any point in time, before or
after the filing of the petition.” In particular, father asserts, “The
children . . . all denied knowledge of any history of domestic
violence between mother and [father]” and the children “stated
they did not observe [father] behave in a strange or concerning
manner”; father had no criminal history; Albert, a maternal
9
uncle,5 denied knowledge of any domestic violence between the
parents or having witnessed father become violent while using
alcohol; and the children and “all of the visitation monitors said
the visits went well, [father] engaged with all of the children and
there were no reports of negative incidents during the visitation.”
Father also cites excerpts from the detention report to support
his assertions mother had denied that the children (a) “were
present during any marital incidents”6 and (b) “observed [father]
under the influence” of drugs. Additionally, although father
acknowledges mother accused him of “grabb[ing] her arm” on
February 19, 2023, he claims to have (a) “denied that there was
any domestic violence” and (b) maintained that mother “was the
aggressor and [had] insulted him.”
5 DCFS asserts that Albert’s true name is “Alberto” and
that he is erroneously identified as “Albert” in certain parts of the
record. This ambiguity has no impact on our resolution of this
appeal.
6 We note father’s characterization of this portion of the
detention report is misleading. The excerpt father cites is a
quotation from a police report documenting the April 2021
incident discussed later in this section in which father allegedly
covered mother’s face with a pillow. The quotation from the
police report provides in pertinent part: “[Mother] said there
have been approximately ten unreported domestic violence
incidents during their entire relationship. [¶] [Mother] stated
[she] and [father] have been married for approximately ten years
and have children in common. [Mother] said the children were
not present during these incidents.” (Italics added.) This passage
indicates mother may have told the police that her children
did not witness 10 unreported pre-April 2021 incidents of
domestic violence.
10
In leveling this evidentiary challenge to the inclusion of the
children in the permanent restraining order, father overlooks the
deferential substantial evidence standard governing his claim of
error. Under this standard, “ ‘ “ ‘we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations’ ” ’ ” (In re S.R.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 219), and we “discard the unfavorable
evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier
of fact’ ” (Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452). As we
explain below, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred
from other evidence that father jeopardized his children’s
physical safety by exposing them to risk that he would commit
acts of domestic violence against mother in their presence.7
As we noted earlier, father pleaded no contest to—and the
juvenile court sustained—an amended dependency petition,
which alleged that he and mother “have a history of engaging in
violent altercations,” including an occasion in April 2021 when
“father chased . . . mother with a rake[ ] in the presence of the
children Rocio and Santiago” and another incident in 2021 when
“father slapped . . . mother’s face”; “[f]ather has a history of
substance abuse, including alcohol, and is a recent user of
amphetamine [and] methamphetamine”; and “[s]uch violent
conduct on the part of . . . mother and . . . father, substance use
7 In light of our conclusion, we do not decide whether the
juvenile court’s finding that father put the children’s “emotional
safety at risk of harm” further supports including them as
protected parties in the restraining order. (See Estate of Sapp
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 104 [“ ‘If the decision of a lower court is
correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment
or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the
grounds upon which the lower court reached its conclusion.’ ”].)
11
by . . . father, and . . . mother’s failure to protect the children . . .
place the children at risk of serious physical harm . . . .”
(Procedural Background, ante.)
A declaration mother filed in another matter in May 2021
to support a prior request for a restraining order against father
contains additional evidence regarding father’s acts of domestic
violence and his substance abuse.8 In particular, mother attested
that in April 2021, father “grabbed a pillow and put it over [her]
face” while Santiago was sleeping in the bed next to her, and that
father removed the pillow from mother’s face and allowed her to
leave the room after Santiago awoke. Mother further attested
that in April 2021, father “went towards [one of the children’s
maternal uncles] to physically assault him” after the maternal
uncle confronted father for playing loud music, but another
maternal uncle succeeded in “h[olding father] back.” Mother also
testified that father was drunk when he chased her with the
rake, and that Rocio and Santiago were witnesses to that
incident. Similarly, mother declared that on one occasion in
2013, father physically assaulted her while he “was heavily
drunk . . . .”
Indeed, DCFS noted in the jurisdiction/disposition report
mother had told the agency that “father drank alcohol daily,”
“father would become agitated, rude and verbally confrontational
with . . . mother whenever he consumed excessive amounts of
alcohol,” and “the arguing between the parents had been
8 In June 2021, the trial court granted mother a six-month
restraining order in that case. Mother’s request for the prior
restraining order (including her supporting declaration) and the
prior restraining order itself were attached to an addendum
report DCFS filed on July 8, 2022.
12
escalating for some time due to . . . father’s consumption of
alcohol.” Likewise, in the jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS
noted Albert (one of the children’s maternal uncles) stated “the
arguments between the parents seemed to occur when . . . father
drank alcohol,” and “father could become easily agitated, . . . got
angry quickly and . . . could sometimes verbally insult . . . mother
in a loud voice.”
Furthermore, there is evidence that father continued to
present a risk of physical harm to his children after the juvenile
court sustained the amended dependency petition.
At the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on
August 26, 2022, the juvenile court ordered father to participate
in a full drug and alcohol program, complete a 12-step program,
submit to random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing, and
complete a 26-week domestic violence program. Yet, in its
section 364 status review report filed on February 8, 2023, DCFS
informed the court that father had not provided the agency with
proof he had enrolled in a full drug and alcohol program or a 12-
step program, father had completed only three out of 26 weekly
domestic violence classes because he missed several sessions, and
father missed 10 drug/alcohol tests from August 30, 2022 to
January 11, 2023 and tested positive for Ethanol on seven
occasions during that period. The report also indicated that
father admitted testing positive for Ethanol because he had
consumed alcohol.
In addition, mother attested in her declaration supporting
her request for the instant permanent restraining order that
father harassed mother on multiple occasions between
September 2022 and February 2023.
13
Mother stated in her declaration that father “entered [her]
home without [her] permission” in September 2022, and that she
“had to call the police” and “changed the locks to [her] home.”
Mother also stated that in October 2022, father followed mother
in his vehicle when she drove the children to school. She claimed
that on one occasion when father picked up the children in
November 2022, he “verbally attacked” and “shout[ed] insults” at
mother. Mother further declared, “On February 14, 2023,
[father] called me and told me that he knew my whereabouts all
the time because he had ‘eyes all over the city.’ ” According to
mother, on February 19, 2023, “[father] grabbed the house key
out of [her] hand” and stole the key; mother claimed to have
sustained a bruise on her hand as a result of this incident.
Similarly, a last minute information report filed by the agency
on February 27, 2023 shows mother told DCFS that on
February 19, 2023, father had grabbed her arm and told her that
when the case was closed, he was returning to the home “whether
she liked it or not.”
Mother also claimed in her declaration that father
threatened her after the juvenile court had sustained the
amended petition. Specifically, mother stated that in
December 2022, father telephoned her, and stated that “if [she]
was ever with another man, he would shoot [her] and who[m]ever
[she] was with,” and that “he did not care if he went to jail.”
Mother further attested, “On February 2, 2023, [father] stated
that if he ever found out that I was with another person, I would
be sorry.”
Based on the evidence detailed above, the juvenile court
could have reasonably found that father repeatedly engaged in
aggressive acts in mother’s and the children’s presence both
14
before and after the court had asserted dependency jurisdiction,
and that father’s ongoing substance abuse contributed to his
behavior. Because there is substantial evidence that the
children’s safety would have been jeopardized in the absence of a
restraining order protecting them from father, the juvenile court
did not err in naming them as protected parties in the order.
Lastly, father asserts in a heading to his opening brief that
“the juvenile court erred by including the children in the
restraining order while simultaneously ordering joint legal
custody to both parents.” (Italics added; capitalization & boldface
omitted.) He also seems to argue that the permanent restraining
order “limit[s] his ability to exercise his educational rights over
his children” because the order “prevent[s father] from being
within 100 yards of the children’s school . . . .”9 (Fn. omitted.)
Father does not develop this argument further or cite authority
to support it. Accordingly, father waives this claim of error. (See
J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 79 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails
to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.” ’ ”].)
B. We Reject Father’s Assertion the Juvenile Court
Concluded It Lacked Authority To Address His
Request for Unmonitored Visitation
Father asserts that at the March 17, 2023 permanent
restraining order hearing, “the juvenile court erroneously held
9 We observe that the permanent restraining order
does not bar father from exercising his right to make educational
decisions for the children by contacting their school via mail,
telephone, or electronic means.
15
that it did not have authority to address [his] request for
unmonitored visitation” “because it was not before the court . . . .”
He argues, “This was legally incorrect as the court always has
authority to consider visitation when terminating dependency
jurisdiction and issuing juvenile custody orders.”
The reporter’s transcript of the March 17, 2023 hearing
belies father’s claim the juvenile court concluded that it lacked
authority to consider his request for unmonitored visitation. At
that hearing, father’s counsel orally requested that the court
“restore [father] to unmonitored” visits with the children.
Mother’s counsel countered that father’s request for unmonitored
visits was not “proper . . . at th[at] time” because “[t]he court
previously stayed receipt of the custody order until [March] 24th
in order to hear the restraining order request, and the case closed
for monitored visitation for father.”
In rejecting father’s request for unmonitored visitation, the
juvenile court remarked:
[Father’s counsel], the minute order from
February 27 indicates that the juvenile custody order
is to reflect mother to be awarded sole physical
custody of all the children . . . . Parents were to be
awarded joint legal custody . . . . Father is to be
awarded monitored visitation. Mother is not to
monitor nor be present at father’s visits.
There’s no indication that the issue of father’s
visits would be heard today. At that time[, the] court
found a basis for reverting father’s visits to
16
monitored, and I will not disturb that order at this
time.[10]
The transcript thus reveals the juvenile court agreed with
mother’s counsel that father’s oral entreaty for unmonitored
visits with his children was procedurally improper because the
court had previously decided to issue exit orders awarding him
only monitored visitation. The court merely found that it had
already adjudicated the proper scope of father’s visitation rights,
and not that it was powerless to revisit that prior determination.
Indeed, by observing that “the juvenile court declined to hear
[his] request” for unmonitored visitation at the restraining order
hearing (italics added), father seems to acknowledge the court
simply elected not to reconsider whether father would be
awarded unmonitored visitation in the exit order.
Father does not argue—let alone cite authority
demonstrating—that the juvenile court erred in declining to
exercise its discretion to reconsider its prior decision to close the
dependency case with an order granting father only monitored
visits. (See Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
92, 111, 116 (Nickolas F.) [holding that a juvenile court has the
discretion to “reconsider the substance of a previous order”].)
Instead, father argues, in passing, “[T]he juvenile court erred in
ordering monitored visits . . . in light of the evidence that there
10 Whereas Commissioner Murillo conducted the
March 17, 2023 permanent restraining order hearing, Judge Vera
presided over the section 364 review hearing held on
February 27, 2023. As the quotation in the text indicates,
Commissioner Murillo did not claim she lacked authority to
review Judge Vera’s prior rulings from the section 364 hearing.
17
were no concerns or inappropriate behavior during [father’s]
visitation with his children.”
Insofar as father challenges the juvenile court’s decision
not to reconsider its prior ruling restricting him to monitored
visitation, we reject that claim of error. As we explained in
Discussion, part A, ante, the record contains substantial evidence
that at the conclusion of the dependency proceedings, there was
still a risk that father would perpetrate future acts of domestic
violence against mother in the children’s presence. Accordingly,
the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider its
decision to grant father only monitored visitation. (See
Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 118–119 [indicating
that in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling for abuse of discretion,
the court’s factual findings will be affirmed if they are supported
by substantial evidence]; N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094
[holding that the juvenile court’s “ ‘primary consideration’ ” in
fashioning an exit order “ ‘must always be the best interests of
the child’ ”].)
18
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s March 17, 2023 restraining
order and the juvenile custody order issued on March 24, 2023.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
KLINE, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the California Court of
Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
19