People v. Wilford CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/25/24 P. v. Wilford CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083442, D083443
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCS256542 &
SCD261253)
JOHNNY JEROME WILFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General.
I
INTRODUCTION
The trial court sentenced defendant Johnny Jerome Wilford to state
prison in two separate criminal proceedings and imposed, but stayed, a
prison prior enhancement under former Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (b).1 Subsequently, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code. That
statutory provision, which has since been renumbered as section 1172.75,
declares most previously imposed prison prior enhancements legally invalid
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a)), and it compels trial courts to recall the sentence of any
inmate who is currently serving a term for a judgment with a now-invalid
prison prior enhancement and to resentence the inmate (id., subds. (c)–(d)).
In the proceedings below, Wilford argued he was entitled to
resentencing under section 1172.75 because he was serving time for a
judgment that included an invalid—albeit stayed—prison prior enhancement.
However, the trial court denied relief on the basis that section 1172.75
applies only when an inmate’s sentence includes a prison prior enhancement
that the sentencing court imposed and executed (rather than imposed and
stayed).
The Courts of Appeal are divided on whether section 1172.75 applies to
an inmate when his or her sentence includes an otherwise-qualifying prison
prior enhancement that was imposed and stayed, or whether it applies only
when the inmate’s sentence includes a prison prior enhancement that was
imposed and executed. (Compare People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
188 (Espino) [resentencing is available when prison prior enhancement is
imposed and punishment is stricken]; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Cal.App.5th 665 (Mayberry), review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853
[resentencing is available when prison prior enhancement is imposed and
stayed]; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270 (Saldana), review
granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 [same]; People v. Christianson (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 300 (Christianson), review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189
[same]; and People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276 [same]; with
People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted Feb. 21, 2024,
S283169 [recall and resentencing is only available when prison prior
enhancement is imposed and executed].) In Christianson, this court
determined that section 1172.75 applies where, as here, the sentencing court
imposed and then stayed a prison prior enhancement. (Christianson, at
pp. 311–317.)
We adhere to the Christianson decision, which in our view sets forth
the correct statutory interpretation of section 1172.75. Therefore, we reverse
the order denying relief to Wilford and remand the matter to the trial court
with directions to recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing
proceeding under section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
II
BACKGROUND
A. The Judgments of Conviction
In 2012, in Case No. SCS256542, Wilford pleaded guilty to one count of
false imprisonment by force (§§ 236, 237; count 3) and admitted a prison prior
enhancement (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) arising from a 2010 conviction for
assault with a semi-automatic firearm. The trial court imposed a four-year
prison sentence, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Wilford on
formal probation for three years. The court later revoked probation and
sentenced Wilford to prison for eight months on the false imprisonment
3
conviction (one-third the midterm), which it ran consecutively to a prison
sentence imposed in a separate criminal matter, Case No. SCD261253.
In 2015, in Case No. SCD261253, a jury found Wilford guilty of one
count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4); count 1), one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243,
subd. (d); count 2), one count of resisting an executive officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1); count 4), and two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a
cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 5 and 6). It also found true a sentencing
enhancement allegation that Wilford personally inflicted great bodily injury
on a person other than an accomplice in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found true a prison prior
enhancement (former § 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony prior enhancement
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), all
arising from Wilford’s 2010 conviction for assault with a semi-automatic
firearm. The court initially sentenced Wilford to an aggregate prison term of
twenty-one years and four months. However, following a direct appeal of the
judgment of conviction (People v. Wilford (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 827), the
court resentenced Wilford to an aggregate prison term of twenty-two years.
As part of the sentence, the court imposed and stayed execution of a one-year
term for the prison prior enhancement.
B. The Resentencing Proceedings
After the enactment of Senate Bill No. 483, the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Wilford as an inmate
who was serving a sentence that included a prison prior enhancement under
former section 667.5, subdivision (b), which may be invalid under section
1172.75. The trial court appointed a public defender for Wilford and solicited
4
briefing from the parties to determine Wilford’s eligibility for recall of his
sentence and resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (c).
In his written briefing, Wilford argued he was entitled to a recall of his
sentence and a full resentencing because he was serving a term of
incarceration for a judgment that included a prison prior enhancement the
Legislature had deemed invalid after its imposition. The district attorney
took the position that sentence modification was unwarranted because
Wilford was not serving additional time in prison for his stayed prison prior
enhancement. The district attorney contended section 1172.75 allows for a
recall of an inmate’s sentence and resentencing only when the sentencing
court imposes and executes (rather than imposes and stays) a qualifying
prison prior enhancement.
The trial court held a hearing on the matter and denied relief to
Wilford. Wilford filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s order.
III
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Wilford contends his stayed one-year prison prior
enhancement is legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), and,
therefore, the trial court erred when it declined to recall his sentence and
resentence him under section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d). For reasons
we shall explain, we agree with Wilford.
A. Statutory Framework
Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required a
sentencing court to impose a one-year sentencing enhancement “for each
prior separate prison term” served by the defendant, unless the defendant
remained free from custody for a period of five years. (Former § 667.5,
subd. (b).) This sentencing enhancement is commonly known as a prison
5
prior enhancement. Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–
2020 Reg. Sess.) limited a sentencing court’s ability to impose a prison prior
enhancement only to those cases in which the defendant’s past convictions
were for certain specified sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
In 2021, the Legislature approved Senate Bill No. 483 for the stated
purpose of “ensur[ing] equal justice and address[ing] systemic racial bias in
sentencing” by “retroactively apply[ing] ... Senate Bill [No.] 136 ... to all
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for [a]
repealed [prison prior] sentence enhancement[].” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
To achieve this objective, Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the
Penal Code, a statutory provision that was subsequently renumbered to
section 1172.75 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) For
purposes of this opinion, we will refer to this provision as section 1172.75.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), declares, “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5 ... is legally invalid,” except for certain specified prison prior
enhancements based on past convictions for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 1172.5, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) compels the CDCR and the county
correctional administrator of each county to “identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a),” and to provide the person’s name,
birth date, and identifying case information to the court that sentenced the
person. (Id., subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) instructs the court, upon receipt of
such information, to “review the judgment and verify that the current
judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in [section 1172.75,]
subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current
6
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), outlines the procedures applicable to
the resentencing proceeding. It states that resentencing “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination
of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.
Resentencing ... shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (§ 1172.5, subd. (d)(1).) It requires the court to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(2).) It also directs the court to “consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).)
B. Application
The question at issue here is whether a prison prior enhancement
based on a past conviction for a non-sexually violent offense is “imposed” for
purposes of section 1172.75, subdivision (a), when the sentencing court
imposes and then stays the enhancement, or, alternatively, whether a prison
prior enhancement is “imposed” only when the court imposes and then
executes the enhancement. This question is central to resolving the current
7
dispute because the recall and resentencing procedures set forth in
section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d), apply only when an inmate is
serving a term for a judgment with a sentencing enhancement described in
subdivision (a)—i.e., an enhancement that was “imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5 ....” Because this is a
question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 308, 310, review granted.)
In Christianson, our court concluded, “[o]n its face, the word ‘imposed,’
in this context, is at least somewhat ambiguous. As our high court has
explained, ‘it is important to understand that the word “impose” applies to
enhancements that are “imposed and then executed” as well as those that are
“imposed and then stayed.[”] However, as a practical matter, the word
‘impose’ is often employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while
the word ‘stay’ often refers to the latter.” ’ ” (Christianson, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 311, review granted.) “Section 1172.75 requires the CDCR
to identify all inmates ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that includes
an enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (b), italics
added.) A judgment may include a sentence that has been imposed but
suspended or stayed. [Citation.] Thus, by its plain language, all that is
required for the CDCR to identify an inmate under section 1172.75,
subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in the abstract of
judgment, regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed. Had the Legislature
intended for the language in subdivision (b) to limit the identification to those
inmates that would necessarily be required to serve an additional term based
on the enhancement, it certainly could have done so.” (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312, review granted.)
8
Removal of a stayed enhancement provides the statutorily proscribed
relief to the defendant insofar as it eliminates the potential of an increased
sentence. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, review granted; see
also Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 674—675, review granted.)
When an enhancement is imposed and stayed, the court “retains the ability to
lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance, such as if an
alternately imposed term is invalidated.” (Christianson, at p. 312.) Thus, it
follows that “removing the stayed term from the abstract of judgment results
in a ‘lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.’ ” (Ibid.; see also
Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 197 [“elimination of the prison prior
reduces the potential sentence facing the defendant and therefore results in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed”]; Saldana, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1278 [rejecting argument “that defendants serving
sentences with stayed enhancements will not be subject to a lesser sentence
… if their enhancements are stricken”], review granted.)
Further, we cannot ignore that section 1172.75 is “expressly aimed at
reducing sentences by retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement
described as exacerbating ‘existing racial and socio-economic disparities in
our criminal justice system.’ ” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314,
review granted.) To condition an inmate’s eligibility for resentencing on
whether the sentencing enhancement was executed would, in our view,
maintain—or, at the very least, do less to alleviate—these existing
disparities. Moreover, our construction of section 1172.75 comports with “the
rule of lenity’s overriding principle that, where the Legislature’s intent
cannot be determined, courts must prefer the interpretation that is most
favorable to defendants.” (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 198.)
9
In sum, we adopt the analysis and conclusions from Christianson as
though they were set forth in full in this opinion. Applying Christianson, we
conclude the trial court erred when it denied relief to Wilford. The
sentencing court imposed and stayed the prison prior enhancement arising
from Wilford’s prior conviction from 2010. Thus, the prison prior
enhancement is legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a).
Because Wilford is serving a prison term for a judgment with a legally invalid
prison prior enhancement, the trial court must recall the sentence and
conduct a full resentencing proceeding. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see Saldana,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, review granted [“ ‘By its plain terms,
section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court
strike the newly “invalid” enhancements.’ ”].) During the resentencing
proceeding, the trial court “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)2
2 Because we are reversing the denial order for the grounds stated
herein, we do not address Wilford’s alternative claim that the trial court
violated his right to be present at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding
by conducting the hearing on his resentencing request in his absence.
10
IV
DISPOSITION
The denial order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to recall the sentence and conduct a full resentencing
proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
KELETY, J.
11