P.v. Mears CA2/6 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/14/24 P.v. Mears CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B333490
    (Super. Ct. No. BA503765)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County)
    v.
    TIMOTHY ROBERT MEARS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Timothy Mears appeals the judgment after a jury convicted
    him of attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187; count 1),
    simple mayhem (§ 203; count 2), assault with a deadly weapon
    (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and aggravated mayhem (§ 205;
    count 4). The jury also found true the allegations that he
    personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) for counts
    1 and 2 and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury
    (§ 12022.7) as to counts 1 and 3. The trial court sentenced him to
    1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
    Code.
    life in prison with the possibility of parole (count 4 as the
    principal term and stayed counts 1-3 pursuant to § 654).
    Mears contends his conviction for aggravated mayhem
    should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence he
    intended to maim or disfigure the victim. He also contends, and
    the Attorney General concedes, the simple mayhem conviction
    (count 2) should be reversed because it is a lesser included offense
    of aggravated mayhem (count 4). We modify the judgment to
    reverse count 2 but otherwise affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In March 2022, W.Y. was walking on a sidewalk in Los
    Angeles Chinatown in the afternoon when he encountered Mears.
    W.Y. and Mears had never met before. Mears and W.Y. made
    brief eye contact, and Mears was muttering something loudly.
    Mears put his hands on W.Y.’s shoulders to stop him from
    walking. When W.Y. tried to go around him, Mears hit W.Y. “a
    couple of times” on the head. W.Y. felt something piercing his
    skin on the back of his head and noticed he was bleeding “a lot”
    from the back and side of the head.
    W.Y. tried to restrain Mears by tackling him to the ground.
    When he tackled him, Mears dropped a knife he was holding.
    Mears bit W.Y. on his left arm twice while he was restrained. At
    some point while Mears was still restrained, he picked up the
    knife and continued to stab W.Y.
    A bystander saw Mears attacking W.Y. He described
    Mears throwing a “big haymaker punch”2 and then punching
    W.Y. approximately 10 times. He saw W.Y.’s face and neck were
    covered in blood and realized Mears was stabbing W.Y. He saw
    2 He explained that a haymaker is a “big, rounded,
    dramatic punch.”
    2
    W.Y. reach for Mears’s hand that was holding the knife to try to
    stop the stabbing.
    An anonymous witness called 911 to report that a man was
    stabbing another man. The witness said the other man was
    “trying to hold the guy down so he doesn’t stab him anymore.”
    Another bystander recorded on their cell phone a video depicting
    a portion of the incident, in which the two men were on the
    ground.
    Los Angeles Police Sergeant Janet Kim responded to the
    scene. As she approached the two men, she observed W.Y. on top
    of Mears trying to hold him down to the ground. She drew her
    firearm and ordered the men to stop. When W.Y turned his head
    to look at Sergeant Kim, Mears “stabbed [W.Y.] in the groin.”
    Sergeant Kim separated the two men and had W.Y. sit down
    against a wall and had Mears lie on his stomach. Sergeant Kim
    located a knife next to Mears’s right leg by the curb.
    Firefighter paramedics arrived on scene to treat W.Y. One
    paramedic testified that W.Y. stood out because of the amount of
    slash wounds on him. W.Y. also had one stab wound (a puncture)
    to the left armpit area. The paramedic was concerned that the
    stab wound punctured the lung or that the injury could lead to
    respiratory distress. Another paramedic treated Mears at the
    scene. He had no slash or stab wounds.
    W.Y. was transported to the hospital, where he remained
    for three or four days. He had a two-inch scar and a half-inch
    scar below his elbow from Mears’s bite. He had multiple
    lacerations to his head, face, neck, and throat and a stab wound
    to his shoulder. He also had a wound to his groin area. His neck
    and face injuries required stitches. The doctors told W.Y. he had
    3
    to be circumcised due to his groin injuries, and his penis remains
    crooked.
    The emergency room physician, who treated W.Y., testified
    that W.Y. suffered multiple lacerations to the left and right side
    of his face, behind his ear, neck, shoulder, penis, and scrotum.
    The neck wound required about nine stitches. The physician also
    testified the lacerations behind the ear and under the jaw
    required stitches. W.Y.’s “deepest of injuries” was to the back of
    the shoulder. The physician testified that the injuries, if left
    untreated, could result in scars and infection.
    DISCUSSION
    Aggravated mayhem
    Mears concedes there was sufficient evidence of a
    permanent disfiguring injury for aggravated mayhem. But he
    contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding
    that he specifically intended to maim or disfigure W.Y, requiring
    reversal. We are not persuaded.
    A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem if the person
    “unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of another
    person, intentionally causes permanent disability or
    disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being
    of a limb, organ, or member of his or her body.” (§ 205.)
    Both simple mayhem under section 203 and aggravated
    mayhem under section 205 require the disfiguring injury be
    permanent. The difference between simple and aggravated
    mayhem is the requisite criminal intent. (People v. Newby (2008)
    
    167 Cal.App.4th 1341
    , 1347-1348.) Unlike simple mayhem,
    which is a general intent crime, aggravated mayhem is a “specific
    intent crime which requires proof the defendant specifically
    4
    intended to cause the maiming injury, i.e., the permanent
    disability or disfigurement. [Citation.] ‘[S]pecific intent may be
    inferred from the circumstances attending an act, the manner in
    which it is done, and the means used, among other factors.’
    [Citation.] Thus evidence of a ‘controlled and directed’ attack or
    an attack of ‘focused or limited scope’ may provide substantial
    evidence of such specific intent. [Citation.] However, where the
    evidence shows no more than an ‘indiscriminate’ or ‘random’
    attack, or an ‘explosion of violence’ upon the victim, it is
    insufficient to prove a specific intent to maim.” (People v.
    Quintero (2006) 
    135 Cal.App.4th 1152
    , 1162 (Quintero), overruled
    on other grounds in People v. Poisson (2016) 
    246 Cal.App.4th 121
    ,
    125; see also People v. Park (2003) 
    112 Cal.App.4th 61
    , 64 (Park).)
    Evidence of “ ‘a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably
    circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as
    direct evidence to support a conviction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
    (Park, at p. 68.)
    We review sufficiency of evidence challenges to the
    judgment of conviction for substantial evidence. Thus, we review
    the whole record to determine whether the evidence is such that
    a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence reasonably justifies
    the trier of fact’s finding, we do not reverse even if the evidence
    might also justify a contrary finding. (Park, supra, 112
    Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) We do not reweigh evidence. The
    credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the
    evidence are exclusively within the province of the trier of fact.
    (People v. Albillar (2010) 
    51 Cal.4th 47
    , 60.)
    Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
    Mears had a specific intent to maim or disfigure W.Y. The attack
    5
    was mostly directed at a vulnerable area of W.Y.’s body—his
    head. Several cases have held that similar focused attacks to a
    victim’s head support a specific intent to maim. (See Park, 
    supra,
    112 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 [“Defendant’s limiting the scope of his
    attack to [the victim’s] head shows this was not an indiscriminate
    attack but instead was an attack guided by the specific intent of
    inflicting serious injury upon [the victim’s] head”]; Quintero,
    
    supra,
     135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 [the defendant used a
    retractable bladed knife in an uppercut motion to slash the
    victim’s face many times]; People v. Manibusan (2013) 
    58 Cal.4th 40
    , 88 [gunshots fired in close range hitting in the face and upper
    arm near the face reasonably supports the inference the
    defendant focused his attack on the victim’s head, which was a
    particularly vulnerable part of the body]; People v. Campbell
    (1987) 
    193 Cal.App.3d 1653
    , 1668-1669 [the focused attack on the
    victim’s face and head, rather than random attacks on the body,
    was evidence of the defendant’s intent to disfigure that area of
    the victim’s body].)
    The evidence showed that Mears attacked W.Y.’s head with
    a knife and slashed him several more times near the head. The
    jury considered photographs of all W.Y.’s injuries, including the
    multiple slashes to W.Y.’s head, neck, and shoulder. It also heard
    the testimony of witnesses, including one bystander who testified
    regarding the manner of attack and seeing Mears throw a
    “haymaker” punch to the head. Other witnesses testified
    regarding the extent of W.Y.’s injuries to his head and neck area.
    The jury was also able to see W.Y. and the scars on his head
    when he testified in court. A jury could reasonably conclude from
    this evidence that Mears intended to disfigure W.Y. based on his
    manner of attack.
    6
    Mears compares this case to People v. Sears (1965) 
    62 Cal.2d 737
     and People v. Lee (1990) 
    220 Cal.App.3d 320
     (Lee) to
    argue that Mears’s attacks were indiscriminate and random such
    that they lacked any specific intent. But those cases are
    distinguishable. In Sears, the defendant began hitting his wife
    with a steel pipe when her daughter came in between the
    defendant and her mother. (Sears, at p. 741.) The defendant
    struck the daughter “several times with a steel pipe” with “one of
    the blows result[ing] in a laceration of the lip; another, a
    laceration of the nose.” (Id. at p. 745.) She also suffered a fatal
    knife wound which punctured her jugular vein. (Id. at p. 741.)
    The court concluded that “such evidence does no more than
    indicate an indiscriminate attack.” (Id. at p. 745.) Unlike Sears,
    W.Y. did not intervene in an ongoing attack, but rather, the
    attack began when Mears started striking W.Y. in the head
    multiple times. The multiple attacks were mostly targeted near
    the head area, resulting in lacerations in the face, neck, throat,
    and a stab wound in the shoulder. Mears later focused his attack
    on another vulnerable part of W.Y.’s body by stabbing him in the
    groin.
    In Lee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 326, the defendant
    punched his victim in the face three times and kicked him at
    least twice somewhere on the body. There was no evidence the
    kicks were directed at the head. (Ibid.) As a result of injury to
    the head, the victim suffered head trauma and was paralyzed.
    (Id. at p. 323.) The court found the evidence “shows no more than
    a sudden, indiscriminate, and unfocused battering of [the
    victim’s] body” such that a reasonable jury could not infer the
    defendant harbored a specific intent to disable the victim. (Id. at
    p. 326.) Unlike Lee, the jury had the benefit of reviewing
    7
    photographs of the injuries and seeing the scars on W.Y. when he
    testified in court. The jury also heard testimony regarding W.Y.’s
    account of the attack and his injuries and another witness’s
    description of the attack. The evidence is thus sufficient for a
    reasonable jury to conclude that Mears harbored an intent to
    maim or disfigure.
    Count 2
    Mears contends and the Attorney General concedes the
    simple mayhem conviction (count 2) must be reversed because it
    is a lesser included offense of the aggravated mayhem conviction
    (count 4). A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and
    a lesser included offense. (People v. Medina (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 685
    , 701-702.) The prosecutor argued that Mears was guilty of
    both simple and aggravated mayhem based on all the same
    injuries to W.Y. We therefore reverse the conviction on count 2
    for simple mayhem. (Ibid.)
    DISPOSITION
    The conviction on count 2 for simple mayhem is reversed.
    The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of
    judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
    affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    BALTODANO, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.                     YEGAN, J.
    8
    Henry J. Hall, Judge
    Superior Court County of Los Angeles
    ______________________________
    Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and William H. Shin,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B333490

Filed Date: 10/14/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2024