Price v. Super. Ct. ( 2024 )

Filed 10/23/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
WILLIAM JAY PRICE, C100920
Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. 21MH03146)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTE COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Petition granted. Michael R. Deems,
Judge.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Julie A.
Hokans, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
1
In 2006, petitioner William Jay Price was admitted to the State Department of
State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator. In 2022, the superior court found that Price
was suitable for conditional release. Months later, and prior to placing Price in the
community, the superior court reconsidered its order granting Price’s petition for
conditional release, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable.
Price now contends that the superior court erred in denying him the assistance of
experts in defending his suitability at the contested hearing. Price further argues that the
superior court erred in subsequently finding him unsuitable for conditional release,
contending that the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. Real party in interest
maintains the court had the authority to properly reconsider its order, but concedes the
court erred in denying Price the assistance of experts prior to finding him unsuitable for
conditional release. We conclude the trial court erred in finding Price unsuitable for
conditional release and for reasons expounded below, we issue a peremptory writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order finding as such.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)1
“allows for the involuntary [civil] commitment of certain convicted sex offenders, whose
diagnosed mental disorders make them likely to reoffend if released at the end of their
prison terms.” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 235.) A person can only
be civilly committed if, after a trial, a judge or a unanimous jury finds beyond a
reasonable doubt the person is a sexually violent predator (SVP). (§§ 6600, 6601, 6603,
6604; see also Cooley, at p. 243.) If the person is found to be an SVP, the court orders
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
them committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) “for an indefinite term
. . . for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility.” (§ 6604.)
The SVPA was not designed to be punitive. (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1138, 1144.) Instead, it was “designed ‘ “to provide ‘treatment’ to mentally
disordered individuals who cannot control sexually violent criminal behavior” ’ and to
keep them confined until they no longer pose a threat to the public.” (People v. Putney
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1065; see also § 6606, subd. (a) [SVP “shall be provided with
. . . treatment for his or her diagnosed mental disorder”]; § 6066, subd. (c).) “Because the
SVPA is designed to ensure a committed person does not remain confined any longer
than he or she qualifies as a sexually violent predator, it provides means for that
individual to obtain review of his or her mental condition to determine if civil
confinement is still necessary. [Citation.] One of two ways such review may be had is
by petition for conditional release . . . under section 6608.” (People v. Collins (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 340, 346, italics added.)
Conditional release proceedings can be initiated by either DSH or the committed
person. DSH can initiate release proceedings if it “determines that the person’s
diagnosed mental disorder has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of
predatory sexual violence while under supervision and treatment in the community.”
(§ 6607, subd. (a).) Alternatively, the committed person can petition the court for
conditional release after one year of commitment. (See § 6608, subds. (a), (c), (f).)
Where, as here, DSH authorizes the petition for conditional release, the SVP is
presumptively entitled to conditional release and the state bears the burden of showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that “ ‘conditional release is not appropriate.’ ”
(People v. Peyton (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 784, 797, citing § 6608, subd. (k).) During the
hearing, the committed person is entitled to the assistance of counsel and the appointment
of experts, and the state is entitled to have the committed person evaluated by its own
experts. (§ 6608, subds. (a), (g); see People v. McCloud (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-15.)
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2022, DSH and Liberty Healthcare CONREP (Liberty) opined that
Price was suitable for conditional release pursuant to section 6608. That same day, the
superior court found Price suitable for conditional release. The court ordered a placement
hearing to be held in November. The Butte County Sheriff’s Office was designated to
assist Liberty in finding a housing placement for Price.
Securing a suitable residential placement for Price proved to be difficult. Multiple
reports were submitted to the superior court at subsequent placement hearings held
between November 2022 and July 2023. During that time, Liberty searched a total of
341 potential locations in Butte County but had not identified a suitable or agreeable
placement. The record also shows that although the search for housing was ongoing, the
housing committee2 only met three times, with the last one in April 2023.
On July 4, 2023, Liberty submitted a housing status report describing its ongoing
placement search for Price. The report also indicated that since Price was granted
conditional release in October 2022, his behaviors had concerned Liberty, leading to
doubts as to his readiness for conditional release, warranting further assessment. As such,
Liberty requested six additional months for further review of Price’s readiness for
conditional release and to allow Price the “opportunity for further treatment to address
these concerns in effort to aide him to be better equipe to navigate the stressors and
challenges accompanying community outpatient treatment.”
On July 6, 2023, the superior court held a scheduled continuation of the placement
hearing. The district attorney requested the court grant a six-month continuance to allow
2 Effective January 1, 2023, changes to section 6608.5, subdivision (d), pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 1034 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), specify that DSH shall convene a
committee consisting of counsel for the SVP, the sheriff or the chief of police of the
locality for placement, and the county counsel and the district attorney of the county of
domicile to assist in finding appropriate housing.
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for further review of Price by Liberty. The court noted it had read and considered the
July 4 report submitted by Liberty. Based on the report, the court found Price was not to
be released “for reasons stated in this report,” found good cause to continue the
placement hearing, and granted the request for a six-month continuance so that Liberty
and DSH could “further review Mr. Price’s readiness and to allow him the opportunity for
further treatment to address the concerns that are stated in this report.” The court set the
matter for January 11, 2024, to “address the concerns of CONREP as expressed in their
report dated July 4th, 2023, and dependent thereon for continued review of placement.”
On July 13, 2023, Price filed in the superior court a request that, “[s]ince Liberty
[had] put [his] mental health into question,” the court order “two unbiased [DSH] full
evaluations to establish [his] current condition for supervised outpatient community
release under W&I 6608.”
On July 14, 2023, Price filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging that the continued placement hearings infringed on his liberty interest and
requesting his immediate conditional release as a transient. The matter was assigned case
no. C099016.3 After considering informal responses, a different panel of this court issued
an order to show cause (Order). In the Order, this court found that Price established a
prima facie case that the superior court’s continuance of the placement hearing for six
months to January 2024 was an excessive period of time following the determination in
October of 2022 that conditional release was appropriate, impacting his “significant
liberty interest.” (See People v. Superior Court (Karsai) (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 774;
see also § 6608, subd. (i).) We also stated that, in the interim, the superior court retained
the authority to render the matter moot by advancing the hearing date. We stated, “At
3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our records in case No. C099016.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Epic Communications, Inc. v. Richwave Technology, Inc.
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1347, fn. 3 [“ ‘a court may take judicial notice of the
contents of its own records’ ”].)
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such a hearing, the court must: (1) consider whether petitioner’s conditional release with
programming but without housing, if housing remains unavailable, is required by law at
this time, and (2) allow petitioner the opportunity to address any evidentiary showing
supporting his continued detention and to present any relevant evidence or argument
addressing specific concerns raised about his release. Should the court nevertheless
conclude petitioner’s conditional release is not warranted at this time, it must make
explicit factual findings supporting a showing of good cause for a continuance and must
set the matter for further hearing within a reasonable time.” We appointed habeas corpus
counsel for Price.
On October 3, 2023, the People filed a motion arguing that conditional release
without housing was not required, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008,
subdivision (b), the People moved the superior court to reconsider its previous order for
conditional release. Specifically, the People argued that “Price has become growingly
belligerent toward the court. At times interrupting the court, preventing the court from
proceeding, voluntarily absenting himself from the proceedings and . . . has refused, in
stringent terms, to live in permanent housing anywhere” but the city of his choosing.
On October 4, 2023, Liberty filed in the superior court a letter of recommendation
pursuant to section 6608, subdivision (f) opining that Price was no longer suitable for
conditional release. Liberty attached a “Hospital Liaison Report: Follow-up Patient
Visit” dated September 27, 2023, from DSH, which largely provided the factual support
for three events that purportedly constituted new facts and circumstances ultimately
relied upon by the court in its reconsideration. In its report, DSH concluded that Price
was not suitable for conditional release and recommended a review in six months to
“identify if [Price] has been able to gain the self-management skills to be successful
under the rigorous terms of conditional release.”
On November 14, 2023, the superior court held a hearing, partly in response to
this court’s Order and partly in response to the concerns about Price’s suitability for
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conditional release raised by the People and Liberty. The superior court noted that, on a
previous date, it addressed this court’s first concern posed in the Order and determined
that conditional release with programming but without housing was not required by law.4
In an attempt to address the second concern posed in the Order, the court heard testimony
from Price regarding the concerns and allegations brought by Liberty in the September 27
report and by the People in its motion for reconsideration.
The court found that over the course of the various placement hearings, “Price
became increasingly obstreperous, interrupting the [c]ourt and other attendees. At one
point, he had to be muted because of his interruptions,” and that his behaviors had caused
serious concerns on his readiness for conditional release at this time. Relying on these
observations and the DSH report of September 27, 2023, the court concluded that, “Given
the changed facts and circumstances as stated by this [c]ourt and pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1008, the [c]ourt hereby reconsiders its conditional release order
and finds that Mr. Price cannot be safely and adequately managed and treated in the
community, and is, therefore, deemed not suitable for conditional release at this time.”
With respect to case No. C099016, this court issued an order stating that in light of
the hearing in the superior court, this court was considering dismissing the petition as
moot. However, we invited Price’s counsel to request an expansion of the scope of his
appointment to file a petition for a writ of mandate in this court challenging the superior
court’s decision to find Price unsuitable for conditional release. Not long after, we
granted such a request by counsel on behalf of Price, and later dismissed the petition filed
in case No. C099016 as moot.
On April 22, 2024, counsel filed the instant petition for writ of mandate on behalf
of Price. We issued an order to show cause.
4 This aspect of the ruling is not challenged in the instant petition.
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DISCUSSION
Reconsideration of the Order Granting Conditional Release
We agree with the parties that the superior court’s finding of unsuitability for
conditional release, made upon reconsideration of a prior grant of suitability, was
procedurally flawed and cannot stand. We further conclude that Price is entitled to a new
hearing in which the court reconsiders his petition for conditional release. We review
statutory interpretation and implementation de novo. (Landau v. Superior Court (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1080-1081.)
Price initially filed a petition for release with the concurrence of DSH. On
October 7, 2022, the superior court determined that Price would not be a danger to others
while under supervision and treatment in the community and ordered Price suitable for
conditional release. Over a year later, on November 14, 2023, the superior court held a
hearing in which it considered anew the issue of Price’s suitability for conditional release,
based on new circumstances. This time apparently without the concurrence of DSH. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court changed its decision regarding Price’s
suitability for conditional release. Price argues he was denied due process during this
hearing because he was not granted access to experts who could have assisted him in the
hearing. Real party in interest agrees Price was improperly denied the assistance of
experts, as do we.
Once the superior court decided to hold a new hearing on Price’s suitability for
release, we conclude the procedural protections within section 6608, subdivision (g)
applied and Price should have been afforded the right to the appointment of experts as he
had requested. As the statute governing hearings on conditional release expressly
provides that a petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel and the appointment of
experts, the superior court’s noncompliance with the statutory provisions denied Price
due process and the resultant finding of unsuitability cannot stand. (See People v.
McCloud, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 15 [due process requires the appointment of
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experts when a hearing is warranted]; cf. People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1192
[“expert testimony is critical in an SVP commitment proceeding”], superseded on other
grounds by statute.) As the parties acknowledge, Price is entitled to a new hearing on this
basis.
We find People v. McKee instructive. In McKee, the California Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of Proposition 83, which amended the term of an SVP’s
civil confinement from a fixed two years (at the end of which the prosecution had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant still met the definition of an SVP) to
an indefinite commitment “from which the [defendant] can be released if he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is an SVP.” (People v. McKee, supra,47 Cal.4th at p. 1184.) McKee, a committed SVP, argued the amendment violated federal
due process because, among other things, it made no provision for the appointment of an
independent expert to assist indigent SVPs petition for conditional release.
The court agreed that access to an independent medical expert is crucial for SVPs
seeking release from involuntary civil confinement. “[E]xpert testimony is critical in an
SVP commitment proceeding, in which the primary issue is not, as in a criminal trial,
whether the individual committed certain acts, but rather involves a prediction about the
individual’s future behavior.” (People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) The court
reasoned, “If the state involuntarily commits someone on the basis of expert opinion
about future dangerousness, places the burden on that person to disprove future
dangerousness, and then makes it difficult for him to access his own expert because of his
indigence to challenge his continuing commitment, that schema would indeed raise a
serious due process concern.” (Ibid.) The court further observed that “the denial of
access to expert opinion when an indigent individual petitions on his or her own to be
released” — as opposed to when the person in charge of their treatment “authorize[s]” the
petition — could pose “a significant obstacle to ensuring that only those meeting SVP
commitment criteria remain committed.” (Id. at p. 1193.) Citing the rule that we should
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“construe statutes when reasonable to avoid difficult constitutional issues,” the court
interpreted the SVP statute “to mandate appointment of an expert for an indigent SVP
who petitions the court for release.” (Ibid.) After McKee, the Legislature amended the
statute, which now explicitly provides that an SVP petitioning for conditional release
“shall have the right to the appointment of experts, if the committed person so requests.”
(§ 6608, subd. (g).)
We conclude that the due process concern articulated in McKee applies with equal
force to SVPs who face reconsideration of the court’s decision to grant conditional
release. “Once a court has determined that a particular SVP would not be a danger to the
health and safety of others in that it is not likely that he or she would engage in sexually
violent criminal behavior due to his or her diagnosed mental disorder if under supervision
and treatment in the community, that person unquestionably has a significant liberty
interest in being released.” (People v. Superior Court (Karsai), supra, 213 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 788-789.) Upon reconsideration of this ruling, such a petitioner is called upon to
defend against accusations of future dangerousness that may deprive him or her of this
liberty interest. Depriving a person of a conditional liberty interest may only be had with
due process protections. (See People v. DeGuzman (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 414, 420 [SVP
outpatient status revocation]; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 482 [parole
revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458 [probation revocation].) We
conclude the only way to avoid that due process concern in the reconsideration setting is
to provide the protections afforded in section 6608, including the appointment of experts
to assist a petitioner in defending against such accusations.
Because the reconsideration hearing here violated due process, the court’s
subsequent finding of unsuitability must be vacated, and Price must be returned to his
conditional release status. Should the parties seek reconsideration upon remand, the new
hearing must include the protections provided by section 6608. Because conditional
release status grants Price a conditional liberty interest, return to this status logically
10
dictates that during reconsideration, the party seeking reconsideration has the burden to
prove that Price is unsuitable for conditional release.
Thus, we disagree with real party in interest’s conclusory claim that Price should
have a new hearing on his petition where he bears the burden of proving that conditional
release is appropriate. Real party in interest essentially argues that, because DSH no
longer concurs with Price’s request for conditional release, he is placed in the position of
seeking conditional release without DSH’s approval and therefore, under section 6608,
subdivision (k), he bears the burden to prove he is suitable. But this overlooks the fact
that here, the finding of suitability had already been made. As concluded above and as
the parties concede, the due process violation occurred during the reconsideration of that
ruling and it is the resultant finding of unsuitability that cannot stand. While we
acknowledge that DSH withdrew its concurrence to Price’s petition, it did so only after
Price’s conditional release had been granted, vesting him with a conditional liberty
interest. DSH’s withdrawal of its concurrence, after the court found him suitable for
conditional release, does not operate to shift the burden to Price to prove the suitability
status the court has already found. (Cf. People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 442
[deprivation of a conditional liberty interest must require facts justifying such deprivation
by proof by a preponderance of the evidence].) Rather, having been found suitable for
conditional release, if real party in interest wishes the court to reconsider that finding, it
must bear the burden of doing so. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the
merits of Price’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was likely to
reoffend sexually if conditionally released.
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DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the superior court to vacate its
November 14, 2023, order finding Price unsuitable for conditional release. Should the
parties seek reconsideration, any new hearing shall be pursuant to the procedures
described in section 6608 and consistent with this opinion.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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