People v. Geason CA2/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/7/24 P. v. Geason CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B333478
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super Ct. No. KA127534)
v.
ROBERT GERROD GEASON II,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan C. Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
A jury convicted Robert Gerrod Geason II (defendant) of
battery resulting in serious bodily injury and willful infliction of
corporal injury in the context of a dating relationship in violation
of Penal Code sections 243, subdivision (d)1 and 273.5,
subdivision (a), respectively, after he picked up and slammed
Dong Doe (Dong) headfirst onto a concrete surface, resulting in
her suffering traumatic brain injury and other impairments.
Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of prior uncharged acts under
Evidence Code section 1109, which codifies a statutory exception
to the general ban on propensity evidence when the charged
offenses involve domestic violence. Specifically, defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence that defendant once punched Dong in the face while she
was driving and that he repeatedly stole the side mirror from her
car. Defendant further contends the car-part theft was not a
prior act of “domestic violence” within the meaning of Evidence
Code section 1109. We affirm as modified (1) to strike the
restitution fines, which the trial court did not orally impose, from
the abstract of judgment; and (2) to add the mandatory court fees
to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, consistent with the
abstract of judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
According to the evidence presented at trial, Dong and
defendant met in 2018 and dated for five to six months during
2020. At some point, Dong “tried to break up with [defendant]
because he hid[] . . . his background” from her. Approximately
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless other indicated.
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three or four months after they began their relationship,
defendant became aggressive with Dong, including, on one
occasion, punching her in the face while she was driving.
Defendant also began showing up to Dong’s home unannounced
in the early hours of the morning. After her car’s right side-view
mirror was stolen three times, Dong confronted defendant about
the thefts.
One of Dong’s text messages to defendant read, “[in] all
honesty, I feel so miserable waking up knowing I still have to
keep in contact with you so you don’t keep damaging [my
property] and calling my work place. I really hope you’ll find
someone else and fall in love with another girl soon.” Dong
complained in another text message that the cost of replacing the
repeatedly removed car mirror had risen from $200 to $550.
Defendant responded, “It will get taken care of. Don’t trip.”
Dong texted defendant, “all the kissing and hugging really isn’t
worth getting my car damaged and more troubles in the future.
I just want to focus on work and my mom.” Defendant told Dong,
“Let me know the total and I’ll bring you the cash at Cal Poly
[Pomona] and [] that will be it. I’m tired of back and forth.”
Dong agreed to meet defendant at Cal Poly on May 4, 2021,
so that defendant could give her $500 to replace her mirror.
Dong arrived at the parking lot in front of the bookstore, hid her
phone in her car to prevent defendant from destroying it, and
walked to meet defendant. Defendant approached Dong, and
demanded that she tell him where her phone was. Dong
responded that she had left her phone at home, and defendant
proceeded to search her backpack. Not finding the phone,
defendant walked to Dong’s car, and Dong followed him.
Dong’s next memory was waking up in a hospital.
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A Cal Poly bookstore employee witnessed defendant and
Dong yelling at each other, and heard defendant say, “Give me
the keys bitch,” in a “hostile and aggressive tone.” The arguing
ended, and “the two of them turned around and started walking
in opposite directions. And then [defendant] stopped and turned
back around[,] . . . moved into a crouched position and started
moving back towards [Dong]. And she didn’t seem to notice that
he was coming.” Defendant “grabbed [Dong] from behind” in a
“bear hug,” and the two struggled for a couple of seconds.
Defendant then “picked her up and . . . threw her onto the floor,”
causing “a dull thud on the concrete,” followed by silence.
Dong sustained fractures to various parts of her skull and
suffered a traumatic brain injury. Her brain was so swollen that
a large part of her skull had to be removed, and a band
connecting the brain’s hemispheres cut, so that the brain could
fall out of the skull’s base until the swelling subsided. When
these measures failed to control the swelling, the neurosurgeon
“took out a clot from her left temporal lobe . . . [and] remove[d]
some of her bruised and dead brain to make more space.” Dong’s
treating physicians induced a medically necessitated coma. As a
result of the attack, Dong’s left limbs “do not work as well as the
right,” and her personality has changed. According to her
neurosurgeon, “She will never make a full recovery.”
II. Procedural Background
The People charged defendant with one count of battery
with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 1), and one
count of injuring a dating companion resulting in a traumatic
condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). The People further alleged,
as to the first count, that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
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(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and, in connection with both counts, that,
as contemplated by California Rules of Court, rule 4.421: the
crimes involved great violence or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (id., subd. (a)(1));
Dong was a particularly vulnerable victim (id., (a)(3)); defendant
engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society
(id., subd. (b)(1)); defendant has suffered prior convictions as an
adult and sustained petitions in juvenile dependency proceedings
that are numerous and of increasing seriousness (id., subd.
(b)(2)); and defendant previously performed unsatisfactorily on
probation, mandatory supervision, post release community
supervision, and parole (id., subd. (b)(5)).
The matter proceeded to trial by jury, and the jury found
defendant guilty of both counts. It further found true all
allegations under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. The
trial court sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison on
count 2, comprised of a four-year base term, plus five years for
the enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (e) for great
bodily injury involving domestic violence, and stayed the
sentence imposed under section 654 for count 1.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting
the uncharged acts of domestic violence—theft of Dong’s car
mirror, and defendant’s punching her while she drove. He
further argues that the fines and fees reflected in the minute
order and abstract of judgment must be stricken because the trial
court failed to orally impose them.
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I. Uncharged Acts Admitted Under Evidence Code
Sections 1109 and 352
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his past uncharged acts of domestic violence because
the probative value was substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352) and, additionally, with respect to
the car mirror thefts, that the uncharged acts were not “domestic
violence” under Evidence Code section 1109. Defendant’s
argument regarding applicability of Evidence Code section 1109
to the car mirror thefts raises a question of statutory
interpretation subject to de novo review. (People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) We review the trial court’s
rulings on Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1295.)
A. Governing Principles
Generally, “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
his . . . character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his . . . conduct) is
inadmissible when offered to prove his . . . conduct on a specified
occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, “in a
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense
involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible
by section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1109 of
the Evidence Code “reflect[s] the Legislature’s determination that
in . . . domestic violence cases, ‘similar prior offenses are uniquely
probative of a defendant’s guilt on a later occasion.’ ” (People v.
Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345, 1352.)
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B. Defendant’s Theft of Dong’s Mirror Qualifies as
“Domestic Violence” Under the Statutory Definition
Evidence Code section 1109, defines “domestic violence”
as having the meaning set forth in section 13700, and, “if the act
occurred no more than five years before the charged offense,”
additionally has the meaning set forth in Family Code
section 6211. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (d)(3).) Family Code
section 6211 defines domestic violence as “abuse” committed
against someone with whom the perpetrator has had a dating
relationship. The Law Revision Commission notes to Family
Code section 6211 refer to Family Code Section 6203 for the
definition of “abuse.” Family Code section 6203, in turn, defines
“abuse” to include “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or
could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320,” and expressly
provides that “[a]buse is not limited to the actual infliction of
physical injury or assault.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subds. (a)(4) &
(b).) The behaviors listed in section Family Code section 6320
include “destroying personal property” and “disturbing the peace
of the other party,” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subds. (a) & (c).)
“Section 1109 applies if the [uncharged] offense falls within the
Family Code definition of domestic violence even if it does not fall
within the more restrictive Penal Code definition.” (People v.
Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144 (Ogle).)
The parties do not dispute that the uncharged acts occurred
within five years of the charged offenses, making both the Family
Code and the Penal Code definitions of “domestic violence”
applicable. (Ogle, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.)
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Defendant’s argument that the mirror theft does not
qualify as “an act of domestic violence,” is at odds with the
express language of the Family Code definition, which provides
that domestic violence includes “abuse,” and that “abuse” is
“not limited to . . . infliction of physical injury” and includes
“destroying [the] personal property” of another. (Fam. Code,
§§ 6203, subds. (a)(4), (b); 6320, subd. (a).) The evidence also
indicates the repeated vandalizing of Dong’s car, in addition to
constituting a “destr[uction] [of her] personal property,” was
activity “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Fam. Code,
§ 6320, subds. (a) & (c); see N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
595, 603 [disturbing the peace means “ ‘conduct that destroys the
mental or emotional calm of the other party’ ”].)
C. Admitting Evidence of Prior Uncharged Acts Was
Within the Trial Court’s Discretion
Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Here, the uncharged conduct was squarely within the
parameters of Evidence Code section 1109 and the risk of undue
prejudice was minimal, particularly given the extreme brutality
of the charged offense and the substantially lower level of harm
inflicted by the uncharged acts. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 372 [incidents that were “not significantly more
inflammatory than the charged offenses” posed no substantial
danger of undue prejudice]; accord People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th
1, 31-32.) Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that
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the evidence of prior uncharged acts posed “a substantial risk the
jury would confuse the issues and punish [defendant] . . . for []
unproven allegations.” (See People v. Wilson (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014 [“Jurors are credited with intelligence
and common sense,” and “[w]e ‘presume they generally
understand and follow the instructions’ ”].)
Having concluded there was no error, we decline to address
the parties’ arguments on whether any error was harmless.
II. Fines and Fees
Defendant argues the fines and fees set forth in the
abstract of judgment—$300 restitution fine, $300 parole
revocation fine, $80 court operations assessment, and $60
criminal conviction assessment—must be stricken because the
trial court did not impose them during its oral pronouncement of
judgment at the sentencing hearing. “Courts may correct clerical
errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . that have properly
assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts
of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of
sentencing courts.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181,
185.)
The People concede the two $300 fines should be stricken in
view of their omission from the trial court’s oral pronouncement,
and we agree. We likewise agree with the People’s position that
the required fee assessments of $60 and $80 may remain (see
People v. Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 484-485 [modifying
oral pronouncement to impose court fees consistent with the
abstract of judgment].)
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DISPOSITION
The abstract of judgment is modified to strike the $300
restitution fine and the $300 parole revocation fine.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
*
DAVIS, J.
We Concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
*
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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