Batta v. Hunt ( 2024 )

Filed 10/29/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ELI G. BATTA et al., B326589
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 19VECV01805)
THERESE R. HUNT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Yates Litigation and John R. Yates for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Schorr Law, Zachary D. Schorr, and Stephanie C. Goldstein
for Defendant and Appellant.
_________________________________
This case involves a dispute over two adjacent parcels of
property each containing a multi-unit apartment complex with
on-site parking for their residents. The parties sought to
determine their rights regarding a purported easement to use
a disputed area on one parcel for additional space for tenant
parking and trash dumpsters.
After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents Eli and
Maha Batta (the Battas), finding they had established easement
rights for additional parking and the dumpsters in the disputed
area on the adjacent parcel, which was owned by defendant,
respondent, and cross-appellant Therese Hunt. The trial court
found the Battas established their easement rights under
multiple theories, including by oral grant, by prescription, and
by implication. While the trial court granted the parking and
trash dumpster easement in favor of the Battas, it ordered that
the easement would expire upon a bona fide sale of either
property by the Battas or Hunt.
Both parties appealed. Hunt argues the trial court erred
in granting the easement rights on various procedural and
evidentiary grounds while the Battas argue the trial court abused
its discretion in ruling the easement would expire upon a bona
fide sale of either property. For the reasons stated below,
we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The history of the two properties and the Battas’
complaint
Hunt owned two adjacent properties located at 6870
Woodley Avenue (the Hunt Property) and 6866 Woodley Avenue
2
(the Batta Property). The Hunt Property contains a four-unit
apartment building and a separate carport to the west of the
building. The Batta Property sits directly south of the Hunt
Property and contains a nine-unit apartment building, which
includes an overhang in the back of the building where tenants
can park. The Batta Property also contains two additional
parking spaces in the front of the building. A driveway runs east
to west between the two apartment buildings.
The Battas purchased the Batta Property from Hunt in
1994. In 2019, the Battas sought a parking covenant from Hunt
to prove to the City of Los Angeles that the Batta Property had
sufficient available parking spaces. When Hunt refused to sign
the covenant, the Battas brought this action, seeking an
easement for parking as well as space to place their dumpsters,
which had also been placed on the Hunt Property since the time
of purchase.
The Battas’ original complaint alleged causes of action for
(1) quiet title to an easement by grant, (2) quiet title to an
easement by prescription, (3) quiet title to an irrevocable license,
and (4) breach of contract. They sought a determination as to
whether the Batta Property tenants could use four parking
spaces on the Hunt Property and whether the Battas could place
a garbage dumpster on the Hunt Property adjacent to the four
parking spaces. The Battas alleged their tenants had parked in
the same locations on the Hunt Property since their purchase in
1994, and the dumpster had always been placed in the same
location. The Battas alleged the disputed area was subject to an
easement granted by Hunt. The Battas further alleged a
description of the easement was contained in a real estate
transfer disclosure statement (TDS) completed by Hunt after the
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Battas purchased the Batta Property. The Battas alleged they
would not have purchased the property without an easement.
II. Bench trial
The trial court conducted a two-day bench trial. The trial
court heard testimony from the Battas, Hunt’s daughter Cynthia
Hunt, a land surveyor, and two current tenants of the Batta
Property. Since Hunt was unable to attend the trial due to
health reasons, it admitted a video recording of Hunt’s
deposition.
During trial and after Hunt rested, Batta moved to conform
to proof a cause of action for easement by implication. Finding no
prejudice to either party, the trial court granted the motion, and
reopened evidence on this new theory to allow both sides to
present additional testimony and evidence. Thereafter, Hunt
submitted the original site plan for the Batta Property, showing
eight on-site parking spaces for what at the time was an eight-
unit building.1
III. Findings of fact
The trial court issued its tentative statement of decision
and directed the parties to file closing briefs and objections. After
issuing a series of tentative and final statements of decision, the
trial court ruled in favor of the Battas. The trial court found
clear and convincing evidence supported the following facts.
Before the Battas purchased the Batta Property, Hunt
owned the two adjacent parcels. There was a four-unit
apartment building on the Hunt Property and a nine-unit
1 When Hunt owned both properties, she subdivided one of
the units in the Batta Property, adding a nonpermitted ninth
unit.
4
apartment building on the Batta Property, although the Batta
Property was only permitted for eight units. There is a multi-car
carport on the Hunt Property and a driveway in between both
properties.
Between 1977 and 1994, while Hunt owned both properties,
the tenants for the Batta Property parked their cars in three
parking spaces behind the carport of the Hunt Property, and the
Batta Property’s trash and recycling dumpsters were stored near
the back of the Hunt Property’s carport.
The Battas purchased the Batta Property from Hunt in
1994. Before the Battas purchased the property, all of the
tenants in both apartment buildings parked wherever it was
most convenient for them. After the Battas purchased the
property, their tenants continued to park on both the Hunt
Property and the Batta Property.
Before selling the Batta Property, Hunt told the Battas she
believed there was an easement on the Hunt Property, which
gave the Batta Property rights to park and place a trash
dumpster on the Hunt Property. Although the purchase
agreement did not mention an easement, Hunt described an
easement in the TDS. The TDS identified an easement on the
Hunt Property for parking for two units of the Batta Property
and space for the dumpster. Hunt also verbally told the Battas
there was an easement for parking and the dumpster. Both Hunt
and the Battas expected that the tenants in two of the units on
the Batta Property would continue to use the three parking
spaces behind the Hunt Property carport pursuant to the
easement, and the parties operated under this assumption from
the time of purchase until 2019.
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After the sale, Hunt never told the Battas or their tenants
that they could or could not continue to park on the Hunt
Property. Hunt never really knew exactly where the property
line was along the driveway between the two properties. The
Battas paved the area behind the Hunt Property carport and also
the driveway. Hunt knew about the paving but took no action to
prevent it, remove it, or check the property line. The paved
driveway covers areas on both proprieties; however, the vast
majority sits on the Batta Property.
The Batta Property tenants used the driveway between the
two apartment buildings to access the parking. The driveway
was partially on the Hunt Property. The tenants needed this
driveway to access the parking spaces, three of which were on the
Hunt Property while the remainder were on the Batta Property.
While the Batta Property had some additional on-site parking,
the spaces were not realistically usable as some appeared to be
too narrow or difficult to access without damaging the cars or
supporting beams. Further, some of these additional spaces on
the Batta Property had been used for almost 30 years as a
common area for the tenants. Both sides expected that after the
Battas purchased the property, the dumpster would continue to
be stored against the back wall of the Hunt Property carport,
which is located at the end of the parties’ shared driveway.
The parties never recorded an easement. Instead, the
parties continued to operate as if there was an easement from the
time the Battas bought the Batta property in 1994 until 2019.
In support of its finding that the Battas had established an
easement by prescription, the trial court found the Battas did not
have permission to the use the disputed area on the Hunt
6
Property. It found Hunt’s testimony that she gave the Battas
permission to use the land was not credible.
IV. Judgment
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Battas.
It found there was an easement by implication, by oral grant and
by prescription in favor of the Batta Property for three parking
spaces on the Hunt Property and space for a trash and recycling
dumpsters. It further found a nonexclusive driveway easement
by implication, oral grant, and by prescription between the Batta
Property and the Hunt Property to the extent the driveway
overlaps the two properties in order for the Battas’ tenants to
access the parking spaces and dumpsters. The trial court
enjoined the Hunt Property from using the easement in a manner
inconsistent with its findings. The trial court further ordered
that the easement did not run with the title of either property
and that the easement would expire in the event of a good faith
bona fide sale by the parties.
The trial court also ordered a nonexclusive easement by
implication, by oral grant, and by prescription to the extent that
the driveway was necessary access to the Batta Property.
The trial court ordered this easement to run with title to both
properties.
Both sides appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court’s findings were inconsistent
Hunt argues the judgment must be set aside and a new
trial ordered on the grounds that the trial court’s findings on each
of the Battas’ causes of action were inconsistent and
irreconcilable. Hunt first directs us to Battas’ operative
complaint, which alleged inconsistent theories on their right to
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an easement. The Battas alleged they were entitled to an
easement by express grant, by implication, or by prescription.
The first two of these causes of action require the Battas to show
Hunt, either impliedly or expressly, agreed to grant the Battas an
easement over the disputed area. Meanwhile, the easement by
prescription requires the trial court to find the Battas’ right to
use the disputed area was hostile and adverse to Hunt’s interest,
i.e., without Hunt’s permission. Since the trial court found the
Battas met their burden under all three theories, it necessarily
found that Hunt impliedly or expressly granted the Battas an
easement while also finding Hunt never granted the Battas
permission to use the disputed area. Hunt asserts these findings
are fatally inconsistent since Hunt could not both agree to grant
the Battas an easement while also not giving them permission to
use the disputed area. As explained further below, we conclude
these inconsistent findings require reversal.
A. Law governing inconsistent findings
A plaintiff may plead inconsistent causes of action.
(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World
Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1224.) “When a pleader is
in doubt about what actually occurred or what can be established
by the evidence, the modern practice allows that party to plead in
the alternative and make inconsistent allegations.” (Mendoza v.
Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.) This
doubt can arise when plaintiffs are certain of their legal rights
but unsure about some of the ultimate facts or when plaintiffs are
reasonably certain of the facts but are unsure about their legal
rights. (See Gutirrez v. Southern Pac. Co. (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d
866, 873.) To accommodate these uncertainties, plaintiffs can
generally plead “alternative factual allegations relying on
8
alternative legal theories.” (Williams v. Southern California Gas
Co. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 591, 598.)
Given that alternative legal theories may be pled, “it is not
proper for the judge to force upon the plaintiff an election
between those causes which he has a right to plead.” (Tanforan
v. Tanforan (1916) 173 Cal. 270, 274.) “Plaintiff is entitled to
introduce his evidence upon each and all of these causes of action,
and the election, or in other words the decision as to which of
them is sustained, is, after the taking of all the evidence, a
matter for the judge or the jury.” (Ibid.)
However, where the plaintiff has not made an election, it is
“the duty of the trial court . . . , upon the close of the evidence, to
decide which of the antagonistic causes of action ha[ve] been
sustained, and in so deciding the court [i]s required to take as
true the averments in the complaint which bore most strongly
against the pleader, and which were sustained by proofs either in
the form of evidence or admissions of the pleadings.” (Beatty v.
Pacific States Savings & Loan Co. (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 692, 697.)
If the judgment is based on irreconcilable contradictory findings,
the judgment must be reversed. (Id. at p. 699.)
B. Law of easements
“ ‘An easement is an interest in the land of another, which
entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment
of the other’s land. [Citations.] [¶] An easement creates a
nonpossessory right to enter and use land in another’s possession
and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses
authorized by the easement.’ ” (Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright
& Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1053–1054 (Main
Street).) Relevant here, easements may be created by an express
grant, an implied grant, or by prescription. (Ibid.)
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An express grant of an easement may be created by an
executed oral agreement. (Rubio Canon Land & Water Ass’n v.
Everett (1908) 154 Cal. 29, 32–35; Churchill v. Russell (1905)
148 Cal. 1, 2–4; Wilkes v. Brady (1927) 84 Cal.App. 365, 368
(Wilkes).) Courts will create an easement by executed oral
agreement where a seller orally agrees that the buyer will have
an easement over the seller’s property, but fails to convey it
expressly by the deed and where the buyer uses and improves the
easement and performs the contract. (Wilkes, at p. 368.)
An implied easement will be found where the following
conditions exist: (1) “ ‘the owner of property conveys or transfers
a portion of that property to another’ ”; (2) “ ‘the owner’s prior
existing use of the property was of a nature that the parties must
have intended or believed that the use would continue; meaning
that the existing use must either have been known to the grantor
and the grantee, or have been so obviously and apparently
permanent that the parties should have known of the use’ ”; and
(3) “ ‘the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit
of the quasi-dominant tenement.’ ” (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 (Thorstrom).)
A prescriptive easement will be found where the party
seeking the easement proves use of the property for the statutory
period of five years and where the use has been “ ‘(1) open and
notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) hostile to the
true owner; and (4) under claim of right.’ ” (Main Street, supra,
194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) In other words, “[a]n easement
acquired by prescription is one acquired by adverse use for a
certain period.” (Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084,
1092.) “ ‘Adverse use’ means . . . that the claimant’s use of the
property was made without the explicit or implicit permission of
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the landowner.” (Aaron v. Dunham (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1244,
1252.) This requirement “ ‘ “ensures that a prescriptive easement
can arise only if the owner had an opportunity to protect his or
her rights by taking legal action to prevent the wrongful use, yet
failed to do so.” ’ ” (Husain v. California Pacific Bank (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 717, 726.)
C. The trial court’s findings supporting Hunt’s
express or implied grant of an easement were
inconsistent with its finding that Hunt did not
grant the Battas permission to use her property
Here, the evidence the trial court relied on to rule in favor
of the Battas on their claims for easements by implication and
oral grant establish that the Battas’ use of the Hunt Property
was not adverse. The trial court found that the Hunt’s
statements to the Battas prior to the purchase and subsequently
the TDS constituted an oral grant of an easement. It also found
that the parties expected that the tenants would continue to park
their cars on the Hunt Property as if there was an easement at
the time of purchase. In other words, the trial court’s findings
reflect that the Battas’ use of the Hunt Property was permissive.
On the other hand, in finding that the Battas established a
prescriptive easement over Hunt’s Property, it concluded that
Hunt did not give permission for the Battas to use her property.
In sum, the trial court found there was an express or implied
agreement but no permission.
These findings are inherently conflicting, irreconcilable,
and, as explained in more detail below, require reversal of the
judgment.
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II. We cannot modify the judgment and affirm as
modified
The Battas seem to concede that the trial court made
inconsistent findings. However, the Battas argue we should
modify the judgment and affirm since it is apparent the trial
court intended to grant easement rights over the Hunt Property
and the Battas established those rights either by implication or
oral grant. We find modification and affirmance would be
inappropriate here.
“The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a
judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions
are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of
affirmance.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “ ‘In general, in reviewing a judgment
based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, “any
conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the
trial court decision.” ’ ” (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.) We liberally construe findings of fact
to support the judgment. (Ibid.)
“The meaning and effect of a judgment is determined
according to the rules governing the interpretation of writings
generally. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he entire document is to be taken by
its four corners and construed as a whole to effectuate the
obvious intention.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “No particular part or clause in
the judgment is to be seized upon and given the power to destroy
the remainder if such effect can be avoided.” ’ ” (People v. Landon
White Bail Bonds (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 66, 76 (Landon).)
“Where an ambiguity exists, the court may examine the
entire record to determine the judgment’s scope and effect.
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[Citations.] The court may also ‘ “refer to the circumstances
surrounding the making of the order or judgment, [and] to the
condition of the cause in which it was entered.” ’ [Citations.]
Subsequent actions by the rendering judge may be considered as
bearing upon the judgment’s intended meaning and effect.”
(Landon, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 76.)
Here, the Battas argue they sufficiently established their
rights to an easement by implication and oral grant; therefore,
we should affirm the judgment as modified because the judgment
is correct on at least one of these theories. In examining these
remaining theories, we find that neither is sufficient to affirm the
judgment.
A. The Battas did not prove an easement by
oral grant
The Battas argue the evidence was sufficient to support an
easement by oral grant. We disagree.
While easements must generally be conveyed in writing, an
executed oral agreement will convey title to an easement.
(Wilkes, supra, 84 Cal.App. at p. 369.) Thus, although an
easement is an interest in real property and generally must be
agreed to in writing, an oral agreement to grant an easement will
be enforced where the grantee improves the easement and
otherwise performs under the terms of the agreement. (Id. at
p. 368.)
Here, the evidence relied on by the trial court to find an
easement by oral grant was Hunt’s statements during the sales
process and prior to purchase that there was an easement, and
Hunt’s statement in the TDS where she described an easement
for parking and trash bins. Hunt argues this evidence was
insufficient to create an oral grant because Hunt’s statements
13
during the sales process and before the sale could not modify the
purchase agreement under the parol evidence rule, and the TDS
was insufficient to constitute a separate agreement to grant an
easement. We agree with Hunt.
1. Hunt’s statements prior to the sale were
barred by the parol evidence rule
“Application of the parol evidence rule to exclude a
collateral oral agreement raises a question of law to be
determined by the court. Upon appellate review, the court is not
bound by the trial court’s determination and may consider the
issue de novo. Application of the rule involves a two-part
analysis. First, was the writing intended to be an integration,
i.e., a complete and final expression of the parties’ agreement,
precluding any evidence of collateral agreements? Second, is the
agreement susceptible of the meaning contended for by the party
offering the evidence? Put another way, if a writing is deemed
integrated, extrinsic evidence is admissible only if it is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible. [Citation.] Thus, parol evidence may be
admitted to explain the meaning of a writing when the meaning
urged is one to which the written contract term is reasonably
susceptible or when the contract is ambiguous. Parol evidence
cannot be admitted to show intention independent of an
unambiguous written instrument.” (Hayter Trucking, Inc. v.
Shell Western E&P, Inc. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1, 14–15.)
“When the parties to a written contract have agreed to it as an
‘integration’—a complete and final embodiment of the terms of an
agreement—parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its
terms.” (Masterson v. Sine (1968) 68 Cal.2d 222, 225.)
14
Here, the parties do not dispute that the purchase
agreement contained an integration clause. Nor do they dispute
that the purchase agreement makes no mention of an easement.
Further, the Battas do not argue that any of the purchase
agreement’s terms are reasonably susceptible to their
interpretation or that the terms are ambiguous such that parol
evidence is necessary. Therefore, Hunt’s statements during the
sales process that she was granting an easement in favor of the
Batta Property constituted parol evidence that was inadmissible
to vary the terms of the purchase agreement.
The Battas respond that the parol evidence rule does not
apply because the TDS constituted a separate agreement
executed after the purchase agreement and otherwise met the
legal requirements for a grant of easement. In arguing the TDS
met all the legal requirements for a grant of an easement, the
Battas assert the TDS is signed by Hunt as the grantor and the
TDS’s description of the easement, combined with the evidence of
the tenants’ continued use, was sufficient evidence of the
easement’s location and scope. We disagree.
We find the TDS was insufficient to modify the original
purchase agreement and grant easement rights to the Battas.
As Hunt correctly argues, the TDS was merely informational and
was signed by Hunt to comply with her disclosure obligations
under Civil Code section 1102 to put the Battas on notice of any
existing conditions on the property. Hunt’s signature did not
convert the TDS from a disclosure statement to a binding
contract or offer creating easement rights. Rather, Hunt’s
signature reflects her statement that the information in the TDS
was true and correct, nothing more. Similarly, the Battas’
signature simply reflects that they received the document.
15
As Hunt points out, to construe the TDS in the manner asserted
by the Battas would allow any representations in a disclosure
form to become vested rights even in those situations where the
right does not exist or may not have been subject to a separate
agreement. Further, to the extent the Battas argue the TDS
modified the purchase agreement, there is no indication that any
further agreement, oral or otherwise, was ever executed to
constitute a valid modification of the original purchase
agreement.
Accordingly, we find the trial court’s finding that the
Battas established their right to an easement by oral grant was
not supported by the evidence.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the Battas to amend their
complaint to add a cause of action for
easement by implication without allowing
Hunt the opportunity to rebut the Battas’
evidence that the easement was
reasonably necessary
Having found the trial court’s finding that the Battas
proved the existence of an easement by oral grant was not
supported by the evidence, we turn to the Battas’ remaining
theory of relief for an implied easement. While the record shows
that the Battas established their right to an implied easement
and the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence, we
nonetheless find the judgment on this theory should be reversed
as well. This is because we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the Battas to amend their complaint to add
this new theory as Hunt did not have a sufficient opportunity to
marshal evidence in response.
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“[T]he allowance of amendments to conform to the proof
rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and its
determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly
appears that such discretion has been abused. [Citations.] Such
amendments have been allowed with great liberality ‘and no
abuse of discretion is shown [u]nless by permitting the
amendment new and substantially different issues are introduced
in the case or the rights of the adverse party prejudiced.’ ”
(Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 31.)
“ ‘The cases on amending pleadings during trial suggest
trial courts should be guided by two general principles:
(1) whether facts or legal theories are being changed and
(2) whether the opposing party will be prejudiced by the proposed
amendment. Frequently, each principle represents a different
side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice
may easily result because of the inability of the other party to
investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged
in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts
supports merely a different theory—for example, an easement as
opposed to a fee—no prejudice can result.’ [Citation.] ‘The basic
rule applicable to amendments to conform to proof is that the
amended pleading must be based upon the same general set of
facts as those upon which the cause of action or defense as
originally pleaded was grounded.’ ” (Garcia v. Roberts (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 900, 910.)
As stated above, one of the elements to establish an implied
easement is that “ ‘the easement is reasonably necessary to the
use and benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement.’ ” (Thorstrom,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.) “The law does not require
that such easement be absolutely necessary; it is sufficient if the
17
easement is reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of
the property.” (McCarty v. Walton (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 39, 43.)
One consideration in whether an easement is reasonably
necessary is whether the party claiming the easement can, at
reasonable cost, create a substitute on the party’s own estate.
(Leonard v. Haydon (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 263, 273.)
Hunt argues the trial court abused its discretion when it
granted the Battas leave to amend to add an implied easement
claim, as she did not have an opportunity to conduct any
discovery related to whether the Battas could show whether the
easement was reasonably necessary.
Hunt argues, had she known earlier that the Battas
intended to pursue an easement by implication, she would have
retained experts, deposed someone from the Los Angeles
Department of Building and Safety (LADBS), and deposed any
third parties that the Battas consulted with regarding parking on
the Batta Property. She also would have conducted discovery
regarding whether the Battas attempted to determine if they
could create alternative parking arrangements on their own
property at a reasonable cost. Further, Hunt would have
introduced a copy of the site plan dated January 9, 2021, with
handwritten comments from a LADBS reviewer, which stated
that all eight required parking spaces were provided on site.
Hunt claims she was unable to do any of these things or call any
witnesses to conclusively show that the Battas could not satisfy
any purported parking requirements with off-site parking and
that in fact, the Battas are probably required to reconfigure their
own property to create on-site parking.
The Battas argue these claims fail to show prejudice. First,
the Battas argue they had the burden of proof on the element of
18
“reasonable necessity”; therefore Hunt was not prejudiced by the
absence of discovery on this point. However, as Hunt correctly
points out, even if the Battas initially had the burden of proof,
Hunt was entitled to offer evidence to show the Battas had not
met that burden or at least rebut the evidence presented by the
Battas. Second, the Battas argue Hunt’s trial counsel established
through the Battas’ testimony that the Battas told their tenants
to quit using three parking spaces under the building because
there were constant problems with cars hitting the support
beams and damaging them. However, this does not address the
fundamental problem with allowing the late amendment, which
deprived Hunt of the opportunity to explore the potential cost to
create alternative parking arrangements on the Batta Property.
Third, the Battas argue any prejudice was cured when the trial
court granted the Battas’ motion to amend and allowed
additional evidence, which included the original site plan for the
Batta Property, showing eight on-site parking spaces for what
at the time was an eight unit building. While the trial court’s
allowance of additional evidence certainly cured some of the
prejudice as Hunt was able to introduce the Batta Property’s
original site plan, we find Hunt has sufficiently identified
additional evidence that could have been offered regarding
whether the easement was reasonably necessary.
Given these issues, the trial court should have suspended
proceedings and reopened discovery to allow Hunt to marshal
additional evidence, if any.
Since we conclude that the trial court’s findings on whether
Hunt granted the Battas either an implied easement or an
easement by prescription are fundamentally inconsistent, and the
Battas failed to prove their claim for an easement by oral grant,
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we find it impossible to modify the judgment and affirm as
modified.
In light of our reversal, we find it unnecessary to consider
the parties’ additional arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Hunt
shall recover her costs on appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WILEY, J.
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