People v. Knowles ( 2024 )

Filed 9/16/24 Certified for Publication 10/4/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B328439
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487402)
v.
ROMEO DEONTE KNOWLES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Appellant and defendant Romeo Deonte Knowles attacked
a worker at a homeless shelter causing the victim to fall, hit his
head, and perish. Knowles pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and the court sentenced him to the midterm of six
years’ imprisonment. Knowles now appeals, arguing the court
erred by not sentencing him to the low term of three years. We
find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the sentence imposed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct1
On April 28, 2020, Knowles was 23 years old and unhoused.
He resided at Midnight Mission, which provides services
including shelter for homeless persons. Around midnight, a 53-
year-old security guard at the facility named William Bullock was
performing bunk checks. According to another resident, Knowles
approached to show Bullock an object Knowles was holding.
Evidence obtained after the fact suggested that Knowles was
holding a broken knife handle. Bullock looked at what Knowles
was holding, and Knowles then swung at Bullock and punched
him in the head three to four times. Bullock backed away, lost
his footing, and fell to the ground. Bullock hit his head as he fell;
he began bleeding and became nonresponsive. He was
transported to the hospital and later died of his injuries. The
medical examiner determined the cause of death to be blunt force
trauma to the head.
1 The parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing
transcript, the probation report, and the discovery in the case
(including the police report) as the factual basis for the plea. We
base our factual summary on these stipulated sources.
2
After his arrest, Knowles claimed Bullock had been
intimidating him and that Knowles had been defending himself.
According to another resident, Bullock had a reputation with
some Midnight Mission residents for “push[ing] his authority
around,” although that resident never personally witnessed any
such thing. That resident found Bullock to be strict but had a
good relationship with him.
B. Charges and Plea
An information filed on April 15, 2021, charged Knowles
with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1). The information was
amended on July 11, 2022, to add a second count alleging
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 2). Knowles
pleaded no contest to count 2, and the court later dismissed
count 1.
C. Sentencing
Prior to sentencing, the court received a mitigation packet
from Knowles, a diagnostic report from the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and sentencing
memoranda from both the prosecutor and defense counsel.
1. Mitigation Packet
The mitigation packet included a letter from defense
counsel expressing deep remorse on behalf of Knowles for his
conduct. It also contained two psychological assessments, dated
February 12 and 15, 2021. The packet included evidence that
when Knowles was seven years old, his father was shot and killed
in a case of mistaken identity. Knowles was sexually abused by a
schoolteacher, who was subsequently prosecuted. Knowles was
also bullied and harassed in school. Knowles was hospitalized at
the age of 20 or 21 after experiencing hallucinations, and was
3
diagnosed with either schizophrenia or thought spectrum/mood
disorder. The day Bullock died, Knowles self-admitted to a
hospital and was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder.
Dr. Kevin Booker examined Knowles and opined that
Knowles “appear[ed]” to have been suffering from schizoaffective
disorder since adolescence or early adulthood, and that his
untreated disorder had “likely impaired his . . . executive
decision-making at the time” of the offense. Dr. Booker stated
that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia “may be prone to
impulsive,” “disinhibited behavior” and generally exhibited
“unwary, disorganized, and negligent behavior.” (Italics omitted.)
Dr. Booker also opined, however, that Knowles’s personality type
was consistent with “generally responsible, socially acceptable,
adult behavior,” with no impulsive traits or antisocial tendencies,
and that there was no overt evidence of “delusions,
hallucinations, or bizarre thinking” at the time of examination.
Dr. Haig J. Kojian also examined Knowles. He listed
“disturbances of perception, disturbed affect,” and “withdrawing
from reality” as behaviors associated with schizophrenia. Dr.
Kojian similarly reported that at the time of examination
Knowles exhibited clear thinking, and “[t]here was no acute
evidence of psychosis.” Dr. Kojian also opined that Knowles can
become “quite disorganized and psychotic at times especially
when not treated with medication” and that Knowles stated “he
hadn’t been taking his medication for a number of months before
the incident.”
2. Diagnostic Report
CDCR’s diagnostic report included a psychological
evaluation dated September 21, 2022. Knowles told the clinical
social worker that he was hospitalized at the age of 19 and
4
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Upon being discharged,
he continued treatment until the date of his arrest. Knowles
reported no suicidal ideation or hallucinations, and the social
worker observed none. When asked about the circumstances of
Bullock’s death, Knowles claimed that Bullock had continually
“picked on” Knowles for no reason. Knowles asserted that
Bullock had grabbed him very hard and told him to get out.
Knowles then pushed Bullock, got scared, and fled. The social
worker noted that Knowles was six feet two inches tall and
weighed 270 pounds. Knowles said he was “sorry that this
happened,” that “I think about it every day,” and that “[i]t really
hurts me that someone died because of my actions.”
In statements to correctional counselors, Knowles claimed
that Bullock had sexually harassed and verbally insulted him.
Knowles claimed Bullock grabbed him and raised a fist to strike
at him. Knowles then punched Bullock once and ran out.
Knowles denied repeatedly hitting Bullock.
CDCR also reported that on October 4, 2021, while in
custody, Knowles had approached another inmate, after which
Knowles and others attacked and punched the inmate. Knowles
denied hitting the victim and claimed he intervened to break up
an altercation. Video footage supported the victim’s version of
events, which was that Knowles attacked him, and Knowles
received a disciplinary write-up and loss of privileges for two
weeks.
Both the social worker and the correctional counselors
opined that Knowles was a poor candidate for probation because
he had minimized his role in Bullock’s death, including failing to
admit he had punched Bullock, and because his conduct while in
custody showed he presented a significant risk to society.
5
3. Sentencing Memoranda
Knowles’s sentencing memorandum expressed remorse and
requested that the court impose the low term because of his age,
his suffering of psychological and childhood trauma, his lack of a
prior criminal record, and his low risk of recidivism. Knowles
said Bullock “ ‘had a reputation of picking on new residents at the
facility,’ ” and argued his past trauma and mental illness
“distorted his perception of Mr. Bullock’s conduct and his need to
act in response to it.”
The prosecution’s sentencing memorandum reminded the
court of its general discretion to impose a term not in excess of
the midterm (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)), the applicability of the low
term presumption in light of Knowles’s past trauma and youth
(id., subd. (b)(6)), and that the low term presumption did not
apply where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the low term
would not serve the interests of justice (ibid.). The prosecution
requested that the court sentence Knowles to the midterm
because Bullock had not acted aggressively toward Knowles, and
Knowles had failed to take responsibility for his actions.
4. The Court Imposes Sentence
On January 12, 2023, the court sentenced Knowles to serve
the midterm of 6 years imprisonment. The court found the
midterm sentence “in the interest of justice [because] the
aggravating factors do outweigh the mitigating factors.” The
court identified the aggravating factors as the victim’s
vulnerability, Knowles’s disciplinary writeup while in custody,
and that Knowles had repeatedly minimized his involvement in
Bullock’s death. The court found the mitigating factors to be
Knowles’s age at the time of the offense and his lack of a criminal
6
record. In response to defense counsel’s claim that the court
failed to engage with additional mitigating factors such as
Knowles’s childhood trauma, the court stated, “I do believe in
looking at the entirety of the record, in my view the aggravating
factors which I have stated are the appropriate factors in this
case.”
DISCUSSION
Knowles contends the court abused its discretion in not
sentencing him to the low term of three years imprisonment. He
argues the court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing
discretion, disregarded substantial mitigating evidence triggering
the low term presumption, and otherwise abused its discretion in
imposing a midterm sentence.
A. Applicable Law
1. Standard of Review
We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) A
court abuses its sentencing discretion when it acts arbitrarily and
capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or
is unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not
exercise informed discretion at all. (People v. Panozo (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 825, 837.) Exercises of sentencing discretion must
be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the law.” (People v.
Sandoval, supra, at p. 847.) “ ‘[A]ll exercises of legal discretion
must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal
principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at
issue.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187,
195.)
7
We presume that the trial court acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objectives. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997)
14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) The burden is on the party challenging
the sentencing decision to show that the court abused its
discretion. (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) We
may not presume error from a silent record. (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) “Unless the record
affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to
have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in
the rules.” (People v. Parra Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317,
322; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409 [all relevant
sentencing factors “will be deemed to have been considered
unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise”].)
2. Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)
As applicable here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) creates
a presumption that the court should impose the low term “if any
of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of
the offense: [¶] (A) The [defendant] has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶]
(B) The person is a youth [meaning under the age of 26 years of
age] . . . at the time of the commission of the offense.” This
presumption may be overcome if the court “finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (Ibid.) As made plain by the
statutory text, the mere fact a defendant is young or has suffered
past trauma is insufficient—either or both must be “a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense” for the low
8
term presumption to apply. (Ibid.; see also People v. Fredrickson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.)
B. The Court Did Not Misunderstand the Scope of its
Sentencing Discretion
Knowles argues that we should reverse because the court
applied the wrong standard to its weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. According to Knowles, the low term
presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) “cannot be
overcome just because aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances.” He claims we should read the
statutory requirement that the court must “find[] that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) as
meaning the aggravating circumstances must so outweigh the
mitigating circumstances that a low term sentence would be
“ ‘irrational’ or ‘indefensible.’ ” Knowles asserts that unless we
give the statute this construction, the low term “presumption
would be meaningless, and the phrase ‘contrary to the interests
of justice’ would be surplusage.”
We disagree. Knowles seeks to re-write the statute.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) plainly states that the court may
sentence above the low term if the aggravating circumstances
“outweigh the mitigating” ones such that “imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” This language
is unambiguous. We therefore “ ‘presume that the Legislature
meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906.) The
statute does not say, and does not require, imposition of a low
term sentence in every circumstance except those where it would
9
be “irrational or indefensible.” Nor does the statute require the
aggravating factors not just outweigh the mitigating factors but
also outweigh them by some undefined additional quantum of
proof. The record here shows the court correctly understood the
scope of its sentencing discretion under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6).
We find unpersuasive Knowles’s reliance on our Supreme
Court’s recent decision in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024to support his proffered construction of section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6). Walker interpreted a different statute—section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)—that requires courts considering whether
dismissal of a sentencing enhancement is in the interest of justice
to “afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant”
concerning certain specified factors (which include the current
offense being connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or
childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D-E)), and that proof of
such factors “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).)
Walker held this language did not create a presumption in favor
of dismissing an enhancement when specified mitigating factors
are proven. (People v. Walker, supra, at p. 1029.) Instead,
“absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a
court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements
provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (Ibid.)
Knowles asserts section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) is in pari
materia with section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). He claims we
should import section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s language (as
construed by Walker) regarding mitigating factors having great
10
weight in the enhancement context into section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)’s requirement that to exceed the midterm “aggravating
circumstances [must] outweigh the mitigating circumstances
[such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice.” (Ibid.) Put differently, Knowles asserts
Walker suggests we construe the presence of a factor identified in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) as strongly favoring the low term,
and that a court may not find the low term presumption rebutted
unless it finds aggravating circumstances that “ ‘neutralize even
the great weight of the mitigating circumstance.’ ” (People v.
Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
“[D]ifferent statutes should be construed together only if
they stand in pari materia.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47
Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) The phrase “in pari materia” means “ ‘[o]f
the same matter; on the same subject.’ ” (Altaville Drug Store,
Inc. v. Employment Development Department (1988) 44 Cal.3d
231, 236, fn. 4.) “ ‘Statutes are considered to be in pari materia
when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of
person[s] [or] things, or have the same purpose or object.
Characterization of the object or purpose is more important than
characterization of subject matter in determining whether
different statutes are closely enough related to justify
interpreting one in light of the other. It has been held that where
the same subject is treated in several acts having different
objects the statutes are not in pari materia. “The adventitious
occurrence of . . . similar subject matter, in laws enacted for
wholly different ends will normally not justify applying the
rule.” ’ [Citation.]” (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 124,
fn. 4.)
11
Although at a high level of generality the subject matter of
both statutes involves sentencing, sections 1385 and 1170 are not
in pari materia because they do not have the same object or
purpose and were enacted for different ends. One governs the
dismissal of enhancements, the other which level of a sentencing
triad will be imposed. Further, the two statutes take very
different approaches to their distinct objects and purposes. Both
list specific mitigating factors; those lists have some overlap but
also meaningful differences. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
contains a number of mitigating factors not listed in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). Even where they overlap there are differences.
For example, for age to be a mitigating factor under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) the defendant must have been “a juvenile when
they committed the current offense or any prior offenses . . . that
trigger the enhancement or enhancements applied in the current
case.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(G).) Under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6) the defendant need only be under the age of 26 “at the time
of the commission of the offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(6)(B).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) lists numerous factors a
defendant can demonstrate without regard to their connection to
the current offense (for example, that multiple enhancements are
alleged, that application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years, and the enhancement being based on a
prior conviction over five years old). (Id., subd. (c)(2)(B), (C), (H).)
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) in contrast requires that the low
term presumption applies only when the identified factor “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” Section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) has no presumption in favor of dismissing
an enhancement and requires the court to give “great weight” to
the specified factors. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) does the
12
opposite: it creates a presumption in favor of the low term and
does not contain any language requiring the court to give great
weight to mitigating factors when weighing them against
aggravating circumstances.
When statutes are in pari materia, they are construed
together as one statute. (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of
Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 468.) But when two
statutes are not in pari materia, which given their myriad
differences sections 1170 and 1385 are not, we do not construe
their unrelated provisions together. Furthermore, the in pari
materia “rule of statutory construction does not mean . . . that
one statutory definition may be ignored and replaced by a
different one.” (People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 328.)
We decline to read into the statutory language of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) terms that it does not contain in its explanation
of how the court is to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances from an unrelated statute governing the dismissal
of enhancements that lacks a similar presumption and provides a
different procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
C. The Court Did Not Improperly Fail to Consider
Mitigating Evidence
Knowles next argues we should remand for resentencing
because the court failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence.
It is true the court did not mention all of the mitigating evidence,
including Knowles’s childhood trauma, during the sentencing
hearing. We presume, however, that the court properly
considered such evidence “unless the record affirmatively reflects
otherwise.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409.) Knowles argues the
record here does affirmatively reflect otherwise. We disagree.
13
Knowles first points out that when his counsel objected
that the defense sentencing memorandum contained “many more
mitigating factors” beyond those identified by the court, the court
responded that in its view “looking at the entirety of the record,
in my view the aggravating factors which I have stated are the
appropriate factors in this case.” Knowles interprets this as the
trial court stating it could disregard some of the statutory factors
triggering the low term presumption. We reject this strained
interpretation. The more reasonable reading is that the court
was not convinced those additional claimed mitigating factors
contributed to the assault that ended in Bullock’s death. For
example, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that
Knowles’s mental illness did not contribute to his offense. Drs.
Kojian and Booker found no indication that Knowles was
antisocial or impulsive, or that he was suffering from psychosis or
any hallucinations.2 Neither Dr. Kojian nor Dr. Booker explained
how the impacts of Knowles’s childhood trauma contributed to
his planning and execution of the assault on Bullock. Knowles
himself justified his attack by claiming Bullock had picked on
him and raised a fist to strike Knowles, and that Knowles simply
2 The closest either came was Dr. Booker’s statement that
Knowles’s “moderate psychiatric mood disorder . . . likely
impaired his global functioning, to include his executive decision-
making at the time he became involved in the current case” and
that Knowles’s condition “can, at times, impair his insight and
decision-making abilities.” These statements were sufficiently
qualified and vague that the court could reasonably find they did
not show Knowles’s psychological condition contributed to his
repeated punching of Bullock, especially in light of Knowles’s
later statements attempting to justify his actions based on
Bullock’s purported actions and not on his psychological state.
14
pushed him and fled. Those explanations did not suggest prior
trauma or psychological conditions contributed to Knowles’s
actions, and were also (as the court found in aggravation)
contrary to evidence that Knowles’s attack was unprovoked and
that he repeatedly punched Bullock.
Knowles next points to the court’s statements to the
families of Knowles and Bullock at the beginning of the
sentencing hearing that “[t]here is nothing I am going to say or
do in the next few moments that will make your life any easier. I
feel very much for your loss.” Addressing Bullock’s family in
particular, the court then said, “If I were to impose the most
severe sentence I could possibly think of, that wouldn’t bring your
love[d] one back. It seems like he was a very great man and I am
very sorry. It is my job to impose the law. I am constrained by
what the law is. I have to look at the aggravating and the
mitigating factors on both sides and come up with what I believe
is a fair judgment based on the law. I can pretty much tell the
Bullock family the sentence I am going to impose is not a
sentence that will make you happy. The law simply doesn’t allow
me to give a sentence which would make you happy or satisfied.”
Knowles claims this statement shows the court did not
want to sentence him to the low term even though the law
required it, and the court therefore disregarded the applicable
law because it felt that voluntary manslaughter has an
unreasonably low mitigated term. We find this interpretation
unsupported. The court did not say it would not follow the law.
It expressly stated to the contrary, and conveyed to the victim’s
family that, regardless of whether it imposed the low term or the
midterm, it understood the family might consider the sentence
imposed insufficient given their loss. We decline to read this
15
gesture of sympathy towards a grieving family as a sub rosa
statement that the court would disregard the applicable law.
D. The Court Did Not Otherwise Abuse its Discretion in
Sentencing Knowles
Knowles lastly claims the court abused its discretion in how
it weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before
it. Weighing those circumstances is the province of the trial
court. We may not reverse a sentencing decision “ ‘merely
because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, 14 Cal.4th
at p. 978.) The court’s analysis here of the evidence before it
along with the applicable sentencing factors was neither
irrational nor arbitrary, and we therefore will not disturb it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J. KELLEY, J.*
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
16
Filed 10/4/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B328439
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487402)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING FOR
ROMEO DEONTE KNOWLES, PUBLICATION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on
September 16, 2024, was not certified for publication in the
Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
____________________________________________________________
WEINGART, J. BENDIX, Acting P. J. KELLEY, J.*
*
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.