In re Marriage of Shayan ( 2024 )

Filed 10/25/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re the Marriage of ZOHREH B323455
MCINTYRE and SHAHRIYAR
SHAYAN.
ZOHREH MCINTYRE (Los Angeles County
SHAYAN, Super. Ct. No. SD025162)
Respondent,
v.
SHAHRIYAR SHAYAN,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Elizabeth Scully, Judge. Affirmed.
Stuart J. Faber; Law Offices of William W. Oxley and
William W. Oxley for Appellant.
SP Law Group and Vladimir Shagramanov for Respondent.
_______________________________________
Shahriyar Shayan appeals from an order denying his
motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by
respondent Zohreh McIntyre Shayan.1 Shahriyar argues the writ
should have been quashed because it was sought more than ten
years after the entry of judgment in violation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.020, and was subject to the renewal
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. He
asserts that, while judgments entered under the Family Code are
generally exempt from Code of Civil Procedure sections 683.020’s
10-year limitation period and section 683.130’s renewal
requirements under Family Code section 291, that exemption
does not apply for judgments to satisfy an order for attorney fees.
We disagree with Shahriyar. When a judgment for
attorney fees is entered under the Family Code, the judgment is
enforceable until satisfied in full. Failure to renew the judgment
has no effect on its enforceability per Family Code section 291,
subdivision (b). Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shahriyar and Zohreh married in 2002, and had two
children together. Zohreh petitioned for dissolution in 2007.
On February 22, 2010, Zohreh filed a motion for attorney
fees for services previously rendered and for fees for future
litigation. On May 25, 2010, the family court granted the motion,
awarding fees for past services by Zohreh’s two attorneys in the
amount of $65,000 for Navid Natanian, and $50,000 for Barry
Fischer.
1 As is customary in family law proceedings, we refer to the
parties by their first names.
2
On August 18, 2010, the family court entered judgment on
reserved issues in Zohreh’s favor and attached a bifurcated trial
award on attorney fees. The total award in attorney fees and
costs was $125,000.
Almost 12 years later, in April 2022, Zohreh filed an
application for the issuance of a writ of execution on the
August 18, 2010 judgment.2 Thereafter, the court clerk issued a
writ of execution for $125,626.20.
On April 20, 2022, Shahriyar requested to set aside the
writ of execution for attorney fees. Shahriyar argued the
judgment had expired after 10 years under Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.020, and Zohreh had not renewed the
judgment within that period as provided by Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.130. The family court denied the request.
Shahriyar appealed.
DISCUSSION
Shahriyar’s only contention on appeal is that an award of
attorney fees constitutes a money judgment that is subject to the
10-year limitation period and renewal requirements of Code of
Civil Procedure section 683.130, and that Family Code
section 291’s exemptions do not apply.
I. Standard of review and rules of statutory
interpretation
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
(Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247.)
“Our goal in interpreting statutes is ‘ “to ascertain the
intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the
2 It appears between June 29, 2020 and April 4, 2022,
Zohreh applied multiple times for a writ of execution and to
renew the August 18, 2010 judgment.
3
construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.” ’
[Citations.] A step-by-step process of statutory interpretation has
been developed by the courts of this state. [Citations.] The ‘ “key
to statutory interpretation is applying the rules of statutory
construction in their proper sequence . . . as follows: ‘we first look
to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its
legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a proposed
construction.’ ” ’ ” (Smart Corner Owners Association v. CJUF
Smart Corner LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439, 459–460
(Smart Corner).)
“In the initial step, we examine ‘the words of the statute,
“because the statutory language is generally the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent.” ’ [Citation.] ‘When the statutory
text is ambiguous, or it otherwise fails to resolve the question of
its intended meaning,’ we proceed to the second step, and ‘look to
the statute’s legislative history and the historical circumstances
behind its enactment.’ [Citation.] ‘In this step, courts may “turn
to secondary rules of interpretation, such as maxims of
construction, ‘which serve as aids in the sense that they express
familiar insights about conventional language usage.’ ” ’ ” (Smart
Corner, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 460.)
“ ‘ “If ambiguity remains after resort to secondary rules of
construction and to the statute’s legislative history, then we must
cautiously take the third and final step in the interpretive
process. [Citation.] In this phase of the process, we apply
‘reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand.’
[Citation.] Where an uncertainty exists, we must consider the
consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.” ’ ”
(Smart Corner, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 460.)
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II. The statutes at issue
Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 provides that a
judgment may not be enforced upon the expiration of 10 years.
This includes all enforcement procedures, including a writ or
order pursuant to the judgment. (Id., subd. (b).) However, a
party may renew the judgment any time before the expiration of
the 10-year period under Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130,
subdivision (a). Code of Civil Procedure section 683.310 states
these rules do “not apply to a judgment or order made or entered
pursuant to the Family Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.310.)
In turn, Family Code section 291, subdivision (a) provides:
“A money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property
that is made or entered under this code, including a judgment for
child, family, or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full
or otherwise satisfied.” (Ibid.) Family Code section 291,
subdivision (b) provides: “A judgment described in this section is
exempt from any requirement that a judgment be renewed.
Failure to renew a judgment described in this section has no
effect on the enforceability of the judgment.” (Ibid.) Notably,
Family Code section 291, subdivision (c)(1) states that, if the
judgment has not previously been renewed as to past due
amounts, it may be renewed “at any time.” Family Code
section 291, subdivision (c)(2) states: “If the judgment has
previously been renewed, the amount of the judgment as
previously renewed and any past due amount that became due
and payable after the previous renewal may be renewed at
any time after a period of at least five years has elapsed from
the time the judgment was previously renewed.” (Ibid.)
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III. Family Code section 291 applies to attorney fee
judgments
Shahriyar’s appeal asks us to interpret the application of
these statutes to the August 18, 2010 judgment for attorney fees,
arguing the judgment for attorney fees should not be exempt to
the 10-year limitation and renewal period under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 683.020 and 683.130 despite the language of
Family Code section 291. As discussed below, the plain language
of Family Code section 291, its legislative history, as well as
reason and commonsense do not support Shahriyar’s position.
A. The plain language of Family Code section 291
supports an interpretation that judgments for
attorney fees are exempt from Code of Civil
Procedure sections 683.020 and 683.130
In considering the text of Family Code section 291, we give
its words “ ‘a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” (Smart Corner,
supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 460.) “In doing so, we do not ‘consider
the statutory language in isolation’; ‘[r]ather, we look to “the
entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope
and purpose of the provision . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘When statutory
language includes words or terms that courts have previously
construed, “the presumption is almost irresistible” that the
Legislature intended them to have the same “precise and
technical” meanings given by the courts.’ [Citations.] Thus,
where the Legislature uses terms ‘that have a well-settled
judicial construction,’ we may presume it intends ‘that the terms
retain the same meaning that the courts have placed upon
them.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, both case law and the definition of a money judgment
under the Code of Civil Procedure establish that an order for
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attorney fees constitutes a money judgment. (See Felczer v.
Apple Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 406, 416 [finding an order for
attorney fees constitutes a separate money judgment]; Code Civ.
Proc., § 680.270 [defining “ ‘[m]oney judgment’ ” as “part of a
judgment that requires the payment of money”]; see also Apex
LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 [finding
an order for attorney fees is enforceable as a money judgment].)
Moreover, the parties both agree that an attorney fees order is a
money judgment. Thus, the plain language of Family Code
section 291, which exempts money judgments entered under the
Family Code from the 10-year limitation period and the renewal
requirement, includes money judgments meant to satisfy
payment for attorney fees.
Despite his concession that attorney fee awards constitute
a money judgment, Shahriyar argues the language of Family
Code section 291 is nonetheless ambiguous. He asserts, although
Family Code section 291 may appear unambiguous on its face,
when read in context and harmonized with Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.310, the language raises the possibility of
two interpretations. He asserts one possibility is that the
Legislature intended to include attorney fees and another
possibility is that it intended to exclude attorney fees.
Specifically, he directs us to the fact that section 291 excludes
money judgments from the Code of Civil Procedure section
683.130, subdivision (a), but then goes on to expressly exclude
judgments for child, spousal, and family support.
Shahriyar provides no authority for these two possible
interpretations or that Family Code section 291 is otherwise
ambiguous. By his own admission, money judgments necessarily
include an order for attorney fees in other contexts. Shahriyar
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appears to rely on the canon of statutory construction, “noscitur a
sociis,” which means “ ‘ “a word takes meaning from the company
it keeps.” ’ ” (People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370, 398.)
“Under this rule, ‘ “ ‘[a] word of uncertain meaning may be known
from its associates and its meaning “enlarged or restrained by
reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] “ ‘ “In accordance with this
principle of construction, a court will adopt a restrictive meaning
of a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would
make other items in the list unnecessary or redundant, or would
otherwise make the item markedly dissimilar to the other items
in the list.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) However, while this doctrine may
support Shahriyar’s interpretation, it is merely an “ ‘extrinsic
aid[] to interpretation’ ” and will “ ‘be used only when the clear
meaning of the words used in the statute is doubtful.’ ” (Id. at
p. 399.) In other words, “ ‘such aids may not be used to create
doubts or offset the plain meaning of the statutes.’ ” (Ibid.)
Therefore, we decline to read an ambiguity into Family Code
section 291 where none exists.
We reach a similar conclusion when considering
Shahriyar’s argument that a specific statute should control over a
more general statute. As an initial matter it is not entirely clear
which statute Shahriyar is asserting is the more specific statute.
Therefore, the argument is forfeited. However, even if this
argument was properly raised, this rule of statutory
interpretation applies only “in the event of [a] statutory conflict.”
(Arbuckle-College City Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Colusa
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1166 (Arbuckle-College).) There is
no conflict in the statutes here. Code of Civil Procedure sections
683.020 and 683.130 provide that judgments expire after 10 years
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but may be renewed prior to that expiration. Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.310 explicitly states those rules do not
apply to “a judgment or order made or entered pursuant to the
Family Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.310.) Family Code
section 291 merely reiterates and clarifies that exemption by
expressly providing that money judgments entered under the
Family Code are enforceable until paid in full and need not be
renewed. There is no conflict. Therefore, we need not consider
whether any of the provisions at issue should control over the
other as the more specific provision. (Arbuckle-College, at
p. 1166.)
Further, contrary to Shahriyar’s argument, we need not
insert language into Family Code section 291 to find that it
exempts attorney fees from the requirements of Code of Civil
Procedure section 683.130. As Shahriyar has admitted, a money
judgment includes an order for attorney fees, and money
judgments under the Family Code are exempted from Code of
Civil Procedure section 683.130. As such, we only need to look at
the “ ‘plain and commonsense meaning’ ” of the words the
Legislature actually used.
Accordingly, we hold that Family Code section 291’s
reference to money judgments necessarily includes those
judgments to satisfy the payment of attorney fees.
B. Legislative history supports our interpretation
Although we find the plain language of Family Code
section 291 is unambiguous and therefore it is unnecessary to
9
consider the statute’s legislative history, we do so briefly here as
the legislative history reinforces our view.3
The language of Family Code section 291 at issue here was
inserted after the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2126 (AB 2126).
According to a bill analysis, AB 2126 “would provide that
enforcement of a money judgment or judgment for possession or
sale of property under the Family Code would be enforceable
until satisfied in full.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 2126 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended April
20, 2006, p. 1.) The bill analysis states: “Historically, different
judgments under the Family Code were subject to different
periods of enforceability. Certain judgments are subject to a ten-
year enforcement period, renewal and exemptions from the
defense of laches. Thus, family law litigants may receive similar
judgments with different enforcement periods.” (Ibid.) “This bill
would provide that all money judgments or judgments for
possession or sale of property under the Family Code are
enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied. This bill
would provide that judgments may, but are not required to be
renewed. Failure to renew has no effect on the enforceability of
the judgment.” (Id. at p. 2.)
Under the stated need for the bill, the bill analysis states
AB 2126 would “ ‘help to avoid the unfairness that can result
from significantly different enforcement rights applying to
similar judgments’ ” and that “ ‘[a] single rule for all Family Code
judgments would be significantly less confusing.’ ” (Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2126 (2005–2006 Reg.
3 We may take judicial notice of legislative history materials
on our own motion. (Gananian v. Wagstaffe (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9.)
10
Sess.), as amended April 20, 2006, p. 4.) The bill analysis also
stated several compelling reasons why a party in family court
may delay enforcement of a judgment. “A party may delay
enforcement of a judgment in order to avoid conflicts that could
undermine the welfare of minor children. [¶] A party awarded
ownership of the family home may allow a former spouse to
continue living in the home out of a sense of obligation for the
former spouse’s welfare. [¶] A party may feel physically or
psychologically intimidated by a former spouse and forego
enforcement of a judgment in order to avoid harm.” (Id. at p. 5.)
The legislative history of Family Code section 291 shows
the statute was meant to simplify the law exempting family court
judgments from the generally applicable rules to enforce
judgments in order to protect the rights of family litigants while
recognizing the unique challenges those litigants face. The
Legislature accomplished this by eliminating the discrepancy in
enforcement rights that were dependent on the nature of the
judgment. This is the exact opposite of what Shahriyar asserts
here—that depending on the type of family court judgment,
different enforcement rights should apply.
Accordingly, we find the legislative history of Family Code
section 291 supports our conclusion that Family Code section
291’s reference to money judgments necessarily includes those
judgments for the payment of attorney fees.
C. Reason and common sense support our
interpretation
Finally, although unnecessary to do so, we note our
interpretation “is consistent with reason and common sense.”
(Smart Corner, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.)
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Often, an award of attorney fees is necessary to vindicate
important statutory rights. (See Murillo v. Fleetwood
Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 996; Kreutzer v. County of
San Diego (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 62, 75; Maria P. v. Riles (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; Grossmont Union High School Dist. v.
Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 579; In re
Dormio (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 788, 794; Leiserson v. City of San
Diego (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725, 735.) Indeed, this need is
expressly identified and provided for in the Family Code. Family
Code section 2030 allows the family court to order one party to
pay to the other party “whatever amount is reasonably necessary
for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending
the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘The purpose of section 2030 is to ensure parity.
“The idea is that both sides should have the opportunity to retain
counsel, not just (as is usually the case) only the party with
greater financial strength.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Knox (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 15, 31.)
As such, it makes no sense for Family Code section 291 to
exempt judgments that determine important rights, e.g., child,
spousal, and family support, but not to exempt those judgments
for attorney fees which are often necessary to enforce those rights
in the first instance.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on
appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WILEY, J.
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