CJ Freshway America Corporation v. Lim CA2/8 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/14/24 CJ Freshway America Corporation v. Lim CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    CJ FRESHWAY AMERICA                                              B321415 & B322905
    CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. 19STCV01929)
    v.
    MINHO LIM et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEALS from judgment and order of the Superior Court
    of Los Angeles County. Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.
    Park, Daniel E. Park, Alisa M. Morgenthaler, Samuel F.
    Izzo, Jason H. Woltman, Wil J. Rios, and Amirah Arif for
    Defendants and Appellants.
    DLA Piper, John S. Gibson, Justin Ilhwan Park, David B.
    Farkas, Justin R. Sarno, and Stanley J. Panikowski, III, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    A jury found defendants Minho Lim, Ki Soon Seo, N9 Int’l
    Trading, Inc. (N9), and Kaldea, Inc. (Kaldea) (collectively,
    defendants) liable for, among other things, receiving stolen
    property belonging to plaintiff CJ Freshway America Corporation
    (Freshway). The jury found Lim, N9, and Kaldea jointly and
    severally liable for over $1.5 million in damages and Seo liable for
    over $900,000 in damages. After entering judgment in
    Freshway’s favor, the court awarded the company over $1 million
    in attorney fees.
    Defendants appeal from the judgment and the
    postjudgment attorney fee award. They raise several claims of
    error arising out of the jury trial, and they argue the court
    abused its discretion in calculating the amount of Freshway’s
    attorney fee award. We have consolidated both appeals for
    purposes of oral argument and decision. As we explain, all of
    defendants’ arguments lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment and the fee award.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1.    The parties
    Freshway is headquartered in Los Angeles. The company
    imports food from overseas and sells it throughout the United
    States.
    Seo is Lim’s mother. Seo formed Kaldea in 2017. She was
    Kaldea’s sole owner until she transferred ownership to Lim in
    2019. Lim is the sole owner of N9.
    2.    Lim’s employment with Freshway
    In July 2016, Freshway hired Lim as a sales associate.
    Lim was responsible for negotiating Freshway’s agreements with
    its suppliers and buyers. Lim introduced Freshway to Meshquat
    2
    International Trading Company, LLC (“Meshquat”) and MiCal
    Seafood Inc. (MiCal), which would become Freshway’s biggest
    supplier and customer, respectively. Freshway often purchased
    seafood from Meshquat and sold it to MiCal and another buyer,
    Mariscos Bahia, Inc. (Mariscos).
    Between 2017 and 2018, Lim and Meshquat engaged in
    a scheme to defraud Freshway. Lim convinced Freshway to
    approve 12 purchase agreements that Meshquat never fulfilled.
    When Freshway approved each agreement, it sent part of the
    purchase price to Meshquat. For some of the orders, fake bills of
    lading were generated, which purported to show that Meshquat
    sent goods to Freshway’s buyers. After Lim presented a fake
    bill of lading to Freshway’s management, the company paid
    Meshquat the remainder of the purchase price for the
    corresponding order. Freshway paid Meshquat about
    $1.1 million for orders that were never fulfilled.
    Meshquat sent Kaldea and N9 kickback payments for
    the orders that Meshquat never fulfilled. On the same date
    Freshway sent a payment to Meshquat, Meshquat would transfer
    money to Kaldea or N9. In total, Meshquat sent Kaldea and N9
    about $450,000 in kickback payments. Unbeknownst to
    Freshway, Lim also provided discounted seafood to MiCal and
    Mariscos in exchange for $50,000 in kickback payments sent to
    Kaldea. Lim used the kickback payments to pay for personal
    expenses, including entertainment, gambling, car payments,
    rent, and travel.
    In August 2018, Freshway conducted an audit of orders
    that Lim negotiated. After Lim learned of the audit, he texted
    an employee at MiCal, “I think they found out. O-F-U-K.”
    Lim deleted from his work computer files related to Freshway’s
    3
    transactions with Meshquat, and he deleted from his phone text
    messages with employees at Meshquat. Kaldea also transferred
    $310,000 to Seo’s bank account around the time of Freshway’s
    audit.
    Freshway’s management interviewed Lim as part of the
    audit. Lim exchanged over 200 text messages with Seo, in which
    she coached him on how to behave during the interview. Among
    other things, Seo told Lim to deny ownership of Kaldea and “act
    like you know nothing.”
    Lim did not return to work at Freshway after his interview.
    3.      Freshway’s lawsuit
    Freshway sued Lim, Seo, N9, and Kaldea. Freshway’s
    operative second amended complaint asserted the following
    causes of action: (1) breach of duty of loyalty against all
    defendants; (2) breach of written contract against Lim; (3) fraud
    against Lim, Kaldea, and N9; (4) aiding and abetting fraud
    against Seo, N9, and Kaldea; (5) fraudulent concealment against
    Lim; (6) aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty against Seo,
    N9, and Kaldea; (7) conversion against all defendants; (8) unjust
    enrichment against all defendants; (9) violation of Business and
    Professions Code section 17200 against all defendants;
    (10) interference with prospective economic relations against all
    defendants; (11) receiving stolen property in violation of Penal
    Code section 496 against all defendants; (12) declaratory relief
    against all defendants; and (13) negligent interference with
    prospective economic relations against all defendants.
    In March 2021, Freshway moved for summary adjudication
    of its first, second, sixth, and eighth causes of action. The court
    granted summary adjudication in Freshway’s favor on its first
    cause of action for breach of duty of loyalty as to Lim and its sixth
    4
    cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty
    as to Seo, Kaldea, and N9. The court found Lim, Seo, Kaldea,
    and N9 were liable for $503,792 in damages against Freshway.
    The court denied Freshway’s motion on the company’s second
    cause of action for breach of written contract and eighth cause of
    action for unjust enrichment.
    In February 2022, the court held a jury trial on Freshway’s
    remaining causes of action. The jury made the following findings:
    (1) Lim was liable for breach of contract; (2) Lim, N9, and Kaldea
    were liable for making fraudulent misrepresentations; (3) Seo,
    N9, and Kaldea were liable for aiding and abetting fraud; (4) Lim
    was liable for fraudulent concealment; (5) Lim, N9, and Kaldea,
    but not Seo, were liable for conversion; (6) Lim, N9, and Kaldea,
    but not Seo, were liable for intentional interference with
    prospective economic relations; (7) all defendants were liable for
    receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496;
    and (8) only Lim was liable for negligent interference with
    prospective economic relations. As for the 11th cause of action for
    receiving stolen property, the jury found Lim, N9, and Kaldea
    were liable for $503,792 and Seo was liable for $310,000.
    The jury also awarded Freshway $50,000 in punitive damages
    against Lim, N9, and Kaldea. The jury found Freshway was not
    entitled to any compensatory damages.
    In March 2022, the court entered judgment in Freshway’s
    favor and against Lim, Seo, N9, and Kaldea. As to Lim, N9, and
    Kaldea, the court entered judgment against them, jointly and
    severally, for $1,561,376, consisting of $503,792, tripled under
    Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c), plus $50,000, with
    interest under Civil Code section 3287 and Code of Civil
    Procedure section 685.010. As to Seo, the court entered judgment
    5
    against her, jointly and severally with the other defendants,
    for $930,000, consisting of $310,000, tripled under Penal Code
    section 496, subdivision (c), with interest under Civil Code
    section 3287 and Code of Civil Procedure section 685.010.
    Defendants appealed from the judgment.
    4.     Attorney Fees
    In May 2022, Freshway moved for $1,566,185.02 in
    attorney fees under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c),
    and Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5.1
    In support of its attorney fees motion, Freshway submitted
    a declaration from one of its attorneys, Justin Ilhwan Park. Park
    was the lead attorney and billing partner representing Freshway.
    When Park began representing Freshway in January 2019, he
    worked at Mayer Brown LLP (Mayer Brown). Park continued to
    represent Freshway after he moved to DLA Piper, LLP (DLA
    Piper) in 2020.
    Park has practiced for over 15 years, and he has extensive
    experience in complex commercial litigation. He billed Freshway
    between $705.37 and $755 per hour for work related to its
    lawsuit against defendants. Several other attorneys billed
    Freshway for work related to its lawsuit against defendants.
    Park described the qualifications and hourly billing rates of two
    of those attorneys: David B. Farkas and John Gibson. Farkas
    has nearly 15 years of experience in business and commercial
    litigation, and Gibson has more than thirty years of experience in
    antitrust, commercial, healthcare, and technology litigation.
    1      Freshway initially requested $1,750,683.29 in attorney
    fees, but the company reduced its request after defendants
    identified a tabulation error in the company’s fees calculation.
    6
    Farkas billed Freshway at $685 per hour, and Gibson billed
    Freshway at $882.75 per hour.
    Park testified that the rates charged by DLA Piper’s and
    Mayer Brown’s attorneys for work related to this lawsuit were
    “in line with or significantly lower than the rates charged by law
    firms of similar caliber and reputation.” Park also submitted two
    articles—one published by the National Law Journal in 2014
    and the other published by the Wall Street Journal in 2016—
    discussing the general increase in rates charged by large law
    firms across the country. The National Law Review article also
    noted that, according to an annual national survey of large law
    firms, the average rate charged by partners in Los Angeles was
    $665, while the average rate charged by associates in Los Angeles
    was $401.
    Freshway submitted billing invoices from Mayer Brown
    and DLA Piper, covering work related to Freshway’s lawsuit that
    the two firms performed between January 2019 and April 2022.
    According to Park, the invoices showed how much time each
    timekeeper spent working on this lawsuit, in one-tenth-of-an-
    hour increments, and they included only work necessary to the
    lawsuit, while any time reflecting unnecessary or duplicative
    work was “written off.” The invoices were reviewed and approved
    by the responsible partner before they were sent to Freshway.
    Park redacted from the invoices text that would reveal attorney
    work product or attorney-client communications.
    Park explained that Mayer Brown incurred $23,262.53 in
    fees preparing Freshway’s attorney fees motion and opposing a
    motion to tax costs filed by defendants that had yet been billed to
    Freshway. Park also noted that DLA Piper and Mayer Brown
    wrote off some of the work that they performed for Freshway
    7
    throughout this lawsuit, and that Mayer Brown provided
    Freshway a “17.5% discount on each invoice.”
    Defendants opposed Freshway’s attorney fees request.
    Defendants argued the court should deny Freshway’s request in
    its entirety, or significantly reduce any award of fees, because the
    requested amount of fees was unreasonable.
    The court granted Freshway’s attorney fees motion, finding
    that Freshway was entitled to recover its fees under Penal Code
    section 496, subdivision (c), because the jury found each
    defendant liable for receiving stolen property. The court awarded
    Freshway a total of $1,050,000 in attorney fees.
    The court explained that it reduced the billing rate for
    Freshway’s attorneys to $600 per hour, finding that such a rate
    was reasonable based on “ ‘the “prevailing market rates in the
    relevant community” ’ ” and the court’s “ ‘own knowledge and
    familiarity with the legal market.’ ” Although the court noted
    that Freshway’s redacted billing invoices did not itemize the
    hours worked by each timekeeper, it concluded that company’s
    counsel billed more than 2,300 hours for work related to this
    lawsuit. The court found that 1,750 of those hours were
    reasonably billed to Freshway because some of the work
    performed by Freshway’s counsel was excessive and duplicative.
    The court also did not award fees for work performed by
    Freshway’s counsel on the company’s motion for summary
    adjudication, finding that motion did not relate to Freshway’s
    claim for receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496.
    Nevertheless, the court found that Freshway’s claim for receiving
    stolen property was intertwined and shared common issues with
    the company’s other claims.
    8
    Defendants appealed from the order awarding Freshway
    attorney fees.
    DISCUSSION
    In their first appeal (B321415), defendants challenge the
    judgment entered after the jury trial. Defendants contend:
    (1) the court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of
    receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496;
    (2) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Seo
    knowingly received stolen property; (3) kickback payments
    cannot constitute stolen property under Penal Code section 496;
    and (4) the court erred when it awarded Freshway treble and
    punitive damages under Penal Code section 496.
    In their second appeal (B322905), defendants challenge the
    court’s postjudgment order awarding Freshway $1,050,000 in
    attorney fees. Defendants do not contend the court erred in
    awarding Freshway attorney fees. Instead, they argue the
    amount of fees that the court awarded was unreasonable.
    As we explain, all of defendants’ arguments lack merit.
    1.     Defendants have not shown the court erred when it
    instructed the jury on the elements of receiving
    stolen property
    The court used a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1750 to
    instruct the jury on the elements of receiving stolen property.
    Relevant here, the court instructed the jury that “[p]roperty is
    stolen if it was obtained by any type of theft, including theft by
    ‘any false or fraudulent representation or pretense.’ ” The court
    did not define the elements of theft by false or fraudulent
    representation or pretense. Defendants argue the court erred by
    failing to do so. We disagree.
    9
    As a threshold matter, we reject Freshway’s contention
    that defendants forfeited this issue by not objecting to the
    modified version of CALCRIM No. 1750 used by the court.
    A party is deemed to have objected to an instruction requested by
    the other party unless the complaining party agreed to or
    requested the challenged instruction. (Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp.
    (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 958
    , 970, fn. 3; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
    § 647.) Here, Freshway proposed the modified version of
    CALCRIM No. 1750 that defendants contend did not fully define
    the elements of theft by false or fraudulent representation or
    pretense. Although defendants did not object to the instruction
    on the grounds that it was incomplete, the record does not
    establish that they requested or agreed to the form of the
    instruction that the court used. Nevertheless, as we explain
    below, defendants have not shown the court erred when it did not
    instruct the jury on the elements of theft by false or fraudulent
    representation or pretense.
    A court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on general
    principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the
    facts presented at trial. (People v. Brown (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 518
    ,
    559.) Where there is a factual dispute about whether the
    property received was in fact stolen, the court must instruct the
    jury on the complete definitions of theft. (People v. MacArthur
    (2006) 
    142 Cal.App.4th 275
    , 280 (MacArthur).)
    Defendants rely on MacArthur to contend the court had a
    sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the elements of theft by
    false or fraudulent representation or pretense. Defendants’
    reliance on MacArthur is misplaced.
    In MacArthur, the defendant’s girlfriend frequently took
    her mother’s jewelry, pawned it, and later retrieved it from the
    10
    pawn shop. (MacArthur, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 278.)
    The girlfriend sometimes did so with her mother’s knowledge,
    and she and her mother occasionally retrieved the jewelry
    together. (Id. at p. 280.) The defendant was convicted of
    receiving stolen property after his girlfriend gave him some of her
    mother’s jewelry to pawn. (Id. at pp. 278–279.)
    On appeal, the reviewing court reversed the defendant’s
    conviction, concluding the trial court prejudicially erred because
    it did not instruct the jury on the elements of theft. (MacArthur,
    supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.) The court reasoned that the
    girlfriend’s testimony about her pattern of pawning and
    retrieving her mother’s jewelry “called into question whether any
    relevant participant had the requisite intent” to permanently
    deprive the mother of her jewelry. (Id. at pp. 280–281.) Without
    instructing on the definition of “ ‘stolen’ ” and “ ‘theft,’ ” the trial
    court “failed to provide any guidance to the jury for determining
    whether property had, in fact, been stolen.” (Id. at pp. 279–280.)
    Unlike the defendant in MacArthur, defendants have not
    shown there was any factual dispute at trial about whether the
    property at issue in this case was stolen. In their opening brief,
    defendants argue in a conclusory manner that it was disputed at
    trial whether the kickback payments received by Kaldea and N9
    consisted of money that was “stolen” from Freshway. Defendants
    do not, however, point to any evidence, including any witness
    testimony at trial, that would support a finding that the money
    was not stolen. As appellants, it is defendants’ burden to point to
    evidence in the record that supports their claims of error on
    appeal. (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 
    189 Cal.App.4th 647
    , 655–656
    (Keyes).) By failing to do so, defendants have not shown the court
    11
    erred when it did not instruct the jury on the elements of theft by
    false or fraudulent representation or pretense. (Ibid.)
    2.     Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
    Seo received stolen property
    Defendants next contend insufficient evidence supports the
    jury’s finding that Seo violated Penal Code section 496.
    Specifically, defendants argue that Freshway failed to prove that
    Seo knew she received stolen property when Kaldea transferred
    $310,000 to her personal bank account. We disagree.
    To establish a violation of Penal Code section 496, the
    plaintiff must prove: (1) the property was stolen; (2) the
    defendant knew the property was stolen; and (3) the defendant
    had possession of the stolen property. (Lacagnina v. Comprehend
    Systems, Inc. (2018) 
    25 Cal.App.5th 955
    , 970.) A defendant’s
    knowledge that property was stolen may be proved by
    circumstantial evidence. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 
    133 Cal.App.3d 1003
    , 1019 (Alvarado).) An inference that the
    defendant knowingly received stolen property may be supported
    by the defendant’s possession of the property accompanied by
    suspicious circumstances. (Id. at pp. 1019–1020.)
    Whether a defendant knowingly received stolen property is
    a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence.
    (Alvarado, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1019–1020.) We “ ‘ “view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
    giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving
    all conflicts in its favor.” ’ ” (Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy
    Corp. (2016) 
    246 Cal.App.4th 500
    , 517.) “We do not reweigh
    evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses . . . [because] [w]e
    are ‘not a second trier of fact.’ ” (Pope v. Babick (2014) 
    229 Cal.App.4th 1238
    , 1246.)
    12
    Freshway presented the following evidence at trial.
    Meshquat engaged in a pattern of sending Kaldea and N9
    kickback payments on the same dates that Freshway paid
    Meshquat for the orders that Lim negotiated and Meshquat
    never fulfilled. At the time Kaldea received the kickback
    payments, Seo was Kaldea’s sole owner. Around the time of
    Freshway’s audit of the orders that Meshquat never fulfilled,
    Kaldea transferred $310,000 to Seo’s personal bank account.
    In addition, Seo exchanged hundreds of text messages with Lim
    during Freshway’s audit—around the time that Kaldea
    transferred money into her bank account—in which she
    encouraged Lim to lie about Kaldea’s ownership and his
    involvement in Meshquat’s scheme to defraud Freshway. Seo’s
    receipt of money from Kaldea after the company received
    kickback payments from Meshquat, the timing of Kaldea’s
    transfer of that money to Seo, and Seo’s suspicious behavior
    during Freshway’s audit of the orders that Meshquat never
    fulfilled support an inference that Seo knew she received stolen
    property. (See Alvarado, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1019–
    1020.)
    3.     Defendants have failed to show kickback payments
    cannot constitute stolen property under Penal Code
    section 496
    Defendants next contend that the court erred in allowing
    the jury to find they violated Penal Code section 496 because
    kickback payments can never constitute stolen property. As we
    explain, defendants have failed to show any error.
    The trial court’s judgment is presumed correct. (Keyes,
    
    supra,
     189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656.) The appellant carries
    the burden to prove otherwise by providing reasoned argument
    13
    with citations to relevant legal authority on each point made.
    (Ibid.) The reviewing court is not obligated to develop issues
    raised by the appellant. (Bains v. Moores (2009) 
    172 Cal.App.4th 445
    , 455.) Instead, our review is limited to the issues that the
    appellant adequately raises and briefs. (Ibid.) The appellant
    forfeits any points that are not supported by reasoned legal
    argument and factual analysis. (Keyes, at pp. 655–656.)
    In their opening brief, defendants rely solely on McNally v.
    United States (1987) 
    483 U.S. 350
     (McNally) and United States v.
    Holzer (7th Cir. 1988) 
    840 F.2d 1343
     (Holzer) to contend that
    kickback payments can never constitute stolen property for
    purposes of Penal Code section 496. Defendants’ reliance on
    these opinions is misplaced.
    McNally and Holzer addressed what type of conduct could
    support convictions under a former version of 
    18 United States Code section 1341
    , the federal mail fraud statute. In both cases,
    government officials were convicted of defrauding the public of its
    intangible right to the fair and honest administration of
    government. (McNally, 
    supra,
     483 U.S. at p. 352; Holzer, supra,
    840 F.2d at p. 1345.) Although the officials in both cases received
    kickback payments—commissions and bribes—in exchange for
    their fraudulent conduct, neither opinion turned on whether such
    payments could constitute stolen property. (McNally, at pp. 356–
    361; Holzer, at pp. 1346–1350.) Rather, both opinions turned on
    the nature of the victims’ rights that were implicated by the
    defendants’ fraudulent conduct. (McNally, at pp. 356–361;
    Holzer, at pp. 1346–1350.) McNally held, and Holzer followed,
    that the version of the federal mail fraud statute in effect at the
    time the cases were decided required a defendant to deprive his
    or her victim of a tangible property interest, such as an interest
    14
    in money. (McNally, at pp. 356–361; Holzer, at pp. 1346–1350.)
    Because the government in both cases proved only that the
    officials deprived the public of its intangible right to the fair and
    honest administration of government, the courts reversed the
    defendants’ convictions. (McNally, at pp. 356–361; Holzer, at
    pp. 1346–1350.)
    Neither McNally nor Holzer held that kickback payments
    can never constitute stolen property, let alone that such
    payments cannot support a claim for receiving stolen property
    under Penal Code section 496. McNally and Holzer therefore do
    not support defendants’ contention that kickback payments
    cannot constitute stolen property under Penal Code section 496.
    (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
    (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 220
    , 243 (Santa Clara County) [opinions are not
    authority for issues they do not consider].) In fact, dicta from
    Holzer undermines defendants’ position. As defendants
    acknowledge, the court in Holzer discussed a hypothetical in
    which kickback payments could constitute stolen property, where
    the defendant received kickback payments consisting of money
    that was intended for his employer. (Holzer, supra, 840 F.2d at
    p. 1348.) Freshway relied on a similar theory in this case—i.e.,
    that N9 and Kaldea received kickback payments consisting of
    money that was obtained from Freshway through fraudulent
    means.
    Defendants do not otherwise develop any argument in their
    opening brief addressing this issue. Indeed, defendants’ opening
    brief cites no authority discussing what constitutes stolen
    property, or how courts go about determining what constitutes
    stolen property, for purposes of Penal Code section 496. In their
    reply brief, defendants raise several new arguments for the first
    15
    time on appeal. Defendants have forfeited these arguments by
    failing to raise them in their opening brief. (City of Palo Alto v.
    Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 
    5 Cal.App.5th 1271
    ,
    1318.)
    In sum, defendants have failed to show the court erred by
    allowing the jury to find defendants liable for receiving stolen
    property based on their receipt of the kickback payments at issue
    in this case. (Keyes, 
    supra,
     189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656.)
    4.     Defendants have failed to show the court erred by
    awarding Freshway punitive and treble damages
    Finally, defendants argue the court erred because it
    awarded Freshway both treble and punitive damages for Lim’s,
    N9’s, and Kaldea’s violations of Penal Code section 496. This
    argument lacks merit.
    Under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c), any person
    who has been injured by a violation of the statute “may bring an
    action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any,
    sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s
    fees.” Generally, a plaintiff is not prohibited from recovering
    punitive damages simply because a statute authorizes a plaintiff
    to recover treble damages for the same wrongful act. (Marshall v.
    Brown (1983) 
    141 Cal.App.3d 408
    , 418–419.) If the purpose of
    the statutory damages is the same as that of the punitive
    damages, however, a plaintiff cannot recover both the statutory
    and punitive damages. (Id. at p. 419.)
    The only authority defendants cite in their opening brief
    to support their contention that Freshway was precluded from
    recovering both punitive damages and treble damages for Lim’s,
    N9’s, and Kaldea’s violations of Penal Code section 496 is Siry
    Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 333
     (Siry).
    16
    Specifically, defendants cite to the procedural background from
    Siry, which notes that the trial court granted the defendants’
    motion for a new trial in part and directed the plaintiff to “choose
    to collect either treble damages or punitive damages” under
    Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c). (Siry, at p. 342.)
    But Siry did not address whether the trial court was correct
    in requiring the plaintiff to elect between an award of punitive
    damages and an award of treble damages under Penal Code
    section 496, subdivision (c). (Siry, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 343–
    367; see also id., at p. 346, fn. 6 [declining to address issue of
    whether trial court correctly required the plaintiff to elect
    between punitive and treble damages].) Nor did Siry otherwise
    discuss whether a plaintiff may recover both punitive damages
    and treble damages for a defendant’s violation of Penal Code
    section 496. (Ibid.) Instead, Siry addressed a different issue—
    whether a plaintiff may recover both treble damages and
    attorney fees under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c).
    (Ibid.) Thus, Siry does not support defendants’ contention that
    the court erred by allowing Freshway to recover punitive
    damages and treble damages under Penal Code section 496. (See
    Santa Clara County, 
    supra,
     11 Cal.4th at p. 243 [“an opinion is
    not authority for an issue not considered therein”].)
    Defendants do not otherwise develop any legal analysis
    addressing this issue. Because we must presume the court’s
    judgment is correct, defendants have not shown the court erred
    by permitting Freshway to recover punitive and treble damages.
    (Keyes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656.)
    17
    5.     The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
    Freshway attorney fees
    5.1. Applicable law and standard of review
    A plaintiff who prevails on a claim for receiving stolen
    property under Penal Code section 496 is entitled to an award of
    attorney fees. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (c).) In calculating the fee
    award, the court should first settle on a lodestar figure.
    (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 
    24 Cal.4th 1122
    , 1133 (Ketchum).)
    To do so, the court must determine the reasonable hours spent on
    the case by plaintiff’s attorneys and multiply that number by the
    prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community
    engaged in similar litigation. (Ibid.)
    The court has discretion to adjust the lodestar figure up or
    down based on a series of factors. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007)
    
    155 Cal.App.4th 1233
    , 1240 (Nichols).) Those factors include:
    “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the
    skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the
    nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
    attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]
    The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market
    value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
    retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk
    or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of
    the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market
    rate for such services.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
    We review a trial court’s determination of reasonable
    attorney fees for abuse of discretion. (Los Angeles Unified School
    District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 
    57 Cal.App.5th 480
    ,
    516.) “The ‘ “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value
    of professional services rendered in his court, and while his
    18
    judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
    unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ ”
    (Ketchum, 
    supra,
     24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) Accordingly, our review
    of a court’s award of attorney fees is highly deferential. (Nichols,
    
    supra,
     155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.)
    5.2. Reasonable hourly rate
    Defendants contend the $600 hourly rate used by the court
    to calculate Freshway’s lodestar figure was unreasonable.
    We disagree.
    To determine an hourly rate for a lodestar figure, the court
    should look to “the ‘prevailing market rates in the relevant
    community.’ ” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013)
    
    215 Cal.App.4th 972
    , 1009.) The court should consider the
    experience, skill, and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees,
    and it may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the
    legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Ibid.)
    The court may also rely on affidavits of the prevailing party’s
    attorneys and other attorneys concerning “ ‘prevailing fees in the
    community,’ ” as well as rate determinations in other cases.
    (Ibid.)
    The court did not abuse its discretion in selecting $600 per
    hour as the prevailing hourly rate for Freshway’s lodestar figure.
    Freshway submitted evidence of the prevailing hourly rates for
    partners and associates at large firms in Los Angeles, as well as
    the background, experience, and billed hourly rates for three
    partners who worked on Freshway’s lawsuit. The rate selected
    by the court is almost $100 per hour lower than the lowest billing
    rate, and almost $300 per hour lower than the highest billing
    rate claimed by those partners. In addition, according to the
    National Law Review article that Freshway submitted in support
    19
    of its fees motion, the rate selected by the court was lower than
    the average rate charged by partners at large firms in Los
    Angeles as of 2014, several years before Freshway’s attorneys
    began working on this case and about eight years before the court
    calculated the challenged fee award. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v.
    Drexler (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 1084
    , 1095 [the “reasonable hourly rate
    is that prevailing in the community for similar work”].)
    Defendants rely on Vasquez v. Packaging Corporation of
    America (C.D.Cal., Aug. 17, 2020, No. CV19-1935 PSG (PLAx)
    
    2020 WL 6785650
    ) (Vazquez), a federal district court decision, to
    argue the court erred because it did not consult the 2018 Real
    Rate Report (Real Report) for fees in the Central District of
    Los Angeles when it calculated the prevailing hourly rate for
    Freshway’s lodestar figure. Decisions of federal district courts
    are not binding on California state courts. (Futrell v. Payday
    California, Inc. (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 1419
    , 1432, fn. 6.)
    Regardless, the court in Vazquez noted only that the Real Report
    is a useful tool for calculating reasonable hourly rates. (Vasquez,
    at pp. 26–27.) It did not hold that courts are required to refer to
    the Real Report when calculating a lodestar figure. (Ibid.) In
    any event, the Real Report supports a finding that $600 per hour
    was a reasonable hourly rate for Freshway’s lodestar figure.
    According to Vazquez, the Real Report shows that as of 2018,
    partners in Los Angeles charged hourly rates between $450 to
    $955, while associates in Los Angeles charged hourly rates
    between $382 and $721. (Id. at p. 27.) The hourly rate that
    the court selected in this case falls well within those ranges.
    Defendants argue the court erred in calculating the hourly
    rate in this case because the actual averages of rates billed by
    Park and Farkas were lower than the rates outlined in Park’s
    20
    declaration. According to defendants, Park’s average billing rate
    throughout this lawsuit was $687.69 per hour, and Farkas’s
    average billing rate throughout this lawsuit was $669.67 per
    hour. To support this argument, defendants include in their
    opening brief two tables that they created purporting to calculate
    the average billed rates for Park and Farkas. But defendants do
    not cite to, or otherwise explain, where in the record the figures
    used in their calculations were derived. Nor do they otherwise
    cite any evidence in the record showing Freshway supplied the
    court with inaccurate billing rates for some of its attorneys.
    Defendants have, therefore, forfeited this argument. (Keyes,
    
    supra,
     189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656 [the appellant forfeits any
    argument not supported by “appropriate citations to the material
    facts in the record”].)
    In sum, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
    when it selected $600 per hour as the reasonable hourly rate for
    Freshway’s lodestar figure.
    5.3. Reasonable hours spent on the litigation
    A trial court has discretion to decide which of the hours
    expended by the plaintiff’s attorneys were reasonably spent on
    the litigation. (Meister v. Regents of University of California
    (1998) 
    67 Cal.App.4th 437
    , 449.) We may only reverse a fee
    award if it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and
    prejudice influenced the determination or if it is not supported by
    the evidence. (Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 
    68 Cal.App.5th 1032
    , 1051; Jones v. Union Bank of California (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 542
    , 549–550.)
    Defendants contend the court erred when it found
    Freshway’s attorneys billed the company for more than
    2,300 hours spent working on matters related to this lawsuit.
    21
    According to defendants, Freshway substantiated about only
    1,400 of those hours, because that is how many hours Park,
    Farkas, and Gibson, the attorneys identified in Park’s
    declaration, billed Freshway for work related to this lawsuit.
    This argument lacks merit.
    In its attorney fees order, the court explained that it
    reviewed the billing invoices that Freshway submitted in support
    of its attorney fees motion. Based on its review of those
    documents, the court found that Freshway’s attorneys billed the
    company for more than 2,300 hours of work related to this
    lawsuit. In addition to the hours billed by Park, Farkas, and
    Gibson, Freshway’s billing invoices also reflect work performed
    by other attorneys and timekeepers, a fact that the court
    acknowledged in calculating Freshway’s lodestar figure.
    Defendants point to nothing in Freshway’s billing invoices that
    undermines the court’s finding that the hours billed by the
    company’s attorneys exceeded 2,300 hours.
    Defendants next argue the court miscalculated how many
    “timekeepers” billed Freshway for work spent on matters related
    to this lawsuit. Defendants have forfeited this argument by
    failing to cite anything in the record to support it. (Keyes, supra,
    189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656.)
    Defendants also argue the court erred in finding
    Freshway’s attorneys reasonably billed the company for
    1,750 hours of work because (1) the size of Freshway’s legal team
    “deviate[d] significantly from standard legal practice,” and (2) the
    court failed to explain how many hours it attributed to work
    related to Freshway’s summary adjudication motion. Defendants
    do not, however, cite any authority addressing what the
    “standard legal practice” is for the types of claims raised in this
    22
    lawsuit. Nor do defendants cite any authority requiring the court
    to explain, item by item, how it calculated the number of hours a
    plaintiff’s attorneys reasonably spent working on a lawsuit.
    In any event, it is well-settled that a trial court is not required
    to issue any, let alone a detailed, explanation of its fee award
    calculation. (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v.
    Hazelbaker (2016) 
    2 Cal.App.5th 252
    , 264 (Rancho Mirage).)
    Here, Freshway submitted approximately 200 pages of
    billing invoices and a declaration from its billing partner
    assigned to this lawsuit describing the nature of the work
    performed by Freshway’s attorneys. After reviewing that
    evidence, the court found that many of the hours billed by
    Freshway’s attorneys covered duplicative work or work related to
    Freshway’s motion for summary adjudication, which the court
    determined was not sufficiently related to its receiving stolen
    property claim. The court excluded those hours from its lodestar
    calculation when it found that Freshway’s attorneys reasonably
    spent 1,750 hours working on matters concerning the company’s
    receiving stolen property claim and its related causes of action.
    (See Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 
    92 Cal.App.4th 819
    ,
    843–844 [a trial court should exclude from its lodestar calculation
    attorney hours spent working on duplicative matters].)
    Defendants have not shown the court abused its discretion in
    reaching that figure.
    5.4. Redacted billing invoices
    Defendants argue the court erred when it admitted
    Freshway’s redacted billing invoices. This argument also lacks
    merit.
    A court does not abuse its discretion when it awards
    attorney fees where the plaintiff has submitted billing records
    23
    that have been heavily redacted. (Rancho Mirage, supra,
    2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 263–264.) Unlike some other jurisdictions,
    California “does not require detailed billing records to support a
    fee award.” (Id. at p. 263.) An “ ‘attorney’s testimony as to the
    number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an
    award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time
    records.’ ” (Ibid.)
    Although Freshway redacted from most of its billing
    invoices the descriptions of the nature of work performed by its
    attorneys, the invoices show the hours billed, and the hourly
    rates charged, for each attorney who billed Freshway. In
    addition, Park testified about the type of work Freshway’s
    attorneys performed in connection with this lawsuit, and he
    provided a summary of the types of work the billing invoices
    covered throughout the course of this lawsuit. The court did not
    abuse its discretion by relying on this evidence when calculating
    Freshway’s fee award. (Rancho Mirage, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 263–264.)
    5.5. Negative lodestar multiplier
    Finally, defendants contend the court should have applied
    a negative multiplier to Freshway’s lodestar figure. Specifically,
    defendants argue the court should have reduced the lodestar
    figure because: (1) Freshway requested an inflated fee award;
    (2) Freshway’s billing records include several “numerical
    oddities,” such as one attorney allegedly recording a
    disproportionate number of billing entries that end in “.30” hours
    worked; and (3) Freshway miscalculated the amount of its initial
    request for attorney fees. These arguments lack merit.
    As for defendants’ first two points, they are forfeited
    because, like several of defendants’ other arguments, they are not
    24
    accompanied by citations to the record where facts supporting
    the claims of error appear. (Keyes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 655–656.) As for defendants’ third point, it is true that
    Freshway miscalculated the total number of fees it initially
    requested in its attorney fees motion. But the company
    acknowledged the miscalculation after defendants pointed it out
    and reduced the amount of fees it requested when it filed its reply
    brief. The court noted the reduced request in its order awarding
    attorney fees, and it did not find that Freshway intentionally
    miscalculated its initial request or otherwise engaged in any
    inappropriate conduct with respect to its attorney fees motion.
    In any event, it is well-settled that application of a positive
    or negative lodestar multiplier is completely discretionary.
    (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138; Snoeck v. ExakTime
    Innovations, Inc. (2023) 
    96 Cal.App.5th 908
    , 920.) Nothing in the
    record shows the court abused its discretion by not applying a
    negative multiplier to Freshway’s lodestar figure.
    As we explained above, the court considered Freshway’s
    evidence supporting the attorney fees motion when it calculated
    the lodestar figure, and it awarded Freshway an amount of fees
    that was significantly lower than the amount that Freshway
    requested. In calculating its lodestar figure, the court reduced
    the hourly rate requested, and the total hours billed, by
    Freshway’s attorneys. The court reasonably could have
    concluded that because it reduced both Freshway’s requested
    hourly rate and total hours billed in calculating the lodestar
    figure, it did not also need to apply a negative multiplier to that
    figure.
    25
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment and postjudgment attorney fee award are
    affirmed. Freshway shall recover its costs on appeal.
    VIRAMONTES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    GRIMES, Acting P. J.
    WILEY, J.
    26
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B321415

Filed Date: 10/14/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2024