San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. J.H. CA1/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/4/24 San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. J.H. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED A169135
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. N23-0983)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
J.H., OPINION; AND ORDER
DENYING REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
The opinion filed September 20, 2024, is modified as follows:
(1) Delete footnote 4 on page 11 that currently states:
In her opening brief, J.H. argued that her tweets were protected
speech because they were not directed at any School District employee.
But she conceded in her reply that an indirect threat qualifies as a true
threat that is not protected by the First Amendment. We therefore do
not address this argument.
(2) After the last full paragraph on page 12, add the following new
paragraphs:
In her opening brief, J.H. argued that her tweets were protected
speech because they were not directed at any School District employee.
But she conceded in her reply that an indirect threat qualifies as a true
threat that is not protected by the First Amendment. In her petition
for rehearing, J.H. argues that we misinterpreted her concession and
1
that her indirect threats were protected by the First Amendment
because they were not directed at anyone associated with the School
District. We already rejected this argument when we concluded that
J.H.’s tweets, when viewed in context, placed a reasonable person
working at her former high school in fear for their safety. (See, ante, at
pp. 6-7.)
In her petition for rehearing, J.H. also reiterates that there was
no evidence “that she intended to communicate any threats to any
school employee.” We reject this argument on the merits. In In re A.G.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, the defendant posted a temporary “story” on
Snapchat to his 60 followers (id. at p. 653) that included a photo of a
gun with the caption, “ ‘Everybody go to school tomorrow. I’m taking
gum [sic]’ ” (id. at p. 651). A few hours later, he posted on Snapchat
that his first story “ ‘wasn’t real’ ” and that he was “ ‘xanned out.’ ”
(Ibid.) Based on these facts, the defendant argued that he did not
intend to communicate a threat to anyone at his former high school.
(Id. at p. 656.) The court of appeal disagreed, concluding that the
defendant, by posting on Snapchat, “intended many people to see it,”
including a former classmate who still attended the school. (Id. at p.
657.) The court further concluded that the defendant “must have been
aware that anyone who saw it might feel threatened” and “send it to
others.” (Ibid.) Here, there is even stronger evidence that J.H.
intended to communicate her threats to a School District employee.
J.H. had approximately 400 twitter followers, including her twin sister
who also graduated from the high school and knew about her
longstanding animosity toward the school and some of her former
classmates. Under these circumstances, J.H. could hardly be surprised
that some of her followers would be alarmed by her tweets and send
them to a School District employee. Accordingly, there is ample
evidence that J.H. intended to threaten “an expansive group of people,
which included” School District employees. (Ibid.)
This order does not effect a change in the judgment.
Appellant J.H.’s October 1, 2024 petition for rehearing is denied.
CHOU, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
BURNS, J.
San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. J.H. (A169135)
2
Filed 9/20/24 San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. J.H. CA1/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, A169135
Plaintiff and Respondent.,
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
v. No. N23-0983)
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant J.H. appeals from the trial court’s order granting a
workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) in favor of plaintiff and
respondent San Ramon Valley Unified School District (School District). The
order was issued after J.H.’s twin sister contacted the police regarding tweets
J.H. had posted online, including one stating that she was “ ‘the next school
shooter.’ ” J.H. contends that the trial court erred in granting the restraining
order because there was no clear and convincing evidence that J.H.’s tweets
constituted credible threats of violence or that J.H. presented a threat of
violence in the future. J.H. also argues that her tweets were protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
J.H. graduated from a high school within the School District (high
school) in 2016. On May 25, 2023, R.H., J.H.’s twin sister, left a voicemail for
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Officer Meagan Morales, the high school’s resource officer, to report J.H.’s
plan to “commit, basically, a mass shooting at [the high school].” During
their call later that same day, R.H. told Officer Morales that J.H. was
involuntarily hospitalized in Massachusetts but that she could be released
any day. J.H. lived near the high school but traveled to Massachusetts often,
where she previously attended college. R.H. also told Officer Morales that
during her conversation with J.H. the day before, J.H. stated that she
recently visited the high school to assess how to commit a mass shooting.1
Following their call, R.H. emailed Officer Morales screenshots of J.H.’s
tweets, among other documents. In several tweets between 2021 and 2023,
J.H. wrote about negative experiences she had in high school, including
getting suspended. And in three tweets from May 16, 2023, J.H. wrote: (1)
“I’m the next school shooter. Get ready. I’m going on Criminal Minds:
Evolution;” (2) “I’ll kill you all;” and (3) “I’m a terrorist. The government has
officially classified me as a terrorist.” In her report, Officer Morales noted
that R.H. was “concern[ed] over [J.H.]’s mental health and [R.H.]’s desire for
[the police] to take her report seriously, since [she] felt she had not been
taken seriously by law enforcement in the past.” Following the call, Officer
Morales contacted the high school’s principal (principal) regarding J.H. The
School District’s Director of Communications and Community Relations
(Director), was also made aware of J.H.’s tweets. The Director discussed
these tweets with Officer Allan Shields (Chief of Police), and he recommended
that she obtain a restraining order against J.H.
On June 1, 2023, the School District filed a petition for a WVRO and
1 During their May 24, 2023 recorded call, J.H. told R.H. that she
looked into the high school’s security “for [her] musical” and that she was
acting as an inspector in scoping out the high school because she “want[ed] to
stop school shootings.”
2
obtained a temporary restraining order against J.H. On June 6, after
learning about the temporary restraining order, R.H. emailed Officer Morales
and other law enforcement to clarify that J.H. never directly named the high
school as the target of a mass shooting. R.H. stated that she assumed J.H.
would target the high school because it was one of the two schools she
attended. R.H. also stated that J.H. walking on the high school’s campus “is
not odd behavior by itself” because she lived within walking distance and had
“gone to that track many times over the years.” Finally, R.H. emphasized
that she was “not against the restraining order” but was “against an order
that relies on false facts.”
B. Court Trial
At the trial as to the issuance of the WVRO, the School District called
three witnesses: Chief Shields, the principal, and J.H.
Chief Shields testified that he reviewed J.H.’s tweets about being the
next school shooter and suggested to the Director that the School District get
a restraining order against J.H. Chief Shields also testified that he listened
to a portion of the recorded phone call between J.H. and R.H. and did not
hear J.H. say that she would shoot up the high school.
The principal testified that Officer Morales told him about threats J.H.
made on social media about a school shooting. Although the principal was
concerned, he decided to continue with the high school’s graduation ceremony
on campus because police would be there and because J.H. was in
Massachusetts at the time. The principal conceded that he did not receive
any threats directly from J.H. but testified that he had reviewed J.H.’s
tweets. He also conceded that J.H.’s tweet about being “ ‘the next school
shooter’ ” did not mention the high school.
3
J.H. testified that when she posted, “ ‘I’m the next school shooter,’ ” she
was “manic” and “was referencing Criminal Minds Evolution as a TV show”
because she “wanted to be an actor.” J.H. then testified that she was “not a
violent person” and that she “would never cause a mass shooting” or “become
a school shooter.” According to J.H., she had been hospitalized a number of
times after she moved back to California in January 2023. When she moved
back to Massachusetts later that year, she experienced a manic episode after
she “started another protest and . . . drank a lot.” J.H. had experienced a
similar cycle of events in October 2022 when she was in Massachusetts; she
stopped taking her medications, started drinking heavily, and then
experienced a manic episode when she stopped drinking.
J.H. admitted that she “said some things on Twitter [she] shouldn’t
have” but claimed that R.H. “overreacted” and “called 911.” The day after her
May 16, 2023 tweets, J.H. testified that she was visited by emergency
medical personnel and police. She told the police that she did not believe that
she was threatening anyone and that she was “just in the mindset of
protesting, having fun, making jokes.” Nonetheless, the police decided to
involuntarily commit J.H. to the hospital. She completed a seven-week
treatment program and was discharged from the hospital after her treating
doctor reported that her psychiatric symptoms were “resolved.”2 Finally, J.H.
testified that she has never committed a violent act and has never owned or
possessed a firearm.
2 J.H. submitted a declaration by this doctor that the trial court
reviewed. In the declaration, the doctor stated that J.H. exhibited symptoms
of mania and psychosis but denied having any thoughts or plans to commit
homicide. He did not believe that J.H. posed a danger of committing any acts
of violence in the future when he discharged her on June 29, 2023.
4
J.H. called her brother as her only witness. Her brother testified that
R.H. was concerned that hospitals kept releasing J.H. before her symptoms of
mania and delusions had been adequately treated. He also testified that R.H.
was frustrated and “willing to lie” so J.H. could get the treatment she needed.
He admitted, however, that R.H. never told him that she had lied to the
police.
At the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimony, the trial court asked why
the School District did not call R.H. to testify. The School District’s counsel
responded that R.H. had changed her story after the petition was filed.
Following closing arguments, the court granted a three-year WVRO. J.H.
timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Under Code of Civil Procedure3 section 527.8, an “employer, whose
employee has suffered . . . a credible threat of violence . . . that can
reasonably be construed to be carried out . . . may seek a [WVRO] after
hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any
number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other
employees at other workplaces of the employer.” (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) A
“ ‘[c]redible threat of violence’ ” is a “knowing and willful statement or course
of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety, or the
safety of their immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”
(Id., subd. (b)(2).) “If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent . . . made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue
prohibiting further . . . threats of violence.” (Id., subd. (j).)
3 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
5
On appeal from a WVRO, we review the record for substantial evidence
“to determine whether the trial court ‘could have found it highly probable’
that [a defendant] made a ‘credible threat of violence’ against [the plaintiff].”
(Technology Credit Union v. Rafat (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 323; citing
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.) In doing so, “we
resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the
prevailing party and draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial
court’s findings.” (City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526,
538.)
J.H. contends that there was insufficient evidence that she made a
credible threat of violence or that she presented a threat of future violence.
As explained below, we reject both contentions.
1. Credible Threat of Violence
J.H. argues that she did not make a credible threat of violence against
her former high school located within the School District (high school) or its
employees because her tweets neither mentioned the school nor were they
directed at any of the school’s employees. J.H. also argues that the tweets
were not “ ‘convincing’ ” evidence that she actually intended to commit a
shooting at the high school. After considering all of the relevant facts in the
light most favorable to the WVRO, we are not persuaded. J.H.’s tweets and
her twin sister’s actions and reports in response to those tweets support the
trial court’s finding that it was highly probable that J.H.’s conduct placed a
reasonable person in fear for their safety.
First, J.H.’s tweets, by themselves, established a credible threat of
violence to the high school. In those tweets, she repeatedly expressed her
animosity toward the school and her former classmates over a roughly two-
year period. Indeed, several of her tweets referenced her desire to take
6
revenge on the school as well as her former classmates. Viewed in the
context of these earlier tweets, the trial court reasonably concluded that
J.H.’s subsequent tweets that she was “the next school shooter” and that she
would “kill you all” placed a reasonable person working at her former high
school in fear for their safety.
Second, R.H., J.H.’s twin sister, reported to the police that based on
J.H.’s tweets, her conversations with J.H., and her knowledge of J.H. and
J.H.’s mental health issues, she was concerned that J.H. was planning to
commit a mass shooting at the high school. Indeed, R.H. made online posts
immediately after J.H.’s tweets threatening a mass shooting stating that
those tweets “should be taken seriously.” More notably, R.H. told the police
that J.H. recently went to the high school’s campus to assess how to commit a
mass shooting. Based on these actions by and reports of J.H.’s sister, who
admittedly knew her well, there was more than enough evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that J.H. made a credible threat of violence.
J.H.’s attacks on this evidence are unavailing because we must resolve
all questions of credibility and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
WVRO. (City of San Jose v. Garbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.)
Thus, while J.H. testified at trial that she “was protesting” when she made
these tweets, we must assume for purposes of appeal that the trial court did
not find her testimony to be credible. Likewise, we must assume that the
court did not credit J.H.’s claim that she looked into the high school’s security
for her “musical” and that she “want[ed] to stop school shootings.” Indeed,
the court was understandably skeptical of J.H.’s explanation when she
admitted to her sister just one week after tweeting that she was going to be
“the next school shooter” that she had gone to the high school to assess its
security and vulnerability to a shooting.
7
Finally, R.H.’s attempt to recant or qualify some of her earlier
statements after the issuance of the temporary restraining order does not
alter our conclusion. R.H. did tell the police that J.H. never directly said that
she planned to commit a mass shooting at the high school. But R.H. also
maintained that she personally believed if J.H. was going to carry out a mass
shooting, her target would be the high school or one other school that she had
attended. R.H. further maintained that she was “not against the restraining
order.” Given the limited nature of these qualifications to her prior
statements and the failure of R.H. to testify, the trial court understandably
gave little weight to her attempt to recant. In any event, the court was free
to give more weight to R.H.’s earlier statements that she believed J.H. was
planning to commit a shooting at the high school.
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that J.H. made a credible threat of violence against the high school.
2. Probability of Future Threat of Violence
J.H. argues that the WVRO was unwarranted because any threat that
she posed to the high school had dissipated by the time of the trial. We
disagree and find that J.H.’s history of repeated relapses following her
hospitalizations supported the trial court’s conclusion that J.H. continued to
present a threat of violence to the high school at the time of the trial.
To obtain a WVRO, a “plaintiff must establish not only that [the]
defendant . . . made a credible threat of violence, but also that great or
irreparable harm would result to an employee without issuance of the
prohibitory injunction.” (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324,
327 (Scripps).) In other words, the plaintiff must show a “reasonable
probability the wrongful acts will be repeated in the future” “without
issuance of the prohibitory injunction.” (Id. at p. 331.) These wrongful acts
8
may include both “further unlawful violence or the threat thereof.” (Id. at p.
332.)
J.H. argues that any credible threat of violence had dissipated by the
time of trial because she had received extensive mental health treatment
during her hospitalization—which “resolved” her psychiatric symptoms—and
because her doctor did not believe that she posed a threat of violence upon
her discharge–which was approximately two months before trial. J.H.
further argues that the School District did not present any evidence to rebut
this. But J.H.’s arguments do not account for the standard of review on
appeal, which requires that “we resolve all factual conflicts and questions of
credibility in favor of the prevailing party[.]” (City of San Jose v. Garbett,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.)
Here, J.H.’s own testimony as well as her brother’s testimony and her
twin sister’s email to the police supported the trial court’s finding that J.H.
still posed a credible threat of violence in the future. That evidence
established a troubling pattern where J.H. would be hospitalized for acute
psychiatric symptoms, including the symptoms that presumably led to her
threatening tweets, and would relapse soon after her release, necessitating
another round of hospitalization and treatment.
For example, J.H. testified that she had been hospitalized for mental
health issues at least seven times over the past three to four years. Indeed,
she admitted to suffering from delusions as recently as her last
hospitalization less than four months earlier, when she posted the
threatening tweets. She further admitted that she “made the school shooting
tweet” when she was “suffering from a severe mental health crisis which
included psychosis, mania, and delusions.” Her brother confirmed that J.H.
had been in and out of hospitals over the past several years and testified that
9
she would be released each time before her symptoms resolved. Finally, R.H.,
in an email to the police, stated that J.H. bragged about deceiving her doctors
in order to get released from the hospital. According to R.H., J.H., upon her
release and consistent with her past behavior, would probably not continue
treatment or take her medications. As a result, J.H. would likely exhibit the
same mental health issues that led to her threats of violence against the high
school soon after her release. Based on this pattern of behavior, the trial
court reasonably found clear and convincing evidence that J.H. would
continue to present a credible threat of violence in the future
notwithstanding her most recent hospitalization and treatment.
Scripps, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 324, does not compel a contrary
conclusion. In Scripps, the defendant, whose mother was a patient at the
plaintiff’s facility, “pulled [a] door open, striking [the plaintiff’s employee]
with the door and pushing her into the wall” when that employee blocked the
defendant from leaving the room. (Id. at p. 328.) In reversing the WVRO,
the court of appeal found no substantial evidence that the defendant was
likely to commit further acts of violence against the plaintiff’s employees
because by the time of trial, the defendant’s mother had switched her health
insurance provider so she was unlikely “to return as a patient to” the
plaintiff’s facility. (Id. at p. 336.) As a result, it was unlikely that the
defendant “would repeat any violent acts against [the plaintiff’s] employees.”
(Ibid.) By contrast, J.H. regularly walked to the high school’s campus—
which was near her family’s primary residence—making her return to the
campus far more likely. More notably, there was ample evidence that the
psychiatric symptoms that led to J.H.’s threatening tweets may recur in the
future based on J.H.’s troubling pattern of behavior in recent years.
Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
10
finding that J.H. continued to pose a credible threat of violence to the high
school.
B. Protected Speech
Alternatively, J.H. argues that her tweets were protected speech under
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because they did not
constitute a true threat.4 We disagree. When viewed in context and in light
of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable reader would understand
J.H.’s tweets to be a true threat.
True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. (Counterman
v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66, 72-74; Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343,
359 (Black).) “ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” (Black,
at p. 359.) Thus, any “threatening statement[] that a reasonable listener
would understand, in light of the context and surrounding circumstances, to
constitute a true threat” is not protected speech. (People v. Lowery (2011) 52
Cal.4th 419, 427.) Finally, the speaker need not intend to or have the ability
to carry out the threat imminently in order for it to be a true threat. (Id. at p.
428.)
“[W]hen a challenged finding implicates the First Amendment, the
reviewing court conducts an independent review of the record as an added
safeguard against infringement of constitutional rights.” (People v. Peterson
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1066.) Independent review however, “is not the
4 In her opening brief, J.H. argued that her tweets were protected
speech because they were not directed at any School District employee. But
she conceded in her reply that an indirect threat qualifies as a true threat
that is not protected by the First Amendment. We therefore do not address
this argument.
11
equivalent of de novo review ‘in which a reviewing court makes an original
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes’ the outcome
should have been different. [Citation.] Because the trier of fact is in a
superior position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, credibility
determinations are not subject to independent review, nor are findings of fact
that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue.” (In re George T. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 620, 634.)
Accordingly, we independently review the record to determine whether
J.H.’s tweets constituted a true threat but defer to the trial court’s credibility
determinations. Based on our review, we find that a reasonable employee of
the School District would understand J.H.’s statements, in light of the
context and surrounding circumstances, to be a true threat. J.H. tweeted
about the high school and her negative experiences there at least 24 times
between February 2021 to March 2023. Her primary family residence is
within walking distance of the high school, and J.H. has frequently walked
to the campus in the past. After expressing considerable animosity toward
her high school and former classmates for two years, J.H. tweeted, “I’m the
next school shooter” and “I’ll kill you all.” She then told R.H., her twin
sister, a week later that she recently went to the high school’s campus to
scope out its security to see how difficult it would be for a school shooter to
infiltrate the school. R.H. also posted online that J.H.’s threatening tweets
should be taken seriously and that they were not just posted randomly or for
attention. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would
understand J.H.’s tweets to constitute a serious expression of her intent to
commit unlawful violence. Those tweets therefore constituted true threats
that are not protected by the First Amendment.
12
C. Vagueness Challenge
J.H. argues in a footnote to her opening brief that the WVRO is void for
vagueness and lacks specificity because it ordered her to stay away from all
of the School District’s sites and property. But J.H. forfeited this issue by
failing to identify it with a proper heading. (See Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that
may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading”].)
J.H. also forfeited the issue by failing to raise it below. (See Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 699.) Our ruling
does not, however, preclude J.H. from requesting a subsequent modification
to the scope of the WVRO. (See § 527.8, subd. (k)(1) [WVRO is “subject to
termination or modification by further order of the court . . . on the motion of
a party”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CHOU, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
BURNS, J.
San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. J.H. (A169135)
13