In re C.B. CA4/2 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 10/17/24 In re C.B. CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    In re C.B. et al, Persons Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
    CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           E083755
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.Nos. J287910, J287911)
    v.                                                                      OPINION
    C.B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
    Judge. Conditionally reversed with directions.
    Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Tom Bunton, County Counsel and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    1
    INTRODUCTION
    C.B (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights
    (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26) as to his children, C.B., Jr. and Josie B. (the children).
    Father contends the matter must be conditionally reversed and remanded because the
    court failed to ask two paternal relatives about the children’s possible Native American
    ancestry. We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for
    further proceedings.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    Father and Jamie N. had two children together — C.B, Jr. and Chloe N.. Father
    later married another woman named Tamara B., and they had one child together — Josie
    B.3
    On January 26, 2021, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services
    (CFS) filed petitions on behalf of C.B., Jr., who was nine years old at the time, and Josie
    B., who was six years old. Both petitions alleged that the children came within the
    provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to
    1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
    unless otherwise indicated.
    2 The first portion of the procedural background is taken from the opinion in
    father’s prior petition for extraordinary writ, in which he challenged the juvenile court’s
    order bypassing his reunification services. (C.B. v. Superior Court (June 6, 2022,
    E078770 [nonpub. opn.] (C.B.)) We incorporate the record in E078770 in this case.
    3 Neither Jamie N. nor Tamara B. are parties to this appeal.
    2
    protect), (f) (parent caused death of another child through abuse or neglect), (g) (no
    provision for support), (i) (cruelty), and (j) (abuse of sibling).
    The social worker filed a detention report and stated that CFS received an
    immediate response referral alleging physical abuse of the children by Tamara B. It was
    reported that Chloe N. (C.B. Jr.’s sister) got dizzy, fell, and hit her head. She became
    lethargic and Tamara B. attempted to feed her oatmeal, but she did not respond. Tamara
    B. gave Chloe N. Narcan and called the police. When they arrived, Chloe N. was
    unconscious. She was taken to the hospital where she was pronounced dead.
    (C.B., supra, E078770.) A social worker obtained a detention warrant for the children
    the following day, and the children were detained.
    The court held a detention hearing on January 27, 2021. The court asked Tamara
    B. if she had Native American ancestry, and she said she was registered with the “Yupik
    [sic], Eskimo tribe.”4 Father denied having any Native American ancestry. The court
    asked father where Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) was living, and father said he had no
    idea.5 The court detained the children and set a jurisdiction/disposition hearing for
    February 23, 2021.
    CFS initiated a search for Jamie N. and efforts revealed eight addresses and 11
    phone numbers. CFS sent Jamie N. notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing at the
    numerous addresses and confirmed one of the phone numbers as her contact number.
    4 The Jupik Tribe is apparently part of the Mekoryuk Tribe.
    5 The court then asked Tamara B. about her other son, Julian H., whose father was
    M.H. Julian H. is not a subject of this appeal.
    3
    Jurisdiction/Disposition
    The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report, requesting a 45-day
    continuance. The social worker reported that father denied having any known Native
    American ancestry again on February 2, 2021. However, on February 8, 2021, he said he
    may have an insignificant amount of Indian heritage, but did not name a tribe. Father
    also stated he was primarily raised by his mother, who had passed away. On February
    10, 2021, the social worker asked the paternal grandfather if there was any Native
    American ancestry on his side or the paternal grandmother’s side, and he said no.
    The social worker further reported that Jamie N. was given notice of the
    jurisdiction/hearing via phone call on February 5, 2021. The social worker received a
    return phone call from Jamie N., and the social worker informed her that Chloe N. passed
    away and C.B., Jr. was in CFS’s care. On February 12, 2021, the social worker
    conducted a phone interview with Jamie N. and asked if she had any Native American
    ancestry. Jamie N. claimed Indian heritage in the Chumash tribe through her father’s side
    of the family. Notices were sent out with regard to C.B., Jr., indicating that a child
    custody proceeding under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (
    25 U.S.C. § 1901
     et.
    seq.) (ICWA) had been initiated, and a jurisdiction/disposition hearing was scheduled for
    February 23, 2021. The notices indicated that C.B., Jr. may be eligible for membership
    in the Chumash tribe and listed information for Jamie N. and father. Notice was sent to
    the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Santa Ynez Band of Mission (Chumash) Indians, and
    the Tejon Indian Tribe. On or around February 11, 2021, the Santa Ynez Band of
    Chumash Indians responded and said C.B., Jr. was not an enrolled member and not
    4
    eligible for enrollment. The Tejon Indian Tribe also responded, stating C.B., Jr. and his
    parents were not members of the tribe.
    As to Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother), the social worker reported that, on January
    28, 2021, she said she had Native American ancestry through the maternal side of her
    family, and her mother and grandmother were enrolled members of a tribe called the
    Native Village of Mekoryuk (the Mekoryuk Tribe). On February 8, 2021, CFS sent
    ICWA notice to the BIA and the Mekoryuk Tribe. The Mekoryuk Tribe responded and
    said Tamara B. was an enrolled member, and her children were not members, but were
    eligible for enrollment. The Mekoryuk Tribe intervened and began to attend the
    dependency hearings.
    On April 8, 2021, the social worker filed an addendum to the
    jurisdiction/disposition report and requested another 45-day continuance. The
    jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued multiple times.
    On May 7, 2021, the court found that proper and adequate ICWA inquiry had been
    conducted by CFS as to Josie B., ICWA notice was sent out, and there had been an
    affirmative response of tribal eligibility of membership. The court ordered that ICWA
    applied and no further notice was required.
    The court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on March 23, 2022,
    sustained the petitions, and declared C.B., Jr. and Josie B. dependents. It bypassed
    reunification services for father and Jamie N. The court found that ICWA applied in
    Josie B.’s case and the Mekoryuk Tribe was her tribe, but that ICWA did not apply to
    C.B., Jr.. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for July 21, 2022.
    5
    Father filed a Notice of Intent to File a Writ Petition on March 30, 2022. This
    court affirmed the denial of his reunification services. (C.B., supra, E078770.)
    Section 366.26 and Permanent Plan Review (PPR)
    On July 20, 2022, the social worker filed a section 366.26 report recommending
    the “permanent plan of foster care with the permanent plan of adoption.”6 The report
    indicated ICWA did not apply to C.B, Jr. and that on March 23, 2022, the court found he
    did not come under the provisions of ICWA. As to Josie B., the report indicated that
    ICWA did apply.
    The court held a section 366.26 hearing on July 21, 2022. The court continued the
    children as dependents of the court, finding that termination of parental rights would be
    detrimental, as they were living with foster parents who were unwilling or unable to
    adopt them, but were willing to provide them with a stable environment. The court
    ordered the permanent plan of placement in foster care with a permanent plan of adoption
    and continued the matter for a PPR on January 20, 2023.
    The social worker filed a status review report on January 17, 2023 and noted that
    the court ordered an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children with the state of
    Alaska for placement of the children with Josie B.’s maternal grandparents. However,
    CFS had concerns regarding the protective capacity of the maternal grandparents. The
    social worker noted that the children wanted to be placed with the paternal grandfather
    6 The social worker actually filed separate section 366.26 reports with regard to
    C.B., Jr. and Josie B. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will just refer to the social
    worker’s section 366.26 report, understanding that it incorporates both reports.
    6
    and his wife, with a plan of adoption. As to C.B., Jr., the social worker opined that a
    section 366.26 hearing was not in C.B., Jr.’s interest since he was not a proper subject for
    adoption at that time and a potential legal guardian had not been identified.
    The court held a PPR hearing on January 20, 2023 and ordered no visitation
    between the children and their parents. It continued the matter to April 14, 2023 for a
    further PPR hearing.
    The court held a PPR hearing on April 14, 2023 and allowed the paternal
    grandfather and his wife overnight visits with the children three times a week. The court
    continued the matter to June 9, 2023.
    On June 9, 2023, the court held a hearing on the issue of placement. The court
    heard testimony from several witnesses, including father’s brother, Chris O. (the paternal
    uncle), and father’s aunt, Sharon L. (the paternal great aunt), who were there to testify
    about the paternal grandfather’s propensity for violence. The paternal great aunt was the
    paternal grandmother’s sister. After hearing testimony, the court ordered an extended
    visit with the paternal grandfather and his wife, and ordered the parties back on July 21,
    2023.
    On July 21, 2023, the court ordered the children placed with the paternal
    grandfather and his wife, and set a section 366.26 hearing to determine the most
    appropriate permanent plan.
    The court held a hearing on January 25, 2024, and Jamie N. made her first
    appearance in court. The court asked her if she had any Native American ancestry, and
    she said had Chumash ancestry and was in the process of enrolling with the tribe. Jamie
    7
    N. completed an ICWA Inquiry form (CFS 030) and an ICWA-020 form indicating that
    her father was a member of the “Chumash Santa Ynez Band.” The court ordered the
    matter continued to April 4, 2024.
    The social worker filed a report on April 2, 2024, recommending that the court
    terminate parental rights and set adoption as the permanent plan. She reported that, on
    March 4, 2024, CFS sent informal ICWA notice via email to the BIA and the “Santa
    Ynez Band of Cumash [sic] Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation.”
    Furthermore, the social worker contacted Jamie N.’s father, who said he was a registered
    member of the “Santa Ynez C[h]umash tribe.” However, on March 27, 2024, the social
    worker received notice from the Santa Ynez Chumash tribe stating, “This family is not
    from the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians.”
    The court held a section 366.26 hearing on April 4, 2024. County counsel
    informed the court that CFS attempted to contact the BIA and Chumash tribe regarding
    C.B., Jr., and there was no reason to believe or know he was a member or eligible for
    membership. County counsel requested the court to find that ICWA did not apply to
    C.B., Jr. The court asked if anyone objected to that finding, and no one objected. Thus,
    the court found that ICWA did not apply to C.B., Jr. As to Josie B., all parties stipulated
    to a qualified ICWA witness expert’s report, which stated that Josie B. was a member of
    the Mekoryuk tribe, and that removal from father and Tamara B. was necessary to protect
    her. The ICWA expert further reported that Josie B. “is placed in a Mekoryuk Native
    Village tribal ICWA preferred and compliant out of home placement” with C.B., Jr., and
    that the current caregivers indicated they were willing to support Josie B.’s connection to
    8
    the Mekoryuk Tribe. County counsel argued that the court should terminate parental
    rights and free the children for adoption. Father testified about the bond he had with the
    children and objected to the termination of parental rights, arguing that the beneficial
    parental exception applied. Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother) objected to the termination of
    parental rights and the plan of adoption. Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) submitted on
    CFS’s recommendation of termination of parental rights and adoption. Counsel for the
    children also submitted on CFS’s recommendation.
    The court found the children generally and specifically adoptable. It then found
    that the benefits of adoption outweighed the parent-child relationship, and it terminated
    parental rights.
    DISCUSSION
    The Matter Should Be Remanded for Further Inquiry
    Father’s sole argument on appeal is the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance
    with California law enacted to implement ICWA. Specifically, he cites California Rules
    of Court, rule 5.481, subdivision (a)(2)(A) (hereinafter, rule 5.481), and contends that
    during the placement hearing on June 9, 2023, the paternal uncle (Christopher O.) and the
    paternal great aunt (Sharon L.) testified, yet were not asked about possible Indian
    ancestry. Father avers that, under rule 5.481, the court owed a duty to ask “each
    participant” whether they knew or had reason to know the children were Indian children.
    He concludes that since CFS and/or the court failed to inquire of the paternal uncle and
    paternal great aunt, the court’s implied finding of an adequate inquiry constituted an
    abuse of discretion. We conclude the matter should be remanded for further inquiry.
    9
    A. Applicable Law
    “ICWA establishes minimum federal standards that a state court must follow
    before removing Indian children from their families. [Citation.] California law
    implementing ICWA also imposes requirements to protect the rights of Indian children,
    their families, and their tribes.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 
    82 Cal.App.5th 671
    , 678,
    disapproved on other grounds, as stated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 
    16 Cal.5th 1112
    , 1152, fn.
    18 (Dezi C.).) CFS and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing duty to
    inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”
    (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to develop information concerning whether a child is an
    Indian child rests with the court and the Department, not the parents or members of the
    parents’ families.” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 421
    , 430.) Section 224.2
    “creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the
    Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry
    to ask all involved persons whether the child may be an Indian child. [Citation.] Second,
    if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the
    Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and
    shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ [Citation.] Third, if that further inquiry
    results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice
    requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 1041
    , 1052
    (D.S.).)
    The duty of initial inquiry begins with the initial contact, when CFS must ask “the
    party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child
    10
    may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Once a child is taken into temporary
    custody, CFS must ask the child, the parents, legal guardian, extended family members,
    and others who have an interest in the child whether the child is or may be an Indian
    child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s
    stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, and sisters. (
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (2);
    § 224.1, subd. (c).)
    “At the commencement of a child custody proceeding, the court is obligated
    to inquire from each participant whether there is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is or
    may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (a); 
    25 C.F.R. § 23.107
    (a) (2024); § 224.2, subd. (c)7.)
    The juvenile court “has a responsibility to ascertain that the agency has conducted
    an adequate investigation and cannot simply sign off on the notices as legally adequate
    without doing so.” (In re K.R. (2018) 
    20 Cal.App.5th 701
    , 709.) If the court finds that
    CFS has complied with its duty of inquiry and there is no reason to know that the child is
    an Indian child, then the court may find that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2);
    Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) “A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does
    not apply implies ‘that social workers had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.’ ” (In re
    7 We note that, effective September 27, 2024, section 224.2, subdivision (c) was
    amended and provides that at the first hearing on a petition, “the court shall ask each
    party to the proceeding and all other interested persons present whether the child is, or
    may be, an Indian child, whether they know or have reason to know that the child is an
    Indian child.”
    11
    Dominick D. (2022) 
    82 Cal.App.5th 560
    , 567.) “[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA
    findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable,
    credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.” (In re A.M. (2020) 
    47 Cal.App.5th 303
    , 314.) However, “‘the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that
    an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is “a quintessentially discretionary
    function” [Citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.’” (Dezi C., 
    supra,
     16
    Cal.5th at p. 1141; see, In re K.H. (2022) 
    84 Cal.App.5th 566
    , 589 [“the court has
    relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
    adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case”].)
    B. The Court’s ICWA Finding Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
    It is undisputed that the paternal uncle and the paternal great aunt were not asked
    about the children’s potential Indian ancestry at the placement hearing. However, CFS
    contends it complied with its duty of inquiry, and any error was harmless, since there was
    extensive ICWA noticing to the relevant tribes, and there was tribal participation in the
    proceedings. Further, it was speculative to think that inquiring of the paternal uncle and
    paternal great aunt would reveal any relevant information.
    We first note this case is unique in that it involves father’s two children, C.B., Jr.
    and Josie B., who have different mothers. Although there are three parents involved,
    father’s claim only concerns his side of the family. The record demonstrates that, at the
    detention hearing on January 27, 2021, the court asked father if he had any Native
    American ancestry, and he said no. He again denied having any known Native American
    ancestry on February 2, 2021. However, a few days later, father said he may have an
    12
    insignificant amount of Indian heritage, but did not name a tribe. The social worker then
    asked the paternal grandfather if there was any Native American ancestry on his side or
    the paternal grandmother’s side, and he said no.
    Father contends the failure of the court or CFS to ask the paternal uncle and the
    paternal great aunt about possible Indian ancestry at the placement hearing was
    “potentially significant” since it was “unclear whether the ICWA might also apply to
    both children based on the paternal grandmother’s Indian ancestry.” He notes that the
    paternal grandmother was deceased and could not be questioned, and contends that her
    son, the paternal uncle, and especially her sister, the paternal great aunt, “were likely to
    know” whether the paternal grandmother had Indian ancestry.
    “At the commencement of a child custody proceeding, the court is obligated
    to inquire from each participant whether there is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is or
    may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; 
    25 U.S.C. § 1912
    (a); 
    25 C.F.R. § 23.107
    (a) (2024); § 224.2, subd. (c).) “An implementing federal
    regulation … observes that ‘participants could … include … relatives or trial witnesses,
    depending on who is involved in the case.’” (Dezi C., 
    supra,
     16 Cal.5th at p. 1130, fn. 3.)
    Here, the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt were trial witnesses at the placement
    hearing on June 9, 2023 and were not asked if he/she had reason to know the children
    were Indian children. (Dezi C., 
    supra,
     16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; § 224.2, subd. (c).)
    Notably, “[t]he operative concept [of section 224.2] is those people who are reasonably
    available to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential
    Indian ancestry should be asked.” (Dezi C., 
    supra,
     16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) The paternal
    13
    uncle and paternal great aunt were readily available when they appeared in court to
    testify, and they should have been asked about the children’s potential Indian ancestry.
    Thus, the inquiry was inadequate.
    Although father’s claim only involves his side of the family, we acknowledge that
    CFS thoroughly inquired about the children’s potential Native American ancestry on their
    mothers’ sides. When Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) claimed Indian heritage in the
    Chumash tribe, CFS sent ICWA notice to the BIA, Santa Ynez Band of Mission
    (Chumash) Indians, and the Tejon Indian Tribe. The Santa Ynez Band responded that
    C.B., Jr. was not eligible for enrollment, and the Tejon Indian Tribe similarly responded
    that he was not a member of the tribe. The record also indicates that CFS subsequently
    sent informal ICWA notice via email to the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission
    Indians, and the Santa Ynez Chumash tribe responded that “[t]his family is not from the
    Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians.” When Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother) stated her
    mother and grandmother were enrolled members of the Mekoryuk Tribe, CFS sent ICWA
    notice to the BIA and the Mekoryuk Tribe. The Mekoryuk Tribe responded that Josie B.
    was eligible for enrollment, and it intervened in the proceedings.
    Ultimately, because the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt were not asked
    about the children’s possible Indian ancestry, the court should not have found that ICWA
    did not apply to C.B., Jr. (See In re K.T. (2022) 
    76 Cal.App.5th 732
    , 744.) Although the
    court properly found that ICWA applied to Josie B., further inquiry of these paternal
    relatives is still required. The order terminating parental rights must therefore be
    conditionally reversed, and the matter remanded for the court or CFS to make the proper
    14
    inquiry. (§ 224.2, subds. (b) and (c).) If the inquiry reveals a reason to believe C.B., Jr.
    is an Indian child and Josie B. is an Indian child through a tribe other than the Mekoryuk
    Tribe, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing
    provisions. (Dezi C., 
    supra,
     16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The matter is
    remanded to the juvenile court with directions to comply with the inquiry provisions of
    ICWA and of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224.2 (and, if applicable, the notice
    provisions as well) — specifically, to inquire of the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt
    regarding the children’s Native American ancestry. If, after completing the inquiry,
    neither CFS nor the court has reason to believe or know the children are Indian children,
    the order terminating parental rights shall be reinstated. If CFS or the court has reason to
    believe that the children are Indian children, the court shall proceed in conformity with
    ICWA and California implementing provisions.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    FIELDS
    J.
    We concur:
    CODRINGTON
    Acting P. J.
    RAPHAEL
    J.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E083755

Filed Date: 10/17/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2024