People v. Molina CA5 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/2/24 P. v. Molina CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086900
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. F22904172 and
v. F23904128)
JOSEPH SHAWN MOLINA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gabriel L.
Brickey, Judge.
Maureen M. Bodo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and R. Todd
Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
Defendant Joseph Shawn Molina contends on appeal that the sentence must be
reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to the middle term and denying his request for residential drug treatment.
The People disagree. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On June 14, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a complaint in
case No. F22904172, charging defendant with vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a); count 1); receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)1;
count 2); giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a); count 3); and
misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1));
count 4). It was further alleged as to counts 1 and 2 that defendant suffered six prior auto
theft convictions (§ 666.5). It was further alleged as to count 4 that defendant suffered a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and 13 prior
felony convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). Factors in aggravation pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) and (3)2 were also alleged.
On September 1, 2022, defendant pled not guilty in case No. F22904172 to
counts 1 through 4 and denied all enhancements and prior convictions.
On June 2, 2023, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a complaint in
case No. F23904128, charging defendant with five counts of grand theft of personal
property (§ 487, subd. (a); counts 1, 3, 5, 7, & 15); five counts of second degree
commercial burglary (§§ 459/460, subd. (b); counts 2, 4, 6, 8, & 16); three counts of
misdemeanor petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a); counts 9, 11, & 13); and three counts of
misdemeanor shoplifting (§ 459.5, subd. (a); counts 10, 12, & 14). It was further alleged
defendant suffered 15 prior convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). The complaint also
alleged factors in aggravation pursuant to rule 4.421(b)(2) and (3).
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 All rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
2.
On June 12, 2023, defendant pled not guilty in case No. F23904128 to
counts 1 through 16 and denied all enhancements and prior convictions.
On June 21, 2023, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest in
case No. F23904128 to counts 1 and 3 and admitted the enhancements. The remaining
counts and allegations were dismissed. Defendant agreed to a two-year eight-month lid,
concurrent with the sentence in case No. F22904172.
Also on June 21, 2023, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest in
case No. F22904172 to count 1. All remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
Defendant agreed to a three-year lid on count 1.
On September 5, 2023, defendant filed a sentencing memorandum requesting the
trial court impose a low term sentence and allow him to enter a one-year residential
treatment facility.
On September 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant in case No. F22904172
to the middle term of three years, to be served locally, and in case No. F23904128,
defendant was sentenced to two years, concurrent to his sentence in case No. F22904172.
On October 9, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY3
On April 13, 2022, defendant climbed into a running car parked in front of a hotel
and drove away without permission. He drove out of the hotel parking lot at a high rate
of speed and was promptly pulled over by police.
On April 14, 16, 20, and May 10 and 24, 2023, defendant repeatedly entered a
clothing store and stole clothing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the sentence must be reversed and remanded because the
trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to the middle term and denied his
3 The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the pleas pursuant to People v. West
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 (a plea of no contest without admitting a factual basis for the plea).
3.
request for residential drug treatment. Defendant argues the court failed to consider his
alcoholism and substance abuse as mitigating factors. The People disagree. We agree
with the People.
A. Background
On June 21, 2023, defendant pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to
count 1 in case No. F22904172 and counts 1 and 3 in case No. F23904128 with a
three-year lid, as was recommended in defendant’s probation report.
On September 5, 2023, defendant filed a sentencing memorandum requesting the
trial court impose the low term sentence and allow him to enter a one-year residential
treatment facility, the Teen Challenge program. Defendant argued pursuant to
rule 4.423(a)(3) that his crimes were committed because of an unusual circumstance: his
daily substance abuse. Defendant also argued, citing rule 4.423(a)(4), that his criminal
conduct was partially excusable, for reasons not amounting to a defense, because of the
strong nexus between his criminal conduct and daily substance abuse. Further, defendant
argued pursuant to rule 4.423(b)(8) that he voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing before
arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process.
At sentencing, defense counsel argued for the low term sentence and the
residential drug treatment facility. A representative from Teen Challenge addressed the
trial court and discussed defendant’s acceptance into the program and positive future
prospects.
The prosecution objected, arguing that, based upon defendant’s extensive recent
criminal history, the low term would not be appropriate and the residential drug treatment
facility would likely be of no benefit to him.
The trial court stated it had read and considered both the probation report and
defendant’s sentencing memorandum. It stated,
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“[D]efendant has had multiple opportunities to program, both as a juvenile
and as an adult, as listed in the [probation report], back in 2001,
participating in the Crossroads Hope of Life Program. He was granted
probation in 2013, and again in 2016, a local commitment. It indicates he
was offered the Teen Challenge Program at that point, and again in 2017.
[¶] [D]efendant is not eligible for probation except in unusual
circumstances. This Court finds there are none. And, in fact, … defendant
has nine prior felony convictions. While the program may benefit …
defendant, the Court does not disagree with that, the Court must balance the
interest of the community and society, and this defendant’s record suggests
that he has caused significant harm to the public and should be held
accountable for that conduct. [¶] [I]n case [No. F22904172], probation is
denied. The defendant is committed to the Fresno County Jail pursuant to
[section] 1170[, subdivision] (h) for the middle term of three years.”
B. Law
When the Penal Code statute under which a defendant is convicted specifies
three possible terms, the selection of the upper, middle, or lower term rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. (§ 1170, subd. (b); rule 4.420(a).) In making this
decision, “the sentencing judge may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation,
and any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision.” (Rule 4.420(d).)
Circumstances in mitigation are listed in rule 4.423, and “[r]elevant factors
enumerated in [the Rules of Court] must be considered by the sentencing judge .…”
(Rule 4.409.) Rule 4.423 provides in pertinent part that the following are mitigating
circumstances: “The crime was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as
great provocation, that is unlikely to recur” (rule 4.423(a)(3)); “The defendant
participated in the crime under circumstances of coercion or duress, or the criminal
conduct was partially excusable for some other reason not amounting to a defense”
(rule 4.423(a)(4)); and “[t]he defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing before
arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process” (rule 4.423(b)(8)). The circumstances
enumerated in the rules “are illustrative and not exclusive. Other factors both in
aggravation and mitigation should be considered under [former] rule 408(a)
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[now rule 4.408(a)].” (People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 193, fn. 4.) “A
remand for resentencing is required when the court fails to consider relevant mitigating
factors.” (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 582.)
“Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors. [Citation.] Indeed, a trial court may ‘minimize or even entirely disregard
mitigating factors without stating its reasons.’ ” (People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
1227, 1258.) The court is not required to review in detail each of the mitigating factors
upon which the defendant relies. It can reject all mitigating factors without explanation.
(See People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583 [court need not explain its
reasons for rejecting mitigating factors].) “ ‘Further, unless the record affirmatively
indicates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all relevant criteria,
including any mitigating factors.’ ” (People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1322;
People v. Holguin (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1317–1318; rule 4.409 [court is
presumed to have considered all relevant factors unless the record affirmatively shows
otherwise]; People v. Kelley, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.)
Moreover, “[t]he trial court is not required to set forth its reasons for rejecting a
mitigating factor.” (People v. Holguin, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1317; see also
People v. Avalos, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th
795, 860 [trial court’s failure to mention mitigating evidence does not mean the court
ignored it, but simply indicates the court did not consider such evidence to have
appreciable mitigating weight].)
Alcoholism and substance abuse may be mitigating factors. However, they are not
always mitigating. (People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 960 (Reyes); People v.
Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531, 538–540.) “As a policy matter, when a defendant
has a drug addiction or substance abuse problem, where the defendant has failed to deal
with the problem despite repeated opportunities, where the defendant shows little or no
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motivation to change his life style, and where the substance abuse problem is a
substantial factor in the commission of crimes, the need to protect the public from further
crimes by that individual suggests that a longer sentence should be imposed, not a shorter
sentence. For example, the felony drunk driver who is suffering from an uncontrolled
alcoholism should be sentenced to a longer term, not a shorter one, in order to prevent
him from driving under the influence again.” (Reyes, at p. 963.)
“ ‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978.)
C. Analysis
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to the
middle term and denying his request for residential drug treatment, as the court properly
considered whether his alcoholism or substance abuse was a mitigating circumstance
here. (See Reyes, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 963; see also People v. Regalado, supra,
108 Cal.App.3d at p. 539.)
The sentencing court’s conclusion that defendant’s alcoholism and substance
abuse were not mitigating does not establish that the court failed to consider relevant
mitigating factors. (See In re Handa (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 966, 973 [“many alleged
factors in mitigation are disputable either because … they may not be mitigating under
the circumstances of a particular case [and w]here an alleged factor in mitigation is
disputable, the court may find an absence of mitigating factors and need not explain the
reason for its conclusion.”].)
The record here indicates the trial court considered the factors that defendant
claims were ignored, as it stated that while defendant “may benefit” from the residential
treatment program, this benefit was outweighed by the interests of the community, in
light of the “significant harm” he caused to the public. Further, it noted he had already
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received probation multiple times and had also already been offered treatment programs
multiple times, “both as a juvenile and as an adult,” including the Teen Challenge
program, but nonetheless had nine prior felony convictions.
Here, the trial court articulated similar considerations as in Reyes, observing the
need to protect the public from defendant’s alcoholism and substance abuse meant this
was not a circumstance in mitigation. (See Reyes, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 963
[where a defendant has a substance abuse problem that he has failed to deal with despite
repeated opportunities and the substance abuse problem is a substantial factor in the
commission of the crimes, “the need to protect the public from further crimes by that
individual suggests that a longer sentence should be imposed, not a shorter sentence”].)
Likewise, the trial court here specifically considered defendant’s argument that his
alcoholism and substance abuse were mitigating factors, and properly rejected it.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to the
middle term and denied his request for a residential treatment program.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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