People v. Centenomiranda CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/30/24 P. v. Centenomiranda CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062723
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19WF1563)
JULIO IGNACIO OPINION
CENTENOMIRANDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene
A. Sevidal and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Julio Ignacio Centenomiranda was sentenced to 20
years to life in prison for sexually assaulting and inflicting great bodily injury
on an elderly woman during a burglary. On appeal, he contends: 1) There is
insufficient evidence he harbored felonious intent in entering the victim’s
house or that he inflicted the injuries she sustained; and 2) the trial court
erred in denying his request for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s alleged
misconduct during closing argument. Finding no merit to these contentions,
we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2019, K.L. was living with her family and 87-year-old
grandmother C.L. in a rear dwelling unit that is attached to her parent’s
home in Garden Grove. The unit has a private entrance that is accessible
only by walking through a side gate and traversing a pathway on the side of
the house.
Having suffered a stroke that left her partially paralyzed, C.L.
could not speak or walk at the time this case arose. She slept in a medical bed
that had a safety railing, and if she had to use the bathroom or wanted to
move about the house, someone would have to lift her out of bed and put her
into her wheelchair.
On the night of June 27, 2019, K.L. put C.L. to bed and went to
sleep around 10:00 p.m. However, a few hours later, K.L. heard C.L. making
noise, so she got up to check on her. K.L. discovered C.L. in her wheelchair in
the kitchen with defendant. Having removed C.L.’s pants, defendant was
kneeling in front of her with his pants downs and his head in her pelvis area.
K.L. screamed for her husband, and together they grabbed defendant and
wrestled him outside. Defendant fought back and struggled to get away, but
K.L. and her family managed to subdue him until the police arrived.
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By that time, defendant was no longer struggling. In fact, he
appeared rather sleepy and was having trouble walking on his own. At the
scene, the police found his backpack, which contained some empty beer cans
and an open package of condoms. They also discovered that defendant lived
in an apartment duplex about three quarters of a mile away from C.L.’s
dwelling.
Because defendant appeared to be intoxicated, the police took
him to the hospital to be evaluated. His blood alcohol level several hours
later, at 10:30 a.m., was .056 percent. Subsequent investigation revealed the
presence of C.L.’s DNA on defendant’s penis. And defendant’s DNA, along
with saliva enzymes, were found on C.L.’s vagina.
Following the incident, C.L. was taken to the hospital emergency
room with bruising and trauma on the left side of her face and head, as well
as bruising on her left arm. A CT scan revealed she also had a brain bleed
that was attributable to the head trauma she sustained during her encounter
with defendant.
At trial, defendant faced two charges: 1) Assault with the intent
to commit a sexual offense during the commission of first degree burglary,
and 2) forcible oral copulation. (Pen. Code, §§ 220, subd. (b), 287, subd.
(c)(2)(A).) As to both counts, it was further alleged that defendant inflicted
great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 12022.8.) In addition, the prosecution
alleged that defendant orally copulated C.L. during a burglary, for purposes
of the One Strike law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(7), (d)(4), (e)(2).)
In closing argument, defense counsel did not dispute the oral
copulation charge or the great bodily injury allegation. However, he argued
defendant was so drunk that he wandered into C.L.’s house by mistake—
thinking it was his own house—and therefore he did not have felonious intent
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at the time of entry, so as to support the burglary-related charges. The jury
rejected that argument and convicted defendant as charged.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s determination that he entered C.L.’s home with felonious intent or that
he inflicted great bodily injury on her. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is “highly deferential.” (People v.
Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 538.) Our task is to “review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Lindberg
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
In so doing, we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the
credibility of the trial witnesses; rather, “[w]e presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer
from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier
of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding. [Citation.]” (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) “The
conviction shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is
there sufficient substantial evidence to support [it].”’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
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The same standard applies when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury’s true finding on an enhancement allegation.
(People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60; People v. Carrasco (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058.)
B. Felonious Intent
In order to prove the assault charge and the One Strike
allegation, the prosecution had to demonstrate defendant committed the
crime of burglary, which required proof he entered C.L.’s home with the
intent to commit larceny, rape or oral copulation. (Pen. Code, § 459; People v.
Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669; CALCRIM Nos. 890, 3180, 1700.) Defendant
claims there is insufficient evidence he possessed such intent. Relying on the
fact he was intoxicated, he did not have any gloves or burglary tools in his
possession, and there were no signs of forced entry into C.L.’s home, he
claims “the evidence suggested [he] simply walked through the unlocked door
[to C.L.’s home] while drunk” and committed a “crime of opportunity” once he
was inside.
However, the record shows defendant entered C.L.’s house at 1:30
in the morning with an open box of condoms in his possession. Although he
had been drinking and lived within a mile of C.L.’s house, he lived in an
apartment duplex, not an attached rear dwelling like C.L.’s, which is only
accessible through a side gate and walkway. So, it is hard to imagine he
actually mistook C.L.’s residence for his own.
Moreover, once he got inside C.L.’s home, he did not stumble
around aimlessly making noise and causing a commotion, as drunk people
are wont to do. Instead, he lifted C.L. from her bed to her wheelchair,
wheeled her into the kitchen, and proceeded to sexually assault her. The fact
defendant committed a sex offense upon entering the residence is compelling
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proof that is what he intended to do at the time of entry. (Cf. People v. Abilez
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 508 [“‘There is no better proof that (the defendant)
entered the (victim’s house) with intent to commit robbery than a showing he
did in fact commit robbery after his entry.’ [Citation.]”].) Defendant also tried
to flee the scene upon being confronted by K.L. and her husband, which is
evidence of a guilty mind. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970,
1027.)
Although there is no direct evidence as to what defendant was
thinking when he entered C.L.’s home, felonious intent “‘may be, and usually
must be, inferred from circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 606; accord, People v. Wolfe (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 420,
425.) We find the circumstantial evidence in this case is sufficient to support
the jury’s finding that defendant intended to commit a sexual offense upon
entering C.L.’s residence. We are powerless to disturb that finding.
C. Great Bodily Injury
Defendant does not dispute C.L. sustained great bodily injury
during the course of his crimes. However, he argues there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding that he is the one who inflicted those
injuries. In so arguing, defendant notes K.L. told the police and testified at
trial that there was so much commotion going on at the time she confronted
defendant in her kitchen, she was unsure whether she or her husband may
have inadvertently injured C.L. while they were struggling to subdue
defendant.
But K.L. testified she had no actual memory of hitting or
bumping into C.L. during the struggle. She also testified the struggle took
place near the right side of C.L.’s body. This is significant because all of C.L.’s
injuries were on the left side of her body. On the whole, K.L.’s testimony
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simply does not support defendant’s theory that C.L.’s injuries were caused
by K.L. or her husband.
Defendant also speculates C.L.’s injuries may have been related
to the treatment she received at the hospital. However, while C.L.’s treating
physician testified it was conceivable that her arm bruising resulted from the
IV line and the blood pressure testing she received at the hospital, he did not
think that was likely. Instead, he surmised her bruises, as well as her brain
bleed, were attributable to some other form of trauma she received.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that defense counsel made no
attempt to contest the great bodily injury allegation at trial. Considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to judgment below—as we are required
to do—there is ample evidence to support the jury’s determination that
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on C.L. during the
commission of his crimes.
II.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his request for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s closing argument. Again,
we cannot agree.
A. Background
During her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor assailed defense
counsel’s claim that defendant may have entered C.L.’s home by mistake,
thinking it was his own residence. The prosecutor submitted that not only did
the two homes look nothing alike, but defendant did not act like he had made
a mistake after entering C.L.’s home. To drive home the latter point, the
prosecutor noted that after being caught by K.L. and her husband inside
their kitchen, defendant did not ask them what they were doing in his house.
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That prompted an immediate objection from defense counsel.
During a sidebar conference, he contended the prosecutor’s argument
undermined defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Defense counsel further pointed out that the prosecutor had successfully
opposed his attempt to admit statements from defendant indicating he was
drunk and confused when the police arrested him at the scene, statements
that arguable would have supported his mistake of fact defense. Given the
prosecutor’s efforts to prevent the jury from hearing about what defendant
did say at the scene, defense counsel argued it was unfair for her to invite the
jury to draw an adverse inference from what defendant did not say at the
scene. Defense counsel also asked for a mistrial, claiming “[t]here’s no way to
unring this bell[.]”
The trial court was not sympathetic to defense counsel’s
constitutional argument, since the prosecutor was not commenting on
defendant’s postarrest silence or his failure to testify at trial. (See generally
Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 & Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609,
which generally prohibit the prosecution from using the defendant’s
postarrest silence against him.) But the trial court did believe the
prosecutor’s argument was “misleading” and “improper” in light of her
successful opposition to the admission of defendant’s exculpatory statements.
(See People v. Varona (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 566, 570 [prosecutor improperly
argued there was a lack of evidence on an issue that he had successfully
prevented the defense from establishing at trial].)
Nevertheless, the trial court did not believe the misconduct rose
to the level to justify a mistrial because “defendant would still be able to seek
a fair trial.” To ensure that was the case, the court informed the jury it was
sustaining defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s argument about
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what defendant did not say when he was caught inside C.L.’s house.
Additionally, the court told the jurors, “you are not to consider [that
argument] in any way” and that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.
B. Applicable Law
“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment
to the federal Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as
to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words,
the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor’s misconduct ‘that
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair’ violates California law
‘only if it involves “‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt
to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Harrison
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 242.)
Outside of these limitations, prosecutors have considerable
latitude to comment on and argue reasonable inferences from the evidence.
(People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 112–113.) Although the
prosecutor may not imply the defendant has a duty or burden to produce
evidence or to prove his or her innocence, “[c]omments on the state of the
evidence or on the defense’s failure to call logical witnesses, introduce
material evidence, or rebut the People’s case are generally permissible.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Moreover, when prosecutorial misconduct does occur, a mistrial
should only be granted when the defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial
have been irretrievably damaged. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282;
Carrillo v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523.) “‘Whether a
particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative
matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on
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mistrial motions. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th
1032, 1068.) Reversal is not required “‘unless the trial court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1086, 1094, quoting People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113, overruled
on other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
C. Analysis
No such abuse of discretion occurred in this case. Although, as
respondent concedes, the prosecutor’s argument about what defendant did
not say when confronted at the scene was “inartful” and perhaps
“questionable”, the trial court ordered the jury to disregard it. The court also
told the jurors that the attorneys’ arguments are not evidence. There is
nothing in the record to suggest the jurors ignored these direct instructions.
(See People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 559 [absent contrary indications,
jurors are presumed to have followed their instructions].)
Furthermore, the nature of the alleged misconduct was not such
as to mandate a mistrial. The prosecutor was simply trying to point out that
defendant did not act like he had entered the wrong house by mistake when
he was confronted by its rightful occupants, which is something the evidence
bore out and the jury was entitled to consider. While the prosecutor may have
overreached somewhat by talking about what defendant did not say when he
was confronted, her brief remarks on that topic were not such as to render
defendant’s trial unfair, particularly given the trial court’s prompt remedial
actions. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOORE, J.
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