In re L.L. CA2/6 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/14/24 In re L.L. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re L.L., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B330471
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 23JV00009)
(San Luis Obispo County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
L.L. admitted to committing the following offenses as
alleged in a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602: second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211);
possession of ammunition by a minor (id., § 29650); possession of
a firearm by a minor (id., § 29610); and grand theft of a person
(id., §§ 182, 487, subd. (c)). The juvenile court placed appellant in
a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of
confinement of two years and specified a maximum term of five
years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 726, subd. (d), 875, subd. (b).)1 It
calculated appellant was entitled to 206 days of predisposition
credit against his maximum term. (§ 875, subd. (c).)
Appellant contends his precommitment credit should apply
to his baseline term of confinement rather than his maximum
term. He also challenges a condition of probation forbidding him
from “frequent[ing] places where firearms or weapons are used
either illegally or legally” as overly broad. We will affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and another minor robbed a man at gunpoint in
Santa Maria. Police officers were already in the neighborhood
and responded quickly. The officers arrested them after a brief
foot chase and recovered the victim’s backpack, which contained a
videogame console and controller.2
DISCUSSION
Precommitment Credits
Appellant contends his pre-commitment credit should apply
to his two-year baseline term in SYTF rather than his five-year
maximum term of confinement. When a contention “hinges on a
question of statutory construction—we exercise our independent
review.” (City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1010, 1015.)
The Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) stopped
accepting wards into its facilities in July of 2021 after California
realigned its juvenile justice system. (§ 736.5, subd. (e).) Wards
who would have been committed to DJJ prior to realignment are
1 Unmarked statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 The facts are derived from the probation report because
appellant admitted the petition’s allegations.
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now committed to county-based SYTFs “[t]o ensure that justice-
involved youth are closer to their families and communities and
receive age-appropriate treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1,
subd. (b).) Sections 875, 875.5, and 876 govern the commitment
of section 602 wards to SYTFs under the new dispositional model.
Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) states: “Precommitment credits
for time served must be applied against the maximum term of
confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.” (Italics added.)
Appellant attempts to circumvent section 875, subdivision
(c)(1)(C) by analogizing the new dispositional model to its
predecessor. He describes his baseline term under the SYTF
model as the “functional equivalent” of an actual custodial term
under the DJJ model. (§ 731, subd. (b).) He then cites pre-SYTF
authority holding that an equal protection violation arises if the
juvenile court applies precommitment credits to the “theoretical
maximum exposure term” rather than the ward’s actual custodial
term. (In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31, 41.) Our
colleagues in the Fourth District rejected the same argument
earlier this year. (See In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 467
[“Section 875, subdivision (c) thus directs that, for SYTF
placements, precommitment credits are to be applied in the same
way Ernesto L. held they should be applied in the DJJ setting. . . .
[T]here is no disparate treatment that could give rise to an equal
protection problem.].) We reject it as well.
The DJJ model gave the juvenile court considerable
discretion when selecting a maximum actual custodial term.
(§ 731, subd. (b).) The SYTF model, in contrast, gives little
discretion when selecting the baseline term. The court may only
modify the ward’s commitment term (or even release them) at
subsequent review hearings after evaluating the ward’s progress
in treatment. (§ 875, subd. (b), (e)(1).) Transposing In re
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Ernesto’s equal protection reasoning onto the new model may
result in precommitment credits consuming all or much of the
baseline term before the ward can engage meaningfully in their
initial stage of treatment. “‘We must harmonize “the various
parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular
clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a
whole.” [Citations.] We must also avoid a construction that
would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the
Legislature did not intend. [Citations.]’” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 393, 406, quoting People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th
896, 907-908.)
Conditions of Probation
As a condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered
appellant to “[n]ot involve yourself in activities or frequent places
where firearms or weapons are used either illegally or legally.”
Appellant contends this is unconstitutionally vague and overly
broad because it could be interpreted to include places where
adults may legally carry firearms. He asserts that reporting to
probation, for example, could violate this condition because
officers carry their department-issued handguns to work. “[W]e
review constitutional challenges to a probation condition de
novo.” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
We are not persuaded. “Probation terms must be ‘given
“the meaning[s] that would appear to a reasonable, objective
reader’” [citation], and interpreted in context and with the use of
common sense [citation].” (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129.) We will not invalidate a term as
unconstitutionally vague “‘if any reasonable and practical
construction can be given its language or if its terms may be
made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources.’”
(People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117,
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quoting In re Marriage of Walton (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 116.)
The “use” of a firearm or weapon is not reasonably interpreted to
mean merely carrying or arming oneself. The condition is,
therefore, not vague.
Nor is the condition overly broad. The juvenile court’s
order directs appellant to “obey the instructions of the Probation
Officer” and “report to the probation officer as directed.” We
decline to read the subsequent firearms provisions as overriding
these conditions or, more broadly, as frustrating the department’s
oversight of the court’s wards. Doing so would elevate form over
function and defeat the goals of juvenile probation. (See § 730,
subd. (b) [“The court may impose and require any and all
reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to
the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J. BALTODANO, J.
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Gayle L. Peron, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S.
Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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