JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara ( 2024 )

Filed 10/29/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
JCCRANDALL, LLC, 2d Civ. No. B333201
(Super. Ct. No. 21CV04273)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
COUNTY OF SANTA
BARBARA,
Defendant and Respondent.
Many Californians have high expectations that cannabis is
legal in California. This is a reasonable assumption because
Civil Code section 1550.5 says it is.
We regret to inform that cannabis is illegal in California
because federal law says so.
Here we consider cannabis as it applies to easements.
The county grants a conditional use permit (CUP) for the
cultivation of cannabis. To issue a CUP, the county’s land use
code requires a finding that the streets and highways are
adequate for the proposed use. A private easement over a
neighbor’s land is the only access to the land subject to the CUP.
The owner of the servient tenement objects to the use of his land
to transport cannabis. The servient owner petitions for a writ of
administrative mandate challenging the county’s grant of the
CUP. The trial court denies the petition. We reverse because
under federal law cannabis is illegal in California and
everywhere else in the United States. The servient tenant’s
objection on this ground is sufficient to defeat the CUP. That the
possession and cultivation of cannabis has the imprimatur of
legality in California is beside the point.1
FACTS
Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. (Santa Rita) applied to the
County of Santa Barbara (County) for a CUP to cultivate
cannabis. The cultivation would occur on 2.54 acres owned by
Kim Hughes, as trustee of the Hughes Land Holding Trust
(Hughes). Hughes consented to the cannabis cultivation. The
cultivation project (Project) site is zoned for agriculture.
Under the County’s Land Use and Development Code
(LUDC), a CUP is necessary for cannabis cultivation. The
issuance of a CUP requires that the County find streets and
highways are adequate for the proposed use. An easement for
ingress and egress across land owned by JCCrandall, LLC
(JCCrandall) serves the Hughes parcel. The easement is the only
access to the Hughes parcel. The easement was created by deed
in 1998.
The easement is approximately one-half mile long. The
road that runs over the easement is unpaved and approximately
12 feet wide. The County’s fire department and public works
department determined that the road was adequate to serve the
Project.
1 JCCrandall, LLC’s request for judicial notice filed
September 6, 2024, is denied.
2
Over JCCrandall’s objection, the County granted the CUP.
The County’s Board of Supervisors denied JCCrandall’s appeal,
also finding the road adequate to serve the Project.
Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate
JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative
mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the
easement provides adequate access to the Project. JCCrandall
claimed: 1) the use of the easement for cannabis activities is
prohibited by the terms of the easement deed and federal law, 2)
state law requires JCCrandall’s consent for cannabis activities on
its land and JCCrandall refuses to consent, and 3) the road
violates County standards for private roads.
The trial court denied the petition. The court determined
that the County’s decision did not involve a fundamental vested
right. Thus the substantial evidence standard, and not the
independent judgment standard, applies. The court found the
County’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court’s Standard of Review
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 there are
alternative standards for the trial court’s review of an
administrative decision. If the administrative decision involves
or affects a “ ‘fundamental vested right,’ ” the trial court exercises
its independent judgment on the evidence. (HPT IHG-2
Properties Trust v. City of Anaheim (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 188,
198.) Where no fundamental vested right is involved, the trial
court’s review is limited to determining whether the
administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence.
(Ibid.)
3
Whether a claimed right is vested and fundamental is
decided on a case-by-case basis. (McCarthy v. California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 222, 229.) A
vested right is a right that is a preexisting right or a right
already possessed. (Id. at pp. 229-230.)
Here JCCrandall is claiming the right to exclude an
unauthorized person ─ a cannabis grower ─ from its property.
Inherent in the right of ownership is the right to exclude others.
(LT-WR, L.L.C. v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 770, 806.) The right to exclude others is the essence
of the right of property ownership. The right existed prior to any
administrative decision. It is a fundamental vested right. (See
also 301 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd.
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1548 [the right to control the use of one’s
property is a fundamental vested right].) The trial court erred in
applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The court’s
independent judgment is the proper standard.
The County’s reliance on Bakman v. Department of
Transportation (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 665 (Bakman) is misplaced.
In Bakman, homeowners objected to a permit allowing an airport
expansion. None of the homeowners complained that the permit
required a physical invasion of their properties. The Court of
Appeal held that the permit did not involve a fundamental vested
right, and substantial evidence was the proper standard of
review. (Id. at pp. 689-690.)
Bakman is easily distinguished. JCCrandall is not simply
an owner of property in the vicinity of the Project. Here the CUP
is premised on Santa Rita’s right to physically use JCCrandall’s
property.
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II. Easement’s Use to Transport Cannabis
It is often said that cannabis is legal in California. The
statement is not true. Under federal law cannabis is illegal in
every state and territory of the United States. (See Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c)(10);
City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
355, 377.) Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the United States
Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, provides in part,
“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
(a) Civil Code Section 1550.5, subdivision (b)
In finding that the easement provides adequate access for
the Project, the County relied on Civil Code section 1550.5,
subdivision (b) which provides in part:
“Notwithstanding any law, including, but not limited to,
. . . federal law, commercial activity relating to medicinal
cannabis or adult-use cannabis conducted in compliance with
California law and any applicable local standards, requirements,
and regulations shall be deemed to be all of the following:
“(1) A lawful object of a contract.
“(2) Not contrary to, an express provision of law, any policy
of express law, or good morals.
“(3) Not against public policy.”
The subdivision defies the Supremacy Clause. No matter
how much California voters and the Legislature might try,
cannabis cultivation and transportation are illegal in California
as long as it remains illegal under federal law.
5
We need not decide whether Civil Code section 1550.5,
subdivision (b) is valid as between contracting parties who
voluntarily agree to enter into the cannabis business. That is not
the case here. The CUP is premised on JCCrandall being forced
to allow its property to be used in cannabis transportation.
JCCrandall relies on Business and Professions Code section
26051.5, subdivision (a)(2). An applicant for a state license to
conduct commercial cannabis activity must, “Provide evidence of
the legal right to occupy and use the proposed location and
provide a statement from the landowner of real property or that
landowner’s agent where the commercial cannabis activity will
occur, as proof to demonstrate the landowner has acknowledged
and consented to permit commercial cannabis activities to be
conducted on the property by the tenant applicant.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 26051.5, subd. (a)(2).)
JCCrandall argues the statute requires its consent to use
its land for commercial cannabis activity. The County claims the
statute applies only between landlord and tenant.
It is true the statute refers to the “tenant applicant.” But
the statute also refers to consent of the “landowner,” a category
broader than the tenant applicant’s landlord. JCCrandall
certainly qualifies as a landowner. Technical language aside, the
statute evinces a policy that landowners should not be forced to
allow their properties to be used for commercial cannabis
activities but must affirmatively consent. In light of this policy,
we interpret Business and Professions Code section 26051.5,
subdivision (a)(2) as requiring permission for commercial
cannabis activities from all landowners where land is so used,
including the owners of servient tenants over which cannabis is
transported.
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(b) Scope of Easement
Business and Professions Code section 26051.5, subdivision
(a)(2) aside, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow his property to
be used to transport cannabis, because such use exceeds the
scope of uses allowed under the easement.
It is undisputed that in 1998, when the easement was
created, cannabis was illegal under both California and federal
law. It is also undisputed that from the time the easement was
created it has been used for legal agricultural purposes.
For as long as an easement is enjoyed, its mode and
manner of use shall remain substantially the same as it was at
the time the easement was created. (Whalen v. Ruiz (1953) 40
Cal.2d 294, 302.) The County argues the easement was used for
agricultural purposes. But there is a vast difference between
legal and illegal agricultural purposes.
Nor does the County point to any evidence that at the time
the easement was created the parties intended that it would be
used for an illegal purpose. Had the parties so intended, the
easement would have been unenforceable. (See Baccouche v.
Blankenship (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [assuming that
like a contract for an illegal purpose, an easement for an illegal
purpose is void].)
The scope of the easement does not include the illegal
transport of cannabis. Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b)
cannot expand the scope of the easement to allow such use. A
statute that authorizes the permanent physical invasion of the
land of another is void as violating the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419, 426)
7
(c) County Codes
The County tries to distance itself from the dispute by
claiming the use of a private easement is a matter between the
dominant and servient landowners, and not the business of the
County.
But the County’s LUDC requires that to grant a CUP the
County must find: “Streets and highways are adequate and
properly designed to carry the type and quantity of traffic
generated by the proposed use.” (LUDC § 35.82.060, subd.
(E)(1)(d).)
It is undisputed that the easement is the only means of
access to and from the proposed use. The proposed use is the
cultivation and transportation of cannabis. If the easement is not
available for the proposed use, then the streets and highways
cannot be deemed adequate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Costs are awarded to appellant.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
8
Jed Beebe, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside, Ernest Guadiana,
Jackson D. McNeill, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Callie Patton Kim,
Deputy Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.