People v. Wells CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/3/24 P. v. Wells CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B328860
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A018193-01)
v.
STANLEY WELLS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Winston McKesson, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
INTRODUCTION
Stanley Wells, who was convicted in 1978 of first degree
felony murder, appeals from the trial court’s order following an
evidentiary hearing denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1 Wells
argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s ruling he
could still be convicted of murder as a major participant in an
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On September 6, 1977, around 6:00 p.m., Toni McDowell
spoke with her 90-year-old mother, Gladys Ott, over the phone.
Around 5:00 p.m. the next day, McDowell went to Ott’s one-
bedroom apartment. McDowell used a key to unlock the front
door. When she went inside, the apartment was in “shambles.”
McDowell found Ott lying naked on the bed in the bedroom.
Ott did not have a pulse and appeared to be dead. The left side of
Ott’s face was “completely black.” McDowell noticed that items,
including a television and a toaster, were missing from the
apartment.
1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We derive the facts from the testimony and admitted
exhibits at Wells’s trial. The People introduced into evidence the
trial transcripts and exhibits at Wells’s section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing. The People also introduced the prior
appellate opinion, but there is no indication in the record that the
trial court relied on the opinion in making its ruling.
2
Shortly after, police officers arrived at Ott’s apartment.
The apartment was in “an extreme state of disarray.” Closets
and drawers in every room of the apartment had been
“ransacked.” The kitchen window was open and the screen was
removed, suggesting the window may have been a point of entry.
There were footprints outside the kitchen window.
Ott was lying on a bed in the bedroom. Her nightgown was
pulled up over her torso. A blanket was pulled up between Ott’s
legs, and there was a rag wrapped around her neck. Ott was
“badly bruised” on her face and chest. A wine bottle, with what
appeared to be a pubic hair on the neck of the bottle, was on the
floor next to the bed.
Dr. Michael Breton, an expert forensic pathologist,
conducted Ott’s autopsy and opined that Ott died from “asphyxia
due to or as a consequence of manual strangulation.” The
autopsy report noted Ott had contusions on her hands; a
fractured sternum; a broken jaw; considerable hemorrhaging to
the front of the neck and throat; a large contusion covering the
left side of the face, neck, shoulder, and upper chest; lacerations
inside the mouth and jaw; multiple rib fractures on both sides of
the body; slight hemorrhaging inside the vagina; and two tears
inside the vagina.
In a recorded police interview,3 Wells admitted he
burglarized Ott’s apartment along with Earl Lloyd Jackson and
3 On appeal, Wells asserts, without any legal argument, that
his recorded police interview was “unconstitutional.” Because
Wells failed to present meaningful legal analysis, this claim
“ ‘requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Further, at the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing, Wells failed to object to the introduction of
3
Anthony Smith.4 Wells said that Jackson, who lived in the same
apartment building as Ott, told Wells and Smith that he knew
where to get “a new color T.V.” Jackson then brought them to
Ott’s apartment. While they were outside Ott’s apartment, they
tried “to figure out how to get in.” After spotting a window, Wells
helped remove the window screen and lifted one of his
accomplices through the window. While the accomplice was
inside, Wells “stood guard.” The accomplice then opened the
apartment door, allowing Wells and the third person to enter.
Once inside, Wells removed a television and carried it
outside to an alley. Wells went back inside the apartment to look
for more items to steal. He took some jewelry and vacuum
cleaner parts. Wells and his accomplices were inside the
apartment for about 35 minutes before Ott woke up.
The three men then entered the bedroom, where Ott was in
bed. Wells asked Ott where her money was, but Ott did not
respond. Jackson hit Ott repeatedly in the stomach and face,
while periodically stopping to ask Ott where the money was. Ott
was making noise but was not responding to the question.
Meanwhile, Wells was rummaging through the bedroom closet.
At some point, Wells told Jackson to stop hitting Ott and that
there was a “better way than hitting [her]”: they could put a
the interview transcript. He also relied on the transcript in
making his argument. Thus, his claim is forfeited on appeal.
(See People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856.)
4 At the time of the burglary, Wells was 17 years old,
Jackson was 19 years old, and Smith was 15 years old.
4
hand over her mouth.5 However, Jackson did not listen and
continued to beat Ott.
Wells, Smith, and Jackson eventually left the apartment.
Jackson suggested going back inside because he believed Ott had
money or checks. Although he did not want to return, Wells
acquiesced and went back inside the apartment with Jackson.
When he entered the bedroom, he saw Ott’s face was purple and
“real” swollen. Ott sounded like she was having trouble
breathing and like she had blood stuck in her throat. Jackson
pulled up the blankets on Ott’s bed, and Wells saw a green bottle
between Ott’s legs. Wells became afraid and wanted to leave, but
he stayed while Jackson kept looking around the apartment for
items to steal. Jackson rummaged around for 10 minutes, and
then they left.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1978, following a court trial, the court found Wells guilty
of first degree felony murder. This District affirmed the
judgment on appeal. (People v. Wells (Jan. 30, 1979, 2d Crim. No.
33297) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Wells filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. The People opposed on the ground that
Wells was not entitled to relief because he was a major
participant in the underlying burglary who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
The court issued an order to show cause and conducted an
evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the parties relied on
5 Wells did not elaborate on what he meant by a “better
way.” Officer Wren, one of the officers who interviewed Wells,
confirmed that Wells did not provide further clarification.
5
excerpts from the trial transcript, the autopsy report, and a
transcript of Wells’s recorded police interview. No live witnesses
were called.
The court denied the petition, finding beyond a reasonable
doubt Wells was guilty of felony murder under current law as a
major participant in the underlying burglary who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The court reasoned Wells
was a major participant in the burglary because: (1) “[Wells] had
a role in planning the crime”; (2) “[Wells] suggested the weapon
of the hands over [Ott’s] mouth, which is ultimately the way that
she died”; (3) Wells was aware of the danger of burglarizing a
home at night when a “highly vulnerable victim” was present;
(4) Wells was present while Ott was being beaten and “he gave
the advice to put the hands over her mouth”; and (5) Wells failed
to render aid at any point.
The court found Wells acted with reckless indifference to
human life because: (1) Wells was present at the scene and
instead of stopping the beating, Wells “advised the defendant
how to, quote ‘quiet her,’ go in a different way which ended up
being what killed her”; (2) the duration of the burglary gave
Wells “plenty of time to try to mitigate the codefendant’s actions”;
(3) Wells was aware his codefendant was going to kill Ott, given
that “[nobody], even at the age of 17, would think that a 90-year-
old woman would survive the type of beating that this woman
suffered”; and (4) Wells did not try to minimize the harm. The
court concluded that all but one of the factors (the first—
knowledge of weapons used) weighed in favor of finding Wells
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Regarding Wells’s age at the time of the murder (17 years
old), the court stated, “We can all say, ‘Well, he is 17 and he
6
didn’t know or didn’t have the courage to call the police.’ Okay.
But he certainly had the wherewithal to grab his buddy and take
him and haul him off this woman. . . . That was within his
abilities as a 17-year-old, and he did not.”
Wells timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) substantially modified the law governing accomplice
liability for murder. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448
(Curiel); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
(Strong).) Relevant here, it narrowed the felony-murder rule by
adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code. (Curiel, at
p. 448.) Under that provision, “[a] participant in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
SB 1437 also provided a procedure in section 1172.6 for a
person convicted of felony murder to petition the trial court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if the person could not now be convicted of murder because
of the changes to section 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The
resentencing procedure begins with the filing of a petition
7
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are
met. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) The trial court must then determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); Strong, at p. 708.)
If the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she
is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At
the evidentiary hearing the court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may
also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270 (Montanez);
People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “ ‘[W]e . . .
“ ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding
[the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” [ ] While the
trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
8
400, 414; Montanez, at pp. 270-271.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 339; Montanez, at p. 271.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding Wells Is
Not Entitled to Relief Under Section 1172.6
A. Relevant Legal Principles
A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated
felonies, including burglary, may be liable for murder if the
People prove he or she “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within
the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute.
(§ 189, subds. (a), (e); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Our
Supreme Court in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) “clarified the
meaning of the special circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676 (Scoggins)) and identified a
“nonexhaustive” list of factors or considerations relevant to
determining whether a defendant is liable for murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3) (see Strong, at pp. 706-707). “No
one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, at p. 803; accord, Clark, at
p. 618.) Instead, determining a defendant’s culpability for felony
murder requires a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry” into
“the totality of the circumstances.” (Scoggins, at pp. 677, 683.)
In Banks, the Supreme Court identified the following
factors courts must consider in determining whether a defendant
is a major participant: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
9
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 611.)
In Clark, the Supreme Court specified the relevant factors
in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court observed these factors
“ ‘significantly overlap’ ” with the major participant factors
because “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he [or she] acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
The factors include: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun
would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the
crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime
or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677, citing
Clark, at pp. 618-623.)
“In addition to the Banks and Clark factors, a defendant’s
youthful age must be considered” in determining whether the
defendant had a reckless indifference for human life. (People v.
10
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1088, fn. 7; accord, People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 987 [“ ‘a defendant’s youth is
a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life’ ”].) This is because the
“ ‘ “hallmark features” ’ ” of youth, including “ ‘ “immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” ’ ”
bear directly on the youth’s mental state. (Ramirez, at p. 991.)
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” ’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) “Reckless
indifference to human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Id. at
p. 676.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding
Wells Was a Major Participant
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
Wells was a major participant in the underlying burglary. While
Wells did not supply or use a lethal weapon, all the remaining
Banks factors weigh in favor of the court’s finding.
Although Jackson came up with the idea to burglarize Ott’s
apartment, Wells played a role in planning the logistics. Wells
11
stood outside the apartment with Jackson and Smith, and the
three of them “figure[d] out how to get in.” Their entrance then
involved multiple steps: Wells removed a window screen, lifted
his accomplice through the window, and “stood guard” while the
accomplice opened the front door. The court could reasonably
infer that Wells, Jackson, and Smith planned each step of the
break-in and had equal roles in planning it. (See In re Loza
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 49 [while robbery “did not require
particularly sophisticated planning, petitioner nonetheless played
a significant and relatively equal role vis-à-vis the other
participants”].)
Although there is no evidence Wells knew before he broke
into Ott’s apartment what particular dangers the burglary posed,
the “warning signs that the crime[] posed a serious risk of danger
. . . accumulated as the crime[] unfolded.” (Montanez, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 273.) As soon as Wells entered Ott’s
bedroom, he saw that a very elderly woman was home in bed. He
then saw Jackson repeatedly beat her on her face and stomach.
Further, he saw the brutal aftermath of the beating when Ott
was still alive, but her face was purple and “real” swollen, a
bottle was between her legs, and she was struggling to breathe.
Given what Wells witnessed, he plainly was aware while the
burglary was still in progress that there was a grave risk Ott
would die. (See In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 461
(Harper) [substantial evidence supported major participant
finding where defendant “was clearly aware of the risk of death
once the robbery was underway”].)
In addition, Wells “was physically present at every stage of
the crime”: planning, execution, and flight. (People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 592 (Mitchell); see id. at p. 591
12
[defendant’s physical presence “on the scene from start to finish”
supported major participant finding]; see also In re Loza, supra,10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50-51 [“there may be significantly greater
culpability for accomplices who are present”]; cf. Banks, supra,61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5 [“In cases where lethal force is not part
of the agreed-upon plan, absence from the scene may significantly
diminish culpability for death.”].) Wells’s presence in the
bedroom during and after the beating put him in a position to aid
Ott and prevent her murder. While Wells argues he was not in
the bedroom during the entire beating, Ott lived in a one-
bedroom apartment. Thus, even if Wells left Ott’s bedroom at
some point, the trial court reasonably deduced Wells would have
heard the sounds that went along with the severe beating of Ott.
Yet Wells made no attempt to help her. Instead, by suggesting
there was a “better way” and directing Jackson to put a hand
over Ott’s mouth, Wells escalated the violence. As the trial court
reasonably inferred, Wells “recommend[ed] how to kill her.”
Wells argues that his suggestion to put a hand over Ott’s
mouth should be interpreted as an attempt to help Ott, not kill
her. Wells misunderstands our role in a substantial evidence
review. We do not reweigh the facts. Rather, “ ‘we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact the
[superior court] could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 113.)
Further, considering what happened after Wells suggested
Jackson put a hand over Ott’s mouth, it was reasonable for the
court to deduce that Wells’s suggestion encouraged Ott’s murder.
Wells also did nothing after Jackson initially ignored Wells’s
suggestion and continued to beat Ott.
13
Wells also failed to act after returning to Ott’s apartment
and seeing that Ott was on the brink of death— struggling to
breathe and making gurgling noises, with her face swollen and
purple. “Had he cared about the victim’s well-being, [Wells] could
have shown it.” (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.)
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that
Wells was a major participant in the burglary.
C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding
Wells Acted with Reckless Indifference
Substantial evidence similarly supports the trial court’s
finding Wells acted with reckless indifference to human life
during the burglary. All the Clark factors except the
“[k]nowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619), weigh in favor of the
court’s finding (see id. at p. 618 [no single factor is necessary]).
Wells’s physical presence at every step leading up to the
murder and his indifference to Jackson’s violence upon a
particularly vulnerable victim weigh heavily against Wells. (See
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [“Proximity to the murder and
the events leading up to it may be particularly significant where
. . . the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of several
intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally
commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a
willingness to use lethal force”].)
In addition, the murder took place “at the end of a
prolonged period of restraint of the victim,” creating a “ ‘greater
window of opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly
culminating in murder.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 620-
621.) Wells ransacked the apartment for 35 minutes before Ott
woke up. Then, Wells was inside the bedroom while Jackson beat
14
Ott. Because Ott had extensive injuries all over her body, the
court could infer that the period of violence against Ott “was not
short.” (See People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 114
[reckless indifference finding supported where “the underlying
burglary/robbery was not short” as evidenced by the “ransacked
condition” of the victim’s home and the victim’s bound hands and
feet and defensive wounds].) Wells then returned to the
apartment for 10 minutes where he observed Ott’s condition and
his accomplice further ransacked the apartment. The 45-minute
duration of the entire incident, which included close interaction
by Wells with Ott, suggests Wells acted with reckless
indifference. (See Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 283
[duration of felony supported finding of reckless indifference
where victims were bound, and incident lasted approximately 25
minutes].)
Wells contends there is no evidence he knew Jackson would
act violently during the burglary, but as discussed, Jackson’s
violence became apparent once the burglary was underway and
there was still an opportunity for Wells to intervene or extricate
himself. In addition, the trial court reasonably determined Wells
did not make efforts to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622.) While Wells
contends he told Jackson to stop beating Ott and offered a “better
way” than beating her, as discussed, Wells merely suggested an
alternative form of violence—similar to the one Jackson used to
kill Ott. Moreover, even if Wells initially intended to minimize
the violence, his subsequent actions confirm he was not
concerned about the grave risk of death to Ott. (See Harper,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 466 [although the defendant “may not
have had the opportunity to minimize the risk of violence during
15
the planning stage, he did nothing to minimize the risk of
violence when it became clear the original plan had unraveled”].)
Lastly, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that Wells’s youth does not outweigh all the other factors
supporting the conclusion he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Wells argues that as a 17 year old, he “did not know
how to properly respond to what was happening.” However,
other than the fact that Wells was a minor, the record is devoid of
any evidence that his youth affected his understanding of the risk
of death or made him vulnerable to peer pressure. (Cf. People v.
Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 [that the defendant
“was influenced by peer pressure” and “was afraid” of the
consequences if he did not aid the shooter “may well have affected
his calculation of the risk of death posed by using the firearm in
the carjacking”].) In recounting the story of the murder, Wells
did not express any fear of his accomplices or misunderstanding
of the dire condition that Ott was in. (See Mitchell, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595 [“every 18 year old understands bullet
wounds require attention”].) Although Wells’s youth is a factor
for consideration, it “cannot overwhelm all other factors.” (Ibid.)
The other factors, when considered together, substantially
support the court’s findings that Wells consciously disregarded
“ ‘the significant risk of death’ ” his actions created and that his
conduct grossly deviated from the standard of conduct of a law-
abiding person. (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
///
16
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Wells’s petition
under section 1172.6.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
17