People v. Ocampo CA2/7 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/24/24 P. v. Ocampo CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    THE PEOPLE,                                                  B330976
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA424985)
    v.
    ANDORENI LAZARO
    OCAMPO,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
    Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    __________________________
    Andoreni Lazaro Ocampo appeals from a postjudgment
    order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
    former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 In 2015 a jury
    convicted Ocampo of second degree murder, and the trial court
    sentenced him to 15 years to life. In 2020 Ocampo petitioned for
    resentencing, seeking relief from his 2015 conviction. Following
    briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
    the petition.
    On appeal, Ocampo contends the superior court applied the
    substantial evidence standard instead of the correct legal
    standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ocampo also
    argues there was not substantial evidence to support the superior
    court’s finding that, under current law, Ocampo is guilty of
    implied malice murder as an aider and abettor. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.    The Evidence at Trial
    On the evening of April 25, 2014, members of the “H2O”
    and “BYMS” tagging crews—Ocampo, Saul Ambriz, Joao Bonilla,
    Giovanni Garcia, Felix Garcia, Jesse Chavez, and other
    individuals—were at Ocampo’s house drinking beers and
    smoking.2 Ocampo was a member of H2O, and Ambriz and
    Bonilla were members of BYMS.3 Bonilla testified that Ocampo
    1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2     We refer to Giovanni and Felix Garcia by their first names
    to avoid confusion.
    3     “BYMS” was identified as “BUMS” by another member,
    Josue Bernal, who testified at trial. Bonilla and Bernal testified
    2
    became upset and agitated and wanted to leave and drive around.
    Bonilla told Ocampo to calm down, and Ocampo turned his anger
    toward Bonilla. Ocampo lifted his shirt to show Bonilla a scar
    down the length of his abdomen, which Ocampo said was the
    result of a stabbing three months earlier by a member of a rival
    tagging crew. Referring to the scar, Ocampo said, “Look what
    they did to me.” As Ocampo continued to be aggressive toward
    Bonilla, others at the gathering tried to calm him down, telling
    him to “relax.” One member of the group told Ocampo,
    “[Bonilla]’s not the enemy, he’s a homie.” At that point Ocampo
    ceased being aggressive toward Bonilla, but the group was still
    “pumped up” and “emotional.” Bonilla heard someone say they
    should go “lurking,” which meant hunting for enemies. In
    generally regarding the tagging crew culture. BYMS and H2O
    were separate tagging crews, whose members were friendly with
    each other. Each tagging crew had its own territory and hand
    signs, and members of the groups often had nicknames or
    monikers by which they were known. The tagging crews also had
    rivals who had their own territories. When one crew encountered
    the graffiti art of a rival crew, its members would cross it out as a
    sign of disrespect and write the name of their own crew. Rival
    crews would retaliate in kind. Often when they went out tagging,
    members of the crews would bring bats or other weapons to
    protect themselves from rivals. Detective Armando Mendoza,
    who testified as an expert witness on tagging crew culture,
    confirmed Bonilla’s and Bernal’s firsthand descriptions that
    tagging crews engaged in graffiti art, formed alliances and
    rivalries, established known territories, retaliated against one
    another for disrespectful behavior and graffiti, and, on occasion,
    committed violence against rival crews.
    3
    response to the lurking comment, Ocampo said, “Let’s go get an
    enemy.”
    Before the group left the house, Ambriz and Giovanni told
    Bonilla they were carrying knives. Ocampo and Giovanni got
    into a car driven by Felix. A few moments later Bonilla, Ambriz,
    and a third young man got into a car driven by Chavez. Although
    Bonilla asked Chavez to take him home, Chavez followed Felix’s
    car.
    Around 9:00 p.m. Felix, Giovanni, and Ocampo arrived
    near the intersection of Vermont Avenue and 40th Place, a
    location within the territory of “UTF,” a tagging crew that was a
    rival of both BYMS and H2O. Ocampo and Giovanni got out of
    the car and walked down Vermont Avenue, where they
    encountered Osmin Cerna leaving a liquor store carrying a
    backpack and a skateboard. Cerna identified himself as a
    member of UTF. Ocampo and Giovanni attacked Cerna, causing
    him to drop his skateboard. Cerna put his hands up and said,
    “Why are you all attacking me?” The two young men kept
    striking Cerna, and Cerna tried to retreat. Ocampo and Giovanni
    pursued Cerna, and Giovanni picked up the skateboard and
    swung it at Cerna. Cerna tried to defend himself and was able to
    knock Ocampo down, but Ocampo got up and kept fighting.
    A few minutes after the fight started, Chavez arrived at the
    location with Ambriz and the third man. Ambriz and the other
    man got out of the car and ran to the fight. Bonilla saw Ocampo,
    Giovanni, and two or three others fight with Cerna. The
    attackers surrounded Cerna, who was on the ground. Cerna was
    unable to get up and was screaming, “Help! Stop!” After another
    few minutes the attackers returned to their cars and drove away.
    Bonilla testified he got into Felix’s car along with Giovanni and
    4
    Ocampo. Bonilla heard Ocampo say, “‘We got him, we got him
    good.’”
    Paramedics arrived and took Cerna to the hospital, where
    he died that night. The medical examiner testified Cerna had
    been stabbed nine times during the fight, twice in the back, once
    in the buttocks, once in the chest, twice in the abdomen, and
    twice in the face. The fatal wound was the chest wound, which
    had pierced the heart. One of the abdominal wounds might also
    have been fatal if not treated.
    Bernal, who had not been present at Ocampo’s house or at
    the scene of the murder, called Ambriz on his cell phone between
    9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on the night of the fight. Ambriz answered
    and said, “We seen some enemies. I’ll call you back later.”
    Bernal spoke to Ambriz later that night, and Ambriz said they
    had “caught some enemies slippin.” Bernal understood that to
    mean they had “caught people walking down the street that we
    don’t get along with.” Around 3:00 a.m. the following morning,
    Bernal and Ambriz went tagging with some other friends. While
    in the car Bernal heard Ambriz say he had taken out his knife
    and stabbed Cerna during the fight. Bernal testified he had seen
    Ambriz carrying different types of knives on previous occasions.
    On April 26, 2014, the day after the murder, someone
    called a BYMS meeting at Bernal’s house. Bernal testified that
    that there were at least seven individuals in attendance,
    including Bonilla and Ambriz. The discussion turned to the
    incident the previous night, and Ambriz stated he had stabbed
    Cerna twice. Bonilla likewise testified that Ambriz said he had
    stabbed Cerna. Ocampo said he had a knife at the time but
    dropped it during the fight. The police recovered a folding knife
    5
    with its blade locked in an open position at the scene of the fight.
    There was no blood or DNA found on the knife.
    Ocampo did not testify at trial or present any witnesses in
    his defense.
    B.    The Verdict, Sentencing, and Prior Appeal
    The jury found Ocampo guilty of second degree murder,
    and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 15
    years to life. Ocampo appealed, and we affirmed. (People v.
    Ambriz (Apr. 20, 2017, B268685) [nonpub. opn.].)
    C.     Petition for Resentencing, Evidentiary Hearing, and Denial
    of Petition
    On January 3, 2020 Ocampo filed a form petition for
    resentencing seeking to vacate his murder conviction and be
    resentenced in accordance with recent statutory changes relating
    to felony murder and the natural and probable consequences
    doctrine. In his petition, Ocampo checked boxes stating he was
    “convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony
    murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine”
    and he “could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
    because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
    January 1, 2019.” At Ocampo’s request, the superior court
    appointed him counsel. The People filed a response to the
    petition, and on August 31, 2021 the court issued an order to
    show cause.4
    4     Judge Rand S. Rubin presided over the trial but retired in
    2015. Judge William C. Ryan issued the order to show cause and
    presided over the evidentiary hearing.
    6
    After additional briefing from the parties, on January 26,
    2023 the superior court held an evidentiary hearing. At the
    hearing, the prosecutor introduced the transcript from Ocampo’s
    2015 trial, the exhibits admitted at trial (including surveillance
    video footage of Ocampo and Giovanni’s fight with Cerna, which
    was played for the court), and our opinion in Ambriz, supra,
    B268685 (for the procedural history of the case). The prosecutor
    argued that on the night of the incident, Ocampo was upset that
    he had been stabbed by a rival tagging crew several months
    earlier; he was armed with a knife; and he “was angry and out
    hunting for an enemy.” Further, Ocampo instigated the fight; he
    “was a direct perpetrator in the assault”; he knew that “going and
    intending to stab an enemy is going to result in death”; and he
    was armed and had the intent to kill.
    Ocampo’s attorney acknowledged Ocampo was upset on the
    night of the incident. But he argued Ocampo fought without a
    weapon, and Ocampo did not plan or coordinate the fight against
    Cerna. He maintained Ocampo dropped the knife when Cerna
    knocked him to the ground. He also argued there was no
    evidence that Ocampo stabbed Cerna, knew that other people had
    knives, or intended for others to stab Cerna.
    At the continued evidentiary hearing on February 2, 2023,
    following additional argument from counsel, the superior court
    took the matter under submission. On May 11, 2023 the court
    issued an 11-page decision denying Ocampo’s petition for
    resentencing under section 1172.6. The court found
    “overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s implied malice
    aforethought.” The court explained, “Petitioner’s malice
    originated when he rallied the others for a retaliatory attack and
    armed himself with a knife. Petitioner and the others already
    7
    had in mind when they arrived at the scene, before they select
    the victim, that they are going [to] “‘hunt.’” Petitioner was the
    initial and constant aggressor in the fight. He was armed with a
    knife that was later found with the blade in an open position.
    The open blade, combined with Petitioner’s agitated state and
    desire to go hunting for an enemy in retaliation for his own prior
    stabbing evinces an intent to use the blade in a fatal manner.
    Moreover, Petitioner intentionally attacked Cerna with an open
    knife; the natural consequence of which is dangerous to human
    life. Petitioner, having been a stabbing victim himself, is acutely
    aware that attacking someone with a knife is dangerous to
    human life, yet he deliberately attacked Cerna and left him
    bleeding on the sidewalk. Consequently, Petitioner is liable for
    second degree murder under an implied malice [theory].”
    The superior court continued, “[T]he evidence presented
    here supports a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory of
    liability.” The court reasoned, “Petitioner knew the purpose of
    the group’s outing, including the actual killer’s (Ambriz), was to
    go lurking or hunting for the enemy because Petitioner was the
    one who rallied . . . the BYMS and H2O crews to go find a rival
    crew. Petitioner not only encouraged the attack, but facilitated
    the murder by going to enemy territory, arming himself, selecting
    the victim, being the initial and continual aggressor throughout
    the attack, then leaving the victim to die.”
    The court added, “Petitioner’s argument that there is no
    evidence that he ever shared in the actual killer’s intent to stab
    the victim[] and that he did not have notice that the actual
    perpetrator had a knife or intended to kill the victim is not
    supported by the record here. He also alleges that there was no
    coordination or shared destination between the three cars to go
    8
    lurking, but offers no other explanation for how the cars ended up
    at the same location within minutes of each other after all having
    discussed going lurking. Petitioner himself rallied the others at
    his house, including Ambriz, to go hunting or lurking for enemies,
    and violence between rival tagging crews was common, and even
    occasionally resulting in death. Members of tagging crews
    frequently carried weapons, Ambriz was known by members of
    the crews to carry a knife on occasion, and indeed announced he
    was carrying a knife that night. Even more, after leaving to go
    ‘get an enemy,’ Petitioner announced in the car leaving the scene
    of the murder that ‘We got him, we got him good.’”
    Ocampo timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
    Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the
    natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
    a defendant guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope
    of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 698
    , 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 957; People v.
    Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842-843, 847-848 (Gentile); see
    People v. Reyes (2023) 
    14 Cal.5th 981
    , 984 (Reyes).) Section 188,
    subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
    an individual’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
    malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
    felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e).
    (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Section 189,
    subdivision (e), now requires the People to prove specific facts
    relating to the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant
    was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual
    9
    killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the
    commission of murder in the first degree (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
    the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony
    listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless
    indifference to human life as described in section 190.2,
    subdivision (d) (the felony-murder special-circumstance
    provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at p. 708.) Senate
    Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2),
    effective January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of potential relief
    to apply Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals
    convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
    (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
    Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure (now codified in
    section 1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or
    murder under the natural and probable consequences theory or
    other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
    solely on that person’s participation in a crime to petition the
    sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on
    any remaining counts if the individual could not have been
    convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
    sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
    p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
    If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
    information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
    she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
    subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
    represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
    section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Where a petitioner makes the
    requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
    provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
    10
    must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
    hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
    murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
    petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) &
    (d)(1).)
    Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
    evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
    prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
    petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
    California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
    made effective January 1, 2019. . . . A finding that there is
    substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,
    attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
    resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
    proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
    enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
    the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
    We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
    after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence, provided
    the court understood the elements of the offense and applied the
    proper standard and burden of proof. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
    p. 988; People v. Vargas (2022) 
    84 Cal.App.5th 943
    , 951.)
    “[W]here there is an issue as to whether the trial court
    misunderstood the elements of the applicable offense, the case
    presents a question of law which we review independently.”
    (Reyes, at p. 988.)
    11
    B.     The Superior Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
    Ocampo contends the superior court erred in reviewing the
    evidence for substantial evidence instead of applying the correct
    standard of proof to require the prosecution to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of murder. The court
    stated in its written decision, “[T]he court finds that Petitioner
    could today be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second
    degree murder under implied malice, and aiding and abetting
    theories of liability.”5 Although the superior court was imprecise
    when it stated that Ocampo “could today be found guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt” instead of saying Ocampo “is guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt,” the record shows the court and the parties
    were aware of the correct legal standard. In response to
    Ocampo’s petition, the prosecutor acknowledged, “The
    prosecution has the burden at the hearing to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for
    resentencing.” In its order to show cause, the court stated “the
    People bear the burden of proving Petitioner’s ineligibility for
    relief beyond a reasonable doubt.” And in Ocampo’s ex parte
    application for appointment of a defense investigator, Ocampo
    stated, “At the hearing to determine whether petitioner is
    entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
    to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
    ineligible for resentencing.”
    At the outset of the January 26, 2023 evidentiary hearing,
    the court asked, “Who wants to go first?” Ocampo’s attorney
    5     Ocampo asserts the superior court stated “‘the prosecution
    could prove that petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt,’” citing to the court’s memorandum of decision. The
    court’s decision does not contain that statement.
    12
    responded, “I think it’s the People’s burden,” and the court
    replied, “Yeah.” The prosecutor then proceeded to discuss the
    evidence at trial and presented her argument. In response,
    Ocampo’s attorney argued with respect to the aiding and abetting
    theory of liability that the “People have to prove that Mr. Ocampo
    knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime of
    murder. They have to establish, prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that Mr. Ocampo knew that. They can’t.” Ocampo’s
    attorney reiterated, “[T]he court knows you have to prove the
    case beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s the burden on the People.
    I don’t believe that they can prove it now that the law’s changed.”
    He concluded his argument by stating, “[I]n light of the change in
    the law, in light of the People’s theory in what is still a natural
    and probable consequence theory, they cannot prove their case
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” The superior court did not at any
    time state that Ocampo’s attorney’s description of the
    prosecution’s burden was incorrect or that the People did not
    have the burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt.
    In light of this record, it is clear that the court in its findings was
    aware of the correct legal standard and found the People had
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of
    second degree murder under current law.
    C.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
    Finding of Aider and Abettor Liability
    “‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of
    natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
    murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
    aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
    person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
    13
    another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’” (Reyes,
    supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990; accord, Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
    p. 850.) “‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
    actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
    mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus
    reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-
    endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus
    includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the
    life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice
    murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct,
    aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of
    that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by
    the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
    intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
    commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
    human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’”
    (Reyes, at pp. 990-991; accord, People v. Curiel (2023) 
    15 Cal.5th 433
    , 463; People v. Powell (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 689
    , 712-713.)
    Ocampo contends there is insufficient evidence to support
    the trial court’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo
    aided and abetted the second degree murder. He asserts the
    evidence, at most, shows he was merely part of the group that
    committed the assault, he had no knowledge of Ambriz’s intent to
    commit the stabbing, and he did not assist in the stabbing.
    Ocampo’s contentions lack merit.
    Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding
    that Ocampo possessed the requisite actus reus in aiding and
    abetting the murder. As the superior court found, Ocampo by his
    words and conduct aided the commission of the stabbing by
    encouraging his fellow tagging crews (BYMS and H2O) to “hunt”
    14
    for a rival tagging crew member. On the night of the incident,
    Ocampo was agitated and upset, and he got angry with Bonilla
    after Bonilla told him to calm down. Ocampo showed Bonilla an
    abdominal scar, which resulted from a stabbing three months
    earlier by a rival tagging crew member, and said, “Look what
    they did to me.” When someone suggested the group go “lurking,”
    Ocampo responded, “Let’s go get an enemy.” Ocampo armed
    himself with a knife, went to the territory of UTF (a rival tagging
    crew), and initiated the attack on Cerna after Cerna identified
    himself as a UTF member. During the fight, Ocampo took out his
    folding knife with the blade locked in an open position, which
    showed his intent to use the knife on Cerna.
    Substantial evidence also supports the superior court’s
    finding that Ocampo harbored the requisite mens rea as an aider
    and abettor. Ocampo denies that he knew that Ambriz was
    carrying a knife. But it is a reasonable inference that Ocampo
    was present when Giovanni and Ambriz told Bonilla before the
    group left Ocampo’s house that they were carrying knives to
    “hunt” for a rival tagging crew member. And Ocampo was
    physically fighting with Cerna when Ambriz joined the fight
    armed with a knife, which further supports the court’s finding
    that Ocampo had knowledge of Ambriz’s intent to stab Cerna.
    Further, Ocampo would have seen Ambriz and possibly others
    stab Cerna as the group was attacking Cerna.6 Ocampo intended
    to assist Ambriz in the stabbing by continuing to attack Cerna as
    the fight continued. And after Ocampo got into the car to flee, he
    stated, “We got him, we got him good.” Ocampo knew the
    6     Cerna was stabbed nine times, but Ambriz admitted to
    stabbing Cerna twice.
    15
    stabbing was dangerous to life because he was a victim of a prior
    stabbing. He acted in conscious disregard for life by continuing
    to participate in the attack as Cerna was stabbed, and he left
    Cerna bleeding on the street. Ample evidence therefore supports
    the superior court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Ocampo was guilty of second degree murder as an aider and
    abettor of implied malice murder under current law.7
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying the petition for resentencing under
    section 1172.6 is affirmed.
    FEUER, J.
    We concur:
    MARTINEZ, P. J.               STONE, J.
    7      Ocampo also contends the denial of his section 1172.6
    petition violated his due process rights and the proscription
    against cruel and unusual punishment under the state and
    federal Constitutions (U.S. Const., 8th and 14th Amends.; Cal.
    Const., art. I, §§ 15, 17). Specifically, Ocampo argues the
    superior court violated his constitutional rights because the court
    denied his petition notwithstanding the prosecutor’s failure to
    prove him guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s
    findings beyond a reasonable doubt that Ocampo was guilty of
    implied malice murder, Ocampo’s contentions fail.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B330976

Filed Date: 10/25/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/25/2024