People v. Santana CA2/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/30/24 P. v. Santana CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B330930
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. KA083187)
CHRISTOPHER KEVIN SANTANA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Christopher Kevin Santana appeals the trial court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the petition because it found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Santana was guilty of murder under sections 188 and 189 as
amended effective January 1, 2019.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS2
A. Prosecution Evidence
On March 19, 2008, Santana, Christopher Stratis, and
Victor Maurtua entered Michelle Hsu’s residence on Cameron
Avenue in Covina Hills. Christine Alegre and Magali Fernandez
accompanied the three men but waited outside. Hsu dialed 911
at 11:40 a.m. As she spoke to the emergency operator, Santana
fired multiple shots at Hsu, killing her. Santana targeted Hsu’s
house because he thought an ex-girlfriend who had “nice stuff”
lived there and it would be an easy house to enter.
Following the murder, Santana, accompanied by the four
others, drove to his house. Fernandez testified at trial that
during the drive, Stratis made reference to the fact that
“[Santana] shot her.” Alegre testified that when they arrived at
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The summary of evidence from Santana’s trial is taken
from the appellate opinion in his direct appeal, People v. Santana
(Oct. 6, 2011, B227143) nonpub. opn. We have separately
reviewed the underlying trial record.
2
Santana’s residence, Santana exited the vehicle followed by
Maurtua and then Stratis. Stratis, who was the last of the men
to get out, said, “[Santana] shot her.” A short time later, Alegre
asked Santana, “Who did you shoot?” Santana replied, “[S]ome
bitch.”
After Santana drove Alegre home, she asked him again
what had happened. Santana told her he went inside the house
while Maurtua and Stratis were looking around the garage. He
heard someone on the telephone and he shot her. During a
recorded interview with a police detective, Fernandez said
Santana told the others that “he shot [the victim]” because “she
was talking on the phone” and “she wouldn’t shut up”; he heard
the victim on the telephone, followed her voice to her location,
shot her first from the doorway, and then again at closer range.
A K–9 unit led law enforcement officers to several
discarded items including latex gloves, blue surgical booties,
bandanas, hooded sweatshirts, and a backpack. The backpack
contained, among other things, a ski mask and a loaded .40-
caliber Glock firearm. The ski mask contained Santana’s DNA.
The cartridge casings and bullets recovered from the crime scene
were fired from the Glock. A pancake holster found underneath
Santana’s bed contained impressions that corresponded to the
Glock. Santana told a fellow inmate he committed a robbery and
somebody died. He said, “. . . I guess, she was on the phone and
somebody blasted her.” Santana admitted he had touched the
gun and that his fingerprints were “most likely” on it.
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B. Defense Evidence
Santana testified it was Stratis and Maurtua’s idea to
burglarize a house. Santana was hesitant but they convinced
him to participate. He put on his ski mask and entered the
house. While in the house, Santana heard gunshots. All three
men ran out of the house. As they escaped, Santana discarded
his backpack, shirt and ski mask. Santana never intended for
anyone to be shot nor did he shoot anyone. He did not know
anyone who had lived in Hsu’s house. Santana denied that the
Glock was in his backpack when he discarded it. He implied
Stratis and Maurtua must have put it there after he dropped the
backpack.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Santana was charged with special-circumstance murder
with associated personal firearm use and gang allegations. At
trial, the court instructed the jury on second degree murder, and
two theories of first degree murder: (1) willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder; and (2) felony murder. The jury was also
instructed on aiding and abetting. The jury found Santana guilty
of first degree murder. In doing so, the jury was not required
expressly to specify the theory of liability that it relied upon; it
had only to sign the guilty verdict form for first degree murder,
which stated: “We, the jury in the above-titled action, find the
defendant, CHRISTOPHER KEVIN SANTANA, GUILTY of the
crime of THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF MICHELLE HONG
SUE, a human being, in violation of Penal Code [s]ection 187(a),
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a Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information.” However,
the jury was also asked to return “true” or “not true” findings on
several additional allegations, including as relevant here, the
following: The jury found true the allegation that Santana
committed the murder of Hsu while he, or an accomplice, was
engaged in the commission of a burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)
The jury also found true the allegation that in the commission of
the burglary Santana “personally and intentionally discharged
. . . a handgun, which caused the death of [HSU] within the
meaning of Penal Code [s]ection 12022.53[, subd.] (d).3 Santana
was convicted as charged and sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, plus a consecutive 25 years to life. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.
In 2022, Santana filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6. The People opposed the petition on the basis
that Santana entered Hsu’s home, discovered her on the phone
with a 911 operator, and shot and killed her. Assisted by
appointed counsel, Santana filed a reply. Santana argued that
although the jury was told that it could convict him of murder
even if he was not the actual shooter, the verdict forms
presupposed that he was the shooter and did not provide a way
for the jury to find him guilty as a mere participant.
3 At the time of the verdict, section 12022.53, subdivision
(d), provided: “[A]ny person who, in the commission of a felony
specified in subdivision (a), [s]ection 246, or subdivision
(c) or (d) of [s]ection 12034, personally and intentionally
discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury,
as defined in [s]ection 12022.7, or death, to any person other than
an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years
to life.”
5
The court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Both parties relied on the record,
including evidence adduced at trial, without introducing new or
additional evidence. The court found that, based on the evidence
presented at trial, Santana would still be guilty of murder under
the current laws because the evidence demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt that Santana was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference in the underlying burglary, he
had the intent to kill, and he was the actual killer.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) ‘ “Under the felony-
murder doctrine as it existed at the time of [Santana’s] trial,
‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed] someone during the
commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently
dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found guilty of the
crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even
implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying
felony.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1199.)
The felony murder rule was amended by Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), which
became effective on January 1, 2019. (People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 965.) “As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1437
limited the class of persons liable for felony murder by adding
section 189, subdivision (e). Under current law, ‘[a] participant
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [certain
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enumerated felonies, including burglary] in which a death occurs
is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1)
The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the
actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd.
(e)(1)–(3).)” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for
those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive
relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the process begins with
the filing of a petition declaring that “[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437.
[Citation.] The trial court then reviews the petition to determine
whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. [Citation.] “If the petition and record in the
case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citations.]”
[Citation.]’ (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869, fn.
omitted.)” (People v. Bodely, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1200.)
Where the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, the court issues an order to show cause
setting an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c), (d)(1) & (3).)
“At the hearing . . . the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
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January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The trial court acts as
the finder of fact when determining whether the prosecution has
met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 296–297.)
We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) We review the trial court’s
factfinding on the question of whether a defendant committed a
murder under a still-valid theory for substantial evidence.
(People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
B. Analysis
On appeal, Santana contends there is insufficient evidence
in the record to support one of the court’s findings denying him
relief under section 1172.6: specifically, he argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he intended
to kill Hsu.4 We affirm the court’s order because Santana is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Alternatively, we affirm
4 We note that Santana’s effort to limit the issue on appeal
to whether there was substantial evidence of intent, even if
correct, would not result in reversal. Santana ignores that our
review of the denial of his petition under section 1172.6 must
consider whether there is substantial evidence to support his
conviction under current law on any of the theories presented.
Even if Santana successfully challenged the trial court’s finding
that he acted with intent to kill, to prevail on appeal he would
also need to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction on the basis that he was guilty of felony
murder, both as an actual killer and as a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to life.
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on the basis that the trial court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The jury’s findings demonstrate that it
found him guilty of felony murder as the actual killer, a theory of
liability that remains viable after the January 1, 2019
amendments to section 188 and 189. (People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 965; § 189, subd. (e)(3).)
The verdicts demonstrate that the jury found Santana
guilty of felony murder because it found true the special
circumstance that he committed the murder during the
commission or attempted commission of a burglary (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)). Additionally, the jury found true a firearm use
allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Although that
allegation may be found true if a person “in the commission of a
[specified felony, including burglary], personally and
intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great
bodily injury, as defined in [s]ection 12022.7, or death, to a
person other than an accomplice” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), in this
case the jury was not instructed so broadly. Rather, the trial
court instructed under CALCRIM No. 3149 that if the jury found
Santana guilty of first degree murder it must then decide
whether the People proved the additional allegation that Santana
“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that
crime causing death.” The jury found the allegation true.
Specifically, the verdict form stated that the jury found Santana
“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, to wit, a
handgun, which caused the death of MICHELLE HONG HSU.”
A defendant who, in the commission or attempted commission of
a burglary, actually kills another is still guilty of murder,
regardless of the defendant’s mental state. (People v. Garcia,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 965; § 189, subd. (e)(3).) As the
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shooter and actual killer of Hsu, Santana is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6.
Alternatively, the trial record presented at the section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing contains substantial evidence
to support the court’s finding that Santana was the actual killer.
That evidence included bullets and casings recovered from the
scene of the murder that were fired from a Glock found in
Santana’s backpack; a pancake holster recovered from under
Santana’s bed that showed an impression of that same gun;
Santana’s statement to a jail house informant that he thought his
fingerprints were on the gun; Santana’s statements to Alegre and
Fernandez that he shot Hsu, and his reasons for doing so.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Santana’s petition
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:
KIM, J.
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The People v. Christopher Santana
B330930
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring
I agree substantial evidence—chiefly, defendant’s own
admissions to Magali Fernandez, Christine Alegre, and another
inmate—supports the trial court’s finding that defendant is
Michelle Hsu’s actual killer and thus ineligible for Penal Code
section 1172.6 relief.
BAKER, Acting P. J.