In re A.F. CA2/8 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/11/24 In re A.F. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re A.F., a Person Coming Under B328560
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01125A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.F.,
Defendant and Appellant;
I.T.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________
Father, C.F., appeals the juvenile court’s order granting
him custody over his minor daughter, A.F., on the limited basis
that the order may require him to share the costs of a
professional monitor for A.F.’s visitation with mother I.T. at the
correctional facility where mother is currently incarcerated.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal are
limited. Mother and father were in a dating relationship for a
year or two. When mother turned 18, she moved in with father
and his family. Shortly thereafter, she became pregnant. About
a month into her pregnancy, she ended her relationship with
father. During her pregnancy, they had at least one altercation
that involved physical violence. She gave birth to A.F. in
June 2019. Five months later, mother was arrested for robbery
and detained in custody. She has been incarcerated ever since
and is first eligible for parole in September 2026.
Maternal grandparents became A.F.’s primary caretakers.
Maternal grandparents held a dim view of father, and they did
not get along. Issues over custody arose. Maternal grandmother
commenced guardianship proceedings.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) received a referral about A.F. in
January 2020. The following month, A.F. was detained from the
parents and placed with maternal grandparents. Father’s
visitation was ordered monitored. The juvenile court later
sustained a petition against parents, ordered A.F. removed, and
ordered services for father.
Despite initially resisting the Department’s intervention,
father came to embrace his services. In September 2022, the
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juvenile court found his progress had been substantial and
returned A.F. to his care, provided he complied with orders and
resided with paternal grandparents. Maternal grandparents
were unhappy to lose custody of A.F. Despite a Department
social worker telling her a placement termination letter was
forthcoming, maternal grandmother claimed she still had
caregiver rights over A.F. until receiving such a letter and went
to paternal grandparents’ home to assert those “rights.” Her
conduct there reportedly caused paternal grandfather to suffer a
heart attack. After this incident, father did not feel safe allowing
A.F. to have visitation with her maternal relatives.
In March 2023, the Department reported father was
successfully caring for A.F. in paternal grandparents’ home. He
had also complied with and completed his case plan. However,
mother being incarcerated and the relationship between father
and maternal grandparents complicated A.F.’s visitation with
mother. While A.F. was placed with maternal grandparents,
maternal grandmother had acted as monitor. After A.F. was
returned to father, father monitored and paid for phone calls to
mother to facilitate visitation, even though he was barred from
serving as a monitor given parents’ history of domestic violence.
The Department recommended, and the juvenile court
agreed, that jurisdiction over A.F. should be terminated, and
father given sole legal and physical custody. At the hearing, the
court heard argument about the terms of A.F.’s visitation with
mother. Mother’s counsel expressed concern that father would
not voluntarily facilitate visitation with mother, claiming “if we
are to leave this visitation to father and father alone, father is
not going to allow mother’s visits.” These concerns may have
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been based on father’s reluctance to allow A.F. visits with
maternal relatives due to their treatment of him and his family.
The court agreed with father’s and A.F.’s counsel that,
given her acrimonious history with father, maternal grandmother
could not monitor visits. In contrast, it found paternal
grandparents suitable monitors. It noted they were willing to
monitor virtual and telephonic visits between A.F. and mother
but no one was identified as a willing monitor for in-person visits
at mother’s correctional facility. The court’s custody order
provided: “[M]other is to have monitored visits in person one
time per month and telephonic/virtual visits one time per week
minimum. Monitor to be mutually agreed upon, paternal
grandparents, chosen by father, or paid professional with costs to
be incurred by both parents.” It so ordered despite counsel for
each parent asserting their respective clients lack the financial
means to pay a professional monitor.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father’s appeal concerns only the portion of the custody
order requiring him to share in the cost of a professional monitor,
if necessary, for A.F.’s visitation with mother.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4, subdivision (a)
authorizes a juvenile court to issue family law orders governing
custody or visitation when terminating jurisdiction over a
dependent child. (Ibid.) “An order entered pursuant to section
362.4 is commonly referred to as an ‘ “exit” ’ order.” (In re Cole Y.
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455.)
In fashioning an exit order, “ ‘the court’s focus and primary
consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ”
(In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) In ascertaining those
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interests, the court “ ‘must look to the totality of a child’s
circumstances when making decisions regarding the child.’ ”
(In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.) Juvenile courts
exercise “broad discretion” in fashioning exit orders. (See In re
Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.)
Although they constitute a final judgment of the juvenile
court, exit orders are subject to modification or termination in a
later family law proceeding. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 302,
subd. (d), 362.4, subd. (b).)
We review exit orders issued pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 362.4 for abuse of discretion.
(Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285,
300-301.) We will not disturb a juvenile court’s decision unless it
“ ‘ “exceed[s] the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
As a preliminary matter, each parent mischaracterizes the
exit order. Father says the order “require[s] [f]ather to incur the
cost of mother’s professional visitation monitor . . . .” But the
order provides three alternatives for monitoring visits, only one of
which is a paid professional monitor with costs split between the
parents. Mother claims there are only two alternatives to a paid
monitor: “arranging for supervision by the paternal
grandparents or by a mutually agreed upon individual.” This is
wrong, too. The exit order provides visitation monitoring may
also be performed by an individual “chosen by father.” Mother
justifies arguing this alternative out of the order by calling it
“somewhat confusing.” The words are plain. We see no basis for
confusion.
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Nor do we see any basis for finding the juvenile court
abused its discretion in ordering parents share the cost of a
professional monitor as a last resort if no other alternatives are
available. The court specifically included this provision so there
would be “some sort of parity” regarding payment. Though father
reads this as unfairly burdening him with costs caused by
mother’s circumstances, we interpret it differently. The court
gave parents the opportunity to select a mutually agreed monitor.
The cost sharing provision gives parents the incentive to come to
a reasonable agreement on a volunteer monitor. But even
mother’s failure to cooperate does not force father to bear a
professional monitor’s costs. He is authorized under the exit
order to choose a monitor without mother’s agreement.
There is no doubt the exit order imposes on father some
burden occasioned by mother’s ongoing need to have visits
monitored—a burden that is both a product of, and heightened
by, her being incarcerated. Father must consent to a monitor
suggested by mother, obtain a personal favor from a volunteer
(including a paternal grandparent), or share the cost of a
professional. But father cites no authority that he cannot be so
burdened. Indeed, it is difficult to envision any exit order that
does not impose at least some burden on the custodial parent to
facilitate visitation.
Finally, as noted above, the north star of exit orders is the
child’s best interest. Here, the juvenile court determined A.F.’s
best interest was to have visitation with mother. The terms it
imposed governing that visitation are not arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd. Rather, they were fashioned after consideration
of the parents’ circumstances and the history of the case.
Contrary to father’s claim, they reflect no intent to “punish
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[f]ather for mother’s issues.” Rather, they reflect the court’s
intention that A.F. have meaningful contact with mother. The
burden it imposed on father is in service of this interest.
To the extent the exit order proves unworkable, parents
have the right to seek a modification in the family court. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 362.4.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s custody order is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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