People v. Brewer CA2/6 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/14/24 P. v. Brewer CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B328708
    (Super. Ct. No. 21F-08933)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (San Luis Obispo County)
    v.
    MELISSA BREWER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Melissa Brewer appeals the judgment entered after a jury
    convicted her of leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, §
    20001, subd. (a), count1), two counts of presenting a false or
    fraudulent insurance claim (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(1), counts
    2 & 4),1 two counts of preparing a false or fraudulent insurance
    claim (§ 550, subd. (a)(5), counts 3 & 5), and misdemeanor
    reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a), count 6).
    1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
    Penal code.
    Appellant was sentenced to four years eight months in
    state prison, consisting of a consecutive term of eight months as
    to count 1, three years as to count 2, and a consecutive term of
    one year as to count 4. Counts 3 and 5 were stayed pursuant to
    section 654. Appellant was also sentenced to 180 days in county
    jail as to count 6.
    Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
    should have stayed imposition of the sentence as to count 4
    pursuant to section 654. We affirm.
    Facts
    On March 23, 2021, appellant recklessly drove her vehicle
    southbound on the 101 freeway in the area of Avila Ridge before
    she collided with a motorcycle operated by James Hayes. Several
    witnesses called 911 and stopped to render aid. Appellant did not
    stop. Hayes suffered an open fracture dislocation of his left ankle
    and multiple abrasions. He died prior to trial.2
    On March 28, 2021, appellant filed an electronic claim with
    her insurance company for damages to her car. In her claim,
    appellant indicated that her “vehicle went off the road, went into
    a ditch or rolled over.” She also indicated there were no
    passengers and no injuries.
    On April 4, 2021, appellant sent an electronic
    communication to her insurance company, stating: “‘I’m having
    some stiffness in my upper body and neck. And I went to the
    chiropractor on Friday, April 2nd, and it’s still pretty
    uncomfortable. I just wanted to notify you that I’m going to be
    making another appointment on Monday, April 5th. I will keep
    you updated on the outcome. Thanks, Melissa Brewer.’”
    2 According to the prosecutor, Hayes died a week after the
    accident due to complications from his injuries.
    2
    Discussion
    Appellant contends the trial court should have stayed the
    sentence as to count 4 because the insurance fraud convictions
    connected with the April 4, 2021 conduct were part of the same
    course of conduct as the insurance fraud convictions connected
    with the March 28, 2021 conduct. We disagree.
    “Section 654 prohibits punishment for two offenses arising
    from the same act or from a series of acts constituting an
    indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Sok (2010) 
    181 Cal.App.4th 88
    , 99.) “‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is
    divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
    meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the
    actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the
    defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not
    for more than one.’” (People v. Britt (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 944
    , 951-
    952.)
    If, on the other hand, a defendant harbored “‘multiple
    criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and not merely
    incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory
    violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the
    violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
    indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harrison
    (1989) 
    48 Cal.3d 321
    , 335; accord People v. Vu (2006) 
    143 Cal.App.4th 1009
    , 1033.)
    The trial court has wide latitude in making the factual
    determination whether section 654 applies in a given case. We
    will not reverse its findings if there is any substantial evidence to
    support them. (People v. Jones (2002) 
    103 Cal.App.4th 1139
    ,
    1143.)
    3
    Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
    implied finding that appellant harbored separate intents and
    objectives in her commission of counts 2 and 4. After presenting
    numerous witnesses and evidence at trial, the prosecutor argued
    appellant’s intent in filing the March 28, 2021 claim (count 2)
    was to fix the damage to her car as quickly as possible to get rid
    of any evidence of her involvement in the collision. On the other
    hand, appellant’s intent in sending the April 4, 2021
    communication (count 4) was to seek reimbursement for her
    medical treatment.
    Additionally, appellant’s communications were separate in
    time, approximately one week apart. The trial court could
    reasonably have concluded, based on all of the evidence, that
    appellant’s offenses were separate and distinct and did not arise
    from a single, indivisible course of conduct.
    Appellant’s contention that she should not be punished
    twice for the “same loss or injury” is meritless. Further,
    appellant’s reliance on People v. Zanoletti (2009) 
    170 Cal.App.4th 1516
     (superseded by People v. Zanoletti (2009) 
    173 Cal.App.4th 547
    ) is inapposite. Zanoletti involved the appellant’s challenge to
    multiple convictions pursuant to section 550, subdivisions (a)(1)
    and (a)(5), whereas this case involves appellant’s challenge to
    multiple punishments pursuant to section 654.
    Disposition
    The judgment is affirmed.
    4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    YEGAN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    CODY, J.
    5
    Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge
    Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
    _____________________________
    Bases & Bases and Arielle Bases, under appointment by
    the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B328708

Filed Date: 10/14/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2024