In re G.R. ( 2024 )

Filed 10/25/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re G.R., a Person Coming B332699
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. DK23174
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Dismissed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
R.R., alleged father of G.R., appeals the juvenile court’s exit
order requiring his visitation with G.R. be monitored. We
dismiss his appeal. Unspecified statutory citations are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with R.R. In
2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood
dysregulation disorder. When the mother failed to get G.R. the
mental health services she needed, the Los Angeles Department
of Child and Family Services became involved. The mother told
the Department she did not have contact information for G.R.’s
father.
On June 5, 2017, the juvenile court found R.R. was G.R.’s
alleged father. The minute order from the hearing reflected that
the court found R.R. to be the presumed father. However, the
juvenile court later amended that minute order to show
accurately that it found R.R. to be an alleged father. A later
report from the Department stated R.R. was incarcerated for
domestic violence. A background investigation revealed R.R. had
an extensive criminal history. At an October 2017 hearing, the
juvenile court denied services to R.R. because he was only an
alleged father and ordered no visits until R.R. contacted the
Department.
In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her
mother’s custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In
November 2020, R.R. contacted the Department and stated he
wanted to have a relationship with G.R. G.R. said she was
willing to have visits with R.R. In March 2021, the Department
reported that R.R. had not returned its call to set up visits.
In December 2022, R.R. called the Department to ask about
placement options for G.R., stating that his wife and her two
2
children lived in Los Angeles. The social worker told R.R. he
would have to file a section 388 petition. When asked why he had
not moved forward with services and visits two years before, R.R.
said he did not know G.R. was having behavioral issues and he
now wanted to be in her life and help her.
In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition,
which the juvenile court denied. In June 2023, G.R. reported she
had spoken with R.R. by phone. In August 2023, G.R. said she
was not ready for in-person visits with R.R. In September 2023,
the juvenile court appointed G.R.’s caregiver as her legal
guardian, ordered monitored visits for the mother and R.R., and
terminated its jurisdiction.
R.R. appeals the juvenile court’s order that his visits with
G.R. be monitored. Because he is only an alleged father, he
cannot show he is aggrieved by this order. We therefore dismiss
his appeal.
The dependency statutes distinguish between the rights of
alleged, biological, and presumed fathers. (In re O.S. (2002) 102
Cal.App.4th 1402, 1406–1407 (O.S.).) An alleged father is one
who has not established paternity. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 435, 448–449, fn.15.) A biological father is one who has
established paternity but has not achieved presumed father
status. (Ibid.) A presumed father is one who satisfies certain
enumerated statutory criteria, such as being married to the
mother of the child or receiving the child into his home and
holding the child out as his. (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
588, 603; Fam. Code § 7611.)
Under the dependency statutes, an alleged father is
entitled to notice of the proceedings so that he may appear, assert
his position, and attempt to establish paternity. (In re Kobe A.
3
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.) Unless and until an alleged
father becomes a presumed father, he has no rights to custody,
reunification services, or visits. (O.S., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1410.) The juvenile court may grant services to a biological
father if it is in the child’s best interests. (Ibid.) An alleged
father has no current interest because his paternity has not yet
been established. (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712,
715.)
Here, although R.R. appeared and asserted a position, thus
arguably becoming a party to the proceedings, he did not
establish paternity. (In re Baby Boy V. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1108, 1117 [alleged father becomes party to the proceedings when
he appears and asserts a position].) R.R. makes much of the
juvenile court’s error in listing him as a presumed father in the
June 2017 minute order, but concedes the court later amended
the order to correct its mistake. He makes no argument that he
qualifies as or that the court should have found him to be a
biological or presumed father.
Only a party aggrieved by the court’s order may appeal
it. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034
[to have standing, a person must have legal rights that may
suffer some injury].) R.R. argues that because the juvenile court
made specific visitation orders for him “this verified that [R.R.]
had a known current interest.” He cites no authority for this
proposition and we reject it. As an alleged father, R.R. did not
have a current interest and the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion in crafting an exit order it thought in the best interests
of G.R. does not change that. R.R. had no right to visitation
because he did not change his status from an alleged
father. (Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747,
4
752 [“If a person is given services to which he or she is not
entitled, there is no right to complain on appeal of the court’s
findings”].) Thus, he has no standing to appeal the juvenile
court’s order about his visitation.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss the appeal.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
5