Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A. CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/24/24 Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ASSOCIATION FOR LOS B326243
ANGELES DEPUTY
SHERIFFS, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Appellant, 22STCP01254)
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinksi,
Brian P. Ross, and Zachery A. Lopes for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall, Eleanor S. Ruth, and
Lauren M. Brody for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________________
The Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS)
appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied its
petition for writ of mandate. The petition sought to compel the
County of Los Angeles (County) to refrain from implementing or
enforcing a change in disciplinary procedures relating to
noncompliance with the County’s requirement that all employees
be vaccinated against COVID-19. The petition also alleged the
County violated its obligation to meet and confer with ALADS
prior to enacting a change in disciplinary procedures.
While this appeal was pending, the County repealed the
disciplinary policy challenged by ALADS. The case is now moot.
Because the ordinance on which the trial court’s judgment is
based no longer exists, we reverse the judgment and remand for
the trial court to dismiss the petition as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
Pursuant to the California Constitution, the County is a
legal subdivision of the state and is governed by its charter,
which has the force and effect of legislative enactments. (Cal.
Const., art. XI, §§ 1, subd. (a), & 3, subd. (a).) The County “may
exercise its powers only through the board of supervisors or
through agents and officers acting under authority of the board or
authority conferred by law.” (Gov. Code, § 23005.)1
The County Civil Service Enabling Law (§ 31100, et seq.;
Enabling Law) enables a county to “by ordinance adopt a limited
civil service system for any or all county officers and employees,
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2
except elective officers.” (§ 31104.) The civil service ordinance
must “designate the appointive officers and employees to be
placed in the system.” (§ 31106.) The Enabling Law requires the
civil service ordinance to include certain provisions regarding
employee discipline procedures, including the following: “Any
officer or employee in the classified civil service may be
dismissed, suspended, or reduced in rank or compensation by the
appointing authority after appointment or promotion is complete
by a written order, stating specifically the reasons for the action.”
(§ 31108, subd. (a)(1).) The Enabling Law does not define
“appointive officers” or “appointing authority.”2
As contemplated by the Enabling Law, the Los Angeles
County Charter (Charter) establishes a civil service system for
County employees and directs the Board of Supervisors (Board)
to adopt rules for the civil service system (Civil Service Rules).
(See Charter, art. IX, §§ 30, 35.)3 The Charter requires the Civil
Service Rules to provide for the establishment of lists of qualified
persons for employment and the certification of those lists to
“appointing powers.” (Charter, art. IX, § 35, subd. (2).) It is from
those “eligible service lists” that County officers, such as the
2 Other provisions of the Enabling Law not specifically at
issue in this case use the term “appointing power” (see, e.g.,
section 31115.5), which is also not defined.
3 The trial court granted ALADS’s request to take judicial
notice of the Los Angeles County Charter and Ordinance
No. 2022-0014 of the County of Los Angeles. We also take
judicial notice of those documents. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (c); 459, subd. (a)(1).) In addition, we granted ALADS’s
April 24, 2024 request for judicial notice of the Civil Service
Rules of the County of Los Angeles.
3
Sheriff, “shall appoint” members of their departments. (Charter,
art. IV, § 12; art. XII, § 51.)
The Charter also directs the Board to appoint a Director of
Personnel to administer the civil service system and to “perform
such other duties as may be prescribed by said Board pursuant to
the provisions of Section 22¾ hereof.” (Charter, art. IX, § 32.)
Section 22¾ states, “[O]ther than personnel functions which are
the responsibility of other appointing authorities pursuant to the
provisions of this Charter, the Board of Supervisors may
prescribe that the Director of Personnel exercise general
supervision over and enforce all or any portion of the rules and
procedures of the County’s personnel system including, but not
limited thereto, . . . the administration of rules and procedures to
be followed in the County’s employer-employee relationships.”
(Charter, art. VI, § 22¾.)
The Civil Service Rules adopted by the County define
“[a]ppointing power” as “the person, board, or commission having
authority to make appointments to a position.” (Civil Service
Rules, rule 2.03.) The rules also state an employee “may be
suspended by the appointing power” pending an investigation or
as a disciplinary measure. (Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A).)
B. The COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate and Civil Service
Rule 18.10
In August 2021 the Board established a COVID-19
vaccination policy that required all County employees to be fully
vaccinated against COVID-19 by a specified date. The policy was
set forth in an October 1, 2021 memorandum issued by the
County’s Department of Human Resources. The memorandum
4
stated that “[f]ailure to comply with this Policy may result in
corrective action, up to and including discharge.”4
In response to the vaccination policy, then-Sheriff Alex
Villanueva stated he would “only seek voluntary compliance”
with the vaccine mandate and declared he had “sole authority to
decide discipline” within the Sheriff’s Department.5
On April 5, 2022 the Board amended the Civil Service
Rules by adding Rule 18.10, which stated in part:
“A. Notwithstanding any other provision of these Rules, the
director of personnel may suspend . . . or discharge . . . any
employee not in compliance with the County’s COVID-19
Vaccination Policy . . . . For purposes of any such action only,
references to the ‘appointing power’ in Rule 18.01, 18.02, 18.04, or
18.05, as applicable, mean the director of personnel. [¶] B. The
authority of the Director of Personnel to take any action
4 An attachment to the memorandum, titled “COVID-19
Vaccination Policy Corrective Action Plan,” stated that “[f]ailure
to comply with the Policy will result in corrective action, up to
and including discharge.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted,
italics added.)
5 In December 2021 ALADS filed a complaint for declaratory
relief against the County seeking a declaration that the Board
“does not have the lawful authority to suspend or discharge
employees of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department” and
“only the Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles . . . has the lawful
authority to suspend or discharge employees of the Department.”
The County states in its respondent’s brief that the lawsuit has
been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. (See Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles, Super.
Ct. Los Angeles County, No. 21-ST-CV-44293.)
5
described in this Rule supersedes the authority of the appointing
power.” (Civil Service Rules, rule 18.10 (Rule 18.10).)
C. The Petition and Amended Petition
On April 5, 2022 ALADS filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Los Angeles County Employee Relations
Commission (ERCOM) alleging the County had violated its
employee relations ordinance by adopting Rule 18.10 without
properly fulfilling its meet and confer obligations. Three days
later, ALADS filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, followed by an amended
petition on July 13, 2022.
The amended petition alleged three causes of action
relating to the implementation and substance of Rule 18.10.
First, ALADS alleged the County had violated its ministerial
duty pursuant to statute to meet and confer in good faith with
employee organizations prior to amending its disciplinary
policies. The second and third causes of action alleged the
County had violated its ministerial duties to comply with the
Enabling Law and the Charter, respectively. ALADS alleged the
Enabling Law (in section 31108) identified an employee’s
appointing authority as the sole disciplinary authority for that
employee and the Charter (in article VI, section 22¾) prohibited
the Board from transferring personnel functions from an
appointing authority to the director of personnel. Accordingly,
the Sheriff was the only proper disciplinary authority for
ALADS’s members and designation of the Director of Personnel
as an appointing authority was unlawful.
The amended petition sought a writ of mandate directing
the County: to refrain from implementing Rule 18.10 until it
exhausted its meet and confer obligations; to refrain from
6
“allowing an official other than the Sheriff—the Personnel
Director—from imposing discipline on ALADS’s members;” and a
permanent injunction prohibiting the County from “transferring
disciplinary authority over non-compliance with the County’s
mandatory vaccination policy from the Sheriff to the County’s
Department of Personnel via an amendment to the County’s Civil
Service Rules.”
D. The Demurrer, Ruling, and Notice of Appeal
The County demurred to the amended petition, arguing as
to the first cause of action that ALADS had not exhausted its
administrative remedies before filing its writ petition. The
County noted the ERCOM proceeding was still ongoing and
duplicative of the first cause of action. On the merits, the County
argued it had complied with the applicable statutory bargaining
requirements. Regarding the second and third causes of action,
the County argued the applicable laws “do not grant the Sheriff
exclusive authority over discipline” and it was within the
County’s discretion to adopt Rule 18.10.
On December 16, 2022, after hearing argument and taking
the matter under submission, the trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. The court found ALADS had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the first cause of
action. On the second and third causes of action, after analyzing
the Charter and applicable statutes, the court found ALADS had
“identified no statute or Charter provision mandating that the
Board limit an appointing power to a single individual for all
purposes.” Instead, “the Board has the authority to amend the
civil service rules under the Charter. Thus, the Board could
amend the civil service rules to define who is an appointing
power within the context of the civil service rules.”
7
ALADS filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 2023, before
the trial court entered a signed dismissal or other appealable
order. (See Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65, 67 [“our courts
have held it to be ‘hornbook law that [an] order sustaining a
demurrer is interlocutory, is not appealable, and that the appeal
must be taken from the subsequently entered judgment’”]; see
generally Code Civ. Proc., § 581d [all dismissals ordered by the
court “shall be in the form of a written order signed by the court
and filed in the action”].) However, a judgment in favor of the
County was entered on March 23, 2023. We therefore treat the
premature notice of appeal as filed immediately after entry of the
judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1).)
E. The Repeal of Rule 18.10
While this appeal was pending the County “sunsetted” the
COVID-19 vaccine mandate. Accordingly, on October 17, 2023
the Board repealed Rule 18.10 in its entirety.6
In November 2023 ALADS notified ERCOM that it was
withdrawing its remaining unfair labor practices claim in light of
the repeal of Rule 18.10.7
6 We granted the County’s February 2, 2024 request to take
judicial notice of the “Statement of Proceedings” for the
October 17, 2023 Board meeting; the ordinance repealing
Rule 18.10; and the ERCOM meeting minutes for July 18, 2022
and November 27, 2023.
7 ERCOM had previously dismissed the part of ALADS’s
charge regarding the Board’s failure to engage in “decision
bargaining” prior to enacting Rule 18.10. But ALADS’s claim
regarding “effects bargaining” remained pending before ERCOM
until ALADS’s withdrawal of the claim in 2023.
8
DISCUSSION
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) In other
words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must
first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in
legal status.” (Id. at p. 277.)
Even where an appeal is moot, however, “courts may
exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) As the Supreme
Court explained in D.P., reviewing courts will generally exercise
their discretion when the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties, or a material question remains
for the court to determine. (Ibid.)
The County argues we should dismiss this appeal as moot
because the repeal of Rule 18.10 renders irrelevant any potential
9
conflict between the rule and the Charter and Enabling Law.8
“The courts of this state have held that where a disputed statute,
order or ordinance is repealed before an appeal is concluded the
matter is moot.” (Sierra Club v. Board of Supervisors (1981)
126 Cal.App.3d 698, 704-705 [finding the “central issue” in the
case was moot because county’s adoption of new general plan
eliminated “the objectionable inconsistency” between the plan
and zoning laws]; accord, Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964)
62 Cal.2d 129, 134 (Paul) [finding appeal moot where
“administrative regulation in issue has been repealed prior to the
appellate decision”]; Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School District
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 773 [“an intervening change in the
law—namely, the repeal or modification of a statute under attack
or subsequent legislation correcting a challenged deficiency—that
is the crux of a case may result in mootness”].)
ALADS does not challenge the County’s characterization of
the appeal as moot, nor has it identified any ongoing harm that
could be rectified by the outcome it seeks in this case. Instead,
ALADS argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the
merits of its appeal because the dispute is likely to recur. ALADS
contends the County “has demonstrated its willingness and
ability . . . to remove the sole disciplinary authority from the
Sheriff . . . [and] the County continues to believe that this action
was legally permissible.” Thus, “it is likely that the County will
attempt to remove the sole disciplinary authority from the Sheriff
at some point in the future.”
8 ALADS concedes the appeal of its first cause of action
regarding failure to meet and confer is moot because ALADS
dismissed its administrative unfair labor practice charge before
ERCOM and ALADS has no pending administrative claims.
10
ALADS’s assertion that the County could at some point in
the future in some unknown context amend the Civil Service
Rules regarding disciplinary authority is insufficient to warrant
our discretionary review of the merits in this case. (Center for
Local Government Accountability v. City of San Diego (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1157 [“The voluntary cessation of allegedly
wrongful conduct destroys the justiciability of a controversy and
renders an action moot unless there is a reasonable expectation
the allegedly wrongful conduct will be repeated.”]; see
TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
140, 151 [“When there is no reasonable basis to believe that a
past action will be repeated, a viable claim does not exist simply
because a public entity declines to concede that the action was
illegal . . . .”].) ALADS has not presented any evidence to support
its contention the County’s past action of amending disciplinary
authority is “‘likely to recur,’” other than its speculation that this
could happen with respect to discipline in use-of-force cases
against Sheriff’s deputies. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In
addition, even if the County amends the disciplinary procedures
for its employees at some point in the future, there is no
reasonable basis to believe that a decision by this court regarding
the legality of the specific language and procedure used by the
County in this case would have any relevance to a challenge to a
future amendment.9 Moreover, the unusual circumstances of the
COVID-19 pandemic are no longer present.
9 ALADS’s argument that this case presents an issue of
broad public interest fares no better. ALADS argues it is a
matter of public concern which individual or entity has the
authority to discipline deputy sheriffs. However, that
determination may well depend on the context of the decision,
11
The question remains whether we should dismiss the
appeal as moot. “Ordinarily, when, as here, a case becomes moot
pending an appellate decision, the reviewing court will simply
dismiss the appeal on the ground it can no longer grant any
effective relief. [Citations.] However, when subsequent
legislative or administrative action renders an entire controversy
moot and dismissal of the appeal would have the effect of
affirming the underlying judgment without having reached the
merits, appellate courts usually ‘“dispose of the case, not merely
of the appellate proceeding which brought it here” [citation] . . .
by reversing the judgment solely for the purpose of restoring the
matter to the jurisdiction of the superior court with directions to
the court to dismiss the proceeding.’” (La Mirada Avenue
Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 586, 590-591;10 see Paul, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 134
[rescission of challenged regulation meant “basis for that
judgment has now disappeared,” and proper disposition was to
reverse the judgment and remand with directions to dismiss the
proceeding as moot to avoid impliedly affirming the judgment
declaring the regulation unconstitutional]; Delta Stewardship
Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1055 [amendment of
and, as discussed, ALADS has not shown a dispute over this
issue is likely to recur.
10 In La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at page 591, we
dismissed the appeal as moot instead of vacating the judgment
because the case became moot as a result of the action of the
appellant who had lost the case below. By contrast, this case has
become moot because of the action of the County (the winning
party below) in repealing Rule 18.10.
12
challenged state regulations rendered the “basis for the trial
court’s judgment . . . nonexistent”; therefore, “‘“‘preferable
procedure’”’” was to remand for dismissal as moot]; Coalition for
a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 939, 944-945 [reversing judgment and directing
trial court to dismiss action as moot where city rescinded
challenged resolutions and allowing judgment to stand could
impliedly legitimize project that been abandoned].)
Because the repeal of Rule 18.10 eliminates the basis for
this lawsuit, we adopt the procedure outlined in Paul. The
alternative urged by the County—to leave the judgment standing
but dismiss the appeal—would effectively affirm the judgment,
leaving the question open whether the trial court’s judgment has
any preclusive effect. (See Coalition for a Sustainable Future in
Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 944
[reversal of the judgment “ensures that the judgment can have no
issue preclusive effect”].) We therefore reverse the judgment and
remand with directions for the trial court to dismiss the amended
petition as moot. “Such a reversal, of course, does not imply
approval of a contrary judgment, but is merely a procedural step
necessary to a proper disposition of this case.” (Paul, supra,
62 Cal.2d at p. 135.)
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand for the trial court to
dismiss ALADS’s amended petition as moot. The parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
14