Marriage of Singhal CA2/2 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/29/24 Marriage of Singhal CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    In re the Marriage of                                        B329555
    JENNIFER A. and SHELLY S.
    SINGHAL.                                                     (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    JENNIFER A. SINGHAL,                                         17PDFL00948)
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SHELLY S. SINGHAL,
    Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Dean H. Hansell, Judge. Affirmed.
    Benice Law and Jeffrey S. Benice for Appellant.
    Law Office of Gary W. Kearney and Gary W. Kearney for
    Petitioner.
    ______________________________
    Appellant Shelly S. Singhal (Shelly) appeals from the trial
    court’s judgment awarding child support to his former wife,
    Jennifer A. Singhal (Jennifer).1 Shelly argues that the trial court
    erred in calculating income available for child support, by
    (1) failing to include in Jennifer’s income the loans she received
    from her parents and (2) relying on the testimony of a cannabis
    expert to estimate Shelly’s income. Finding no error, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.     The Marriage and Dissolution
    Shelly and Jennifer married in July 2001 and have four
    children together. The couple separated in 2017. Jennifer filed
    for divorce in February 2018.
    In October 2018, the trial court entered a temporary order
    resolving several issues pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
    Among other things, Shelly stipulated that “his monthly self-
    employment income was $12,000[.]” Based on that income,
    Shelly was required to (1) pay Jennifer a base $5,500 per month
    in child support and $700 per month in spousal support and
    (2) transfer 20 million shares of stock in LiveWire Ergogenics
    (LiveWire stock) to Jennifer so that she could sell enough stock to
    pay the community’s monthly debts and give $50,000 each to
    herself and Shelly.
    1     Because the parties to this appeal share the same last
    name, we refer to them by their first names for ease of
    identification. No disrespect is intended.
    2
    The trial court issued a judgment terminating the parties’
    marital status on October 14, 2022. It reserved jurisdiction over
    all remaining issues.
    II.    Trial
    Pursuant to a later stipulation from the parties, the matter
    proceeded to a bifurcated bench trial on the issue of income
    available for child support.2 Shelly continued to assert that his
    income was $12,000 per month; Jennifer contended that his
    monthly income was $50,000~.
    The trial took place over four days in October 2022. Shelly
    represented himself; Jennifer was represented by counsel.
    A.    Jennifer’s testimony
    Jennifer testified that Shelly worked in the cannabis
    industry as a broker, paying farms millions of dollars for
    marijuana which he would then sell to various groups and
    dispensaries. Shelly told Jennifer that because “everything he
    did was in cash[,]” “there’s no way [she would] be able to prove
    any of this . . . Jennifer] c[ould] never find anything on” Shelley.
    Jennifer also claimed that Shelly never paid child support
    in full. Moreover, Shelly refused to cooperate in the transfer of
    the LiveWire stock, preventing Jennifer from accessing those
    funds to pay the community’s outstanding debts and the family’s
    living expenses.
    To cover these costs, Jennifer received loans from her
    parents in the amount of 1.3 million dollars. At the time of the
    trial, Jennifer had repaid over $147,000 of those loans.
    Jennifer admitted that she and Shelly had borrowed a total
    of $170,000 from her parents during the last two years of their
    2    This phase of trial also addressed attorney’s fees; on
    appeal, Shelly does not challenge that aspect of the judgment.
    3
    marriage, “always [with] the goal” of “pay[ing] them back.” She
    testified that Shelly told her those loans had been repaid.
    B.    Shelly’s testimony
    Shelly admitted that, during a January 2020 deposition, he
    had claimed to work as a consultant for “‘a number of individuals
    in the cannabis industry[,]’” “‘assist[ing] them in finding
    distribution platforms for product.’” He also testified that he paid
    his lawyers in cash, but denied having a “bank, savings, or
    brokerage account” or any money other than what was in his
    wallet.
    On his own cross-examination, Shelly did not admit to any
    amount of income. Instead, he argued that Jennifer could not
    prove her estimation of his income with “third-party records,” and
    alleged that Jennifer “has unlimited access to funds” in the form
    of loans from her parents.
    C.    Jennifer’s mother’s testimony
    Jennifer’s mother, Jo Jeanne Angeloff (Angeloff), testified
    that while there was no hard date for repayment of the loans,
    Jennifer “has been paying back money every month[.]”
    D.    Certified public accountant’s testimony
    Jennifer introduced testimony from a certified public
    accountant, Jackie Adams-Ings (Adams-Ings), who conducted an
    analysis of Shelly’s spending “based upon his monthly expenses”
    “for the period January 2019 to December 2020.” Shelly
    stipulated to Adams-Ings’s expertise in this area.
    Adams-Ings testified that during the “two-year time period”
    between “January 2019 [and] December 2020[,]” Shelly’s “average
    monthly expenses of spending . . . was $50,656 per month.”
    Adams-Ings noted that “this was an abnormal case” because
    Shelly conducted most of his business in cash, resulting in a “lack
    4
    of documentation, [a] lack of bank accounts, [a] lack of credit
    cards.”
    E.     Cannabis industry expert’s testimony
    Jennifer also offered testimony from an attorney, Allison
    Margolin (Margolin), as an expert “[i]n the area of the business
    involved in the manufacture, distribution, and retail sales of—in
    the marijuana industry in Southern California” “and the
    . . . expected profits and income” of “executives and owners of
    [that] business.”
    1.    Declaration
    In her declaration, Margolin gave numerous qualifications
    for her expertise, including that she (1) founded two “leading
    cannabis law firm[s]”; (2) “represented hundreds of defendants in
    state and federal cannabis-related criminal cases throughout
    California[,]” including “cases involving allegations of cannabis-
    related tax evasion and money laundering”; (3) “represented
    approximately 200 clients seeking to establish licensed cannabis
    businesses,” which “involved in many discussions regarding
    valuations of cannabis businesses, and incomes and profits for
    owners of cannabis businesses”; and (4) “closely followed the
    changes in economics of the cannabis industry” and “the finances
    of the illicit, unlicensed, and unregulated cannabis industry.”
    Margolin was asked to give opinions regarding, among
    other things, “[t]he current structure of the marijuana/cannabis
    industry” and “[t]he income that would be received by an
    owner/executive involved within certain parameters of the
    marijuana industry.”
    To form an opinion about the potential income of a
    cannabis executive, Margolin adopted several hypotheses about
    business, including that (1) “[t]he business is involved in the
    5
    manufacturing, brokering, sales, and/or distribution of
    marijuana/cannabis . . . in California”; (2) “[t]he business is the
    biggest cannabis business in the United States”; and (3) “[t]he
    business is a $100,000,000 business.” Margolin opined that a
    principal in such a business “would have an annual income in the
    range of $3 to $6 million per year from commercial cannabis
    activities.”
    2.    Trial testimony
    The parties stipulated to accepting Margolin’s declaration
    as her direct testimony at trial.
    Shelly objected to Margolin’s testimony, arguing that “[s]he
    has no basis to speak on finances of marijuana companies when
    her education is [in] law school.”
    Margolin reiterated the qualifications in her declaration,
    adding that in her work representing licensed cannabis
    companies or individuals, she “had to create business plans for all
    those clients that include potential profit and losses[.]” The trial
    court found that Margolin “amply satisf[ied]” the statutory
    requirements to be an expert witness.
    On cross-examination, Margolin opined that although the
    marijuana industry was not “more profitable today than it was
    two years ago[,]” commercial retailers could increase their profit
    margins by maintaining consistent retail pricing as wholesale
    cannabis prices decreased.
    III. Rulings and Judgment
    On April 6, 2023, the trial court entered the judgment of
    dissolution. The judgment incorporated rulings on various
    issues, including, as relevant to this appeal, the parties’ income
    available for child support.
    6
    A.     Credibility
    The trial court “d[id] not find Shelly to be an honest
    reporter of facts. He was often evasive and cagey in his response
    to questions, especially about his finances. He also showed an
    indifference to accuracy and completeness when it came to his
    income and expense declarations filed in this case . . . [and] his
    testimony was frequently contradicted by documents and by
    Jennifer’s testimony.” Conversely, “[t]he court found Jennifer to
    be credible . . . . Her testimony is consistent with the exhibits
    and she readily acknowledges weaknesses.” The court similarly
    “found . . . Angeloff to be credible[.]”
    B.     Jennifer’s income
    The trial court ruled that Jennifer’s “combined monthly
    income [is] $1,831[.]”
    The trial court did not “attribute income to [Jennifer] from
    monies borrowed from her mother to pay her . . . bills.” It
    explained that, per Jennifer’s testimony, “she had not intended to
    borrow money from her mother[,] but was forced to do so” because
    Shelly had neither (1) transferred the LiveWire stock to
    Jennifer’s name nor (2) paid his court-ordered support obligations
    in full. “Accordingly, the court decline[d] to enable Shelly to
    benefit from his lack of cooperation and his failure to pay what he
    owed in child and spousal support” by counting the parental
    loans towards Jennifer’s income.
    C.     Shelly’s income
    The trial court ruled that Shelly’s “monthly income is at
    least $47,540 monthly commencing January 1, 2019[.]” To
    calculate Shelly’s income, the court relied exclusively on Adams-
    Ings’s analysis.
    7
    The trial court discredited Shelly’s contrary evidence,
    saying that “to call [his] income and expense declarations
    . . . unreliable is an understatement[,]” and that his “own
    testimony . . . create[d] a financial picture that is both opaque
    and lacks credibility.”
    The trial court noted that it also rejected Margolin’s
    testimony on “the income to be received by an owner/executive of
    the [cannabis] industry[,] because [Margolin is] neither a
    [certified public accountant] nor an economist. Of most
    significance, the court found [Margolin’s] primary conclusion”
    about the amount of money a cannabis executive “could be
    expected to receive as annual income” was not supported by
    anything other than the “17 assumptions she was asked to make,
    many of which were not otherwise established.”
    However, the trial court accepted Margolin’s testimony that
    “[t]he cannabis industry . . . is not necessarily less profitable
    today than it was in 2020, although the price that pot farmers
    can obtain for a pound of marijuana is way down . . . [i]f other
    parts of the cannabis industry are able to maintain their prices,
    [e.g.,] distributors and pot dispensaries, then their profits may
    actually go up[.]” Because “[t]he court received testimony that
    Shelly purchased pot from farmers, manufactured it into finished
    products, and then sold it to dispensaries[,]” it concluded that
    “his profit levels in 2022 would actually be the same or better
    than they would be in 2020.”
    In adopting Margolin’s conclusions about the stability of
    the retail cannabis market, the trial court noted that it “received
    no contrary evidence that Shelly’s income has dropped[.]”
    8
    D.     Child Support
    Based on the parties’ available incomes, the trial court
    ordered Shelly to pay a total of $12,463 per month in child
    support, along with $338,449.13 in arrearages.
    IV. Appeal
    Shelly timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Shelly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
    (1) failing to consider parental loans as part of Jennifer’s income
    and (2) accepting Margolin’s expert testimony.
    I.     Parental Loans
    A.     Applicable law
    Section 4055 of the Family Code establishes a formula that
    trial courts must use to calculate child support. (In re Marriage
    of Williamson (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 1303
    , 1312 (Williamson).)
    The formula “takes into account both parents’ ‘net monthly
    disposable income’ ([Fam. Code,] § 4055, subds. (a), (b)), which is
    determined based upon the parents’ ‘annual gross income’ ([Fam.
    Code,] § 4058).” (In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 
    171 Cal.App.4th 718
    , 731 (Alter).) With certain exceptions, “annual gross income
    . . . means income from whatever source derived[.]” (Fam. Code,
    § 4058, subd. (a).) In this context, ‘“income’ should be broadly
    defined while the exclusions are specific and must be narrowly
    construed.” (Alter, 
    supra, at p. 732
    .)
    Loans, which carry an expectation of repayment, are
    generally not considered income under section 4058 of the Family
    Code. (See Williamson, 
    supra,
     226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312.)
    However, “regular gifts of cash” may be deemed “income for
    purposes of child support so long as the gifts bear a reasonable
    relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent
    9
    monetary benefit.” (Alter, 
    supra,
     171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 736–
    737.)
    B.    Standard of review
    “Child support awards are reviewed for an abuse of
    discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Morton (2018)
    
    27 Cal.App.5th 1025
    , 1038 (Morton).) In particular, the question
    of what “should be considered income for purposes of the child
    support calculation is one that must be left to the discretion of
    the trial court.” (Alter, 
    supra,
     171 Cal.App.4th at p. 737.)
    When reviewing for abuse of discretion, we must
    “determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are
    supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court
    reasonably exercised its discretion—that is, whether any judge
    reasonably could have made such an order.” (Morton, supra,
    27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) Substantial evidence is “evidence of
    ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable,
    credible and of solid value.” (Minnegren v. Nozar (2016)
    
    4 Cal.App.5th 500
    , 507.)
    C.    Analysis
    Jennifer testified that the funds she received from Angeloff
    were loans. She did not seek the loans until after she and Shelly
    separated, and she only needed them to cover debts and living
    expenses that she was unable to pay due to Shelly’s years-long
    refusal to comply with his court-ordered obligations. And she
    was repaying Angeloff to the best of her limited ability. Angeloff
    corroborated Jennifer’s claims.
    Jennifer and Angeloff’s testimony—which the trial court
    explicitly found credible—substantially supports a finding that
    10
    the monies were loans.3 (See In re Marriage of Mix (1975)
    
    14 Cal.3d 604
    , 614 [the testimony of just one witness may
    constitute substantial evidence].) And, as noted above, loans are
    generally not considered income available for child support. (See
    Williamson, 
    supra,
     226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312.)
    Under these circumstances, we cannot find that the trial
    court abused its discretion in failing to consider the loans part of
    Jennifer’s income.
    In his opening brief,4 Shelly disputes our conclusion,
    arguing that under Alter, 
    supra,
     
    171 Cal.App.4th 718
    , the trial
    court should have found that the monies were gifts. His
    argument fails for two reasons. First, Alter is distinguishable. In
    that case, a father “receiv[ed] regular cash payments from his
    mother for over a decade.” (Id. at p. 737.) She “had paid many of
    the children’s expenses for most of their lives[,]” and gave her son
    and his ex-wife “$4,000 per month during their [11-year]
    marriage.” (Id. at pp. 723, 731.) The Alter court found that “[t]he
    periodic and regular nature of the payments mean[t] that the
    money is available . . . for the support of [the] children.” (Id. at
    p. 737.)
    3      Shelly contends that contrary evidence supports his
    position that the monies were gifts. His argument is unavailing.
    (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services. United States (2020)
    
    46 Cal.App.5th 1007
    , 1015 [under substantial evidence review,
    “‘“we ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable
    inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .’ [Citation.]”
    [Citation.] . . . We do not reweigh evidence or reassess the
    credibility of witnesses’”].)
    4     Shelly did not file a reply brief.
    11
    Conversely, Jennifer did not start receiving money from
    Angeloff until after she and Shelly had separated.5 Jennifer used
    the money to pay the children’s expenses, but only needed to do
    so because Shelly withheld child support and community funds
    from her during the pendency of their divorce. And crucially,
    unlike the father in Alter, Jennifer consistently made efforts to
    repay Angeloff. These monies bear multiple hallmarks of loans,
    and were thus properly excluded from Jennifer’s income.
    Second, even if Angeloff had consistently gifted money to
    Jennifer, Alter does not require the trial court to consider gifts as
    income. (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 [“[W]hile regular
    gifts of cash may fairly represent income, that might not always
    be so. Therefore, the question of whether gifts should be
    considered income for purposes of the child support calculation is
    one that must be left to the discretion of the trial court.”] [Italics
    added].)
    Regardless of how the funds from Angeloff are
    characterized, Jennifer only needed that money during the
    pendency of the divorce, so that she could cover a temporary
    shortfall created by Shelly. The trial court acted well within its
    discretion in concluding that monies received to resolve a short-
    term financial emergency did not “bear a reasonable relationship
    to the traditional concept of income as a recurrent monetary
    benefit.” (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 737.)
    5     Although Jennifer’s parents had occasionally loaned the
    couple money during their marriage, those loans were fully
    repaid prior to trial.
    12
    II.    Margolin’s Testimony
    A.     Applicable law
    “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if [s]he has
    special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
    sufficient to qualify [her] as an expert on the subject to which
    [her] testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such
    special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must
    be shown before the witness may testify as an expert,” and “may
    be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including [her]
    own testimony.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subds. (a), (b).)
    “‘Whether a person qualifies as an expert in a particular
    case . . . depends upon the facts of the case and the witness’[]
    qualifications.’ [Citation.]” (Howard Entertainment, Inc. v.
    Kudrow (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 1102
    , 1115.) “‘The competency of
    an expert “is in every case a relative one, i.e.[,] relative to the
    topic about which the person is asked to make his statement.”
    [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If an expert ‘exhibits knowledge of the
    subject’ on which she opines, she need not be a specialist; a
    general practitioner may suffice. [Citations.]” (Grafilo v. Soorani
    (2019) 
    41 Cal.App.5th 497
    , 510 (Grafilo).)
    B.     Standard of review
    “The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s
    admission of evidence [citation], including the determination of
    whether an expert is qualified to testify [citation].” (Grafilo,
    supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.)
    C.     Analysis
    In calculating Shelly’s income available for child support,
    the trial court relied largely on the expert opinion of Adams-Ings,
    Jennifer’s certified public accountant.
    13
    The trial court limited Margolin’s expert testimony to her
    opinion that the cannabis economy remained relatively stable for
    retailers and dispensaries, even as the price of wholesale
    marijuana fell. Margolin’s decades of legal work in the cannabis
    field, which included preparing basic financial projections for
    over 200 licensed marijuana businesses, amply establish her
    qualifications as an expert on general economic trends in the
    cannabis industry. We find no abuse of the trial court’s
    discretion in admitting and relying upon Margolin’s testimony for
    the narrow purpose of explaining those trends.
    Shelly admits that the trial court disregarded “Margolin’s
    conclusions concerning a person’s expected annual income from a
    cannabis business[.]” Nevertheless, he insists that because
    Margolin relied on specious assumptions about the scope of his
    business to opine on his income, “[a]ll of [her] conclusions were
    meritless and should have been disregarded.”6
    Shelly pushes the argument one step too far. He is correct
    that the trial court should “act[] as a gatekeeper to exclude expert
    opinion testimony that is . . . based on reasons unsupported by
    the material on which the expert relies, or . . . speculative.”
    (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
    (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 747
    , 771–772.) But here, the trial court did just
    that. It expressly rejected the portions of Margolin’s testimony
    6      Shelly does not explain what effect Margolin’s assumptions
    about his business had on her broader opinion about the cannabis
    industry. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
    
    194 Cal.App.4th 939
    , 956 [“‘We are not bound to develop
    appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of
    cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to
    treat the contention as waived.’ [Citations.]”].)
    14
    that were based on unsupported hypotheticals about Shelly’s
    business, leaving only her qualified testimony about general
    economic trends in the cannabis industry.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Jennifer is entitled to costs on
    appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
    _____________________, J.
    ASHMANN-GERST
    We concur:
    ________________________, P. J.
    LUI
    ________________________, J.
    CHAVEZ
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B329555

Filed Date: 10/29/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/29/2024