1429 Grant Ave, LLC v. Linton CA1/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/14/24 1429 Grant Ave, LLC v. Linton CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
1429 GRANT AVE, LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168906
v.
ANDREW LINTON, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-17-557123)
Defendant and Appellant;
ANTHONY R. FLORES,
Objector and Appellant.
Andrew Linton and his attorney, Anthony R. Flores (collectively,
appellants), appeal from sanctions orders imposed after they filed a motion
seeking to set aside 1429 Grant Ave, LLC’s (1429 Grant Ave) voluntary
dismissal of its ejectment action against Linton. Appellants contend the trial
court failed to make sufficiently specific findings in the sanctions orders.
Because appellants have forfeited their appellate arguments, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
We need not recite the facts and procedural history of this case in
detail. The parties are familiar with the facts and history, and our opinion
does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c).) We thus resolve the case before us with an abbreviated
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written opinion with reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Lewis v.
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262.)
1429 Grant Ave sued Linton for ejectment from its property. The
parties eventually agreed to a settlement, whereby 1429 Grant Ave would
pay Linton $250,000 if he moved out by a certain date. Thereafter, Linton
unsuccessfully moved two separate times to enforce the settlement
agreement, with the trial court concluding he was not entitled to
compensation because he failed to timely deliver the premises to 1429 Grant
Ave. 1429 Grant Ave ultimately dismissed its complaint without prejudice,
but the litigation did not end because Linton renewed his motion to enforce
the settlement, which the court denied, and then moved to set aside the
dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473. The court denied the
motion, and 1429 Grant Ave filed two motions for sanctions—one brought
under section 128.5 and the other brought under section 128.7—based on the
section 473 motion. The court granted both motions and ordered Linton and
Flores to pay sanctions to 1429 Grant Ave.
Appellants’ sole contention on appeal is that the trial court’s orders
granting 1429 Grant Ave’s motions for sanctions were insufficiently detailed
to satisfy sections 128.5, subdivision (c), and 128.7, subdivision (e).2
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 In discussing the remedy for the trial court’s failure to satisfy these
specificity requirements, appellants contend remand is unnecessary because
the record does not support sanctions. However, they do not develop their
argument that the sanctions orders are unsupported by the record under an
appropriate heading, nor do they cite to the record to support this contention.
Thus, the argument has been forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues
that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a
heading.”]; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [court will deem
point waived if party fails to support an argument with necessary citations to
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Section 128.5, subdivision (c) requires that “[a]n order imposing expenses
shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the action or tactic or
circumstances justifying the order.” Similarly, when the court imposes
sanctions under section 128.7, it “shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation” of the statute “and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed.” (§ 128.7, subd. (e).)
The written sanctions orders state that the requests for sanctions were
granted based on Linton and Flores’s violation of sections 128.5 and 128.7.
The orders provide no other detail regarding the conduct justifying the
orders. However, under the circumstances of this case, we agree with
1429 Grant Ave that appellants have forfeited their right to object to the level
of detail in the trial court’s orders by not raising the issue below.
While a jurisdictional challenge may be raised for the first time on
appeal (Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
1175, 1196, fn. 2), “ ‘ “ ‘[a]n appellate court will ordinarily not consider
procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or
defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented
to the [trial] court by some appropriate method’ ” ’ ” (In re Carrie W. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 746, 755). The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial court
to correct such errors, particularly where the error is apparent to the
the record].) Appellants have also forfeited their argument that 1429 Grant
Ave failed to comply with sections 128.5 and 128.7’s safe harbor provisions
because it was raised for the first time in their reply brief. (Herrera v.
Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538, 548 [“ ‘It
is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not
considered by the court.’ ”], abrogated on another ground as stated in Barrera
v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 63, 80–81.) This would
be the case even assuming the safe harbor issue is a purely legal issue, as
appellants claim. (See id. at pp. 547–548.)
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objecting party at the time it was made and could have been avoided. (Keener
v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264.)
We see no reason to depart from this forfeiture rule with respect to
section 128.5 and section 128.7’s specificity requirements. These
requirements are not jurisdictional; the trial court still had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, a point that appellants do not
refute. (§§ 128.5, 128.7; People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286.) Indeed,
Division 3 of this court confirmed that a party may forfeit the right to object
to a lack of specificity in an award of sanctions under section 128.5 for failure
to object in the trial court. (Andrus v. Estrada (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1030,
1043–1044.) The Andrus court explained: “Even if we found the court’s order
deficient, any such error would be waived. Appellants had an opportunity to
review respondent’s proposed order before the court signed it. Appellants
made no objection to the specificity of the order. The specificity requirement
of section 128.5, subdivision (c) is not jurisdictional in nature. Appellants
cannot now claim on appeal that the order was deficient.” (Andrus, at
p. 1043.)
Here, the record shows that appellants had an opportunity to object to
the sanctions orders but failed to do so on the ground that they lacked
sufficient detail. Prior to the hearing on 1429 Grant Ave’s motions for
sanctions, the trial court issued tentative rulings for the motions. Appellants
contested the tentative rulings “in [their] entirety,” but it does not appear
from the record that they objected to their lack of specificity. “ ‘Failure to
raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’ ”
(Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013.) We presume appellants
made no specific challenge to the level of detail in the sanctions orders absent
evidence to the contrary. (See Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998)
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68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.) Therefore, appellants have forfeited their objection
to the sanctions orders.3 (Andrus v. Estrada, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1043–1044; In re Carrie W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.)
DISPOSITION
The orders imposing sanctions are affirmed. Respondent is awarded
its costs on appeal.
3 Given this conclusion, we need not and do not reach 1429 Grant Ave’s
arguments that it complied with section 128.7 and that any error in failing to
comply with section 128.5 was harmless. Additionally, 1429 Grant Ave
requested in its respondent’s brief that this court on its own motion sanction
appellants for their “frivolous” appeal. However, a party requesting
sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal must do so by motion with a
supporting declaration. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)–(b).) Thus, to the
extent 1429 Grant Ave’s request constitutes a motion for sanctions, we deny
it. (Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Pacific Bell (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402 [denying procedurally improper request for
sanctions].) We also decline to impose sanctions on our own motion.
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LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
HILL, J.*
A168906
1429 Grant Ave, LLC v. Linton
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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