Etame v. Ermel CA2/8 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/29/24 Etame v. Ermel CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    MARTIAL ETAME,                                                B331773
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    (Los Angeles County
    v.                                                  Super. Ct. No. BC679337)
    WOLFRAM ERMEL,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County. Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Offices of Nathan Mubasher and Nathan Mubasher for
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Martial Etame, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________________
    This is defendant and appellant Wolfram Ermel’s second
    appeal from a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and
    respondent Martial Etame. In the prior appeal, Ermel
    challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside and
    vacate the default judgment. The reviewing court found Ermel
    failed to file a timely appeal and had not otherwise demonstrated
    error. (Etame v. Ermel (Feb. 9, 2021, B303939) [nonpub. opn.]
    (Etame I).)
    After the first appeal was dismissed, Ermel moved again to
    set aside the default and vacate the default judgment, arguing
    the judgment was void on its face. The trial court denied the
    motion again, and Ermel appealed again.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.     Etame I
    The following procedural and factual background
    information is taken from our prior opinion in Etame I.1
    “On October 12, 2017, . . . Etame filed a complaint against
    Ermel alleging causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, and
    conversion. The complaint alleged Ermel and Etame formed a
    business buying, selling, and restoring cars but the friends had a
    falling out in August 2017. Etame alleged Ermel then unlawfully
    converted five cars owned by Etame that were stored on Ermel's
    property. Both Etame and Ermel were self-represented. Ermel
    1      Etame requested judicial notice of the record and opinion
    filed in Etame I, as well as our order denying Ermel’s petition
    for rehearing and our Supreme Court’s order denying Ermel’s
    petition for review. We deferred ruling on Etame’s request, and
    now grant it. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
    2
    filed a responsive pleading to the complaint on November 22,
    2017, but thereafter failed to appear for a case management
    conference and two order to show cause hearings without excuse.
    As a result, the trial court struck his answer on October 30,
    2018.” (Etame I, supra, B303939.)
    “The court entered default against Ermel on January 28,
    2019, but denied Etame’s application for default judgment
    because he failed to properly plead specific damages. The order
    specified the default would be effectively vacated if an amended
    complaint were to be filed because it would allow Ermel an
    opportunity to submit a responsive pleading. Etame filed a first
    amended complaint alleging a cause of action for fraud and
    specifying damages of $380,000. Ermel failed to respond and a
    default was entered on the first amended complaint. Etame’s
    subsequent application for default judgment proved damages
    totaling $342,000 for the value of the cars and parts in Ermel’s
    possession. On June 17, 2019, the trial court entered a default
    judgment against Ermel for $342,000.” (Etame I, supra,
    B303939.)
    “On November 6 and 18, 2019, Ermel filed two sets of
    papers to set aside or vacate the default judgment. Etame
    opposed. The trial court observed the papers filed by Ermel were
    disorganized and confusing, clearly violated the length
    requirements set out in rule 3.1113 of the California Rules of
    Court, contained numerous extraneous requests, and were
    interspersed with irrelevant evidence, commentary, and statutes.
    Noting that parsing the papers for properly raised evidence and
    arguments was ‘beyond what the [c]ourt is obligated to do,’
    the trial court nevertheless provided a thorough analysis of the
    issues raised by Ermel in a five-page, single-spaced order. After
    3
    an extensive review of the proceedings, the trial court found
    Ermel ‘clearly had notice of the suit and the hearings that led to
    his dismissal, and simply chose to stop participating in misguided
    protest.’ Further, Ermel filed the motion to vacate over five
    months after the default was taken. He provided no explanation
    for the delay. The trial court concluded there was no basis on
    which Ermel could obtain relief from default. On January 10,
    2020, it denied the motion to vacate, and Ermel appealed on
    January 23, 2020.” (Etame I, supra, B303939.)
    The Etame I court dismissed Ermel’s appeal as untimely
    because his notice of appeal was filed over a month after the
    deadline. (Etame I, supra, B303939.) Nevertheless, the Etame I
    court also found that Ermel had otherwise failed to demonstrate
    reversible error. (Ibid.) “[W]e cannot discern from Ermel’s
    lengthy opening brief any cogent argument related to the order
    denying the motion to vacate. It appears the bulk of his brief is
    devoted to refuting the damages claimed by Etame, arguing
    extraneous points, and summarizing the proceedings contained in
    the three-volume clerk’s transcript. We thus treat Ermel’s
    arguments, such as they are, as waived.” (Ibid.)
    II.   Ermel’s current motion and the trial court’s denial
    On remand, Ermel retained counsel and filed another
    motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment as void on its
    face. The primary issue raised by Ermel was that the default
    judgment previously rendered against him was void for lack of
    jurisdiction. Ermel also argued the trial court failed to obtain
    jurisdiction of him because he never made a general appearance,
    and because Etame did not properly serve the first amended
    complaint (FAC) and summons upon him. Additionally, Ermel
    4
    argued the FAC is invalid because Etame filed it without leave of
    the court in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324.
    The trial court denied the motion. It found Ermel was
    served with the original complaint and made a general
    appearance in the case. It cited to Ermel’s filings challenging the
    merits of the underlying judgment and noted Ermel made
    general appearances on November 6, 2019, and November 18,
    2019. Further, because service of the original complaint was
    proper, Ermel had notice of the case, Etame did not need to serve
    a second summons for the trial court to obtain jurisdiction over
    Ermel. With respect to whether Etame failed to comply with
    California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, the trial court found no
    authority for Ermel’s argument that the FAC was inherently
    invalid and the judgment is void for a failure to comply with
    rule 3.1324.
    Etame appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Ermel argues the trial court erred in denying his motion on
    several grounds. First, he argues the default judgment must be
    set aside because the factual basis for Etame’s allegations were
    fraudulent. Second, Ermel argues the record shows he was never
    served with the FAC and therefore the judgment is void. Third,
    Ermel argues his current challenge to the default judgment is not
    barred by res judicata.
    I.    Governing law and standard of review
    A “court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
    party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
    dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
    through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
    5
    neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc.,2 § 473, subd. (b).) “Where, as here, a
    motion to vacate is made more than six months after entry of a
    judgment, a trial court may grant a motion to set aside that
    judgment as void only if the judgment is void on its face.
    [Citations.] ‘ “A judgment or order is said to be void on its face
    when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the
    judgment-roll.” ’ ” (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014)
    
    223 Cal.App.4th 1434
    , 1440 (Ramos).) “This inquiry, however,
    ‘does not hinge on evidence: A void judgment’s invalidity appears
    on the face of the record.’ ” (Kremerman v. White (2021)
    
    71 Cal.App.5th 358
    , 370 (Kremerman), italics in original.) “A
    judgment ‘is considered void on its face only when the invalidity
    is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court
    record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.]
    When a default judgment has been taken, the judgment roll
    consists of ‘the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service;
    the complaint; the request for entry of default . . . , and a copy of
    the judgment.’ [Citation.] If the invalidity can be shown only
    through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations
    or testimony, the order/judgment is not void on its face.” (Ibid.)
    “Because any defect in service must appear on the face of
    the judgment roll . . . , our review of a trial court’s order finding
    such a facial defect is of necessity de novo.” (Ramos, supra,
    223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440.)
    II.    Ermel’s challenge to the sufficiency of allegations
    Ermel’s first argument on appeal is a challenge to the
    underlying allegations of Etame’s pleading. He asserts the
    2    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
    Code of Civil Procedure.
    6
    allegations that Etame owned certain vehicles are “a patent lie”
    and that an “evidentiary hearing” would “set the record straight.”
    Ermel has even gone so far as to attach potential exhibits to his
    opening brief. Thus, Ermel’s challenge to the validity of the
    default judgment is merely an attempt to discredit the
    underlying allegations, and is based entirely on extrinsic
    evidence. Because Ermel’s argument relies entirely on extrinsic
    evidence, it is insufficient to show the judgment is void on its
    face. (Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 370.)
    III. Ermel’s argument that he was not served with the
    FAC and other challenges to the proof of service
    Ermel next argues the judgment was void because he was
    not served with the FAC. He asserts that various proofs of
    service were fraudulent because he was out of the country when
    service was effected and, in one instance, service was effected
    upon “a random non-Defendant, Daniel Yosef” at the wrong
    address.
    With respect to Ermel’s contention that he was out of the
    country when service was effected, this argument fails for the
    same reasons as his challenge to the underlying allegations.
    It requires consideration of extrinsic evidence, here, Ermel’s
    declaration stating he was out of the country between certain
    dates. Therefore, it is insufficient to show the judgment is void
    on its face. (Kremerman, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 370.)
    Ermel also argues that the default judgment is void
    because he was never served with the first amended complaint.
    Specifically, Ermel directs us to the case register, which shows
    Etame filed a proof of personal service the same day he filed the
    first amended complaint and then filed a proof of service by mail
    several weeks later. With respect to the proof of personal service,
    7
    Ermel argues it must be fraudulent since the case register shows
    the proof of service was filed before the filing of the first amended
    complaint. With respect to the proof of service by mail, Ermel
    argues it was mailed to the wrong person at the wrong address.
    We are not persuaded either argument requires reversal here.
    Assuming personal service was not effected here, because
    Ermel had already made an appearance in the action, Etame was
    permitted to serve the first amended complaint by mail. (See
    Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d. 436, 441
    [“[S]ervice of an amended complaint by mail under Code of Civil
    Procedure section 1012 is sufficient where the defendant has
    made an appearance in the action”].) Regarding whether the
    amended complaint was mailed to the wrong person at the wrong
    address, Ermel has not cited any evidence in support of this
    assertion other than his own declaration in support of his motion
    to vacate the default and the case register, which contains no
    information on who was served. As such, Ermel has not
    demonstrated that he was not validly served with the FAC such
    that the default judgment is void.
    Having found Ermel has not met his burden to demonstrate
    error, we do not consider his third argument—whether or not
    res judicata applies.3
    3     Etame also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
    grounds Ermel’s arguments were already decided by the prior
    appeal. While it is true some of Etame’s arguments may have
    overlapped, the motion to vacate and set aside the default
    judgment here was based on a different standard than in the
    prior appeal. Now, having decided the current appeal on the
    merits, we deny Etame’s motion to dismiss.
    8
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his
    costs on appeal.
    VIRAMONTES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    GRIMES, Acting P. J.
    WILEY, J.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B331773

Filed Date: 10/29/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/29/2024