People v. Lopez CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/3/24 P. v. Lopez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B332958
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA091954
v.
RONALD L. LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2017, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a
second amended information charging defendant and appellant
Ronald Lee Lopez with 17 felony offenses.1 A jury convicted Lopez
on all counts. Relevant to this appeal, the jury convicted Lopez of
the first degree murder of William Knight (Pen. Code,2 § 187,
subd. (a); count 1); conspiracy to murder Knight (§§ 182, 187,
subd. (a); count 2); the attempted murders of James Arrellano
and Daniel Bugarin (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 16 and 18);
and conspiracy to murder Arrellano and Bugarin (§§ 182, 187,
subd. (a); counts 17 and 19). The trial court sentenced Lopez to
535 years to life in state prison.
In 2022, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95.3 The trial court appointed counsel on
Lopez’s behalf. The prosecution filed a response, arguing, among
other things, because the jury’s guilty verdicts on the conspiracy
counts all included findings that Lopez harbored the intent to
1 The second amended information also charged two co-
defendants, David Solorio and Sheldon McMorries, with various
offenses, many of which overlapped with Lopez’s charges.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. For the sake of
simplicity, we will refer to the statute by its new code section.
That section provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequence
doctrine, as well as certain individuals convicted of murder under
an imputed-malice theory of liability. (See § 1172.6.)
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kill, the record demonstrates Lopez is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law on his murder and attempted murder convictions.
The prosecution also noted that this court, in resolving Lopez’s
direct appeal, concluded it “is not possible that the jury relied on
the doctrine of natural and probable consequences to find [Lopez]
guilty of murder [or] attempted murder[,]” but rather convicted
Lopez of those offenses as an aider and abettor. (People v.
McMorries et al. (Mar. 9, 2022, B289194) [nonpub. opn.].) The
prosecution additionally explained that, although the jury was
instructed it could convict Lopez of second degree murder based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, it is clear
that because the jury convicted him of first degree murder, the
jury did not rely on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Along with its response, the prosecution attached as
exhibits this court’s opinion resolving Lopez’s direct appeal, as
well as the record of Lopez’s trial, which included the jury
instructions. It does not appear that Lopez’s appointed counsel
filed a reply.
At Lopez’s prima facie hearing, the prosecution reiterated
that this court, in Lopez’s direct appeal, concluded it is not
possible the jury relied on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to convict Lopez of murder or attempted murder. The
prosecution also reiterated that, because the jury found Lopez
guilty on the conspiracy counts (counts 2, 17, and 19), it is clear
the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt Lopez harbored
express malice in the commission of the murder and attempted
murders. Defense counsel submitted, and the trial court agreed
with the prosecution that Lopez was ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law.
3
Lopez timely appealed, and we appointed counsel to
represent him. On January 18, 2024, Lopez’s appellate counsel
filed a brief raising no issues and requesting discretionary
independent review of the record under People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. On April 18, 2024, Lopez filed a
supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
In his brief, Lopez argues: (1) his trial counsel was
ineffective by not raising arguments that he is eligible for relief;
(2) the trial judge’s reference to the fact that Lopez’s case
involved the Mexican Mafia demonstrates the judge harbored
racial bias toward Lopez; (3) because the jury was instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the record does
not demonstrate Lopez is ineligible for relief as a matter of law;
and (4) the prosecution’s response to Lopez’s petition should not
have addressed why co-defendant McMorries was ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief. Lopez also appears to argue remand is
warranted because the trial court erred by denying his Marsden
motion.4 We are unpersuaded.
As the prosecution correctly explained in the trial court,
with respect to each murder and attempted murder, the jury also
convicted Lopez of conspiracy to murder each victim. Indeed, a
review of the jury instructions shows that, in finding Lopez guilty
on those conspiracy counts, the jury necessarily concluded he
harbored the intent to kill in the commission of the murder and
attempted murders. The instructions explained to the jury: “The
crime of conspiracy to commit murder requires proof that the
4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
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conspirators harbored express malice aforethought, namely, the
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” The
instructions later stated that, to convict Lopez of conspiracy to
commit murder, the jury had to find he “harbored express malice
aforethought, namely a specific intent to kill unlawfully another
human being.” Because the record conclusively demonstrates the
jury found Lopez harbored express malice in the commission of
the murder and attempted murders, and because express malice
remains a valid theory of murder liability under current law (see
§ 188, subd. (a)(1)), the trial court was correct in concluding
Lopez is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. We
therefore reject Lopez’s assertions that the court erred in denying
him relief.
We also reject Lopez’s argument that remand is warranted
because his trial counsel was ineffective. In order to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of counsel, Lopez must show he was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].)
Because Lopez is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law, there is nothing his counsel could have done to obtain a
better outcome. In other words, Lopez cannot demonstrate
prejudice because he has no chance of obtaining a more favorable
outcome on remand. Thus, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is without merit.
In short, because the record demonstrates as a matter of
law that Lopez was not convicted under an imputed-malice
theory of liability, rendering him ineligible for section 1172.6
relief under the plain language of the statute, we reject all of his
arguments that his case should be remanded.
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In addition to rejecting the arguments Lopez raised in his
supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record, and conclude no arguable issues
exist. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Lopez section 1172.6 relief.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
MORI, J.
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