People v. Nelson CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/15/24 P. v. Nelson CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063524
v. (Super. Ct. No. C-92266)
OMAIMA AREE NELSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Omaima Aree Nelson, in pro. per.; Sylvia W. Beckham, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Omaima Aree Nelson filed a petition asking the trial
court to vacate her conviction for second degree murder and resentence her.
The court denied the petition, and Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that this court
review the entire record. Nelson was given notice and an opportunity to file a
supplemental brief, which she did.
Exercising our discretion under People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pages 231 to 232, we have independently examined the entire
record as well as counsel’s brief and Nelson’s supplemental brief, and we find
no reasonably arguable issue. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND1
Nelson married William Nelson on November 1, 1991, about four
weeks after they met. As we explained in an unpublished opinion affirming
Nelson’s conviction for murder, she “spent Thanksgiving weekend of 1991
killing, decapitating, dismembering, disemboweling, cooking, and freezing
William Nelson.” William’s skull (found in the freezer) had been struck by a
heavy object, consistent with an iron found in the bedroom closet which was
stained with blood and had hairs consistent with William’s. William’s heart
and lungs were recovered (possibly from a trash bag full of William’s
“entrails” which had been located in his car at the home); both were found to
have stab and slash wounds. William died either from the stab wounds to his
heart, lung, or carotid artery, or from the blows to his skull.
1
The relevant facts are drawn from this court’s prior unpublished
opinion. (People v. Nelson (Feb. 28, 1995, G013962) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
Nelson, who testified on her own behalf at the trial, claimed she
attacked William as he was physically and sexually assaulting her. “Nelson
denied intending to kill William or planning to take his money. She claimed
to have very little memory of his dismemberment, but recalled cutting off his
penis and his ring finger, cleaning the apartment, and packaging the body
parts.” A psychiatrist testified Nelson had suffered from chronic psychosis
before she killed William. A clinical psychologist testified Nelson suffered
from posttraumatic stress disorder and fit the definition of a psychotic.
Nelson had been the victim of significant abuse as a child in Egypt. Nelson
did not pursue an insanity defense at trial. Evidence of Nelson’s previous acts
of physical violence, as well as her acts of moral turpitude, was admitted to
counter her claim of battered woman syndrome.
In April 1992, Nelson was charged in an information with the
murder of William Nelson (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]),2 with
sentencing enhancement allegations of personal use of a deadly weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)), and commission of a crime while released on bail
(§ 12022.1). Nelson was also charged with assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2) [count 2]), attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 213,
subd. (a)(1) [count 3]), and false imprisonment (§ 236 [count 4]); the crimes
charged in counts 2, 3, and 4 were committed against Robert Hannson. The
information alleged Nelson personally used a firearm in committing counts 2,
3, and 4. (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).)
A jury found Nelson guilty of counts 1 and 2, and found true the
personal use of a deadly weapon and personal use of a firearm enhancements.
2
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
The jury acquitted Nelson of counts 3 and 4. In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found the on-bail sentencing enhancement allegation to be true.
The trial court sentenced Nelson to a term of 27 years to life:
15 years to life on count 1, the upper term of four years on count 2, five years
for the firearm enhancement, one year for the deadly weapon enhancement,
and two years for the on-bail enhancement. All other sentences were to run
consecutive to the sentence in count 1. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
(People v. Nelson (Feb. 28, 1995, G013962) [nonpub. opn.])
After this court issued an unpublished opinion affirming the
judgment, the trial court dismissed a 1991 automobile theft case against
Nelson that was the basis for the on-bail sentencing enhancement. This court
granted in part Nelson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ordered the trial
court to vacate the on-bail sentencing enhancement, and directed the court to
prepare a modified abstract of judgment. (In re Nelson (Aug. 31, 2000,
G026900 [nonpub. opn.].)
In June 2023, Nelson filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. Counsel was appointed for Nelson. Following briefing and a
hearing, the trial court denied Nelson’s petition. Nelson timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Nelson was charged as the actual killer of her husband, and the
evidence at trial supported the charge. The jury was not instructed on felony
murder, aiding and abetting, or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. The jury was fully instructed on the necessary mens rea to convict
Nelson of murder. Nelson was not entitled to resentencing based on the
amendments to sections 188 and 189.
In a supplemental brief, Nelson argues she did not have the
intent to kill because she was not in her “right healthy mind.” She contends
4
malice was negated because she “was under extremely a huge deal of stress,
PTSD, suffering from Battered Women Syndrom[e], mental disorders,
substance abuse history, lack of control, a history of [being] abused
psychologically, physically, sexually, and childhood trauma, and that I feared
for my life and acted insanely.” The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support Nelson’s conviction for murder was not before the trial court when it
3
ruled on her petition under section 1172.6, and it is not before us now.
The only issue before us now is whether the trial court properly
denied Nelson’s petition under section 1172.6. We conclude it did. Section
1172.6 allows “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime” to seek resentencing given the changes to sections 188 and 189.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute does not authorize a person convicted of
murder to re-litigate the same arguments raised at their original trial. In
addition, the statute does not apply to the actual perpetrator of a murder,
like Nelson. Here, malice was not imputed to Nelson based solely on her
participation in a murder committed by another person. To the contrary,
malice was established by the specifics of the murder she committed herself.
The trial court did not err in denying Nelson’s petition.
After an independent review of the entire appellate record and
the briefs of counsel and Nelson, we find no arguable issue. Nelson has been
3
Whether one or more of these psychological conditions negated
malice in the killing of William could have been—and was—addressed at
Nelson’s trial.
5
represented by competent counsel. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order
denying Nelson postjudgment relief.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
6