People v. Salas CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/16/24 P. v. Salas CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B324105
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. KA063662)
v.
JESUS SALAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Jesus Salas Jr. of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder and attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder and found true various firearm allegations.
The trial court sentenced Salas to a prison term of 50 years to
life, plus a term of life with a minimum parole eligibility of seven
years. The trial court struck the firearm enhancements on the
attempted murder conviction.
Salas argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 571 and CALCRIM No. 604 on imperfect self-
defense for murder and attempted murder, respectively. Salas
contends the instructions were erroneous because they did not
tell the jurors that they could convict him of voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder (and attempted voluntary
manslaughter rather than attempted murder) if they found he
used more force than was reasonably necessary for self-defense.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing
the jury on self-defense with the pattern jury instructions.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Salas Kills One Person and Injures Another
August 29, 2003 was Osiris “Ozzy” Bernal’s 19th birthday.
That evening his friends Juan “Johnny” Mora and Moises Villalta
were celebrating with Bernal at his home in El Monte with a few
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other friends. They were hanging out, drinking, and listening to
the radio.
After the group had been at Bernal’s house for three or four
hours, a car drove by around midnight with Salas in the back
seat. The car drove away toward Salas’s house, and the group
continued hanging out in Bernal’s garage.
Five minutes later, Salas appeared in the street in front of
Bernal’s house. Mora walked over to Salas and asked why he
was there. As Mora approached Salas, he noticed Salas had a
rifle. Mora told him to leave. Villalta saw Salas was screaming
and acting aggressive toward Mora. Villalta pushed Mora out of
the way and swung at Salas. Salas took a step back and fired
several shots, hitting Villalta in the chest. Villalta swung at
Salas two more times.
Mora grabbed Villalta, lowered him to the ground, and
tried to hide behind a car. As Mora ran away, Salas shot him in
the shoulder. Mora looked and saw Salas running backward and
shooting in Mora’s direction. Bernal called the 911 emergency
operator, and paramedics arrived and took Villalta and Mora to
the hospital. Villalta died as a result of his gunshot wound.
B. Salas Describes His History with the Assassins and
Salas Gives His Version of the Shooting
According to Salas, long before the August 29, 2003
shooting he had conflicts with a group of men that included
Bernal, Villalta, and Mora and whose members referred to
themselves as the Assassins. The members of the group said
they dressed “like rebels and greasers . . . in the 50’s and 60’s”
and went to parties together so that other people would “think
twice about approaching you the wrong way.” Although the
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members admitted they called themselves the Assassins, they
denied they killed people.
The conflict between Salas and the Assassins went back to
2000, when Salas was attacked by Danny Leyva, the older
brother of one of the Assassins. Salas was in bed when he heard
a loud noise outside his house. He went outside and saw a car
colliding with the front gate to his driveway. Salas looked outside
and saw a car driven by Leyva pulling out of his driveway. Salas
got in his car and chased Leyva’s car. When Salas caught up
with Leyva’s car, Leyva pulled Salas out of his car, and Leyva
and other members of the Assassins beat him up in the street.
One of the Assassins got into Salas’s car and drove away in it.
As a result of his injuries, Salas had to use crutches for six
months.
A year later, on April 14, 2001, Salas called the
911 emergency operator to report a drive-by shooting at his home.
Salas claimed that Mora was driving the car involved in the
shooting and that Villalta, a passenger in the car, fired four or
five shots at Salas while Salas was standing in his front yard.
Although Salas claimed at trial Mora and Villalta were
responsible for the shooting, at the time of the shooting Salas told
the police that members of a local gang, El Monte Flores, had
fired the shots at his home. Salas claimed at trial he did not
want to tell the police who was actually responsible because he
feared retaliation.
On February 15, 2002 Salas again heard gunshots outside
his house. Salas claimed that, when he looked out his window, he
saw Villalta shooting at the windows of Salas’s car with a
shotgun, as Mora watched. Salas claimed that, prior to these
incidents, Mora had tried several times to get him to join the
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Assassins and had asked Salas to help him obtain a master key
to steal cars. Salas declined to join the Assassins or obtain a
master key to assist in stealing cars.
Fearing for his life after another attack by Leyva, Salas
met with a detective to discuss the incidents with the Assassins.
The detective told Salas that he should move out of his home and
move to Mexico. Salas, who was on probation at the time, did not
follow the detective’s advice.
Testifying about his version of the August 29, 2023
shooting, Salas stated that he was outside his home when he saw
Villalta and other members of the Assassins approach his house.
Salas claimed Villalta told him he “was a snitch” and they should
“handle it in the streets or [they] were going to handle it then and
there.” Fearing for his safety, Salas grabbed his gun and ran.
Bernal, Mora, and Villalta tried to attack Salas, and Villalta hit
him. Salas pulled out his gun to make the men back away, and
Bernal grabbed the barrel of Salas’s gun. As Salas and Bernal
struggled over the gun, the gun fired several shots, one of them
into the air. Salas ran away, firing additional shots behind him
without looking where he was pointing his gun.
Following this incident, Salas went to Mexico on a
previously planned trip. Salas, who did not know he had shot
anyone, learned the next day Villalta had died. Salas decided to
stay in Mexico because he was scared he would be killed in
retaliation if returned home. Salas remained in Mexico for 17
years before authorities finally arrested him and extradited him
to the United States. Salas told police he had been acting in self-
defense against the Assassins.
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C. The Trial Court Instructs the Jury on Self-defense
At a pre-trial hearing in December 2021, counsel for Salas
stated he planned to argue accident and self-defense. The trial
court pointed out that accident and self-defense were inconsistent
theories because self-defense required an intentional, not
accidental, use of deadly force and that proceeding on both
theories could confuse the jury.
After reviewing the jury instructions with counsel, the trial
court, despite concerns about Salas’s conflicting theories, agreed
to Salas’s request to instruct the jury on accident and self-
defense. The trial court stated it would instruct the jury on
imperfect self-defense for murder with CALCRIM No. 571 and on
imperfect self-defense for attempted murder with CALCRIM No.
604. Neither counsel for Salas nor the prosecutor objected to
these instructions.
The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense with
CALCRIM No. 505: “The defendant is not guilty of murder and
attempted murder if he was justified in killing or attempting to
kill someone in self-defense. The defendant acts with lawful self-
defense if: 1. The defendant reasonably believed that he was in
imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of
deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; [and]
3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend against the danger.”
The trial court also instructed the jury on imperfect self-
defense for murder with CALCRIM No. 571: “A killing that
would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter
if the defendant killed a person because he acted with what’s
called imperfect self-defense. If you conclude the defendant acted
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in complete self-defense, his action was lawful, and you must find
him not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete
self-defense and imperfect self-defense depends on whether the
defendant’s beliefs in the need to use deadly force was
reasonable. The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:
1. The defendant actually believed that he was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; 2. The
defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly
force was necessary to defend against the danger; [but] 3. At least
one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
Finally, the court instructed the jury on imperfect self-
defense on attempted murder with CALCRIM No. 604: “An
attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is
reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
attempted to kill a person because he acted in imperfect self-
defense. If you conclude that the defendant acted in complete
self-defense, his action was lawful. You must find him not guilty
of any crime. The difference between complete self-defense and
imperfect self-defense depends on whether the defendant’s belief
in the need to use deadly force was reasonable. The defendant
acts with imperfect self-defense if: 1. The defendant took at least
one direct but ineffective step toward killing a person; 2. The
defendant intended to kill when he acted; 3. The defendant
believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or
suffering great bodily injury; 4. The defendant believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against
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the danger; and 5. At least one of the defendant’s belief’s was
unreasonable.”
D. The Jury Convicts Salas, and the Trial Court
Sentences Him
The jury found Salas guilty of the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder of Villalta and the attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Mora. The jury also
found true firearm allegations under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).
The trial court sentenced Salas on his murder conviction to
50 years to life (25 years to life for first degree murder, plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d)) and on his attempted murder
conviction life with a minimum parole eligibility of seven years.
The court struck the firearm enhancements with respect to the
attempted murder. Salas timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
As discussed, the defendant acts in lawful or perfect self-
defense (which means the defendant is not guilty of murder) if he
or she (1) reasonably believes he or she was in imminent danger
of being killed or suffering great bodily injury, (2) reasonably
believed using deadly force was necessary to defend against the
danger, and (3) uses no more force than reasonably necessary to
defend against the danger. As also discussed, the defendant acts
in imperfect self-defense (which reduces murder to voluntary
manslaughter) if he or she (1) actually but unreasonably believes
he or she was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering
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great bodily injury or (2) actually but unreasonably believes
using deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger.
But, as Salas points out, the defendant does not act in imperfect
self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that the danger is
imminent and that the use of deadly force is necessary, but uses
more force than necessary (thus making perfect self-defense
unavailable). Salas argues CALCRIM No. 571, the pattern
instruction on imperfect self-defense that reduces murder to
voluntary manslaughter, and CALCRIM No. 604, the pattern
instruction on imperfect self-defense that reduces attempted
murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, “are erroneous to
the extent they do not allow a jury to find the defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter
based on the use of more force than was reasonably necessary to
defend against the danger.”
The court in People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978(Morales) rightly rejected this very argument. In that case the
jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder for
stabbing the victim to death. (Id. at p. 983.) The defendant
argued CALCRIM No. 571 “was insufficient because it failed to
tell the jury that a homicide also qualifies as voluntary
manslaughter and not murder when a defendant’s beliefs in
danger and the need to use deadly force are reasonable but the
sort of deadly force he uses is excessive and more than necessary
to repel the attack. He argues that if the jury found he
reasonably believed he would suffer great bodily injury from [the
victim] in the course of the robbery and reasonably believed he
needed to arm himself against [the victim], but found that
stabbing [the victim] in the abdomen was more force than was
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reasonably necessary, the jury could find him guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 995.)
In rejecting that argument, the court in Morales stated that
the Supreme Court in People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268 at
page 288 “made clear that ‘not every unreasonable belief will
support a claim of imperfect self-defense’; rather, a defendant can
claim imperfect self-defense based only on a belief ‘that, if
reasonable, would support a claim of perfect self-defense.’
[Citation.] For example, if a defendant unreasonably believes
someone is going to punch him in the arm and stabs him to death
in response, ‘this belief would not support a claim of imperfect
self-defense for the reason that the belief, even if reasonable,
would not permit the use of deadly force.’” [Citation.] In such a
scenario, the use of force would be excessive but still would not
reduce a homicide to voluntary manslaughter. Similarly here, if
[the defendant] reasonably believed he needed to use force
against [the victim] but used more force than was necessary, then
he could not claim perfect self-defense. As a result, he cannot
claim imperfect self-defense, either. (Morales, supra,
69 Cal.App.5th at p. 995.)
The court in Morales also stated that the defendant had not
explained “how his stabbing could be based on his reasonable
belief in the need to use of deadly force but still qualify as
excessive. If [the defendant] reasonably believed he needed to use
deadly force to prevent [the victim] from harming him, his use of
a single stab with his knife would appear to be reasonable.
[Citation.] [The defendant] also cites no authority for his
position that one type of deadly force could be reasonable but
another could be excessive. The relevant consideration is
whether a defendant uses more force than is necessary to repel
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an attack, not the type of deadly force used by a defendant.”
(Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 996, fn. omitted.)
Similarly, if Salas reasonably believed he needed to use
deadly force to defendant against the danger posed by Villalta,
but used more force than reasonable, he could not claim perfect
self-defense. And, as Salas concedes, because he cannot claim
perfect self-defense, he cannot claim imperfect self-defense. (See
People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761 [“claim of imperfect
self-defense would be unavailable because a claim of perfect self-
defense would have been unavailable had the belief been
reasonable”]; People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 288
[same].)
Salas argues “Morales goes off the rails of sound analysis”
because the Supreme Court case on which it relies, People v.
Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th 268, “is not an excessive force case.”
Salas argues that Morales “conflates the aspect of self-defense
related to the belief in the need to use deadly force with the
aspect related to using an excessive amount of such force” and
that “[e]xcessive deadly force can come into play only if it is
reasonable to use deadly force in the first place.” But it is Salas’s
concept of “excessive deadly force” that is not consistent with the
doctrine of self-defense. Once deadly force is justified, the
defendant may use whatever force it takes to kill. As with the
defendant in Morales, Salas cites no authority for his assertion
that the jury instructions on perfect and imperfect self-defense
should distinguish between different degrees of deadly force.
(See Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Had the jury
believed Salas’s testimony, his response to the danger presented
by Villalta (and perhaps Mora) would have been reasonable, no
matter how many shots he fired. The trial court’s instructions
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accurately conveyed the law on imperfect self-defense for murder
and attempted murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
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