People v. McFadden CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/30/24 P. v. McFadden CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083440
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD125464)
CHARLES EDWARD MCFADDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel, and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles McFadden appeals the denial of his motion for resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. Because the trial court’s ruling was
based on an erroneous interpretation of section 1172.75, we reverse and
remand for full resentencing.
In 1997, a jury convicted McFadden of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664)
and found true that he personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). McFadden later
admitted a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), three serious-felony priors (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), and three strike priors (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)).
The court sentenced McFadden to a total prison term of 46 years to life,
including five years for each of the three serious-felony priors and a stayed
term for the prison prior. On appeal, this court struck one of the serious-
felony priors but otherwise affirmed. (People v. McFadden (Jan. 11, 1999,
D028870 [nonpub. opn.].)
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 was added to the Penal Code
by virtue of the passage of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) With one exception not relevant here,
section 1172.75 provides that prison prior enhancements “imposed prior to
January 1, 2020” pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) are “legally
invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) It directs the Department of Corrections
(CDCR) to identify those persons in custody “currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) . . . to
the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (Id., subd. (b).) Upon
receiving this information, “[i]f the court determines that the current
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than
the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement” unless the court finds a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety. (Id., subd. (d).)
The CDCR identified McFadden as a person currently serving a prison
term that included an enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b). The trial court issued an order (1) tentatively denying
resentencing on the basis that McFadden did not qualify for relief because his
sentence was “not enhanced by an eligible prison prior”; and (2) appointing
the Office of the Primary Public Defender (PPD) to represent McFadden and,
if it accepted the appointment, “file briefing on the issue of [McFadden]’s
eligibility for relief or whether it agrees with the tentative denial.” In
response, the PPD filed a motion for resentencing under section 1172.75,
which the trial court denied. The court concluded that McFadden was
ineligible for relief because the punishment on his prison prior was stayed
and did not result in the imposition of any additional prison time. The court
relied on People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted
February 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius) in support of its interpretation of
section 1172.75.
The dispositive issue presented in McFadden’s appeal is whether the
trial court erred in its interpretation of section 1172.75. He contends it did,
and that the statute affords relief to all defendants whose sentences include a
prior prison term enhancement, whether it was imposed and executed or
imposed and stayed. The People contend the court did not err, because
section 1172.75 applies only to those defendants whose prior prison term
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enhancements were imposed and executed. On our de novo review of this
issue (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961), and consistent with this
court’s prior decisions on the issue, we conclude McFadden has the better
argument. Accordingly, we will reverse the order and remand for full
resentencing.
The proper interpretation of section 1172.75 in this context has now
been the subject of conflicting published appellate opinions, and our Supreme
Court has granted review to resolve the conflict. (People v. Renteria (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282–1283; Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43–
48, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169; People v. Christianson (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 300, 311–316, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189
(Christianson); People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276–1279,
review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana); People v. Mayberry (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 665 (Mayberry), review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853;
People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino).)
In Renteria, the trial court declined to apply section 1172.75 to the
defendant’s prior prison term enhancements on the ground that the word
“imposed” as used in subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 did not include
enhancements that were stayed. (Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1282.) The Sixth Appellate District reversed, holding that “imposed”
includes “enhancements that are imposed and then executed as well as those
that are imposed and then stayed.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].)
In Rhodius, a different division of our court reached the opposite
conclusion, relying heavily on People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126
(Gonzalez), in which the California Supreme Court interpreted the word
“imposed” as used in section 12022.53, subdivision (f), to mean imposed and
executed. Examining section 1172.75 as a whole, the Rhodius court observed
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subdivision (d)(1) of section 1172.75 requires the trial court to impose a
“lesser sentence than the one originally imposed,” and reasoned the only way
the enhancement could affect the length of a sentence is if it had been
imposed and executed. (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 43–44, review
granted.) It also found the legislative history of section 1172.75 demonstrates
“a clear presupposition by the Legislature of an imposed and executed
sentence,” including a legislative analysis that found sentencing
enhancements “put significant financial burdens on taxpayers and families
statewide.” (Rhodius, at pp. 46–47 [cleaned up].)
This court, in Christianson, rejected a narrow interpretation of
section 1172.75 and held that section 1172.75 applies to cases in which the
inmate’s abstract of judgment includes one or more section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed.
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 305, review granted.) Although we
considered the word “imposed” in section 1172.75, subdivision (a) to be “at
least somewhat ambiguous,” we concluded that in the context of the statutory
scheme, stated legislative intent, and statutory history, “imposed” was not
“limited to enhancements that were imposed and executed.” (Christianson, at
p. 311.) We observed that subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 requires the
CDCR to identify all inmates “ ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),’ ” and that a judgment
“may include a sentence that has been imposed but suspended or stayed.”
(Christianson, at p. 311.) We found it illogical that the Legislature would
require the CDCR to identify a larger class of inmates based on the abstract
of judgment, only to have the trial court “then look at the same abstracts of
judgment available to the CDCR to determine whether” the enhancements
had been stayed. (Id. at p. 312.)
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We also disagreed that if the statute were interpreted to encompass
stayed enhancements, this would create a conflict with subdivision (d)(1) of
section 1172.75. We explained that when a punishment is stayed, “the trial
court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain
circumstance[s],” and that “removal of the stayed enhancement” therefore
“provide[s] some relief to the defendant by eliminating that potential.”
(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, review granted.) And while in
Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 1126, the California Supreme Court
interpreted the word “imposed” in section 12022.53, subdivision (f), to mean
imposed and executed, we did not find Gonzalez to be controlling. In our
view, the high court had interpreted “imposed” in the context of a statute
intended to ensure longer sentences for felons who use firearms, whereas
section 1172.75 was “expressly aimed at reducing sentences[.]”
(Christianson, at p. 314.) And we found the legislative history to be
consistent with our reading of section 1172.75. (Christianson, at p. 316.)
In Saldana, the Third Appellate District similarly concluded that
section 1172.75 broadly affords relief to all defendants with a now-invalid
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, regardless of whether execution
of the enhancement was stayed. In doing so, it relied on reasoning from
Christianson, and disagreed with the Rhodius court’s view that defendants
whose sentences include stayed enhancements would not be subject to a
lesser sentence if their enhancement was stricken. (Saldana, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1277, 1278, review granted.) The Fifth Appellate
District in Mayberry and the Sixth Appellate District in Espino also agreed
with Christianson. (Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 675, review
granted; Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 194–201.)
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McFadden asks us to interpret section 1172.75 as we did in
Christianson to include all cases in which the trial court imposed a prior
prison term as a part of the original judgment. In response, the People ask
us to follow Rhodius rather than Christianson, hold that section 1172.75 does
not apply to an imposed and stayed section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement, and strike the stayed enhancement on the ground it resulted
in an unauthorized sentence.
We decline the People’s request. “We see no good reason to reject the
weight of authority interpreting section 1172.75” including our own decision
in Christianson. (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.) “Absent a
compelling reason, the Courts of Appeal are normally loath to overrule prior
decisions from another panel of the same undivided district or from the same
division.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9.) Christianson
is a decision of this appellate division, and the People have not provided us
with a compelling reason for reconsidering it. Although they assert that
Rhodius is “the better-reasoned analysis” we were aware of Rhodius when we
decided Christianson and we expressly disagreed with the Rhodius court’s
interpretation of section 1172.75. (See Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 316, fn. 8, review granted.)
Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning and holding of Christianson and
conclude that section 1172.75 affords relief to defendants like McFadden
whose abstracts of judgment include one or more section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed.
McFadden is therefore entitled to a recall of his sentence and full
resentencing upon remand, including the application of “any other changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (§ 1172.75,
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subd. (d)(2).) This moots the People’s argument that the prison prior should
be stricken as unauthorized for reasons independent of section 1172.75.
DISPOSITION
The order denying McFadden’s motion for resentencing is reversed and
the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the
motion, recall McFadden’s sentence, and resentence him consistent with
section 1172.75 and current law.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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