Hamlin v. Jendayi ( 2024 )

Filed 10/17/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DELLA HAMLIN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, A167695
v.
(Alameda County
ZAKIYA JENDAYI, as Trustee, etc., Super. Ct. No. RP20061734)
Defendant and Appellant.
Dr. Laura Dean Head passed away in 2013, survived by her sisters,
respondents Della Hamlin and Helaine Head. Two months before her death,
Dr. Head went into hospice care at the home of a former student and friend,
appellant Zakiya Jendayi, and during that time, Dr. Head executed a trust
instrument naming Jendayi as the trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust.
In 2020, respondents petitioned the probate court to invalidate the trust on
the grounds of undue influence, lack of capacity, and forgery. After a 17-day
bench trial, the court granted the petition, finding Jendayi exerted undue
influence over Dr. Head to execute the trust instrument.
In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that respondents,
as intestate heirs of Dr. Head disinherited by the trust, had standing to
contest the instrument in the probate court and that their petition was not
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts B., C., and D. of
the Discussion.
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barred under Probate Code section 17200. In the unpublished portion of this
opinion, we conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s application of
the common law presumption of undue influence, as well as its finding that
Jendayi unduly influenced Dr. Head to execute the trust instrument. We also
reject Jendayi’s claims of judicial bias and conclude any deficiencies in the
probate court’s statement of decision were harmless. Accordingly, we will
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
At all relevant times, Dr. Head was employed as a college professor at
San Francisco State University (SFSU). She and Jendayi met in 1985 when
Jendayi was a student at SFSU. The two kept in touch over the years, and
on a few occasions, Dr. Head provided letters of recommendation for Jendayi
when she applied to graduate schools.
At trial, Jendayi described her relationship with Dr. Head as “intimate
and personal,” “special,” “physical,” and “sacred,” but she refused to elaborate
further on privacy grounds. Jendayi also submitted documentary evidence of
their relationship, including photographs of the two at social events, and
letters and cards that she had sent to Dr. Head over the years. One of Dr.
Head’s former students testified seeing Jendayi and Dr. Head together in
public on numerous occasions from 1988 through 2012.
The following events occurred in 2013 unless otherwise noted.
On April 2, SFSU requested a welfare check on Dr. Head after she
failed to appear for work for over a week. Police officers found Dr. Head in an
“uninhabitable” house with possums living in it. Dr. Head was reportedly
“lying in [a] very small space in [a] hoarded room floor to ceiling.” She was
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emaciated and unable to walk or state the date. Officers feared she “may die
of self-neglect.”
Dr. Head was admitted to Kaiser hospital in Oakland where she was
diagnosed with gastroesophageal junction cancer, acute renal failure, chronic
alcoholic cirrhosis, chronic anemia, nausea and vomiting, severe protein
calorie malnutrition, pulmonary nodule, bacteriuria, and hypokalemia.
Medical records showed that Dr. Head had recently experienced significant
weight loss—eight pounds in the past month and 70 pounds in past two
years—and had not eaten or had any liquids in almost a week.
Dr. Head’s medical records identified her “sister” as the “DPOA” (or
durable power of attorney) and listed Hamlin as her sole emergency contact.
However, Dr. Head reported to a social worker at the hospital that she was
“estranged from her two sisters.” At trial, social worker Jennifer Hopping
testified that she provided Dr. Head with various brochures and forms,
including a power of attorney form, and asked Dr. Head whom she wanted to
make medical decisions on her behalf. Dr. Head identified Jendayi and
confirmed she did not want her family to be contacted.
On April 9, while still hospitalized, Dr. Head executed a power of
attorney and an advanced healthcare directive naming Jendayi as her
primary agent. Jendayi was present during the signing. By its terms, the
power of attorney was not effective until a licensed physician declared Dr.
Head to be incapacitated.
Hamlin testified that she visited her sister briefly in her hospital room,
and that Dr. Head “perked up a little bit” when Hamlin touched her hand.
After Hamlin was told by a nurse to wait outside, Hamlin received a phone
call from Jim Rogers, a retreat operations director, who told her that Dr.
Head was supposed to attend a retreat from April 9th to the 14th. Rogers
3
said he contacted Hamlin because Dr. Head had identified her as an
emergency contact while registering for the retreat. Hamlin further testified
that she “ ‘had words’ ” with Jendayi, whom she met for the first time at the
hospital, because Jendayi was not forthcoming about Dr. Head’s condition
and refused to allow Hamlin to make copies of the durable power of attorney
and advanced healthcare directive.
Regarding the reports of estrangement between the sisters, Hamlin
acknowledged in her testimony that she saw Dr. Head “[v]ery rarely” because
Dr. Head “had been drinking for quite a while and ended up removing herself
from everyone.” The last time Hamlin saw Dr. Head was in or around 1997
or 1998. However, Hamlin never knew that Dr. Head wanted no contact with
her.
Helaine1 testified that she and Dr. Head were still close and that they
often spent holidays together. Helaine denied the two were estranged and
stated that “[e]verything changed when [Dr. Head] was in the hospital and
[Jendayi] came in.” Helaine further testified she had never heard of Jendayi
until Dr. Head fell ill.
On April 12, Dr. Head was discharged from Kaiser on hospice, released
into Jendayi’s care, and moved into Jendayi’s apartment. That same day,
Jendayi transferred the title to Dr. Head’s vehicle to herself and added
herself as the power of attorney to Dr. Head’s bank account.
Dr. Head’s treating physician, Stephen Sarafian, M.D., issued a
discharge letter dated April 12, stating that Dr. Head was “unable properly to
care for herself, her person, and her property”; that she was “incapable of
providing for her own needs for food, clothing, or shelter”; and that her
1 We use Helaine Head’s first name to avoid confusion. No disrespect is
intended.
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“mental state renders her unable to manage her own financial resources
and/or to resist fraud or undue influence.” Asked at trial about reports that
Dr. Head’s mental status improved after her discharge, Dr. Sarafian
explained that mental status may fluctuate, but he still expected Dr. Head to
undergo a “significant decline” from her cancer, and he maintained that the
statements in his letter were true to a reasonable medical certainty.
In early April, Jendayi contacted attorney Elaine Lee by telephone and
asked her to draft an estate plan for Dr. Head. Jendayi testified that she did
so on instructions from Dr. Head. Lee sent Jendayi a client intake form and
an attorney-client fee agreement, which Jendayi completed.
The fee agreement named Jendayi, not Dr. Head, as Lee’s client, and
Dr. Head’s name was not mentioned anywhere in the agreement. Lee
testified that Jendayi said she signed the fee agreement on Dr. Head’s behalf
under the power of attorney.
In the client intake form, Jendayi identified herself as acting under a
power of attorney. She further indicated that Dr. Head’s assets included,
among other things, a residence on Randolph Avenue in Oakland. In a
section asking for information on “parents, brothers, sisters,
grandparents, and others who will be beneficiary, trustee or executor in
your estate plan,” Jendayi crossed out the blank spaces and wrote, “N/A.”
Jendayi also crossed out portions of the intake form regarding gifts, except to
indicate that Dr. Head wished to disinherit her sisters. Jendayi testified she
never verbally told Lee to name her as a beneficiary and did not learn of her
beneficiary status until after the estate plan was drafted.
Based on the information in the client intake form, Lee prepared a
“rough draft” of the Laura Dean Head Living Trust (the Trust) and met with
Jendayi and Dr. Head on April 15. Lee testified that the April 15 meeting
5
was the first time she spoke to Dr. Head, and that she and Dr. Head met
alone behind closed doors. According to Lee, Dr. Head stated her intent to
make Jendayi the sole beneficiary of the Trust and confirmed that nothing
was to be left to her sisters. Lee believed Dr. Head was acting of her own free
will and did not explore the relationship between Dr. Head and Jendayi
because “they seemed like friends. Nothing seemed suspicious.”
At trial, Lee was asked whether there were any substantive changes
between the rough draft of the Trust that she prepared prior to the April 15
meeting and the final product. Lee responded, “I don’t remember there being
any major changes.”
On June 5, at around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Head was admitted to the Kaiser
hospital emergency room vomiting blood. A note in Dr. Head’s medical
records stated, “mental status, disturbance of consciousness.” (Capitalization
omitted.) Jendayi, under the power of attorney, signed a consent form to
provide Dr. Head with a blood transfusion, stating Dr. Head was “too sick” to
sign it herself.
According to Jendayi’s trial testimony, sometime after 6:00 p.m. on
June 5, Dr. Head asked Jendayi to retrieve the still-unsigned copy of the
Trust from her apartment. Jendayi knew where Dr. Head kept the copy of
the Trust because they shared a bedroom. Jendayi then contacted her friend,
notary Trina Easley-Jackson, and two persons (a neighbor named Jody
Shelton, and Jody’s friend, David) to witness the execution of the Trust.
Jendayi also contacted attorney Lee, but Jendayi did not disclose that Dr.
Head had been rushed to the hospital on an emergency basis that day.
Although Lee testified at trial that she would have still assisted in the
execution of the Trust had she been so informed, the probate court admitted
Lee’s deposition transcript reflecting her contrary testimony that she
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“ ‘[p]robably [would] not’ ” have executed the Trust on June 5 had she been
told of the circumstances of Dr. Head’s emergency hospitalization.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 5, Dr. Head executed the Trust in
her hospital room. The Trust named Dr. Head as the original trustee and
stated that upon her death or incapacity, “the successor trustee shall be my
friend, Zakiya Jendayi.” The Trust instructed the trustee, upon Dr. Head’s
death, to distribute “the entire trust estate” to Jendayi as the primary
beneficiary if she survived Dr. Head, and if not, to Jendayi’s mother, Hattie
Simsisulu. If Jendayi and Simsisulu predeceased Dr. Head, the trust estate
would go to the United Negro College Fund. The Trust contained a no-
contest clause disinheriting any heir, relative, or beneficiary who contested
the validity of the Trust and its provisions, as well as a disinheritance
provision stating that Dr. Head “generally and specifically intentionally
disinherit[ed]” anyone claiming to be her heirs at law.
The Trust property consisted of Dr. Head’s “interest in the property
described in the attached Schedule A document.” Though no such schedule
appears in the record, there was considerable testimony regarding Dr. Head’s
execution of two pour-over wills, the first of which was executed on June 5
around the same time as the Trust, along with a trust transfer deed
transferring the Randolph Avenue residence to the Trust. The second pour-
over will was executed three days later, purportedly to fix grammatical and
other errors in the June 5 will, and to re-execute the will with witnesses Dr.
Head personally knew. The record also discloses Jendayi’s filing of a petition
to probate Dr. Head’s estate, case No. RP20066047 (the ‘047 case). At trial in
the instant matter, Jendayi testified that her petition in the ‘047 case (which
is not at issue here) identifies the Randolph Avenue residence as an asset of
Dr. Head’s estate and values the home at approximately $750,000. Thus, it
7
appears undisputed that one of the main assets Jendayi was to receive as the
beneficiary of the Trust was the Randolph Avenue residence.
On June 19, Dr. Head died at the age of 64 without spouse, issue, or
living parents.
B. Procedural History
As Hamlin explained at trial, Dr. Head was the administrator of their
deceased mother’s estate. But in March 2020, about two months before
respondents initiated the instant matter, Jendayi filed a petition in the
Alameda County probate court “for distribution rights on the property of
[respondents’] mother” in case No. RP12653607 (hereafter the ‘607 case,
which is not at issue here). (Capitalization omitted.) Jendayi explained at
trial that she filed the petition in the ‘607 case pursuant to a provision in the
Trust giving her “ ‘[t]he power to receive additional property, from any
source, and add to my trust.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) In other words,
Jendayi initiated the ‘607 case in order to claim certain properties of Dr.
Head’s and respondents’ deceased mother as additional assets of the Trust.
On May 18, 2020, respondents initiated the instant matter by filing a
verified petition to invalidate the Trust on the grounds of undue influence,
lack of capacity, and/or forgery. The petition alleged it concerns the internal
affairs of the Trust, giving the probate court jurisdiction under Probate Code
section 17000.2
1. Hearing on Standing
Early in the litigation, the trial court raised questions regarding
respondents’ standing to sue. At a hearing in May 2021, the probate court
announced it had “issues with standing” because respondents were neither
trustees nor beneficiaries under section 17200, which provides in relevant
2 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Probate Code.
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part: “Except as provided in Section 15800, a trustee or beneficiary of a trust
may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of
the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.” (§ 17200, subd. (a).)
After cautioning respondents they did not have standing under section 17200,
the court permitted the action to proceed after respondents clarified they
were relying on other legal theories such as financial elder abuse and
invalidation.
2. Trial
A bench trial commenced in July 2022 and was held over the course of
17 days. Jendayi represented herself during the proceedings.
In August 2022, after respondents completed their case-in-chief, they
sought application of a presumption of undue influence. After hearing
argument from the parties, the probate court found the Trust was
presumptively the product of Jendayi’s undue influence. It then shifted the
burden to Jendayi to affirmatively disprove undue influence.
After the conclusion of testimony, the parties submitted written closing
arguments and responsive briefs. The probate court issued a proposed
statement of decision, and Jendayi submitted written objections.
The probate court then issued its final statement of decision in favor of
respondents. The court first found that Dr. Head did not lack contractual
capacity to execute the Trust, and that there was “no credible evidence of
forgery.” However, as to whether Dr. Head was unduly influenced to execute
the Trust, the court referred back to its earlier ruling shifting the burden of
proof to Jendayi and found that Jendayi “failed to meet her burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Trust was not the product of
undue influence.” The court considered the factors set forth in Welfare and
Institutions Code, section 15610.70, subdivision (a), for undue influence and
9
found that Dr. Head was “vulnerable” and “completely dependent” on
Jendayi; that Jendayi exerted apparent authority as Dr. Head’s power of
attorney and “controlled Dr. Head’s necessities of life, food, and hospice care”;
that Jendayi used “affection” to unduly influence Dr. Head; and that Jendayi
effected changes in Dr. Head’s property rights by calling attorney Lee to
prepare the Trust for Dr. Head, completing the client intake form and signing
the attorney-client fee agreement, and giving Lee the information as to the
beneficiary of the Trust. The court further found that Jendayi unduly
benefited from the Trust because it gave her “significant assets” including Dr.
Head’s “real property which has a current estimated value of $800,000.00 and
a claim to [Dr. Head’s] deceased mother’s estate.” The court found this result
to be “inequitable because the evidence shows that [Jendayi] was a former
student and friend who, at best, cared for [Dr. Head] for the last two months
of her life.”
Based on these findings, the probate court invalidated the Trust and
ordered “all Trust assets transferred forthwith to the Special Administrator
of the Estate of Laura Dean Head, Phillip Campbell, in [the ‘047 case].”
Respondents served notice of entry of judgment, and this appeal
followed.3
DISCUSSION
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following
a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.
[Citation.] Under this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are
3 We previously deferred ruling on respondents’ unopposed request for
judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript of the June 2, 2023, hearing on
Jendayi’s motion for a new trial. We now grant the request. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
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liberally construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.] [¶] A single witness’s
testimony may constitute substantial evidence to support a finding.
[Citation.] It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to
assess witness credibility. [Citation.] ‘A judgment or order of a lower court is
presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)
A. Standing
We begin with the general observation that “standing for purposes of
the Probate Code is a fluid concept dependent on the nature of the proceeding
before the trial court and the parties’ relationship to the proceeding, as well
as to the trust (or estate).” (Arman v. Bank of Am. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697,
702–703.) In general, “ ‘[t]o have standing, a party must be beneficially
interested in the controversy, and have “some special interest to be served or
some particular right to be preserved or protected.” [Citation.] This interest
must be concrete and actual, and must not be conjectural or hypothetical.’ ”
(Limon v. Circle K. Stores, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 671, 699.) Interested
persons have legal standing to contest the provisions of a trust. (Schwan v.
Permann (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 678, 698.) The Probate Code defines
“ ‘interested person’ ” broadly as including an “[a]n heir, devisee, child,
spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in
or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be
affected by the proceeding” (§ 48, subd. (a)), and its meaning “may vary from
time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of,
and matter involved in, any proceeding” (id., subd. (b)). In turn, an “heir”
11
includes “any person . . . who is entitled to take property of the decedent by
intestate succession under this code.” (§ 44.) Consequently, the probate
court “has flexibility in determining whether to permit a party to participate
as an interested party” and may give standing to “anyone having an interest
in an estate which may be affected by a probate proceeding.” (Estate of Sobol
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 772, 782 (Sobol).)
There can be no dispute that respondents were beneficially interested
in the controversy before the probate court. As intestate heirs of Dr. Head,
respondents had an actual and concrete interest in Dr. Head’s estate and in
invalidating the Trust that purported to disinherit them. Thus, the probate
court had broad flexibility to permit respondents to maintain this trust
contest in light of their relationship to Dr. Head and the trust estate. (Sobol,
supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 782; see Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125 [purported heir petitioned probate court claiming
entitlement to portion of trust under laws of intestacy].)
Olson v. Toy (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818 (Olson) is instructive. There,
the court held that an heir had standing to bring a civil action for declaratory
relief and imposition of a constructive trust in order to invalidate an inter
vivos trust based on allegations that the decedent lacked mental capacity and
was unduly influenced to execute the trust prior to her death. (Id. at pp. 821,
823.) Though Olson involved proceedings in the superior court, we see no
reason why the probate court, which “is a court of general jurisdiction and
has all the powers of the superior court” (§ 17001), would be unable to confer
similar standing upon respondents in this case.
In challenging respondents’ standing, Jendayi maintains that only
trustees and trust beneficiaries have standing to contest a trust. She relies
on section 17200, which as indicated states in relevant part: “Except as
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provided in Section 15800, a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the
court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to
determine the existence of the trust.” (§ 17200, subd. (a).) We are not
convinced.
Section 17200 contains no language purporting to limit standing only to
trustees and beneficiaries of a trust or otherwise indicating the Legislature’s
intent to exclude others from contesting a trust in the probate court. Rather,
the statute simply provides that trustees and trust beneficiaries “may”
petition the court under this chapter “[e]xcept” as provided in section 15800—
i.e., during the time the trust remains revocable, when joint action of settlor
and beneficiaries is required, or “to the extent that the trust instrument
otherwise provides.” (§ 17200, subd. (a), citing § 15800.) But the mere use of
the words “trustee or beneficiary” is hardly an indication of a legislative
intent to circumscribe the probate court’s power to confer standing to contest
a trust on persons other than trustees and trust beneficiaries.
Indeed, Jendayi’s cramped interpretation of section 17200 is
problematic because it conflicts with language in section 16061.7, which sets
forth the trustee’s duty to serve notification of various events related to a
trust, including when a revocable trust or portion thereof becomes irrevocable
due to the settlor’s death. (§ 16061.7, subd. (a)(1).) If the event that requires
notification is the death of a settlor, notice must be served not only on each
trust beneficiary but also on “[e]ach heir of the deceased settlor” (id.,
subd. (b)(1), (2)), and such notice “shall” include the following language:
“ ‘You may not bring an action to contest the trust more than 120 days from
the date this notification by the trustee is served upon you or 60 days from
the date on which a copy of the terms of the trust is delivered to you during
that 120-day period, whichever is later’ ” (id., subd. (h)). The statutory
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requirement that each heir of a deceased settlor be given notice of the
deadlines in which to bring “an action to contest the trust” impliedly reflects
the Legislature’s awareness of the heir’s ability to do just that. If Jendayi’s
construction were adopted, section 17200 would bar standing to the very
persons entitled to receive statutory notice of their right to contest the trust,
rendering portions of section 16061.7, subdivisions (b) and (h), superfluous.
That is a construction we must avoid. (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169,
180.)
The California Supreme Court recently examined section 17200 in
Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 (Barefoot), and held that standing
to petition the probate court under section 17200 extends not only to current
trust beneficiaries but also to individuals formerly named as beneficiaries
who, in a well-pleaded complaint, “claim that trust amendments eliminating
their beneficiary status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.”
(Barefoot, at pp. 825, 828.) In so holding, the Barefoot court started by citing
longstanding decisional authority recognizing that “the Probate Code ‘ “was
intended to broaden the jurisdiction of the probate court so as to give that
court jurisdiction over practically all controversies which might arise between
the trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.” ’ ”
(Barefoot, at pp. 827–828.) The court then emphasized the probate court’s
“ ‘inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its
express powers to supervise the administration of the trust’ ” (id. at p. 829),
as well as the “wide latitude” granted by section 17206 to “ ‘make any orders
and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters
presented by the petition,’ ” (id. at p. 828 [holding section 17206 “supports a
finding of standing here”]). In the words of the Barefoot court, “an expansive
reading of the standing afforded to trust challenges under section 17200 ‘not
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only makes sense as a matter of judicial economy, but it also recognizes the
probate court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to
carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.’ ”
(Id., at pp. 827–828.)
Barefoot expressly left open the question whether “an heir who was
never a trust beneficiary has standing under the Probate Code to challenge
that trust.” (Barefoot, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 825, fn. 2.) That is the situation
presented in this case, as respondents were not named as beneficiaries under
any prior version of the Trust. We have already concluded that nothing in
section 17200 limits petitioner standing before the probate court to only
trustees and trust beneficiaries or otherwise constrains the probate court
from conferring standing on other persons who assert a property right or
claim against a trust estate. Though Barefoot is not directly controlling on
the facts of this case, our conclusion comports with Barefoot’s admonition to
read Probate Code sections “consistent with the statutory scheme as a
whole,” its recognition of the broad jurisdiction and discretionary powers of
the probate court, including the power to confer standing under section 17206
as necessary or proper to dispose of matters presented by a petition, and its
consideration of judicial economy and the public interest in preventing the
administration of a trust that has been procured through fraud or undue
influence. (Barefoot, at pp. 827–830, & fn. 3.)4
4 Notably, commentators have concluded that “[t]hose who would gain a
pecuniary benefit from invalidating the trust should have standing to bring a
trust contest” and that “[u]nder most circumstances, the contestants are the
beneficiaries of an earlier estate plan or the heirs at law.” (Campisi &
Latham, Cal. Trust and Probate Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 2024) § 20.6; see
also § 20.31 [form “petition to determine the validity of purported trust”
pursuant to “Probate Code § 17000”].) In other words, secondary authority
recognizes the standing of heirs to bring trust contests under the Probate
15
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the probate court did not err in
concluding respondents had standing to contest the Trust. Accordingly, we
need not resolve Jendayi’s alternative contention that assuming respondents
had standing to assert financial elder abuse claims in the probate court, those
claims were time-barred.5
B. Undue Influence
1. Presumption of Undue Influence
“Although a person challenging the testamentary instrument ordinarily
bears the burden of proving undue influence [citation], [the Supreme Court]
and the Courts of Appeal have held that a presumption of undue influence,
shifting the burden of proof, arises upon the challenger’s showing that (1) the
Code. (See Earl W. Schott, Inc. v. Kalar (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 943, 946, fn. 4
[secondary authority may be persuasive authority].)
5 To be clear, Jendayi only challenges the timeliness of respondents’
financial elder abuse claims as an alternative to her Probate Code standing
argument. She expressly does not challenge the timeliness of the petition to
the extent it is brought under the Probate Code, perhaps conceding
respondents’ argument that because respondents were not served with the
required notice of trustee under section 16061.7, the statute of limitations of
section 16061.8 never began to run. That said, we acknowledge Jendayi’s
point that respondents have taken shifting positions on the gravamen of their
petition in order to navigate around her standing challenges, arguing below
that their petition asserted financial elder abuse claims, not claims under the
Probate Code, while contending just the opposite on appeal. But beyond
pointing out the inconsistency, Jendayi does not specifically argue or provide
supporting legal authority that respondents should be judicially estopped
from raising an inconsistent position on appeal. (See Bucur v. Ahmad (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 175, 187–188 (Bucur) [discussing judicial estoppel].) Thus,
we treat the issue as forfeited. (Citizens for Positive Growth & Preservation v.
City of Sacramento (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 609, 629–630.) Furthermore, and
in any event, in light of the questions left open after Barefoot, and mindful of
the caution that must be exercised in applying the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, we believe this case does not present such egregious circumstances
as to justify application of judicial estoppel. (See Bucur, at pp. 187–188.)
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person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential
relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in
procuring the instrument’s preparation or execution; and (3) the person
would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument.” (Rice v. Clark (2002)
28 Cal.4th 89, 96–97.) “If this presumption is activated, it shifts to the
proponent of the [instrument] the burden of producing proof by a
preponderance of evidence that the [instrument] was not procured by undue
influence. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the presumption will
apply and whether the burden of rebutting it has been satisfied.” (Estate of
Sarabia (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 599, 605 (Sarabia).)
In applying the undue influence presumption, the probate court
necessarily found that a confidential relationship existed between Dr. Head
and Jendayi; that Jendayi actively participated in procuring the Trust; and
that the Trust would unduly benefit Jendayi. We review the court’s findings
for substantial evidence. (David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672,
684–685.)
a. Confidential Relationship
Jendayi first contends the probate court erred as a matter of law by
adopting the definition of confidential relationship articulated in Richelle L.
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257 (Richelle L.).
Jendayi argues that Richelle L. is distinguishable because it did not involve
testamentary instruments and instead addressed whether the relationship
between a priest and church member could give rise to tort liability. We
conclude the court did not err in adopting the Richelle L. standard.
In Estate of Cover (1922) 188 Cal. 133, 143 (which involved a challenge
to letters of administration issued to a widow), and Estate of Rugani (1952)
108 Cal.App.2d 624, 630 (which involved a will contest), the appellate courts
17
held a confidential relation exists where “ ‘trust and confidence is reposed by
one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.’ ” Richelle L. echoed this
language by stating that a confidential relation “ ‘ “ordinarily arises where a
confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a
relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he [or she] voluntarily
accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his
[or her] acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter’s
knowledge or consent.” ’ ” (Richelle L., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 270.) In
support, Richelle L. cited Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, which
applied the presumption of undue influence in a claim against an estate by
the companion and caretaker of the deceased. In short, Richelle L.’s
definition of confidential relation is consistent with the formulations set forth
by other courts in the testamentary context and therefore provides the
applicable test in this case.
As articulated in Richelle L., the essential elements of a confidential
relationship are: “ ‘1) The vulnerability of one party to the other which
2) results in the empowerment of the stronger party by the weaker which
3) empowerment has been solicited or accepted by the stronger party and
4) prevents the weaker party from effectively protecting itself.’ ” (Richelle L.,
supra, 106 Cal.pp.4th at p. 272.) Vulnerability is a necessary and essential
predicate of a confidential relationship. (Id. at p. 273.) “ ‘Because
confidential relations do not fall into well-defined categories of law and
depend heavily on the circumstances, they are more difficult to identify than
fiduciary relations.’ [Citation.] The existence of a confidential relationship is
a question of fact, and ‘ “the question is only whether the [allegedly weaker
party] actually reposed such trust and confidence in the other, and whether
18
the other ‘accepted the relationship.” ’ ” (Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc.
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1160–1161.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the probate court’s finding
of Dr. Head’s vulnerability. “Evidence of vulnerability may include, but is not
limited to, incapacity, illness, disability, injury, age, education, impaired
cognitive function, emotional distress, isolation, or dependency, and whether
the influencer knew or should have known of the alleged victim’s
vulnerability.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(1).) Here, Dr. Head
was terminally ill and placed in hospice care with Jendayi. On the day the
Trust was executed, Dr. Head had been rushed to the hospital on an
emergency basis and was so ill that Jendayi had to sign a blood transfusion
consent form on her behalf. Meanwhile, Dr. Sarafian’s April 12 letter
explicitly stated that upon her discharge from Kaiser in April 2013, Dr. Head
was “unable properly to care for herself, her person, and her property” and
“incapable of providing for her own needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” The
evidence amply supported a finding that Dr. Head was extremely vulnerable
and dependent on Jendayi, placing her in a position of relative weakness at
the time the Trust was executed.
Jendayi insists Dr. Head was not vulnerable for purposes of Richelle L.
because at the time of her death, Dr. Head was still a highly educated college
professor of only 64 years of age. She also notes that numerous witnesses,
including a Kaiser doctor, a registered nurse, a social worker, and attorney
Lee, all testified that Dr. Head was competent, lucid, and capable of making
her own decisions, and the probate court did not find her incompetent. But in
reviewing the lower court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, we
accept the evidence that supports the prevailing party and disregard the
contrary evidence, while drawing all reasonable inferences to uphold the
19
judgment. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) As discussed, the evidence of Dr. Head’s severe illness
and dependency on Jendayi amply supported the vulnerability finding.
Moreover, the court presumably credited Dr. Sarafian’s testimony that
notwithstanding fluctuations in Dr. Head’s mental status, she would still be
unable to manage her own affairs or resist undue influence as her illnesses
progressed. We also infer that the court found Lee impeached by her own
deposition testimony admitting she likely would not have executed the Trust
had she been informed of the circumstances of Dr. Head’s emergency
hospitalization.
Finally, Jendayi argues that mere friendship and affection does not
create a confidential relationship. This is true so far as it goes (see
Blackburn v. Allen (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 30, 34; Meyer v. Zuber (1928) 92
Cal.App.767, 772), but we may reasonably infer from the record that the
probate court did not rest its confidential relationship finding solely on the
friendship between Dr. Head and Jendayi. Notably, the evidence
demonstrated that Jendayi acted on numerous occasions as Dr. Head’s
attorney-in-fact pursuant to a power of attorney, including transferring title
to Dr. Head’s vehicle to herself, adding herself to Dr. Head’s bank account,
and retaining attorney Lee to draft Dr. Head’s testamentary instruments.
Courts have consistently found a confidential relationship when the
beneficiary runs the settlor’s financial affairs or has the power of attorney
prior to the time a will or other testamentary document was executed. (See,
e.g., Sarabia, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 603; Estate of Straisinger (1967)
247 Cal.App.2d 574, 579, 585; Faulkner v. Beatty (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 547,
549, 550–551; Estate of Hull (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 135, 139, 141–142.)
20
In sum, the probate court did not err in finding a confidential
relationship.
b. Active Participation
The active participation element requires proof of a “causal link
between the ability to influence the testator arising from the confidential
relationship and the unnatural document. Mere general influence is not
enough. A contestant must show that the influence was brought directly to
bear upon the testamentary act.” (Estate of Fritschi (1963) 60 Cal.2d 367,
374.) “The procurement of a person to witness the will or of an attorney to
draw it does not itself constitute active participation in the preparation of the
will.” (Id. at p. 376.) There must be activity “ ‘in the preparation of’ ” the
testamentary document. (Ibid.; see Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 807, 819–820 (Swetmann) [“direct[ing] the drafted document to
be written out in its final form”].)
Jendayi argues there was no substantial evidence of her active
participation in the preparation of the Trust because the evidence at trial
demonstrated it was the social workers who recommended Dr. Head prepare
an estate plan and Jendayi merely followed Dr. Head’s instructions to contact
an estate planning attorney and arrange for their meeting. Jendayi also
emphasizes that the attorney Lee’s client intake form did not list Jendayi as
the beneficiary of the Trust, and that Lee testified Jendayi did not take any
part in creating or arriving at any part of the Trust.
Once again, Jendayi’s contention is based on the evidence favorable to
her but fails to account for contrary evidence. Drawing all reasonable
inferences to uphold the judgment, we conclude the evidence circumstantially
supported a finding that Jendayi actively participated in the preparation of
the Trust. (See Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 54
21
[substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences flowing from it]; Estate of Garibaldi (1961) 57 Cal.2d 108, 113
[activity in procuring the execution of the will may be established by
circumstantial evidence].) Based on Lee’s testimony that she made no “major
changes” between the rough draft and the final Trust instrument, the probate
court could reasonably find that the Trust was already in substantially final
form when Lee met with Dr. Head on April 15. That is, the rough draft—
which Lee had prepared after speaking on the phone with Jendayi but before
Lee met with Dr. Head on April 15—already named Jendayi as the sole
beneficiary of the Trust. Since Lee testified the April 15 meeting was the
first instance in which she spoke to Dr. Head, the court could logically infer
that the instruction to make Jendayi the beneficiary must have been made
prior to that meeting, and that it was Jendayi who directed Lee to do so. As
such, substantial evidence supported a finding of Jendayi’s active
participation in “direct[ing] the drafted document to be written out in its final
form.” (Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 819–820.)
c. Undue Benefit
The determination of an undue benefit “is based on a qualitative
assessment of the evidence, not a quantitative one.” (Conservatorship of
Davidson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1060 (Davidson), disapproved on
other grounds as stated in Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 810–811.)
The issue is not whether the beneficiary profited from the decedent’s
disposition of her estate; it is whether the profit was “ ‘undue.’ ” (Davidson,
at p. 1060.) A person “unduly benefit[s]” when he or she receives a bequest
that is “ ‘unwarranted, excessive, inappropriate, unjustifiable or
improper.’ ” (Estate of Auen (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 300, 311.) “To determine
if the beneficiary’s profit is ‘undue’ the trier must necessarily decide what
22
profit would be ‘due.’ These determinations cannot be made in an evidentiary
vacuum. The trier of fact derives from the evidence introduced an
appreciation of the respective relative standings of the beneficiary and the
contestant to the decedent in order that the trier of fact can determine which
party would be the more obvious object of the decedent’s testamentary
disposition.” (Sarabia, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 607–608.)
We conclude substantial evidence supported the probate court’s finding
of an undue benefit. First, there was no dispute that Jendayi stood to receive
a substantial benefit from the Trust, including the Randolph Avenue
residence and a claim to respondents’ deceased mother’s estate. This was a
significant change from before the Trust was executed, when Dr. Head had no
prior estate plan that included Jendayi as a beneficiary.
Second, the probate court could reasonably find based on the evidence
of Dr. Head’s relationships with her sisters and Jendayi that Jendayi was not
the obvious object of Dr. Head’s testamentary intent. (Sarabia, supra, 221
Cal.App.3d at p. 607.) The evidence of estrangement between Dr. Head and
respondents was mixed. While Dr. Head reportedly told social workers and
medical personnel that she and her sisters were estranged, these reports
were made while Dr. Head was vulnerable and dependent from illness.
Helaine flatly denied any estrangement between her and Dr. Head and
testified that they saw each other often, and Dr. Head continued to hold
Hamlin out as an emergency contact right up until her hospitalization in
April 2013.
Meanwhile, the probate court could reasonably find that Jendayi’s
claim of an intimate romantic relationship with Dr. Head was unsupported
by the evidence. Jendayi did not explain what she meant by a “sacred”
relationship, and her unwillingness to elaborate beyond generalizations (i.e.,
23
“intimate,” “personal,” “special”) hampered the court’s ability to conduct a
qualitative assessment of their relationship. Although the evidence and
testimony demonstrated that Jendayi and Dr. Head maintained a friendship
over many years, there was no evidence of a serious romantic relationship
other than Jendayi’s testimony, which the court was entitled to reject.
Indeed, Jendayi admitted at trial that she was dating someone else at the
time of Dr. Head’s hospitalization in April 2013, and that she had not seen
Dr. Head since December 2012 and could not recall the last time she was in
Dr. Head’s home. The documentary evidence submitted by Jendayi consisted
mostly of cards and letters that Jendayi sent to Dr. Head, but lacking in the
record was any evidence that Dr. Head reciprocated Jendayi’s affections. On
this score, the probate court was entitled to reject Jendayi’s explanation that
all cards and letters that Dr. Head had sent to her were destroyed in a fire.
Viewing the record in a light favorable to the judgment, the picture that
emerged from trial was that of a mentor-mentee relationship and friendship,
rather than a romantic partnership that would help to explain the
substantial benefit Jendayi was to receive under the Trust. Considering the
evidence as a whole, the probate court could reasonably find that Jendayi
received an undue profit from the Trust.
For all of these reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supported
the probate court’s application of the common law presumption of undue
influence.
2. Finding of Undue Influence
In probate cases, “ ‘[u]ndue influence’ has the same meaning as” used in
the Welfare and Institutions Code—“excessive persuasion that causes
another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person's free
will and results in inequity.” (§ 86; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a).)
24
In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, courts
consider: (1) the victim’s vulnerability; (2) the influencer’s apparent
authority; (3) the tactics used by the influencer; and (4) the equity of the
result. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) “ ‘It [is] for the trial
court to say whether the evidence offered by the plaintiff outweighs the
presumption.’ ” (Estate of Rugani (1952) 108 Cal.App.2d 624, 629.) We
cannot conclude the probate court abused its discretion in finding that
Jendayi failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence or in determining
that undue influence led to Dr. Head’s execution of the Trust.
First, and for reasons similar to those discussed above, we conclude
substantial evidence supported the probate court’s finding of Dr. Head’s
vulnerability. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(1) [vulnerability
may be demonstrated by illness and dependency].)
The second factor, the “influencer’s apparent authority,” may be
demonstrated by the influencer’s “status as a fiduciary, family member, care
provider, health care professional, legal professional, spiritual adviser,
expert, or other qualification.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(2).)
This criterion was satisfied, as Jendayi undertook numerous acts as Dr.
Head’s agent-in-fact and under the power of attorney, including retaining Lee
to draft the Trust, filling out the client intake form, taking control of Dr.
Head’s finances, and communicating with Dr. Head’s healthcare providers, as
reflected in the numerous medical records referring to Jendayi as Dr. Head’s
“DPOA.” Jendayi insists the power of attorney “never took effect, because
[Dr. Head] was not deemed incapacitated.” This argument ignores Dr.
Sarafian’s April 12 letter stating that Dr. Head lacked capacity to care for
herself, manage her own financial affairs, and resist undue influence.
25
The third factor, the influencer’s actions or tactics, may be
demonstrated by the influencer’s “[u]se of affection, intimidation, or coercion”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(3)(B)), and by the “[i]nitiation of
changes in personal or property rights, use of haste or secrecy in effecting
those changes, [and] effecting changes at inappropriate times and places”
(id., subd. (a)(3)(C)). As previously discussed, the probate court could
reasonably reject Jendayi’s claim that she and Dr. Head had a longstanding
romantic relationship and instead conclude Jendayi used affection as a tactic
to influence Dr. Head while she was sick and vulnerable. We have also
previously addressed how the evidence was capable of circumstantially
proving that Jendayi directed Lee to make her (Jendayi) the sole beneficiary
of the Trust, which supports the criterion that Jendayi initiated changes in
Dr. Head’s property rights.
Additionally, substantial evidence supported a finding that, in the
particular circumstances of this case, the Trust was executed at an
inappropriate time and place— i.e., in Dr. Head’s hospital room while she
was severely ill. The trial testimony reflected that Jendayi left the hospital
room to retrieve the unsigned Trust instrument and hastily coordinated
witnesses to be present for the signing. Jendayi never offered an explanation
why, if Dr. Head was lucid in the weeks after Lee drafted the instrument in
April, the Trust was not executed until Dr. Head fell severely ill on June 5.
The evidence supported a finding that Jendayi hastily initiated changes in
Dr. Head’s property rights at an inappropriate time and place. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(3)(C).)
The fourth factor, the equity of the result, involves “the economic
consequences to the victim, any divergence from the victim’s prior intent or
course of conduct or dealing, the relationship of the value conveyed to the
26
value of any services or consideration received, or the appropriateness of the
change in light of the length and nature of the relationship.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)(4).) Here, the evidence demonstrated that prior to
executing the Trust, Dr. Head had no estate plan benefiting Jendayi, but that
once Dr. Head’s health took a dramatic turn, Dr. Head executed
testamentary instruments that would convey property of substantial value to
Jendayi, including the Randolph Avenue home, and a claim to Dr. Head’s
deceased mother’s estate. The court could reasonably conclude such
substantial conveyances of property were inequitable.
In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supported the probate court’s
finding of undue influence.
C. Judicial Bias
Jendayi contends she was deprived of a fair trial in violation of various
constitutional guarantees because the probate court was biased against her.
We are not persuaded.
As a threshold matter, Jendayi failed to preserve this claim of error, as
she “never claimed during trial . . . that [her] constitutional rights were
violated because of judicial bias. ‘It is too late to raise the issue for the first
time on appeal.’ ” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111.)
Furthermore, and in any event, Jendayi’s arguments lack merit. The
due process clause “sets an exceptionally stringent standard” for proving
judicial bias. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589
(Schmidt).) “It is ‘extraordinary’ for an appellate court to find judicial bias
amounting to a due process violation. . . . Numerous and continuous rulings
against a party are not grounds for a finding of bias.’ ” (Ibid.)
Jendayi argues the probate court made biased evidentiary rulings in
respondents’ favor with regard to the admissibility of written witness
27
declarations. For instance, she complains that the court granted
respondents’ request to admit a declaration from attorney Lee but denied
Jendayi’s request to admit a declaration of notary Easley-Jackson. But far
from demonstrating the court’s bias, the record reflects that Jendayi simply
did not object to respondents’ request while respondents objected to
Jendayi’s.
Equally without merit is the argument that the probate court
demonstrated bias by prompting respondents’ counsel for objections to
Jendayi’s requests but not similarly prompting Jendayi. Although it is a
party’s responsibility to make timely objections (Evid. Code, § 353), the
probate court in this case had a general practice of asking if there were any
objections before ruling on the admissibility of exhibits. In only one instance
cited by Jendayi did the court fail to prompt her for an objection. We
conclude this sole instance does not meet the “exceptionally stringent
standard” for proving the probate court’s judicial bias against Jendayi.
(Schmidt, supra, at p. 589.)
Jendayi’s remaining claims of bias are derivative of her arguments that
the court erred in finding that respondents had standing to sue and in
shifting the burden of proof to her to prove undue influence. As we have
discussed, these decisions were not erroneous, and in any event, the mere fact
that the court made multiple rulings against Jendayi does not demonstrate
judicial bias. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
D. Statement of Decision
“Under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 632, upon a party’s request
after trial, the court must issue a statement of decision ‘explaining the
factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted
issues at trial.’ And under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 634, if the
28
statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue or is ambiguous,
and the omission or ambiguity was brought to the attention of the trial court,
‘it shall not be inferred on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of
the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) “ ‘Without a statement of decision, the judgment is
effectively insulated from review by the substantial evidence rule,’ as we
would have no means of ascertaining the trial court’s reasoning or
determining whether its findings on disputed factual issues support the
judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 981–982.)
“In rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure
section 632, a trial court is required only to state ultimate rather than
evidentiary facts; only when it fails to make findings on a material issue
which would fairly disclose the trial court’s determination would reversible
error result. [Citations.] Even then, if the judgment is otherwise supported,
the omission to make such findings is harmless error unless the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding in the complaining party’s favor which would
have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings.” (Hellman v.
La Cumbre Golf & Country Club (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.) “In
general, the failure to make a material finding on an issue supported by the
pleadings and substantial evidence is harmless when the missing finding
may reasonably be found to be implicit in other findings. [Citation.] The
court’s failure to make findings is also harmless when, under the facts of the
case, the finding would necessarily have been adverse to the appellant.”
(Rojas v. Mitchell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1450.)
Jendayi argues the statement of decision was defective because the
probate court failed to provide the legal basis for its standing ruling. As a
preliminary matter, we observe that Jendayi failed to comply with the
29
statement of decision procedures by bringing this omission to the court’s
attention in her written objections to the proposed statement of decision.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) In any event, Jendayi fails to demonstrate the
omission was prejudicial, as the probate court adequately explained the legal
basis for its ruling at the May 2021 hearing.
Jendayi next argues the statement of decision was defective because
the probate court “failed to indicate what cause of action was being ruled on,
aside from an amorphous finding of undue influence.” Again, we note that
Jendayi failed to bring this omission to the court’s attention in her written
objections to the proposed statement of decision. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)
Furthermore, as Jendayi acknowledges, the Probate Code and Welfare and
Institutions Code share the same definition of undue influence, (§ 86; Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)), and the probate court expressly stated that
its undue influence finding was based on Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15610.70. Nothing more was required under section 632.
Finally, Jendayi argues the statement of decision was defective because
the probate court did not address the statute of limitations issue. We may
accept that Jendayi’s challenge to the timeliness of respondents’ claims was a
principal controverted issue at trial. Jendayi asserted the statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense in her response to the petition, raised
the issue in her written closing statement, and brought the omission of the
issue from the proposed statement of decision to the court’s attention in her
written objections, yet the court did not address the issue in its final
statement of decision.
That said, Jendayi has not shown reversible error. Although a statute
of limitations issue may present a mixed question of law and fact (Oakes v.
McCarthy Co. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 231, 255), “ ‘[w]here the facts are agreed
30
or ascertained, it is a question of law whether a case is barred by the statute
of limitations.’ ” (Stavropoulos v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 190,
193.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 632, concerning statements of decision,
applies to the determination of questions of fact, not to questions of law.
Where the only issue is one of law, reversal for failure to issue a statement of
decision is not required.” (Estate of Garrett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 831, 840.)
Here, Jendayi does not demonstrate that her statute of limitations challenge
involved disputed questions of fact requiring findings under Code of Civil
Procedure section 632. Indeed, as previously noted (see ante, footnote 5),
Jendayi has entirely forfeited any challenge to the timeliness of respondents’
petition to the extent it was brought under the Probate Code. As such,
Jendayi fails to show error under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 or any
prejudice from the omission.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
31
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
32
Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Sandra Bean
Counsel: Decker Law, James Decker and Griffin Schindler for
Objector and Appellant
Law Offices of Daniel Leahy, Daniel Leahy for Petitioners
and Respondents
Hamlin v. Jendayi (A167695)
33