People v. Robinson CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/8/24 P. v. Robinson CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B334026
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA008895)
v.
ERIC FRANK ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal; Eric Frank Robinson, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Eric Frank Robinson appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) as to his 1994 conviction for
felony murder. The superior court found Robinson was ineligible
for resentencing relief as a direct aider and abettor, or in the
alternative, as a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard for human life.
We appointed counsel to represent Robinson in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, Robinson’s appointed appellate
counsel filed a brief that did not identify any arguable issues.
After independently reviewing the record and the contentions
presented by Robinson in his two supplemental briefs, we have
not identified any either. Therefore, we affirm the order denying
the petition for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
We summarized the evidence at trial in our opinion in
People v. Robinson (May 17, 2022, B312651) (nonpub. opn.):
“[Roberta] Brooks and Robinson were involved in a
fraudulent scheme to obtain student loan funds. They recruited
individuals to lend their names to false student loan applications
to attend a trade school. When the student loan was approved,
Robinson would receive the check at the school. The check was
then given to the ‘student’ to cash and the proceeds distributed
among the various individuals involved in the scheme. Besides
Robinson and Brooks, participants in the scheme included James
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Coulter, two sisters, Denisa and Latisha Jones, and J’Neane
Griffie.
“Griffie recruited Rachel Jones to act [as] an applicant for a
student loan. When Robinson received a $4,000 loan check
payable to Rachel he instructed her to cash the check and bring
the proceeds to him at a motel room. Rachel, accompanied by
Griffie, cashed the check but before the two women could get to
the motel they were robbed. Griffie called the motel room to
report the robbery and spoke to Denisa who was waiting there for
the money along with Latisha, Coulter, Robinson and Brooks.
Denisa told Griffie and Rachel to come to the motel to explain
what happened.
“When Griffie and Rachel arrived at the motel room,
Robinson met them at the door with a gun in his hand. He
grabbed the women, threw them to the floor and started hitting
them with wire coat hangers shouting ‘Where’s the money?’
Griffie told Robinson she and Rachel had been robbed. Latisha,
who lived in the motel room, told Robinson and Coulter to leave
because she was afraid someone might call the police.
“After Robinson and Coulter left, Latisha and Denisa told
Griffie and Rachel the men had stripped them and taken their
jewelry. They wanted Griffie and Rachel to go with them to find
Robinson and Coulter and get their jewelry back.
“The four women and Brooks got into two cars and drove off
to find Robinson and Coulter. After driving around, they learned
Robinson and Coulter were at a motel in Lynwood. The women
went to the motel room. Once inside, the four women were forced
to engage in various sex acts with each other and Robinson,
Coulter, and Brooks. Robinson and Coulter then allowed Denisa
and Latisha to leave, and the men told Griffie and Rachel to get
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dressed. Coulter gave his gun to Brooks and told her to watch
Griffie and Rachel while he talked to Robinson. Brooks pointed
the gun at Griffie and Rachel and asked if they loved each other
and whether they were ready to die. Coulter then told Griffie
and Rachel to forget what had happened in the motel room and
not to go to the police. Griffie and Rachel promised to obey his
instructions. Robinson led Griffie outside while Brooks continued
to guard Rachel.
“Brooks gave the gun to Robinson, and Brooks cleaned the
room of fingerprints and other evidence. Brooks, Robinson, and
Rachel then left the hotel room and walked to Robinson’s car.
Coulter was already sitting in the front passenger seat, and
Griffie was in the back seat. Robinson and Brooks pushed Rachel
into the trunk and closed it. Robinson drove away, with Brooks
and Coulter in the front seat and Griffie in the back. Robinson
started to drive toward Latisha’s motel, but Coulter pointed or
gestured with the gun at Robinson and directed Robinson to drive
in a different direction.
“After driving for some time, Robinson stopped the car in a
dark, vacant lot in Compton. Robinson let Rachel out of the
trunk and said in a kind voice, ‘Come on with me, honey: Don’t
worry about nothing.’ Rachel pleaded for her life, but Robinson
told her to kneel down. Robinson then brought Griffie over and
told her to kneel next to Rachel. While Rachel was starting to
pray, Coulter shot her. Then Griffie started screaming, and
Coulter shot her. The two men and Brooks drove away. Griffie
died of a gunshot wound, but Rachel survived.”
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B. The Verdict and Appeal
The jury convicted Robinson of the first degree murder of
Griffie (§ 187), the attempted murder of Rachel (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664), and multiple sex crimes. The jury found true the special
circumstance the murder was committed in the commission of a
kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also found true as to
the murder and attempted murder counts that Robinson was
armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury convicted
codefendant Brooks of rape and other sex crimes.
On appeal, we reversed the kidnapping special
circumstance and otherwise affirmed the judgment as to
Robinson. (People v. Brooks (Dec. 23, 1996, B085183) [nonpub.
opn.].) In reversing the special circumstance, we concluded, “The
one reasonable inference is that while in the motel room
Robinson and Coulter formed the intent to kill Griffie and Rachel
and transporting them to an isolated location was ‘merely
incidental’ to the murder.” In 2017, on remand, the superior
court sentenced Robinson to 26 years to life in state prison.
(People v. Robinson, supra, B312651.)
C. Robinson’s Petition for Resentencing and the Superior
Court’s Summary Denial
On March 22, 2021 Robinson, representing himself, filed a
petition for resentencing and supporting declaration seeking to
vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced in accordance
with recent statutory changes relating to accomplice liability for
murder. In his petition, Robinson declared his “first degree
murder conviction was based on a theory of felony murder and/or
a theory of murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” and he “could not now be convicted of first or second
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degree murder because of the changes made to Penal Code
sections 188 and 189, made effective on January 1, 2019,
pursuant to Senate Bill 1437.” He stated he was not the actual
killer and did not act with the intent to kill. Further, he was not
a major participant in the felony or did not act with reckless
indifference to human life. Robinson requested the superior court
appoint him counsel. Robinson attached multiple exhibits to his
petition, including the felony complaint and the verdict form on
the murder count.
On April 26, 2021 the superior court summarily denied the
petition without appointing counsel for Robinson, finding
Robinson was not eligible for relief as a matter of law. The court
relied on our opinion in People v. Brooks, supra, B085183,
explaining we found the evidence “was sufficient to support a
finding of specific intent to kill.” The court noted that on appeal
we found Robinson and Coulter had a motive to kill Griffie and
Rachel, and it cited our finding in the context of the kidnapping
special circumstance that “the one reasonable inference” was that
in the motel room Robinson and Coulter formed the intent to kill
Griffie and Rachel.
We reversed. (People v. Robinson, supra, B312651.) We
found the superior court erred in relying on this court’s prior
opinion to conclude Robinson was necessarily convicted as a
direct aider and abettor or of felony murder based on a theory he
was a major participant in the kidnappings and sex crimes and
acted with reckless indifference to human life. We also found it
was error for the trial court to deny Robinson’s petition for
resentencing without first appointing counsel. We remanded the
matter for the trial court to appoint counsel for Robinson and
issue an order to show cause. (Ibid.)
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D. Denial of Robinson’s Petition For Resentencing After an
Evidentiary Hearing
The superior court on remand appointed counsel for
Robinson and ordered the People to file a response to the petition.
In opposition, the People argued Robinson was ineligible for relief
as a matter of law because he “would still be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt as an aider and abettor to a first degree
murder and attempted murder” and that he “was both a major
participant and one who acted with reckless indifference.”
Robinson filed a response arguing the verdict did not preclude
him from relief because the jury instructions did not support a
finding he acted with malice.
At the evidentiary hearing on September 26, 2023, the
parties relied on only the trial testimony. Counsel for Robinson
argued “there aren’t any real facts that address whether
Mr. Robinson was a direct aider and abettor” in the murder and
attempted murder, and the testimony at trial showed “he did not
know Mr. Coulter was going to kill these individuals.” Rather,
according to counsel, Robinson “was in fear for his life. He had a
gun pointed at him as well, [and] if he did not follow Mr.
Coulter’s directions, he would be shot and killed.”
The superior court denied the petition, finding, “This case
doesn’t start when the two victims were shot. It starts way
before that. . . . [¶] When the parties are talking about the travel
school and the student loans. At that time, at the Travelodge, the
defendant, Mr. Robinson, had a gun. And at that time, he hit the
victim Rachel in the head and also struck her with a coat hanger.
[¶] He was responsible for getting rooms at that location. . . . He
sexually assaulted victim Rachel. . . . [W]hile he was doing this,
at times, he had the gun in his hands. . . . [¶] Then we have the
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shootings. . . . They were driven to a location. Mr. Robinson took
victim Rachel out of the car and forced her to kneel on the
ground. Then he took victim Griffie out and onto the ground and
forced her to kneel on the ground. [¶] Then at some point, victim
Rachel pleaded for her life. Mr. Robinson said, ‘We don’t know
why you’re saying that for.’ And then Coulter shot both of them.”
The trial court concluded that “clearly Mr. Robinson is an
aider and abettor. I don’t think it is a close call. Even if you
don’t find he’s an aider and abettor, at minimum, he’s a major
participant and showed reckless disregard for human life. I don’t
think it’s a close call.” Robinson appealed.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Robinson on appeal from
the denial of his postjudgment petition. After reviewing the
record, appointed counsel did not identify any arguable issues
and so informed this court. Appointed counsel advised Robinson
on July 29, 2024 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable
to find any arguable issues and that Robinson could personally
submit any contentions he believed the court should consider.
Counsel also sent Robinson a copy of his appellate brief and the
record on appeal.
On August 26, 2024 we received a typed nine-page
supplemental brief from Robinson, which included 47 pages of
exhibits. Robinson argued in his supplemental brief that the
superior court violated the ex-post facto clause on January 31,
2017 by improperly imposing a 15 percent custody credit
limitation on his entire determinate sentence (applicable only to
violent felonies) instead of awarding 50 percent custody credits.
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Robinson also claimed the July 25, 2018 amended abstract of
judgment improperly imposed a one-year firearm enhancement
on the murder count and the trial court failed to re-impose the
firearm enhancement on the attempted murder count in the
amended abstract.2 Finally, Robinson asserted the 2018
amended abstract of judgment incorrectly calculated his custody
credits.
On September 20, 2024 we received an additional four-page
supplemental brief from Robinson.3 In his brief Robinson argued
he “was 23 years old on 9/28/1991, the day the criminal offenses
occurred [and] [t]here is no evidence in the record, which this
court has that the superior court considered appellant’s youth as
a factor when it denied the petition for resentencing.” According
to Robinson, the failure to consider Robinson’s youth requires a
new evidentiary hearing.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v.
2 On January 16, 2019 we granted Robinson’s petition for
habeas corpus to strike the one-year firearm enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) imposed on the murder count because the
firearm enhancement had already been imposed for the
attempted murder count. (In re Robinson (January 16, 2019,
B292869); see People v. Miles (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 364, 370,
fn. 6.) The trial court issued an amended abstract of judgment on
March 26, 2019.
3 We granted Robinson’s request to consider his additional
brief.
9
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) Under section 1172.6, a defendant
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine can challenge the defendant’s
murder conviction if he or she “makes a ‘prima facie showing’ of
entitlement to relief. . . . This, in turn, requires a showing that,
among other things, he ‘could not presently be convicted of
murder’ under the amendments to the murder statutes that
became effective on January 1, 2019.” (People v. Arreguin (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 58, 62; see Strong, at p. 708. “Senate Bill
No. 1437 did not change the law to prohibit direct aider and
abettor liability on an imputed malice theory.” (People v. Berry-
Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.)
Section 1172.6, however, does not allow a petitioner to raise
a new argument that is not based on changes made by Senate
Bill 1437. (See People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865
[“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal.”].)
Thus, “[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947.) Accordingly, to the extent Robinson’s supplemental brief
challenges the trial court’s calculation of custody credits and
imposition of a firearm enhancement, these arguments are not
properly raised in this appeal because neither argument shows
Robinson “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189”
made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
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Moreover, Robinson has not shown he is entitled to a new
evidentiary hearing based on the trial court’s asserted failure to
consider his youth. Although youth is a relevant factor for a
court to consider at a resentencing hearing (see People v. Pittman
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 418), there is no evidence in the
record of Robinson’s age at the time of the incident. Even if
Robinson was 23 years old, no evidence was presented to show
that his relative youth affected his ability to appreciate the risks
and consequences of his behavior. (People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489 [“we are not here presented with a
situation where a youthful offender was swept up in
circumstances beyond his or her control that led to an unintended
death”]; see People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595
[“Youth can distort risk calculations. Yet every 18 year old
understands bullet wounds require attention. The fact of youth
cannot overwhelm all other factors.”].)
Because no cognizable legal issues have been raised by
Robinson’s appellate counsel or by Robinson or identified in our
independent review of the record, the order denying his petition
for resentencing is affirmed. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232; see generally People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
441-442.)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Robinson’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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