People v. Patterson CA2/8 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/8/24 P. v. Patterson CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B326755
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA434945
v.
RONALD PATTERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Several years into Ronald Patterson’s 20-year prison term,
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
asked the trial court to resentence him. The court struck one
five-year enhancement, reducing Patterson’s sentence to 15
years. We affirm. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
A November 2015 information charged Patterson with one
count of robbery and one count of assault with a deadly weapon
for a single incident from March 2015. The information alleged
Patterson had been convicted of prior serious or violent felonies,
including three robberies from 2006 and a carjacking from 1995.
The information later listed other convictions and asserted
Patterson had served several prior prison terms.
In February 2016, Patterson reached a plea agreement
with the prosecution and agreed to a 20-year sentence. He
pleaded guilty to the robbery count, admitted one prior strike
under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), and
further admitted two prior serious felony convictions under
section 667, subdivision (a). In line with the plea agreement, the
court sentenced Patterson to 20 years in prison—the upper term
of five years for the robbery count, doubled due to the strike, plus
two five-year enhancements for the prior serious felony
convictions Patterson admitted.
In September 2021, the Secretary of the Department wrote
the trial court requesting resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), which now is section 1172.1. (See People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 237, fn. 3, review granted
April 19, 2023, S278786.) The letter said Patterson had been
sentenced before recent sentencing changes gave courts
discretion to strike prior serious felony convictions and the
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punishment for these enhancements. Supporting documents
stressed Patterson’s positive performance in prison.
The Cumulative Case Summary and Evaluation Report
attached to the Department’s resentencing request (the
“Department report”) provided a comprehensive look at
Patterson, including the details of his current offense, his
criminal and parole history, and his performance in prison. The
report identified no mental health concerns.
The trial court invited briefing from the parties about
resentencing.
The defense submissions argued for striking both five-year
priors and for imposing the low or middle term on the robbery
count. Patterson highlighted his “laudatory” behavior in prison
and contended he was entitled to the changes to section 1170
enacted by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and
Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) after his original
sentencing. Patterson also claimed he was entitled to the low
term on the robbery count because he had been molested as a
child and this trauma contributed to his offense.
Patterson’s submission included the Department report
and a two-page report from an unlicensed psychologist, which
discussed Patterson’s history of mental health and substance
abuse problems. Patterson told this psychologist he had been
sexually abused by an uncle from ages seven to 12. In an effort to
link this trauma to his crimes, the report states: “The patient’s
experiences of developmental trauma and potential genetic
predisposition to substance use and mental illness likely
contributed to early-onset, severe substance abuse (possibly as a
means of numbing/coping with low sense of self secondary to
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sexual abuse), which likely contributed to psychosis in his early
20s.”
The defense also provided a short letter from Patterson’s
sister that addresses his “childhood molestation” and claims the
abuser “pushed [Patterson] into a deep depression that he never
recovered from.”
The prosecution argued the court should maintain
Patterson’s 20-year sentence, including the high term on the
robbery count. Patterson had agreed to this sentence when he
faced significantly more prison time. He admitted multiple prior
violent felony convictions as part of his plea bargain, and he had
served time in prison. The prosecution argued the many
aggravating circumstances established by Patterson’s plea
outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The prosecution also
criticized, from many angles, the mental health evidence supplied
by the defense and maintained nothing established any childhood
trauma contributed to the robbery Patterson committed nearly
four decades later.
At the November 2022 hearing, the trial court announced it
intended to strike one of the five-year priors. The court said it
was “employing all current sentencing requirements that are
required at this point in time” including amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), “which directs the court to impose the
midterm, unless there are circumstances in aggravation that
justify imposition of the high term.” It found three aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt and determined these factors
justified the upper term. These factors were Patterson’s “prior
criminal history,” his two prior prison sentences, and his
increasingly serious conduct, given he committed his most recent
crimes while on parole and despite serving prison time. The
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court highlighted facts about a few of Patterson’s prior
convictions: the 2006 robbery, the 1995 carjacking, and a 1994
carjacking. The court concluded Patterson was a “habitual
offender.”
As for Patterson’s claim to the low term, the court implied
the evidence before it was tenuous but stated it would accept “the
childhood sexual abuse to be true.” The court determined there
was an insufficient nexus between this abuse and Patterson’s
current offense, and the same three aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors such that it was not in the
interests of justice to impose the low term.
The court struck one five-year enhancement. It imposed a
new sentence of 15 years, consisting of the high term of five years
doubled for the strike, plus only one five-year enhancement.
Patterson appealed the same day.
II
Patterson maintains the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the high term and in refusing the low term. We find no
abuse. To the extent Patterson’s arguments require us to
construe amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), we
independently review the matter.
We address these issues on the merits despite the
prosecution’s claims of forfeiture. Defense counsel made no
objection at the hearing about any prison term, perhaps because
the trial court started the hearing by announcing its intent to
rule favorably to Patterson by striking an enhancement.
A
Last month, in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742,
757 & 777(Lynch), our Supreme Court addressed the
requirements for imposing the upper term under amended
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section 1170, subdivision (b), which makes the middle term the
presumptive term. Although the defendant had been sentenced
before the recent amendments (id. at p. 742), key
pronouncements in Lynch extend beyond this context.
The court made clear that, absent a defense stipulation and
excluding prior convictions, a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt each aggravating fact used to justify an upper term.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 757, 759–760, 765 & 767 ; see
also § 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3).) If a trial court relies on improperly
proven aggravating facts to impose an upper term, a reviewing
court applies Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18(Chapman) to determine whether the error was prejudicial.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 761 & 768.) No remand for
resentencing is required if “we can conclude that the omission of
a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as
to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper
term sentence” or if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
these facts were uncontested and supported by overwhelming
evidence. (Id. at p. 775.)
Assuming for purposes of analysis the trial court erred in
finding some or all of the aggravating factors here, we apply the
Chapman standard to conclude any error was harmless.
The Department report establishes each aggravating factor
found by the trial court. Again, these three factors were
Patterson’s criminal history, his two prior prison sentences, and
the increasing seriousness of his conduct, given he committed his
latest serious felony while he was on parole.
The Department report Patterson supplied in support of his
request for resentencing establishes he has an extensive criminal
history: “Patterson’s adult criminal history reflects convictions
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for Carjacking, Grand Theft: Auto, Driving while License
Suspended, Under the Influence of Controlled Substance,
Loitering in Public, Possess Narcotic Controlled Substance,
Transport/Sell Narcotic Controlled Substance, and Robbery.”
The report also shows Patterson served two prior prison terms
and was on parole and had not been discharged when he went to
prison for the current case.
Patterson does not dispute any of these facts. His opening
brief relies on the probation report, which is consistent with the
Department report regarding his criminal history and parole
status. The psychologist who examined Patterson confirmed this
was Patterson’s third prison term, and his first two terms were
for “Carjacking (1995-1996) and Robbery, 2nd Striker (2006-
2014).”
Beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury would have found true
the three aggravating factors here. Thus, any error by the trial
court in making these findings was harmless. (See Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 761 & 768.)
Pointing to subdivision (b)(5) of section 1170, Patterson
argues it was impermissible to use his prior convictions both to
enhance his sentence and to impose the upper term. Assuming
Patterson did not forfeit this issue by failing to raise it at the trial
court, Patterson’s convictions remain numerous even if we ignore
the conviction giving rise to the serious felony enhancement the
court did not strike.
Patterson faults the trial court for not stating mitigating
factors when selecting the upper term. Again, he never raised
this issue with the trial court. (See People v. Tilley (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [“Generally, if a party does not object to the
sentence in the trial court, they may not claim on appeal the trial
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court failed to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices”].) Even if we ignore this failure, Patterson’s
appellate briefs identify no authority requiring this explication
when considering the upper term. And before imposing the upper
term, the court did discuss Patterson’s childhood trauma. The
court clearly was aware of the amended statute.
Choosing the upper term was not an abuse of discretion.
(See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 767 & 776–777 [“The current
statute also preserves the trial court’s discretion to determine
whether an upper term sentence is in fact justified”].)
B
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing
the low term. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428,
fn. 8 [applicable standard is abuse of discretion].)
Assuming a defendant establishes a nexus between the
defendant’s childhood trauma and the offense at issue, a trial
court properly may reject the low term if it concludes aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors such that imposing the
low term would run contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).) The court has discretion in making this equitable
balancing determination. (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 189, 204–205.) Contrary to Patterson’s arguments,
no jury findings are required. (Ibid.)
The trial court accepted Patterson had suffered sexual
abuse as a child. This was a mitigating factor. The court
appeared to recognize the evidence of this factor was tenuous.
Then it articulated the same three aggravating factors noted
above and found that these factors were true beyond a reasonable
doubt and outweighed the mitigating factors. The court earlier
had discussed the aggravating factors at length, highlighting
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concerning aspects of Patterson’s criminal record. The court also
discussed Patterson’s positive prison conduct at this hearing.
Rejecting the low term on this record was sound. The court
provided sufficient explanation of its decision. (See § 1170,
subds. (b)(5) & (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.406(a) & 4.420(i).)
Pointing to another potential mitigating factor on appeal
(mental health issues)—which Patterson did not raise at the
hearing—does not show the court’s ruling was an abuse of
discretion. In any event, the court made clear it had considered
the psychologist’s report, which focused on Patterson’s mental
health issues.
Patterson offers no support for claiming the middle term
must be the aggravated term if childhood trauma is established.
Patterson emphasizes the relevant statute, which retains judicial
discretion to choose the term most in line with “the interests of
justice,” provided the requirements of the statute are met. (See
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Patterson’s argument that section 1172.1 supports
remanding this matter because it erects a “presumption for a
lower sentence” is puzzling, as the trial court did reduce his
sentence by five years.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the resentencing order and the judgment.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
GRIMES, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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