In re George C. CA2/4 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/11/24 In re George C. CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    In re GEORGE C. et al.,                                               B327037
    Persons Coming Under the Juvenile                                     (Los Angeles County
    Court Law.                                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04422)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    X.C. et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed.
    Emery El Habiby, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant X.C.
    David M. Yorton, Jr., by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant Jorge C.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
    Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    Mother and father appeal the jurisdictional findings made by the
    juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision
    (b)(1),1 arguing they are not supported by substantial evidence. The parents
    also challenge certain dispositional orders made by the juvenile court. We
    conclude parents’ contentions are without merit and affirm the juvenile
    court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders as to both parents.
    As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
    case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
    facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
    presented on appeal.
    RELEVANT BACKGROUND
    X.C. (mother) and Jorge C. (father) have four children together: George
    (born 2005), Xi. (born 2012), Genesis (born 2013), and Abigail (born 2015).
    The family came to the attention of the Department when someone called the
    police on September 15, 2022, to report domestic violence at the family home.
    When the police arrived, the parents admitted they had been arguing but
    initially claimed there was no physical contact between them. The officers
    observed injuries on mother and physical damage to the home, including a
    hole in the wall of parents’ bedroom and shattered glass in parents’ bedroom
    1    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
    Code unless otherwise stated.
    2
    door. Mother said the glass in the bedroom door shattered accidentally when
    she pushed against the door to enter the parents’ bedroom.
    Upon further questioning, the parents admitted the argument became
    physically violent. Mother told the police that father had used both hands to
    push her down to the ground, sprayed air freshener in her eyes, and punched
    her in the face. Father told the police that mother punched him in the chest
    multiple times. Father admitted he pushed mother twice to try to get away
    from her.
    Father showed the police a video recording of the incident that he took
    on his phone. As described in the police report, the video showed mother
    punching father multiple times in the living room of the house. In response,
    father pushed mother, causing her to fall against the wall. When the
    children’s maternal grandmother tried to intervene to calm mother down,
    mother struck her as well. Mother then resumed her attack on father,
    punching him multiple times. In response, father again pushed mother
    away, this time causing her to fall to the ground. When Mother got up, she
    started throwing unidentified objects at father. Mother then grabbed a
    broomstick from the kitchen and started swinging it at father. On the fourth
    swing, the glass in the bedroom door could be heard shattering.
    The police interviewed the four children. With the exception of George,
    all children reported being asleep during the argument. George told the
    police that he was only half-asleep at the time and heard the argument but
    did not know what it was about.
    The police determined mother was the primary aggressor and arrested
    her for domestic battery. Mother gave a statement while in police custody.
    In her statement, mother said the argument started because she drank two
    beers and father did not like it when she drank alcohol. She said she had
    3
    been sick for the last week and took cold medication before drinking the two
    beers. She recanted her previous statement that father punched her and said
    she did not remember how she sustained her injuries.
    When the Department interviewed the parents five days later, they
    immediately began minimizing the event. Father told the Department the
    police lied about the content of the video and embellished the incident.
    Father denied that mother punched him, swung a broomstick at him, or
    struck maternal grandmother. Father admitted mother got a broom from the
    kitchen but said she simply used it to sweep up the broken glass from the
    bedroom door. He also said he had no recollection of mother throwing objects
    at him. When the Department asked to see the video previously shown to the
    police, father said he had deleted it from his phone. Mother denied ever
    swinging a broomstick at father but otherwise said she could not recall any
    other events described in the police report.
    DISCUSSION
    I.    Justiciability
    On May 25, 2023, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over
    George because he reached the age of majority. At a section 364 review
    hearing on August 10, 2023, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over
    Xi., Genesis, and Abigail with all three children remaining in the parents’
    custody.
    The parties agree that the juvenile court’s termination of jurisdiction
    over the children renders this case moot and our review is discretionary
    under In re D.P. (2023) 
    14 Cal.5th 266
     (D.P.). Several factors may be
    considered in deciding whether to review jurisdictional findings in an
    otherwise moot appeal. (Id. at pp. 283, 285–286.) These factors include
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    whether the finding could be prejudicial to the appellants or potentially
    impact future dependency proceedings. (Id. at p. 283.) Courts may also
    consider whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious
    or stigmatizing conduct. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Additionally, courts can
    consider whether the case became moot due to parents’ prompt compliance
    with their case plans. (Id. at p. 286 [“Principles of fairness may thus favor
    discretionary review of cases rendered moot by the prompt compliance or
    otherwise laudable behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional
    finding on appeal”].) “The factors above are not exhaustive, and no single
    factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
    discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Ibid.)
    The section 300 petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of
    Children and Family Services (the Department) alleged two counts against
    both parents: a-1 and b-1. At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional
    hearing, the juvenile court dismissed count a-1 and sustained count b-1 as
    alleged against both parents. Parents appeal the jurisdictional finding on
    count b-1.
    As b-1 was the sole count sustained against both parents, the outcome
    of their appeals will determine whether they are “offending” or “non-
    offending” parents. (See In re Drake M. (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 754
    , 763 [a
    challenge to the sole jurisdictional finding against father was the difference
    between the father “being an ‘offending’ parent versus a ‘non-offending’
    parent”].) The jurisdictional finding on count b-1 also serves as the basis for
    the dispositional orders that parents challenge on appeal. (Id. at pp. 762–
    763.) Additionally, the parties agree that it appears the juvenile court
    terminated jurisdiction over the children due to parents’ prompt compliance
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    with their case plans. For these reasons, we exercise our discretion to
    consider parents’ appeals on their merits.
    II.   Jurisdictional Findings
    Count b-1, alleged against both parents, claimed that mother and
    father “have a history of engaging in domestic disputes in the children’s home
    and on at least one occasion it resulted in a violent altercation where the
    mother was the primary aggressor while she was intoxicated.” The
    Department alleged the parents’ “physical and verbal altercations”
    endangered the children’s safety, created a detrimental home environment,
    and placed the children at substantial risk of physical harm. On appeal,
    mother and father argue there was insufficient evidence to sustain
    jurisdiction on this count. We disagree.
    A.     Legal Standards
    Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows a juvenile court to exercise
    jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial
    risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of
    . . . [¶] [t]he failure or inability of [his or her] parent . . . to adequately
    supervise or protect the child.” Subdivision (b)(1) requires only that a parent
    has failed or is unable to adequately supervise or protect her child. The
    statute does not require negligent or culpable conduct by the parent. (In re
    R.T. (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 622
    , 629–630 (R.T.).)
    “The juvenile court need not wait until a child is seriously injured to
    assume jurisdiction if there is evidence that the child is at risk of future harm
    from the parent’s . . . conduct.” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 
    7 Cal.App.5th 987
    ,
    993.) The court may consider past events as an indicator of whether the child
    6
    faces a current risk of harm because “[a] parent’s past conduct is a good
    predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 
    217 Cal.App.4th 126
    , 133.) A
    parent’s denial of wrongdoing or failure to recognize the negative impact of
    her conduct is also relevant to determining risk under section 300. (In re A.F.
    (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 283
    , 293 (A.F.).) “[S]ection 300(b)(1) authorizes
    dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or
    blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.”
    (R.T., 
    supra,
     3 Cal.5th at p. 624.)
    To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction
    hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the
    alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 
    176 Cal.App.4th 129
    , 136.)
    “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must
    be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation];
    inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot
    support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services
    (1994) 
    22 Cal.App.4th 1627
    , 1633.)
    We review a juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding for substantial
    evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 
    49 Cal.App.5th 195
    , 206.) We will affirm the
    finding if it is supported by evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
    value. (In re R.V. (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 837
    , 843.) We review the record in
    the light most favorable to the court’s findings and draw all reasonable
    inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (R.T., 
    supra,
     3
    Cal.5th at p. 633.)
    B.     Analysis
    “[D]omestic violence in the same household where children are living
    . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of
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    encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from
    it.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 
    52 Cal.App.4th 183
    , 194.) Children can be “put
    in a position of physical danger from [spousal] violence” because, “for
    example, they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be
    accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg.” (Ibid.) “Both
    common sense and expert opinion indicate spousal abuse is detrimental to
    children.” (In re Benjamin D. (1991) 
    227 Cal.App.3d 1464
    , 1470, fn. 5.)
    “‘Studies show that violence by one parent against another harms children
    even if they do not witness it.’” (In re E.B. (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 568
    , 576.)
    Past violent behavior is the best predictor of future violence. (Ibid.)
    Here, there was substantial evidence in the record from which the
    juvenile court could conclude that parents’ ongoing domestic disputes
    presented a substantial risk of harm to the children. The principle thrust of
    mother and father’s appeals is that the allegations of the petition stem from a
    single domestic dispute that occurred out of the children’s presence. Mother
    and father claim this isolated incident is insufficient to give rise to the
    finding that the children faced a risk of harm. Contrary to parents’ claims,
    the September 2022 altercation was not an isolated incident. The parents
    “reported a prior incident, about a year ago where they pushed each other
    during an argument.” Mother also reported a separate incident where the
    police were called to the family home because mother and father were
    screaming at each other.
    All four children also informed the Department that they had heard the
    parents fighting on prior occasions. Genesis’s teacher also reported that on
    one occasion Genesis was crying in the classroom because her parents were
    fighting or arguing, causing mother to leave the house. Father told the police
    that mother gets aggressive when she has been drinking. George
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    corroborated this, telling the Department his parents argued when they were
    drunk and that mother was usually the one who started the arguments.
    Abigail told the Department that hearing her parents argue made her feel
    sad. Taken cumulatively, there was evidence in the record showing that
    mother and father had a history of loud domestic disputes in the children’s
    presence, which escalated to domestic violence on at least two occasions
    within the last year before the petition was filed.
    In sustaining count b-1 of the petition, the juvenile court also noted
    “We might have been in a different posture if the parents weren’t minimizing
    the domestic violence incident that occurred in September. . . . [T]he biggest
    concern I have is the lack of appreciation of how this type of incident does
    place the children at risk.” “[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining
    whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without
    court supervision.” (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 
    11 Cal.App.4th 1036
    , 1044;
    accord A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.) There was substantial evidence
    in the record that the parents minimized the severity of the September 2022
    altercation. After reporting to the police that the incident involved repeated
    instances of physical violence and showing the police a video corroborating
    these statements, father deleted the video evidence of the incident and the
    parents denied any physical violence occurred between them.
    Having determined that substantial evidence supports the juvenile
    court’s jurisdictional finding against both parents on count b-1, we affirm.
    III.   Dispositional Orders
    Upon sustaining count b-1 against the parents, the juvenile court
    declared the children dependents of the court and ordered them placed with
    parents under the Department’s supervision. The juvenile court issued case
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    plans for the parents. On appeal, mother and father challenge certain
    aspects of their respective case plans. We address their arguments
    separately.
    A.      Legal Standards
    Section 362 authorizes the juvenile court to “direct any reasonable
    orders to the parents” of a dependent child as the court deems necessary and
    proper to ensure appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct,
    maintenance, and support of the child including counseling or education
    programs. (§ 362, subds. (a) & (d).) “The program in which a parent or
    guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those
    conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described
    by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) The reunification plan “‘must be
    appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that
    family.’” (In re Michael S. (1987) 
    188 Cal.App.3d 1448
    , 1458.)
    The juvenile court has “broad discretion to determine what would best
    serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in
    accord with this discretion.” (In re K.T. (2020) 
    49 Cal.App.5th 20
    , 25 (K.T.).)
    This discretion “permits the court to formulate disposition orders to address
    parental deficiencies when necessary to protect and promote the child’s
    welfare, even when that parental conduct did not give rise to the dependency
    proceedings.” (Ibid.) We review the juvenile court’s disposition orders for an
    abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings underlying the orders for
    substantial evidence. (In re I.R. (2021) 
    61 Cal.App.5th 510
    , 522; K.T., supra,
    49 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.)
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    B.    Father’s Case Plan
    Father argues the juvenile court erred in requiring him to participate
    in individual counseling and a family preservation program. At the
    adjudication hearing, father did not object to the order for family
    preservation services and instead explicitly agreed to that component of his
    case plan. Accordingly, father has forfeited any right to challenge the order
    requiring him to participate in a family preservation program. (In re T.G.
    (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 1
    , 14 (T.G.) [“‘[a] party forfeits the right to claim error
    as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in
    the trial court’”]; In re S.B. (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 1287
    , 1293 (S.B.) [“[A] reviewing
    court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could
    have been but was not made in the trial court”].)
    With regard to the order for individual counseling, father’s only
    argument on appeal is that because the jurisdictional finding against him on
    count b-1 was erroneous, there was no basis to order him to undergo
    individual counseling. As we have affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
    finding against father on count b-1, father’s argument regarding individual
    counseling must fail. Father provides no other basis to overturn this
    component of his case plan. As father has not demonstrated any abuse of
    discretion by the juvenile court, we affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional
    orders concerning father.
    C.    Mother’s Case Plan
    Mother argues the juvenile court should not have ordered her to
    participate in individual counseling. However, mother did not object to the
    order for individual counseling at the adjudication hearing. As a result,
    mother has forfeited any claim of error with regard to this aspect of her case
    11
    plan. (T.G., supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 14; S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.
    1293.) Mother does not challenge any other aspect of her case plan, and
    accordingly the dispositional orders against her are affirmed.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders are
    affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    ZUKIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CURREY, P. J.
    MORI, J.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B327037

Filed Date: 10/11/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2024