Bobkoff v. Dewey CA2/6 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/14/24 Bobkoff v. Dewey CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    JOHN BOBKOFF,                                                2d Civ. No. B327917
    (Super. Ct. No. 23CV00256)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    LAURA DEWEY,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    WILLIAM CROPLEY,                                             2d Civ. No. B327919
    (Super. Ct. No. 23CV00254)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    LAURA DEWEY,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    DENNIS BERGER,                           2d Civ. No. B327944
    (Super. Ct. No. 23CV00264)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,         (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    LAURA DEWEY,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    JUDITH HUGHES,                           2d Civ. No. B328595
    (Super. Ct. No. 23CV00251)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,         (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    LAURA DEWEY,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Laura G. Dewey (appellant) appeals from the judgment
    after the trial court granted the requests of John J. Bobkoff,
    William D. Cropley III, Dennis L. Berger, and Judith Hughes for
    restraining orders pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent
    Adult Civil Protection Act (Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 15600 et
    seq.) We will affirm.
    1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
    Welfare and Institutions Code.
    2
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Appellant and respondents live at the Friendship Manor
    retirement community in Goleta. They range in age from 67 to
    86. Residents of Friendship Manor live in separate rooms but eat
    and socialize in the facility’s dining room and common areas.
    Respondents requested restraining orders in January of
    2023. Their declarations described appellant abusing them
    verbally and physically by, among other things: trying to ram
    them with her mobility scooter; waiving her cane at them; falsely
    accusing them of battery and theft; calling them obscene names
    and racial epithets; filming them with her cell phone without
    permission; and using her professional training to intimidate
    them by saying things like “go ahead and sue me I’m a lawyer.”
    They also describe being frightened by her acts toward others,
    such as using her cane to knock down bicyclists and to strike the
    cars of those stopping to pick up family members in front of
    Friendship Manor.
    The trial court heard evidence over two days in February of
    2023. It admitted the parties’ supporting and responsive
    declarations subject to cross-examination of the declarants. It
    declined to admit declarations of those who were not present in
    court. Each respondent testified in a narrative manner and
    answered questions on cross-examination by appellant.
    Friendship Manor’s food service manager, a dining room
    employee, and three residents testified about incidents they
    witnessed in the dining room. Appellant then testified and also
    answered questions on cross-examination from each respondent.
    The trial court granted respondents’ requests and issued
    three-year restraining orders against appellant. It found
    respondents’ testimony “very credible” and described their
    3
    evidence of abuse and emotional harm as “preponderating;
    indeed, it was even, clear, and convincing.” It described
    appellant’s testimony as follows: “She was not credible; her
    testimony was not persuasive; it was argumentative; combative;
    the Court can see where the Persons Seeking Protection were
    intimidated; harassed; abused.” The court found “[t]he evidence
    against [appellant] was overwhelming; it was very persuasive;
    very credible; believable.”
    We consolidated the appeals of each restraining order for
    argument and decision.
    DISCUSSION
    We review protective orders issued under the Act for abuse
    of discretion and factual findings supporting the order for
    substantial evidence. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 1131
    , 1137.) “[W]e will only find an abuse of discretion when the
    trial court exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards the
    uncontradicted evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1140.) We resolve all
    conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and
    construe all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of
    upholding the trial court’s findings. (Id. at pp. 1137-1138.)
    Evidentiary Contentions
    Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing
    respondents to testify in a narrative manner and by admitting
    extensive hearsay evidence. She did not raise the former issue
    below. The argument is forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
    Even if it were not, appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice. She
    testified in the narrative as well. The court tolerated appellant’s
    own forays into hearsay and ruled promptly on her oral
    objections. We presume the court considered only relevant and
    admissible evidence. (Id., § 664.)
    4
    Elder Abuse Act Contentions
    Appellant cites the Act’s preamble sections as showing the
    Legislature intended it to protect the safety of elders, not “to
    resolve disputes between neighbors who happen to be elderly.”
    (§§ 15600, 15601.) We disagree. Nothing in the Act prohibits
    trial courts from issuing protective orders against elderly or
    dependent adults who violate its provisions.
    Elder abuse includes “[p]hysical abuse, neglect,
    abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with
    resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering.”
    (§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).) “‘Mental suffering’ means fear,
    agitation, confusion, severe depression, or other forms of serious
    emotional distress that is brought about by forms of intimidating
    behavior, threats, harassment, or by deceptive acts performed or
    false or misleading statements made with malicious intent to
    agitate, confuse, frighten, or cause severe depression or serious
    emotional distress of the elder or dependent adult.” (§ 15610.53.)
    Courts may issue an order to restrain “any person” it finds
    abused the petitioning party. (§ 15657.03, subd. (c).)
    Here, appellant and respondents supplemented their
    declarations with more than eight hours of live testimony about
    the events at Friendship Manor. Their accounts conflicted, often
    fundamentally. The trial court’s conclusion that each respondent
    had “clearly . . . been emotionally harmed by the actions of
    [appellant]” was based on its weighing of this evidence. “[T]he
    trial court was in the best position to evaluate credibility and to
    resolve factual disputes, and our review of the record reveals
    sufficient evidence to conclude that the court’s order was not an
    abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney
    (2015) 
    237 Cal.App.4th 1416
    , 1426-1427.)
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
    costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    CODY, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    YEGAN, J.
    6
    Thomas P. Anderle, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    Laura G. Dewey, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
    No appearances for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B327917

Filed Date: 10/14/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2024