People v. Navarro CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/14/24 P. v. Navarro CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B323579
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA113232)
v.
CARLO ADRIAN NAVARRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
On Halloween night in 2019, appellant and defendant
Carlo Adrian Navarro, then 20 years old, was driving a large
sport utility vehicle (SUV) down a residential street. He was
heavily intoxicated and racing along at more than two times the
speed limit. He careened past two stop signs without slowing
down, failed to negotiate a bend in the road, and drove up onto
the sidewalk at full speed. There, Navarro plowed into Joseph
and Raihan Awaida and their three-year-old son Omar1 who were
walking home from trick or treating. Navarro’s SUV was going
so fast and hit the Awaida family with so much force that all
three died shortly after Navarro drove straight into them.
The People charged Navarro with three counts of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and three counts of
vehicular manslaughter (id., § 191.5, subd. (a)). A jury convicted
him on all counts. The jury also found true allegations that, in
committing vehicular manslaughter, Navarro caused bodily
injury and death to more than one victim. (Veh. Code, § 23558.)
The court sentenced Navarro to 25 years to life.2
1 Because the three victims share the same surname, to
avoid confusion we refer to them by their first names. No
disrespect is intended.
2 The components of this sentence are as follows: as to the
murder convictions, the court sentenced Navarro to 15 years to
life for the murder in count 3, 15 years to life on the murder in
count 2, to be served concurrent with the sentence on count 3,
and imposed but stayed his sentence for the murder in count 1; as
to the manslaughter convictions, the court imposed the high term
of 10 years for the vehicular manslaughter in count 4, and
imposed but stayed the sentences for the two vehicular
manslaughter convictions in counts 5 and 6. The court also
2
Navarro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the implied malice element of the murder convictions.
He also challenges several evidentiary rulings, including the
admission into evidence of autopsy photos during the testimony
of medical examiners about the victims’ injuries and causes of
their death. We conclude the record discloses substantial
evidence of implied malice and reject Navarro’s challenge to the
sufficiency of that evidence. We further conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Navarro’s
objections to the autopsy photographs or in making other
challenged evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we affirm.
NAVARRO’S OFFENSE CONDUCT
“We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People and presume the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment.
[Citation.] The following summary is based on this appellate
standard of review.” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
1539, 1543.)
A. Navarro’s Drinking Before the Collision
In video recorded interviews played for the jury, Navarro
provided the details of his activities in the hours leading up to
him running over Joseph, Raihan, and Omar. On October 31,
2019, after finishing work that evening, Navarro met with
friends. At 8:30 p.m., Navarro drove them in his Toyota Sequoia
SUV to a liquor store, where they got bottles of vodka and
struck the enhancement allegations under Vehicle Code section
23558. The court required Navarro to serve his sentences for
manslaughter and murder concurrently, resulting in an effective
sentence of 25 years to life.
3
whiskey. Navarro then drove with his friends to an abandoned
golf course, where they drank the whiskey. Navarro then left,
driving his SUV to pick up another friend.
B. The Collision
Around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m., the Awaida family was
walking home on Country Club Drive in Long Beach after
enjoying an evening of trick or treating and visiting with family.
Omar was in a stroller. Halloween is a big festival in the
neighborhood, and it is busy from around 6:00 p.m. until the later
hours of the night. Thus, a number of other people were also
outside in the neighborhood and witnessed what Navarro did.
Navarro’s SUV, the only car seen driving on the street
before the collision, was traveling between 60 and 80 miles per
hour on Country Club Drive, in violation of the 30-miles-per-hour
speed limit. Navarro did not stop for stop signs at two cross
streets near an elementary school and a public park. As he
moved through the neighborhood he did not slow down and
instead kept accelerating. When the SUV came to a bend in the
road, Navarro failed to turn, drove onto the sidewalk adjacent to
the public park, and hit the Awaida family. The impact from the
collision flung all three family members 40 to 50 feet into the air.
Joseph and Raihan eventually landed in a cross street. Omar
came to rest under a car parked across that same cross street.
All three died very shortly after being hit.
Based on photos of the tire marks at the scene and
surveillance video, a detective specializing in traffic collisions
testified that Navarro’s SUV was traveling between 62.3 and 68.8
miles per hour at the time he drove into the Awaida family. The
detective further opined that when Navarro approached the bend
in the road, Navarro could not make the turn because of the high
4
speed at which his SUV was moving. The detective could not
determine whether Navarro had tried to brake before the
collision. Another officer with expertise in automobiles inspected
Navarro’s SUV and found it had no mechanical issues that would
have affected its operation before Navarro killed Joseph, Raihan,
and Omar.
After Navarro struck the Awaida family, he continued to
drive off the street and along the sidewalk bordering Los Cerritos
Park, where his SUV hit signs and knocked a water fountain
encased in cement off its foundation. He finally stopped when he
reached a perpendicular cross-street at the end of the park. A
crowd gathered. Navarro got out of his SUV, began pacing, and
then sat down. When asked, Navarro acknowledged he was the
driver of the SUV.
Eyewitnesses described Navarro as smelling of alcohol,
having slurred speech, and unsteady while both walking and
sitting. After the collision, police found no open containers of
alcohol in the SUV. They did, however, recover an unopened
bottle of vodka from the lower center console and an unopened
bottle of beer from a storage area behind the back seat.
Security footage taken from a nearby house and played for
the jury depicted Navarro’s SUV driving immediately before the
collision, the collision itself, and the aftermath; because it was
dark out, these images are not very well lit. The jury also saw
police body camera video taken immediately following the
collision by an officer responding to the scene, and photographs of
the scene right after the crash.
C. Navarro’s Intoxication
At about 11:20 p.m. that night, Officer Eric Stachura
administered three different sobriety tests on Navarro, all of
5
which indicated that Navarro was impaired due to alcohol
consumption. Navarro also had red, watery eyes, his speech was
slurred, and he smelled of alcohol. Navarro acknowledged that
he was drunk while driving and that he hit someone with his
SUV.
During a physical examination at a hospital several hours
after the crash, Navarro consented to a blood draw, which
reflected Navarro had a blood alcohol level of 0.113 percent as of
1:45 a.m. A police criminalist estimated, based on certain
assumptions about when Navarro had his last drink, that
Navarro’s blood-alcohol level at the time of the crash was
approximately 0.17 percent. It would take about seven and a half
drinks for a person Navarro’s size to reach that blood alcohol
level. Based on a hypothetical mirroring the evidence presented,
Officer Stachura opined that the driver in the hypothetical was
impaired to the point that he could not operate a car safely.
D. The Awaida Family’s Injuries and the Causes of
Death
A police officer who responded to the scene of the crash
testified as to his observations of Joseph and Raihan’s injuries;
the officer was unable to fit under the car where Omar had
become wedged to observe the extent of the child’s injuries.
Medical examiners testified to the causes of death and each
victim’s injuries as they related to the cause of death. While
testifying about the injuries and cause of death, the medical
examiners used autopsy photographs to illustrate their
testimony. Joseph suffered multiple injuries all over his body,
including a nearly severed leg. Nearly all his injuries were on
the left side of his body, indicating where Navarro’s SUV hit him.
Joseph died from blunt force trauma that resulted in bleeding in
6
his brain and chest. Raihan suffered multiple injuries all over
her body, and died from blunt force trauma that resulted in a
direct injury to her brain as well as lacerations to her liver,
spleen, and kidneys. Omar suffered multiple injuries all over his
body, including a fracture to the frontal bone in his head, and
died from blunt force trauma that resulted in a brain hemorrhage
and a lacerated spleen.
E. Navarro’s Pre-driving Knowledge of the Dangers of
Alcohol
1. May 2019 Police Encounter
Navarro had an encounter with the Long Beach Police
Department approximately five months before the collision. On
May 8, 2019, police responded to a report of a person sleeping in a
car blocking an alley and found Navarro “passed out” in the
driver’s seat. Navarro’s car keys were in the center console.
Navarro did not initially respond to commands from police to
wake up. He had watery and bloodshot eyes and smelled of
alcohol. Intoxilyzer tests done that night reflected blood alcohol
levels of 0.117 percent and 0.114 percent. Police arrested
Navarro for being drunk in public. During an interview with
police, Navarro stated he thought he was too drunk to drive that
night, and therefore slept in his car without realizing his car was
blocking an alley.
2. School Instruction
A former instructor at a school Navarro attended as a
teenager testified that she taught a life and job skills course that
included a two-week drug unit. The unit typically included at
least one day discussing alcohol, including the dangers of driving
after consuming alcohol. Navarro took the course in 2016. The
7
instructor could not recall what she specifically taught in 2016,
but believed that she “would almost be sure” that she covered the
dangers of drinking and driving. She could not say if Navarro
had been in class the day that alcohol was discussed assuming it
had been. Navarro scored 100 percent on the drug unit test, but
the test did not include any questions about the dangers of
drinking and driving.
3. Statements to Investigators
In an interview several days after the collision, police and
prosecutors questioned Navarro about his knowledge of the
dangers of drinking and driving. Navarro was asked whether
“that night [of the collision] . . . [he] knew . . . the dangers of
drinking” and more specifically whether he was “aware that if
you were to drink, and . . . get behind the wheel of a car, you
could kill someone.” He responded “Yes” to both questions.
Navarro also stated during this interview that he did not
recall any classes in school on drinking and driving. Navarro did
recall that the dangers of drinking and driving were discussed in
the booklet he read when he applied for his driver’s license. In
addition, when Navarro was 18 years old, he saw a crashed car
and a sign near Long Beach City College that talked about not
drinking and driving. When asked to explain what he knew
about drinking and driving, Navarro said that a driver “could get
in trouble” if he or she had a blood alcohol level of “over 0.8,” by
which he presumably meant .08 percent. When asked to clarify
whether one could “[j]ust get in trouble” or whether “things could
be worse,” Navarro responded that he “really didn’t think about
hitting someone” but rather “was just thinking that you could get
in a crash.”
8
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Implied Malice
Navarro argues there is no substantial evidence that he
acted with implied malice sufficient to support his second degree
murder conviction.3 “[A] conviction for second degree murder,
based on a theory of implied malice, requires proof that a
defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger to human
life.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) Acting with
“conscious disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury” does not
suffice. (Ibid.) “[I]mplied-malice murder has a physical
component: an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to
life. And it has a mental component: [the] defendant’s deliberate
performance of the act with conscious disregard for life, knowing
the act endangers another’s life. [Citation.] The mental
component calls for a subjective inquiry into a defendant’s state
of mind and requires ‘a determination that the defendant
actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.’
(People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297 . . . .)” (In re
Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 604, italics omitted.)
In People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson), our
Supreme Court reversed an order dismissing second degree
murder charges in a criminal information charging both
manslaughter and murder based on the same fatal incident of
drunk driving.4 In so doing, the court held that “a defendant may
3 Navarro does not contest his convictions for vehicular
manslaughter.
4 “At the preliminary examination, the magistrate [had]
found probable cause to charge [the] defendant with vehicular
manslaughter, but refused to hold him to answer the second
9
be charged with second degree murder upon facts which also
would support a charge of vehicular manslaughter” (id. at p. 299),
and further concluded that “[t]he circumstances of the offense, as
elicited at the preliminary examination” (id. at p. 293) “imply
malice and therefore justify charging . . . second degree murder.”
(Id. at p. 300.) The court noted the following specific
circumstances in reaching this conclusion: “[The d]efendant had
consumed enough alcohol to raise his blood alcohol content to a
level which would support a finding that he was legally
intoxicated. He had driven his car to the establishment where he
had been drinking, and he must have known that he would have
to drive it later. It also may be presumed that [the] defendant
was aware of the hazards of driving while intoxicated.[5] . . . [The
degree murder counts, concluding that the facts elicited at the
preliminary examination were insufficient to demonstrate the
essential element of implied malice. Despite the magistrate’s
ruling, the People included in the information the two counts of
second degree murder which were rejected by the magistrate.”
(Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 294.) The defendant successfully
moved to dismiss the murder counts, and the People appealed
from the order of dismissal. (Ibid.)
5 The Watson court explained this presumptive knowledge
by stating: “ ‘One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to
the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must
operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired
physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force
and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious
disregard of the safety of others.’ ” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at
pp. 300-301.) Other language in Watson, as well as subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, clarify that implied malice requires
actual awareness of the risk of death. (See, e.g., In re Ferrell,
10
d]efendant drove at highly excessive speeds through city streets,
an act presenting a great risk of harm or death. [The d]efendant
nearly collided with a vehicle after running a red light; he
avoided the accident only by skidding to a stop. He thereafter
resumed his excessive speed before colliding with the victims’ car,
and then belatedly again attempted to brake his car before the
collision . . . suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of
harm which he had created. In combination, these facts
reasonably and readily support a conclusion that [the] defendant
acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.”
(Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300-301.)
Watson cautioned that it was “neither contemplat[ing] nor
encourag[ing] the routine charging of second degree murder in
vehicular homicide cases,” and further that it was “not
suggest[ing] that the foregoing facts conclusively demonstrate
implied malice, or that the evidence necessarily is sufficient to
convict [the] defendant of second degree murder.” (Watson,
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 301.) Rather, the court described its
holding as “merely determin[ing] that the evidence before [it was]
sufficient to uphold the second degree murder counts in the
information, and to permit the prosecution to prove, if it [could],
the elements of second degree murder.” (Ibid.)
In reviewing Navarro’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support implied malice under a Watson murder
theory, “we ‘review the entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 604; Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 296-
297.)
11
solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” that Navarro acted with implied
malice. (People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 505, 512.) In so
doing, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s finding.
Navarro argues that in the prototypical Watson murder
case the defendant has prior convictions for drunk driving and/or
the defendant had been expressly cautioned as to the risk of
killing someone while driving under the influence. (See, e.g.,
People v. Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 713, 730 [evidence of
“multiple warnings about the dangers of driving while under the
influence of controlled substances,” including that the defendant
“signed a driver’s license application affirming he had been
advised that driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs could
lead to a murder charge”]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
351, 359 [sufficient evidence of implied malice based on, inter
alia, evidence of four prior drunk driving convictions, the
defendant’s participation in a program in which residents “were
constantly ‘bombarded’ with horror stories of the dangers and
consequences of drunk driving” and passengers “desperately
[having] warned [the defendant], at the very time of driving, that
[he] was driving dangerously and should let [someone else] drive
because they did not want to be killed”]; People v. McCarnes
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 532 [four drunk driving convictions,
two of which required the defendant’s participation in drunk
driving educational programs].) Here, Navarro did not have a
prior drunk driving conviction and there was no evidence that he
was expressly cautioned as to the risk of death in driving while
intoxicated.
12
The lack of such evidence, however, is not dispositive
because Watson “ ‘deliberately . . . require[ed] a case-by-case
approach’ ” to assessing implied malice. (People v. Johnigan
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091, quoting People v. Olivas
(1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 989.) We thus look to the specific
evidence here and consider whether, in light of the principles
reflected in Watson, the jury could have reasonably found that
Navarro acted with conscious disregard for human life, knowing
that his actions endangered another’s life.
As in Watson, Navarro was driving with a blood alcohol
level well above the legal limit. Because Navarro was under the
age of 21, his legal blood alcohol limit was under 0.01 percent.
(Veh. Code, § 23136.) The criminologist estimated Navarro’s
level to be 0.17 percent—approximately 17 times the legal limit,
and more than double the limit for someone of legal drinking
age—and it was in any event no lower than 0.113 percent. As to
pre-drinking intent to drive while drunk, Navarro drove to an
abandoned golf course after purchasing liquor and drank the
alcohol there, such that the jury could reasonably infer he
intended to drive away from the golf course afterwards (as he in
fact did).
Navarro drove his SUV between approximately 30 to 40
miles per hour over the speed limit down a residential street on
Halloween evening when people were out walking. He did not
slow down but instead continued to accelerate. He flew through
multiple stop signs without stopping. He was moving at such a
high speed that he lost control and drove onto the sidewalk. The
evidence further showed Navarro was driving at such a high
speed and with such a conscious disregard to human life that
when he hit the Awaida family, he flung them into the air with
13
such force that he inflicted horrific injuries that killed all three of
them. Navarro then continued to drive along the sidewalk—
where thankfully no one else was still in his path—hitting signs
and toppling a concrete water fountain before finally stopping.
These types of actions presenting a great risk of harm or death
are well within the ambit of prior cases applying Watson. (See,
e.g., People v. Saucedo, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 513 [the
defendant “accelerat[ed] down the exit ramp” and “careen[ed]
through a red light without attempting to brake” while
intoxicated]; People v. Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 730
[the defendant drove through a red light at more than double the
applicable speed limit in a residential neighborhood without
braking or honking the car horn”]; People v. Wolfe (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 673, 679, 684 [the defendant veered off the street,
struck a pedestrian standing by the side of the road, and
continued driving].)
Finally, Navarro’s 2019 encounter with police showed that
he knew it was too dangerous to drive while intoxicated such that
he tried to sleep it off before doing so. He also admitted to police
that he was aware before he started to drive away from the golf
course and towards the Awaida family “that if you were to drink,
and . . . get behind the wheel of a car, you could kill someone.”
Such evidence showed that Navarro “must have known [alcohol]
affected his decisionmaking and ability to concentrate.
[Citations.] The jury could reasonably infer that by getting
behind the wheel while [intoxicated from alcohol] and then
attempting such . . . risky” driving maneuvers as he did in a
neighborhood with families and friends out trick or treating that
Navarro “was acting ‘ “ ‘with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Saucedo, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.)
14
Navarro points out that he did not attend educational
courses on the dangers of drunk driving, he did not flee the scene
and was cooperative and apologetic after the incident, he was 20
years old at the time, and there was no evidence that he had been
previously involved in any prior “near-misses.” He further argues
that his statement that he knew that one can kill another if they
drink and drive should be viewed together with other statements
to the police that he “really didn’t think about hitting someone,”
but rather “was just thinking that you could get in a crash.” The
weight of such evidence versus the facts favoring conviction we
have recited was for the jury to determine. Although we review
the “entire record” to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we do not reweigh the
evidence. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,” as
they do here, we will not reverse the judgment “simply because
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings Do Not
Mandate Reversal
Navarro also asserts we should reverse his murder
convictions because the court prejudicially abused its discretion
when making several evidentiary rulings. As to some of this
evidence, Navarro waived any claim of error because he did not
object to its admission during his trial. As to the rulings he did
preserve for appeal, Navarro argues the court erred in admitting
autopsy photographs of injuries suffered by Reihan and Omar, in
refusing to admit evidence that he asked for permission to take a
knee and pray for his victims after he was taken into custody,
and in admitting evidence that the center console of the car in
15
which he was found drunk and asleep in May 2019 contained
shotgun shells. As explained below, we find no reversible error in
these rulings.
1. Admitted Evidence to Which Navarro Did Not Object
at Trial
On appeal, Navarro objects to the court’s admission of
autopsy photographs showing Joseph’s injuries, video from a
body-worn camera on an officer responding to the scene, and
photographs of the area around the crash showing various objects
identified by numbered crime scene placards. Navarro
acknowledges his trial counsel did not object to any of this
evidence at trial. As to each of these challenged pieces of
evidence, “[b]ecause he failed to make an appropriate objection,
the issue is waived. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)” (People v.
Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320.)
Navarro argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object, and we therefore should excuse this waiver and reach
his claims on direct appeal. Our Supreme Court has “repeatedly
emphasized that a claim of ineffective assistance is more
appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding,” where
evidence can be presented regarding the reasons for counsel’s
tactical decisions, and not on direct appeal. (People v. Michaels
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 526.) In accord with that guidance, we
decline to address Navarro’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal. We find such deference particularly
appropriate here as Navarro does not suggest his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the admission of testimony from
the medical examiner who described Joseph’s injuries
independent of the photographs, testimony from the responding
officer about what he observed independent of the body-worn
16
camera corroborating his testimony, or testimony from a police
officer who introduced diagrams showing the path of Navarro’s
SUV from the point it drove onto the sidewalk until it stopped
that relied on the photographs showing the location of various
objects at the crime scene.
2. The Autopsy Photographs of Raihan and Omar
a. The Photographs and Related Testimony
Deputy medical examiner Matthew Miller examined the
bodies of Raihan and Omar. Miller testified that Omar died from
blunt force traumatic injuries. Miller further testified without
objection that the injuries leading to Omar’s death included a
fracture of the left frontal bone in his head, accompanied by a
skin laceration in the same area. Both bones in Omar’s left
forearm were broken, as was his pelvis. The prosecution then
introduced five photographs depicting the injuries to which Miller
had just testified: three pictures of Omar’s injured face (one from
the front, one from the left side, and one from the right side), one
picture of his broken left arm, and one picture of his fractured
right leg. Navarro objected to the photographs; the court
overruled the objection stating “[t]here’s an evidentiary purpose
for it.”
Miller testified Raihan also died of blunt force traumatic
injuries. He testified without objection that the injuries Raihan
suffered leading to her death included bleeding around the brain,
and lacerations of the liver, spleen, and kidney along with
associated bleeding. She also had a broken left arm where the
broken bone went through her skin, and a fractured ankle. The
prosecution then introduced five photos of Raihan depicting the
injuries Miller had just described, each of which showed a
17
different injury. Navarro again objected, and the court again
overruled the objection.
b. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Under
Evidence Code Section 352
Navarro argues the court erred in admitting these autopsy
photographs, citing Evidence Code section 352. He argues the
photographs had little to no relevance to any issue in dispute,
and their prejudicial effect thus outweighed their minimal
probative value. He further argues that absent admission of
these photographs, there is a reasonable probability the jury
would not have convicted him of murder, justifying reversal of his
convictions for that crime.
In murder cases, courts are “often asked to rule on the
propriety of the admission of allegedly gruesome photographs.
[Citations.] At base, the applicable rule is simply one of
relevance, and the trial court has broad discretion in determining
such relevance. [Citation.] ‘ “[M]urder is seldom pretty, and
pictures, testimony and physical evidence in such a case are
always unpleasant” ’ [citations], and we rely on our trial courts to
ensure that relevant, otherwise admissible evidence is not more
prejudicial than probative (Evid. Code, § 352). A trial court’s
decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code section 352
will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such
photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. [Citation.]
Finally, prosecutors, it must be remembered, are not obliged to
prove their case with evidence solely from live witnesses; the jury
is entitled to see details of the victims’ bodies to determine if the
evidence supports the prosecution’s theory of the case.
[Citations.]” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 624.)
18
No one disputes the photographs demonstrated the cause of
Raihan and Omar’s deaths. Navarro and our dissenting
colleague nevertheless claim the photographs had low probative
value on this point because they were cumulative of other
evidence such as medical examiner testimony, and because the
cause of death was not contested at trial. But “[t]he prosecution
was not obliged to prove these details solely from the testimony of
live witnesses, and the jury was entitled to see how the physical
details of the scene and body supported the prosecution theory of
murder . . . .” (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 706.)
Photographs that corroborate and clarify a medical examiner’s
testimony regarding the cause of death and condition of a victim’s
body, as these photographs did, have long been held to have
meaningful probative value and to be noncumulative. (E.g.,
People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 171 [photograph of
charred murder victim relevant because it corroborated
testimony of coroner “regarding the cause of death and condition
of the body”]; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 19 [“insofar as
[the] defendant is contending that the trial court was required to
exclude the photograph under Evidence Code section 352 because
[it] was cumulative of the testimonial evidence presented, the
trial court correctly rejected [the] defendant’s argument”]; People
v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938 [“ ‘[w]e have often rejected the
argument that photographs of a murder victim should be
excluded as cumulative if the facts for which the photographs are
offered have been established by testimony’ ”].) The photographs
here corroborated the medical examiner’s testimony by showing
the injuries to which he testified. Each picture showed a
different injury; none was repetitive. “In these circumstances, a
picture could be worth a thousand words; the images were not
19
simply cumulative of other testimony.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58
Cal.4th 527, 557.)
Navarro’s decision not to contest the cause of death
similarly did not reduce the photographs’ probative value. His
decision not to dispute the cause of death did not relieve the
prosecution of its burden to prove that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. “[A]utopsy . . . photographs are not made inadmissible
because they are offered to prove an issue not in dispute.”
(People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 684.) “[T]he absence of a
defense challenge to particular aspects of the prosecution’s case
or its witnesses does not render victim photographs irrelevant.”
(People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 641.)
In addition to demonstrating the cause of death was the
injuries inflicted by Navarro when he hit Raihan and Omar, the
extent of the victims’ injuries was probative of implied malice.
Photographs about the nature of the victims’ injuries “made it
much easier to visualize” the level of disregard Navarro showed
to the life of his victims. (People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 557.) The dissent does not directly dispute the photographs’
relevancy to implied malice but concludes their probative value
on this issue was “minimal at best” for two reasons. First, it
asserts the photographs were cumulative of other evidence. As
explained above, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this
assertion. (E.g., People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 171;
People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19; People v. Wilson,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 938.)
Second, the dissent claims evaluating the photographs’
probative value as to implied malice “necessarily involves two
steps . . . : (1) the more extensive the injuries a victim sustains in
a car accident, the more likely it is that the driver causing those
20
injuries was driving in a highly dangerous manner; and (2) when
a driver is driving in a highly dangerous manner, it is more likely
he is aware that his driving poses a risk to human life.” The
dissent then proceeds to cast doubt on both these purported
steps, as well as case law citing a defendant’s dangerous driving
as a factor in assessing implied malice.
Contrary to the dissent’s proposed test of probative value,
implied malice is not limited to what is in a defendant’s head.
“The concept of implied malice has both a physical and a mental
component. [Citation.] The physical component is satisfied by
the performance of ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which
are dangerous to life.” ’ [Citation.] The mental component . . .
involves an act ‘ “deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4
Cal.4th 91, 106-107.) As previously discussed above, Watson
itself recognizes these twin components. (Watson, supra, 30
Cal.3d at p. 300 [“malice may be implied when [the] defendant
does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and
does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard
for human life,” italics added].)
Watson and cases that have followed it recognize that a
defendant’s highly dangerous driving is one of the facts that in
combination with other evidence can “reasonably and readily
support a conclusion that [the] defendant acted wantonly and
with a conscious disregard for human life.” (Id. at p. 301; see also
People v. Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 727 [noting factors
for assessing implied malice under Watson include “ ‘highly
dangerous driving’ ”]; People v. Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
21
p. 683 [same]; People v. Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 358
[same].)
Photographs of the victims’ injuries were therefore
probative of the physical component of implied malice. The
severity of the injuries Raihan and Omar suffered showed how
wantonly Navarro was acting when he inflicted those injuries.
The dissent does not and frankly cannot dispute this correlation
in the case before us, and focuses instead on other potential
hypothetical scenarios where such a relationship may not exist.
Needless to say, we decide the case before us and not one of those
hypotheticals.
Given that the photographs had meaningful probative
value on the physical component of implied malice, they did not
need also to demonstrate the mental component of implied
malice. Even so, they did. The dissent posits “there is at best an
attenuated connection between how dangerously one is driving
and whether one is aware that such driving poses a risk not just
of injury or accident, but of death specifically.” Case law has
drawn the opposite conclusion, indicating that the extent of
Navarro’s highly dangerous driving “further supported a jury
inference that he knew he . . . was aware of the danger to human
lives, and deliberately proceeded in conscious disregard of that
risk.” (People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 747.) For
example, in People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, the
defendant drove 70 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone,
ran a red light, crossed out of the traffic lane going in his
direction, and struck someone without even attempting to apply
his brakes (id. at p. 941)—facts similar to those before us. The
Moore court found these actions showed as to the physical
component of implied malice that the defendant “acted with
22
wanton disregard of the near certainty that someone would be
killed.” (Ibid.) They also showed the mental component of
implied malice: “Whether [the defendant] was subjectively aware
of the risk is best answered by the question: how could he not be?
It takes no leap of logic for the jury to conclude that because
anyone would be aware of the risk, [the defendant] was aware of
the risk” posed by his driving. (Ibid.)
Citing In re Ferrell, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 604, the
dissent intimates our high court has prohibited drawing any
inferences as to the mental component of implied malice from the
physical component. That is not what In re Ferrell states, and
the dissent identifies no court that has so held. In re Ferrell
analyzed not a Watson murder theory but the prejudicial impact
of erroneous jury instructions in a case where the defendant
discharged a firearm. In re Ferrell reiterated that “[i]mplied
malice requires proof of both a physical act and a mental state”
and that proof of one without the other is insufficient. (Id. at
pp. 600, 604.) In re Ferrell does not say that one cannot consider
proof of the physical component of implied malice when
evaluating the mental component, nor did it overrule the many
cases that have done exactly that. Indeed, In re Ferrell itself
evaluated what inferences could be drawn as to the mental
component of implied malice from the defendant’s firing of a gun
in concluding the People had not shown the instructional error
was harmless. (Id. at pp. 604-608.)
Given the relevance of the photographs to multiple issues
on which the People carried the burden of proof, the court did not
abuse its discretion in determining their probative value
outweighed the possibility of there being a substantial danger of
undue prejudice, and in admitting the evidence. “To establish an
23
abuse of discretion, defendants must demonstrate that the trial
court’s decision was so erroneous that it ‘falls outside the bounds
of reason.’ [Citations.] A merely debatable ruling cannot be
deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of
discretion will be ‘established by “a showing the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390.) In our view, the arguments of
Navarro and the dissent do not satisfy this standard. Indeed, the
only case cited by Navarro and the dissent which found error in
the admission of autopsy photographs is a 50-year-old opinion in
which the pictures’ depiction of the injuries was “heightened by
vivid coloration” (People v. Smith (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 51, 69,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Wetmore (1978) 22
Cal.3d 318, 324, 327, fns. 5 & 7), something that did not occur
here. Even there, however, the Smith court found the “error
nevertheless did not cause a miscarriage of justice and furnishes
no ground for reversal.” (People v. Smith, supra, at p. 69.)
When evaluating prejudice, we must keep in mind that
“ ‘all evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or
damaging to the defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the
more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence
Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual
and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying
[Evidence Code] section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with
“damaging.” ’ ” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) Here,
the disputed images did not constitute a blatant appeal to the
jury’s emotions distinct from evidence that fairly depicted the
24
horror that Navarro himself perpetrated; they “ ‘did not disclose
to the jury any information that was not presented in detail
through the testimony of witnesses,’ and they were ‘no more
inflammatory than the graphic testimony provided by a number
of the prosecution’s witnesses.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cole (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1158, 1199.)
3. Evidence of Concern for Victims After the Fact
Evidence was admitted that after the collision, Navarro
stayed at the scene and did not attempt to flee. Witnesses also
testified that Navarro appeared to be in shock and was
remorseful and apologetic.
In addition to this testimony, Navarro sought to introduce
evidence through police officers that several hours after his
arrest, while in police custody and waiting at the hospital for a
blood draw, he asked for permission to kneel and pray for his
victims. Navarro argued this evidence was relevant to whether
he acted with conscious disregard of human life at the time of his
offenses. The trial court ruled this evidence was both hearsay
and irrelevant to whether Navarro acted with conscious
disregard of human life but might become relevant and
admissible if Navarro testified. Navarro ultimately decided not
to testify in his own defense.
We need not address whether this evidence was subject to a
hearsay rule exception because even if it was, the evidence was
irrelevant. Navarro cites three cases in support of his argument
that this evidence was relevant to his mens rea, but none is
apposite. In all three cases, evidence was admitted about the
defendants’ actions after their endangering acts but before their
victims died. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 505, 511;
People v. Latham (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319, 330-331; People v.
25
Ogg (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 38, 51.) The defendants’ indifference
to the plight of their victims while those victims were still alive
was relevant to show the defendants’ conscious disregard of
human life. (People v. Cravens, supra, at p. 511; People v.
Latham, supra, at p. 332; People v. Ogg, supra, at p. 51.) Here, in
contrast, Navarro had already killed the Awaida family hours
before the time he asked to take a knee and pray. His belated
request to pray for people he had already killed thus had no
relevance to whether he acted with conscious disregard of human
life when Joseph, Raihan, and Omar were still alive and capable
of being helped. As the proffered evidence was irrelevant, the
trial court did not err in excluding it.
4. Shotgun Shells
One of the officers who spoke to Navarro in connection with
the May 2019 incident testified at trial regarding a video of that
encounter. At one point in the video, while Navarro is still inside
the car, the officer grabs a box from the center console and then
slams the console shut. The officer then quickly ordered Navarro
out of the vehicle. To explain this sequence of events, the
prosecutor asked the officer what was in the box, and the officer
responded it contained shotgun shells. The officer was asked why
he then ordered Navarro out of the car, and the officer responded
that based on the shotgun shells he was concerned there might be
a weapon inside the car. The officer then clarified that no
weapon was later found inside the vehicle.
Before this testimony, the court admonished the jury that
evidence regarding the May 2019 encounter was being introduced
for the limited purpose of determining Navarro’s intent as it
related to conscious disregard for human life on the day of the
crash and not to show his bad character or predisposition to
26
commit crimes. After this testimony, the court instructed the
jury that it was not illegal to possess shotgun shells, and that
testimony on this point was admitted only to explain why the
officer reacted so quickly.
Navarro argues this evidence was irrelevant because there
was no need to explain the officer’s actions, and that the error
(either considered alone or in combination with other alleged
evidentiary errors) was prejudicial. This evidence had some
limited probative value; without this explanation, the officer’s
actions would have been confusing and potentially undermined
his credibility. Although the probative value of this brief
testimony was low, the court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence particularly given the admonitions it gave
before and after the testimony to mitigate any undue prejudice.
(People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869-870 [“Inasmuch as
the jury was promptly and correctly instructed as to the limited
purpose of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in allowing the
testimony”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
I concur:
BENDIX, J.
27
ROTHSCHILD, P. J., Dissenting.
Although, in my view, the evidence supporting implied
malice is close, it is nonetheless sufficient to survive scrutiny
under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review.
I write separately to address Navarro’s argument that
the court abused its discretion in overruling his Evidence Code
section 352 objections to the autopsy photographs of Raihan
Awaida and her 3-year-old son, Omar Awaida. As a result of
this ruling, the jury saw five photographs of Omar’s battered
body: a close up of the child’s injured face with a long line of
suturing down the center of his forehead; other close-up images
of his face highlighting abrasions and bruising; an image of his
bandaged and bloody left arm and his left hand; and an image of
his fractured right leg. The jury also saw five photos of Raihan,
including a close-up of her face with extensive bruising, cuts and
abrasions, and an image of her fully nude, extensively bruised
body with a wrapped right leg, exposing her pubic area and one
breast.
“ ‘ “A trial court’s decision to admit photographs
[challenged] under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on
appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly
outweighs their probative value.” ’ ” (People v. Duff (2014) 58
Cal.4th 527, 557 (Duff).) Navarro argues the court reversibly
erred in admitting these photographs, because they were not
relevant to any issue in dispute, and thus had at best minimal
probative value, yet posed an overwhelming risk that they would
inflame the passions of the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) I agree that
at most they had minimal probative value but were highly
prejudicial. I would thus reverse Navarro’s murder convictions
on this basis.
In assessing the probative value of the autopsy
photographs, the majority points primarily to their relevance in
proving the causes of the victims’ deaths. Cause of death was
not in meaningful dispute at trial, and the prosecution presented
other evidence, including the detailed testimony of the medical
examiner, establishing Raihan and Omar died as a result of the
collision with Navarro’s vehicle.
The majority notes that the prosecution was entitled
to present multiple types of evidence (i.e., both photographs
and testimony) to prove cause of death, and that a defendant
should not be permitted to avoid the full force of the evidence
by conceding an element of the crime can be proven. But that
cumulative evidence regarding points not in dispute is not
automatically excludable does not mean such evidence always
has sufficient probative value to withstand its prejudice. To
the contrary, the cumulativeness of evidence can, and here does,
decrease the probative value of photographic evidence in an
Evidence Code section 352 analysis. (See People v. Gurule
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 625 [ “[t]he fact that the photographic
evidence may have been cumulative to other evidence does not
render it inadmissible [citation], . . . [but] the trial court should
[nevertheless] consider [cumulativeness] when ruling on a motion
to exclude evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352”];
see also People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 905 [“ ‘[t]he
prosecution has no right to present cumulative evidence
which creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the
defendant’ ”].) Considering that these photographs offered
mere visual support for the causes of death to which the medical
examiner had already testified in detail, and that there was no
dispute at trial that Navarro’s driving into the Awaida family
2
caused their deaths, the probative value of the photographs on
this point was extremely low.
The majority notes that “[i]n addition to demonstrating
the cause of death . . . , the extent of the victims’ injuries was
probative of implied malice” because “[p]hotographs about the
nature of the victims’ injuries ‘made it much easier to visualize’
the level of disregard Navarro showed to the life of his victims.”
(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 20.) The reasoning underlying this theory of
relevance necessarily involves two steps. Namely: (1) the more
extensive the injuries a victim sustains in a car accident, the
more likely it is that the driver causing those injuries was driving
in a highly dangerous manner; and (2) when a driver is driving in
a highly dangerous manner, it is more likely he is aware that his
driving poses a risk to human life.
The majority’s reasoning builds one shaky theory of
relevance upon another. First, the photos are cumulative of
other evidence on both of these two points. The surveillance
camera footage of the accident and expert and percipient
witness testimony regarding speed already support that Navarro
was speeding and drove onto a curb, and that his driving was
generally erratic and dangerous. And the medical examiner’s
testimony already speaks to the extent of Omar’s and Raihan’s
injuries. As noted above, cumulativeness is a valid consideration
in evaluating probative value for the purposes of Evidence Code
section 352.
Second, it is not necessarily true that the extent of the
injuries inflicted in a collision correlates with how dangerously
the driver was driving. Although it is possible such a correlation
may exist under certain circumstances, numerous other factors
3
can play into the extent of injury, rending this logical connection
between serious injuries and more dangerous driving weak.
Third, there is at best an attenuated connection between
how dangerously one is driving and whether one is aware
that such driving poses a risk not just of injury or accident, but
of death specifically. (See People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 156 [acting with “conscious disregard of the risk of serious
bodily injury” does not suffice to establish implied malice].)
The connection is particularly attenuated when the individual
in question is intoxicated. Further, the logic that a driver is
more likely aware of the mortal risk his driving poses if his
driving is highly dangerous—or, more specifically here, if he is
speeding and driving onto the sidewalk—is in tension with our
state Supreme Court’s description of implied malice. The high
court has made clear that the prosecution cannot prove implied
malice by establishing the conduct at issue is “inherently
dangerous in the abstract or would appear risky to a reasonable
person.” (See, e.g., In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 604.) Yet
the majority’s reasoning requires precisely such logic; namely,
that because speeding and driving onto the sidewalk are
inherently highly dangerous acts, it is more likely Navarro was
aware that his driving in this manner posed a mortal threat.1
1 I am aware that some cases appear to have accepted this
reasoning and even cite “ ‘highly dangerous driving’ ” (People v.
Murphy (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 713, 727) as a factor in assessing
implied malice that derives directly from People v. Watson
(1981) 30 Cal.3d 290. (See, e.g., Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at p. 727.) Without calling into question the outcomes of those
cases on their unique facts, I note that, in Watson, the court
considered the manner of the defendant’s driving not on the
4
The majority’s theory of relevance thus compounds two
tenuous logical connections by inferring from the extent of the
victims’ injuries that Navarro drove dangerously, and then
further inferring that Navarro’s driving was so dangerous,
Navarro must have known it posed a mortal risk. The
tenuousness of this line of reasoning, its tension with broader
concepts of implied malice, and the fact that it relies on the
photographs to support inferences already established by other
evidence, all render the photographs’ probative value on implied
malice minimal at best.
Thus, I conclude the probative value of the photographs
on the issues at trial, including cause of death and implied
malice, was extremely low.
The question then becomes whether the photographs had a
prejudicial effect that “ ‘ “clearly outweighs” ’ ” their low probative
value. (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 557.) The “ ‘ “prejudice”
referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence
which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the
defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the
issues.’ ” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) Evidence
is prejudicial in this sense if it is “of such a nature as to overcome
theory that he was driving so recklessly he must have been
aware of a risk of death, but rather as follows: “Defendant nearly
collided with a vehicle after running a red light; he avoided the
accident only by skidding to a stop. He thereafter resumed his
excessive speed before colliding with the victims’ car, and then
belatedly again attempted to brake his car before the collision . . .
suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of harm which
he had created.” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 301.) Here,
nothing about the manner of Navarro’s driving suggests he
was aware of mortal risk in the way described in Watson.
5
the jury’s rationality” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th
174, 212) and cause the jury to consider the evidence “ ‘for an
illegitimate purpose.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 439 (Doolin).) Evidence can have such a prejudicial effect
when it “ ‘create[s] a substantial danger of inflaming the jury’s
passions by engendering . . . feelings of sympathy.’ ” (People v.
Covarrubias (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 942, 950; see Doolin, supra,
at p. 439.)
The autopsy photographs had such a prejudicial effect
that “ ‘ “outweigh[ed] their probative value.” ’ ” (Duff, supra,58 Cal.4th at p. 557.) Although the testimony describing
the victims’ deaths under the tragic circumstances of this
case is disturbing, the autopsy photographs are shocking.
The photographs include, for example, images of a dead
three-year-old child’s face with thick black suturing running
down the center of his forehead, and the severely battered face
of his mother. Some of the photographs are so close-up that
the image of each face takes up virtually the entire space in a
photograph, rendering them especially intimate and emotionally
powerful. And the image of the naked, severely bruised corpse
of the mother with her breast and pubic hair visible evokes great
anger. (See Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
I disagree with the majority that the photographs had
no more severe effect than the medical examiner testimony
regarding the causes of death and victims’ injuries. As the
majority notes with respect to other evidence, “a picture could
be worth a thousand words.” (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 557.)
Testimony describing the injuries of a dead child simply does not
have the same impact as images of a dead child—some close-up
enough that the jury could notice small, intimate details about
6
his face and body. Nor can we justify this additional impact as
necessary to provide additional insight into or support for the
causes of death beyond that already established by the testimony.
To the contrary, the photographs at best visually depict the
injuries the medical examiner describes and cannot speak to
whether those injuries were, in fact, the cause of death.2 These
photographs thus offer no additional information about the cause
of death and serve only to upset and inflame the passions of the
jury. “ ‘[E]vidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when
it . . . motivat[es] [the jury] to use the information, not to logically
evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or
punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction.’ ”
(Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439.) The photographs “supplied
no more than a blatant appeal to the jury’s emotions. . . . The
trial court erred in admitting them.” (People v. Smith (1973) 33
Cal.App.3d 51, 69.)
I would reverse the murder convictions based on the
court’s abuse of discretion in admitting these photographs
over Navarro’s objection. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
2 Indeed, some of the photographs depict injuries that,
according to the medical examiner’s testimony, did not contribute
to the victims’ deaths—such as injuries to Omar’s arm or
Raihan’s leg.
7