Mann v. State of Cal. CA2/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/30/24 Mann v. State of Cal. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ROBERT MANN, B328374
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV21366)
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield and Maurice A. Leiter,
Judges. Reversed.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Jodi L. Cleesattle, Assistant
Attorney General, Catherine Woodbridge and Donna M. Dean,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The State of California and the California Highway Patrol
(CHP) appeal from a judgment granting injunctive relief
requiring it to revise its vehicle impound procedures. CHP
contends the injunction improperly requires it to contravene valid
statutes, relies on inapplicable case law, conflicts with the
existing statutory scheme, and mandates unnecessary revisions
to its notice procedures. We agree and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2020, Timothy Barker and Youth Justice
Coalition brought this action against the State of California and
Warren A. Stanley, challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies.1
On June 9, 2020, an amended complaint was filed, substituting
Robert Mann for Timothy Barker as a plaintiff.
Robert Mann is a taxpayer who pays utility, sales, and
property taxes to the City and County of Los Angeles, and sales
and income taxes to the State of California. This action was
brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, which allows
taxpayers to challenge governmental actions that allegedly
constitute illegal or wasteful expenditures of public funds.2 Mann
1 At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted the
motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition under Code
of Civil Procedure section 631.8. Additionally, judgment was
entered in favor of defendant Stanley, who had retired
approximately two years before the trial. The court found
Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper
defendant in this action. Neither Youth Justice Coalition nor
Stanley are parties to this appeal.
2 Code of Civil Procedure section 526a provides in relevant
part: “An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing
2
does not allege any personal involvement with CHP’s vehicle
impound procedures; rather, as a taxpayer he challenges CHP’s
policies and practices on constitutional grounds.
Mann alleged CHP’s impoundment of vehicles without a
warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal
expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful,
unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The
complaint did not mention or request ability-to-pay hearings as
part of the requested relief.3
any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds,
or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against
any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its
behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is
assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the
commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the
defendant local agency . . . .” This statute allows taxpayers to
challenge governmental actions even when they are not
personally harmed to ensure the proper use of public funds.
(Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267–268.)
3 The trial court interpreted the complaint to include a
failure to provide an ability-to-pay claim when it overruled CHP’s
demurrer on October 6, 2020. The order provided, “Although not
argued by the parties, the Court points out that if fees provided
for in statutes are ‘imposed without a determination that the
defendant is able to pay, [they] are thus fundamentally unfair;
imposing these [fees] upon indigent defendants without a
determination that they have the present ability to pay violates
due process under both the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution.’ (People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157, 1168.)”
3
Following a bench trial, a permanent injunction issued
requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ present ability to pay
towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle
release procedures, and revise its notice form, CHP 180, to advise
owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles. The
court found that CHP’s existing policies violated due process by
providing inadequate notice and failing to account for indigent
owners’ inability to pay.
CHP filed a timely notice of appeal contending its actions
were consistent with heretofore constitutional statutes and case
law, the trial court erred by erroneously grafting language
regarding an ability-to-pay hearing from a criminal case into this
civil matter, and by its issuance of a permanent injunction.4
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
CHP challenges both the trial court’s interpretation of
statutes and its application of case law in its decision. “‘In
reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision
following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo.’”
(Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 162.)
“When constitutional provisions and statutes are at issue, we
independently review their meaning.” (Id. at p. 163.)
4 Mann initially filed a notice of cross-appeal to the
judgment. However, his cross-appeal was dismissed on June 11,
2024, for failing to obtain relief from the default caused by his
failure to properly designate the record.
4
II. The injunction requiring ability-to-pay hearings is
improper
The trial court issued an injunction requiring “CHP officers
consider the present ability to pay towing, storage, and any other
fees in vehicle storage hearings under Vehicle Code § 22852 and
in vehicle returns pursuant to the November 2021 policy
memorandum.”5 The court based this injunction on the principles
identified in People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157(Dueñas).6
5 Vehicle Code section 22852 outlines the notice and hearing
requirements for stored or impounded vehicles. It mandates that
within 48 hours of impound, the responsible agency must send a
notice to the registered and legal owners, including: (1) the name,
address, and telephone number of the agency providing the
notice; (2) the location of the vehicle and a description; (3) the
authority and purpose for removal; and (4) a statement informing
the owner of their right to request a hearing to determine the
validity of the storage within 10 days, and instructions on how to
request such a hearing. The statute also requires the hearing be
conducted within 48 hours of the request, excluding weekends
and holidays. If at the hearing it is determined that the storage
was not valid, the agency that authorized the storage is
responsible for the related costs. (Veh. Code, § 22852.)
6 Since Dueñas was decided, many opinions have issued from
the California Courts of Appeal citing it, criticizing it, and
distinguishing it. Many have rejected its application of due
process principles, with some finding the proper analysis is
instead the excessive fines clause in the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and a similar protection provided
in the California Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Cota (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 786, 794–795; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
320, 327–329, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v.
5
We have previously disagreed with Dueñas’s analysis and
have concluded it was wrongly decided. (People v. Hicks, supra,
40 Cal.App.5th 320, review granted.) We do not agree with the
position that due process demands a finding of an ability to pay
prior to the imposition of fines or fees. (Id. at pp. 326–329.)
Rather a violation of due process is shown when the imposition of
fines or fees will result in the denial of the party’s access to the
courts or result in the party’s incarceration. (Ibid.) Since this case
concerns vehicle impounds, not access to court or incarceration,
the due process argument fails. Even if the due process argument
did not fail on this ground, the principles in Dueñas do not apply
to the statutory scheme for impounding vehicles for several other
reasons.
A. Dueñas addressed criminal fines, not civil
impound fees
Dueñas involved a criminal defendant who challenged the
imposition of court fees and fines in her criminal case. (Dueñas,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.) She was an indigent mother of
young children who pleaded no contest to driving with a
suspended license. (Ibid.) After waiving other fees on the basis of
her indigence, the trial court imposed $220 in mandatory fees
and fines. (Id. at p. 1163.)
Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067–1069; People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96–97; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038–1039 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) Others
have refused to extend its reach beyond the precise circumstances
presented in Dueñas. (See, e.g., People v. Oliver (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 1084, 1103; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
312, 326–327; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 926–
927; Kopp, supra, at p. 94; People v. Johnson (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 134, 138–139.)
6
The Court of Appeal held imposing these financial
obligations without determining the defendant’s ability to pay
violated due process under both the United States and California
Constitutions. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168.) The
court reasoned, “[i]mposing unpayable fines on indigent
defendants is not only unfair, it serves no rational purpose” and
creates “a significant barrier for individuals seeking to rebuild
their lives after a criminal conviction.” (Id. at pp. 1167–1168.)
This holding concerned the imposition of criminal fines and
fees on indigent defendants. The circumstances fundamentally
differ from vehicle impound fees in nature, purpose, and
statutory framework.
Vehicle impound fees are civil in nature and serve a
compensatory purpose. As established by Vehicle Code section
22851,7 these fees reimburse third party towing companies for
actual services rendered—specifically, the removal, towing, and
storage of vehicles. The statute creates a possessory lien in favor
of the towing company, reflecting the Legislature’s intent that
these fees be treated as compensation for services, not as punitive
measures or revenue-generating mechanisms for the state.
In contrast, Dueñas dealt with criminal fines and fees
imposed by the court as part of a criminal sentence, including a
$30 court facilities assessment, a $40 court operations
assessment, and a $150 restitution fine. (Dueñas, supra, 30
7 Vehicle Code section 22851 sets forth the legal framework
for liens on impounded vehicles. It provides when a vehicle is
removed from public or private property by an authorized agent
or law enforcement, the person performing the removal has a lien
dependent upon possession for compensation for the removal,
towing, and storage of the vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 22851.)
7
Cal.App.5th at p. 1162.) These assessments and fines serve
multiple purposes: funding court operations, support for the
state’s restitution fund, and act as additional punishment for
criminal offenses. (Id. at p. 1169.)
The Dueñas court was primarily concerned with the
punitive nature of these criminal fines and fees when imposed on
indigent defendants. The court noted these financial obligations
could lead to “cascading consequences” for defendants who cannot
pay, potentially including further incarceration and prolonged
involvement with the criminal justice system. (Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163–1164.)
Vehicle impound fees, however, do not implicate these
concerns. They do not extend a person’s involvement with the
criminal justice system, nor do they result in additional criminal
penalties for nonpayment. While failure to pay impound fees may
result in the loss of the vehicle through a lien sale, this is a civil
consequence directly related to the services provided, not a
criminal punishment.
The statutory scheme governing vehicle impounds already
includes due process protections that were absent in the Dueñas
context. Vehicle owners are entitled to prompt notice and a
hearing to contest the validity of the impound. (Veh. Code,
§§ 14602.6, subd. (b), 22852.)8 If the impound is found invalid, the
8 Vehicle Code section 14602.6 authorizes the impoundment
of vehicles driven by individuals with suspended or revoked
licenses, or by unlicensed drivers. Key provisions include: (a)
allowing peace officers to impound a vehicle for 30 days under
specified circumstances; (b) requiring that vehicle owners be
provided an opportunity for a storage hearing in accordance with
Vehicle Code section 22852; (c) outlining conditions for early
8
agency must bear the towing and storage costs. (Veh. Code,
§ 22852, subd. (e).) The prompt administrative hearing provided
under Vehicle Code sections 14602.6 and 22852 have been found
to satisfy the requirements of due process and, therefore, ensure
that vehicle owners are not arbitrarily deprived of their property
without recourse. (Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 198, 211–214 (Alviso).) These existing
procedures satisfy due process requirements without the need for
additional ability-to-pay hearings.
By contrast, the court in Dueñas was addressing a
perceived gap in the criminal justice system where indigent
defendants could face escalating penalties due to their inability to
pay court-imposed fines and fees. No such gap exists in the
vehicle impound context, as the Legislature has already crafted a
comprehensive scheme balancing the interests of vehicle owners,
law enforcement agencies, and towing companies.
Therefore, the Dueñas holding—that due process requires
an ability-to-pay determination before imposing certain criminal
fines and fees—does not logically extend to civil vehicle impound
fees. To apply Dueñas in this context would inappropriately blur
the lines between criminal penalties and civil fees for services
rendered and would disrupt the carefully balanced statutory
scheme governing vehicle impounds.
release of the vehicle, such as if the driver’s license is reinstated
or if the registered owner was unaware the driver was
unlicensed; (d) stipulating that the registered owner is
responsible for all towing and storage charges related to the
impoundment; and (e) allowing the impounding agency to issue a
release when all towing and storage fees have been paid. (Veh.
Code, § 14602.6.)
9
B. Requiring ability-to-pay hearings contravenes
statutory intent
The trial court’s requirement that CHP conduct ability-to-
pay hearings and potentially waive towing and storage fees
directly contravenes the express language and intent of Vehicle
Code section 14602.6, subdivision (i). This statutory provision
unambiguously provides registered owners “shall remain
responsible for any towing and storage charges related to the
impoundment.”9 (Veh. Code, § 14602.6, subd. (i).)
Vehicle Code section 14602.6 has not been declared
unconstitutional by any appellate court. In the absence of such a
finding, lower courts are bound to apply the law as written. In its
injunction, the trial court required CHP to consider waiving
towing and storage charges based on ability to pay. In so doing,
the trial court rewrote section 14602.6 to create an exception for
indigent vehicle owners.
Article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution
prohibits administrative agencies, including CHP, from refusing
to enforce a statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality unless
an appellate court has made such a determination. By requiring
CHP to potentially waive fees that Vehicle Code section 14602.6
mandates vehicle owners pay, the trial court has placed CHP in
the untenable position of potentially violating this constitutional
provision. This requirement is particularly problematic given
that Vehicle Code section 14602.6 has withstood previous
constitutional scrutiny. (Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at9 The use of the word “shall” indicates a mandatory
obligation, not a discretionary one.
10
pp. 211–214 [finding the impound scheme provided by Veh. Code,
§§ 14602.6 and 22852 does not violate due process].)
Additionally, the Legislature, in crafting this provision,
made a policy decision that vehicle owners should bear the
financial burden of impoundment. This decision reflects a balance
of various interests, including ensuring compensation for towing
services and allocating costs to those whose actions necessitated
the impoundment. It is unclear who would bear the financial
burden if fees are waived, e.g., the towing companies who
provided the service or the CHP. Either outcome seems to conflict
with the statutory scheme.
Absent a finding that Vehicle Code section 14602.6 has
been declared unconstitutional, the trial court was obligated to
apply the statute as written. Its failure to do so constitutes
reversible error.
III. The notice revisions are unwarranted
In its decision, the trial court ordered CHP to “revise the
CHP 180 form to advise vehicle owners of the procedures for
vehicle returns set forth in the November 2021 policy
memorandum.” Due process does not require additional
explanation that goes beyond statutorily mandated noted
requirements.
Due process also does not require agencies to provide
“individualized notice of the procedures for seeking return of
seized property” beyond what is currently mandated by statute.
(City of West Covina v. Perkins (1999) 525 U.S. 234, 242–243.)
The CHP 180 form provides all information required by Vehicle
Code section 22852, including the right to a hearing and how to
request one. It presents this information in a clear, organized
manner that is easily understandable to the average person,
11
using plain language to explain the vehicle owner’s rights and the
steps they can take to challenge the impound. The form’s
emphasis on the right to a hearing serves as a crucial procedural
safeguard, providing an opportunity for owners to contest the
validity of the impound and potentially avoid fees if the impound
is found invalid. The form has been found to comply with due
process because it identifies the car owner’s right to an
administrative hearing and the impounding agency’s statutory
burden of providing the ground for impoundment. (Thompson v.
City of Petaluma (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 101, 107.)
In its judgment, the trial court also ordered information
from CHP’s November 2021 policy memorandum to be added to
the CHP 180 form. The policy memorandum outlines internal
CHP procedures for releasing vehicles. Due process does not
mandate agencies to provide notice of internal procedures or
policies. Therefore, the trial court’s order for revisions is not
required to satisfy due process and it was error to mandate
additional language.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellant shall recover costs on
appeal.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
____________________________ ________________________
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.
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