You v. Rho CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/8/24 You v. Rho CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JU YOUNG YOU et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G062839
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01207866)
YOUNG CHUL RHO et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Shawn Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Andrew Kim and Andrew Kim for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Plaintiffs Ju Young You, Yunsue K. Kang, and Mi Seon Yoon Kim
appeal from a judgment after a bench trial on their complaint against
defendants Young Chul Rho, Young Sim Rho, and C&H Trust Deed Services.
On the morning of the bench trial, plaintiffs, proceeding in propria persona,
announced they were ready for trial. When the trial took place in the
afternoon, plaintiffs indicated they were not adequately prepared because
they did not believe the trial would go forward and requested a continuance.
The court denied the request for a continuance and proceeded with the trial,
but plaintiffs were not able to present any evidence. The court accordingly
granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict. Plaintiffs subsequently filed
a motion for new trial, which the court denied.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the court erred by proceeding with
the trial because it was obvious they were not prepared. We discern no error
in the court’s decision to proceed with the trial and affirm the judgment
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
At the outset, we note our review in this case is impeded by
deficiencies in plaintiffs’ brief and the record on appeal. Plaintiffs recite
various facts regarding the foreclosure sale of their home by one of the
defendants and defendants’ subsequent unlawful detainer action against
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not cite to the record to support these facts, and the
record on appeal does not include plaintiffs’ complaint or other relevant
pleadings. We accordingly do not consider these facts and cannot summarize
the details of the underlying dispute. Plaintiffs also do not provide a coherent
factual summary of all relevant facts concerning their motion for new trial or
1
The appellate record does not include all relevant documents in
the clerk’s transcript. We accordingly summarize the available facts from the
reporter’s transcript and some documents in the clerk’s transcript.
2
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an adequate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Regardless, we
summarize the relevant facts as best we can.
I.
THE TRIAL AND JUDGMENT
In March 2023, two of the plaintiffs, proceeding in propria
persona, appeared for a bench trial. When the court asked why the third
plaintiff, Mi Seon Yoon Kim, did not appear, plaintiffs indicated Kim’s
husband was injured.
Defendants also did not appear for trial, but their counsel did.
Defendants’ counsel apparently believed the trial would not go forward that
day because plaintiffs filed a peremptory challenge to the prior judge and
later informed defendants’ counsel they would file another peremptory
challenge to the next assigned judge. The court reprimanded defendants’
counsel because each party was only entitled to one peremptory challenge
and emphasized attendance at trial was not optional. The court added the
parties were ordered earlier in the day to be available for trial within two
hours, and it was not “up to a layperson to talk you into waiving that
mandate.”
The court then proceeded with the trial, but plaintiffs indicated
they did not want to go forward. The court explained plaintiffs did not have to
proceed but would lose their case. Plaintiffs then attempted to proceed with
the trial but ultimately did not introduce any evidence through witnesses.
When the court indicated it did not have an exhibit list, one of the plaintiffs
stated it “was downstairs and . . . submitted through the window.” The court
2
All further references to rules are to the California Rules of
Court.
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responded plaintiffs were required to bring their exhibits to trial. After
attempting to provide witness testimony, plaintiffs stated they were not
adequately prepared because they did not believe the trial would go forward
that day and requested a continuance, which the court denied. Plaintiffs also
suggested another judge had told them they might be able to continue the
trial.
At the close of plaintiffs’ case, defendants’ counsel requested the
court dismiss the action because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
proving their causes of action. The court construed defendants’ request as a
motion for directed verdict and granted the motion. The court agreed
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof because they only provided
arguments regarding “failures to comply with local court rules or reasons
that this case would be better off continued.”
At the end of March 2023, the court entered judgment in
defendants’ favor.
II.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A few days after the court entered judgment, plaintiffs filed a
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motion for new trial. It appears plaintiffs retained counsel to represent them
in connection with the motion for new trial.4
In their notice of motion, plaintiffs identified the following
grounds for their motion: (1) “Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
3
In their opening brief, plaintiffs claim they filed a motion to
vacate dismissal, which we assume refers to their motion for new trial.
4
The record suggests plaintiffs’ counsel previously represented
plaintiffs at some point in the underlying action and currently serves as their
appellate counsel.
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or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial”; (2) “Accident or surprise,
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against”; and (3) “Newly
discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial.” The appellate record only includes the notice of motion, but it does not
include the actual motion or any opposition papers.
At the motion for new trial hearing, the court summarized what
had happened on the day of the bench trial. The court indicated all the
parties had appeared and announced they were ready for trial in the
morning. The court emphasized this was significant “because once ready was
announced, the idea that they would later sort of argue for a continuance is
really inappropriate unless something unique changed between . . . 9:00 a.m.
and the court call.” The court added that the parties were informed around
11:00 a.m. to appear for trial two hours later but did not show up because
they misunderstood the law regarding peremptory challenges. According to
the court, “some extraordinary bravado caused people to answer ready for
trial and then when the reality hit that trial was going to occur, there was no
ability to proceed.” The court explained plaintiffs did not know what an
opening statement was or how to call witnesses or introduce evidence.
In response, plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged his clients were at
fault and implied they were in contempt of court. But he suggested a prior
judge should have asked if the parties had exhibits with them “before
accepting the pronouncement of ready” for trial. Plaintiffs’ counsel believed
the prior judge could have done more to determine if “both parties . . . [were]
truly . . . prepared to go to trial.”
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In rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments, the court noted: “[E]very time
there was a hearing in the matter, looking at the court’s record, [plaintiffs
would] bring [an attorney] on, then let them go, bring someone on, let them
go. And someone made a mistake and bet on themselves. And they shouldn’t
have done that. But they did.” The court concluded there were no grounds for
a new trial and denied the motion. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue the court erred by proceeding with the trial and
dismissing their case because it was clear they were not ready for trial.
Plaintiffs note they did not submit any joint exhibits or trial binders and one
of the plaintiffs was not present for trial. According to plaintiffs, the court
should not have relied on their “uninformed declaration, as in pro se litigants,
of being ready for trial when it was obvious . . . they were not ready for trial
without any submitted witness and exhibit lists . . . .” None of these
assertions warrant reversal.
A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.
(Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) An
appellant has the burden of demonstrating reversible error and must provide
legal authority to support his or her contentions. (Ibid.) If an appellant fails
to support a point “with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived.” (Ibid.) An appellant’s opening brief also must
“[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record”
(rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)) and must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the
record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the
matter appears” (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)). We may disregard portions of an
appellant’s brief in noncompliance with this rule. (Dominguez v. Financial
Indemnity Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 392, fn. 2.)
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Here, plaintiffs raise arguments without any attempt to apply
the law to the circumstances of their case. Indeed, they only cite legal
authority for the standard of review but not for any of their arguments. They
also fail to provide an adequate record on appeal to demonstrate error. The
appellate record does not include their motion for new trial or any opposition
papers, which is central to this appeal. While the appellate record includes a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing, we are not able to determine all the
arguments that were made to the trial court. “Failure to provide an adequate
record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.”
(Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336,
348.) Finally, plaintiffs did not provide “a summary of the significant facts” or
the court’s reasoning, which we have attempted to gather from the reporter’s
transcript. (Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Given the paucity of legal analysis or factual
support in plaintiffs’ brief, meaningful appellate review is limited. For these
reasons, we could deem plaintiffs’ arguments waived without further
consideration. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
We, nevertheless, address what we believe plaintiffs’ contention
to be. Based on our review of plaintiffs’ opening brief and the record, we can
decipher one central issue—whether the trial court erred by denying
plaintiffs’ oral request for a continuance of trial. Under rule 3.1332(a), the
dates assigned for trial are firm, and parties and their counsel must regard
the trial date as certain. Indeed, “continuances of trials are disfavored” and
may be granted “only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the
continuance.” (Rule 3.1332(c).) Circumstances that may indicate good cause
for a continuance include, among other things, the unavailability of trial
counsel, a party, or a witness due to “excusable circumstances” or a party’s
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“excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material
evidence despite diligent efforts.” (Rule 3.1332(c)(1)-(3) & (6).) The party
seeking a trial continuance “must make the request . . . by a noticed motion
or an ex parte application . . . with supporting declarations.” (Rule 3.1332(b).)
A court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance of trial is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. (Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389,
1395.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a
continuance of the trial. Plaintiffs, despite their status as self-represented
litigants, were required to follow the same procedural rules applicable to all
parties, but it appears they did not follow the rules governing a continuance
of trial. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) They point to
no motion, ex parte application, or declarations. (Rule 3.1332(b).) They also
do not appear to have made any arguments about the unavailability of their
trial counsel due to “excusable circumstances.” (Rule 3.1332(c)(3).) To the
contrary, the court’s comments suggest plaintiffs repeatedly retained and
terminated their counsel throughout the underlying action and chose to
proceed in propria persona for trial. While one of the plaintiffs, Mi Seon Yoon
Kim, was not present at trial, plaintiffs only stated Kim’s husband was
injured without any further explanation. It does not appear they asserted
Kim’s absence as a basis for a continuance. Finally, there is no evidence
plaintiffs were misled regarding their duty to proceed with trial or were
unable to obtain essential testimony or evidence “despite diligent efforts.”
(Rule 3.1332(c)(6).) Indeed, plaintiffs apparently had notice of the trial date
because they personally appeared at court and announced they were ready
for trial. To the extent they misunderstood peremptory challenges and their
effect on the trial, there is nothing in the record suggesting they were misled
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by the court or defendants. Applying the deferential abuse of discretion
standard of review, as we must, we conclude the court’s decision to deny a
continuance of trial did not exceed the bounds of reason, nor was it so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
773.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs
incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P.J.
GOETHALS, J.
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