People v. Juarez CA2/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/17/24 P. v. Juarez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335287
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA261257)
v.
RIGOBERTO JUAREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed.
Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
In 2005, a jury convicted Rigoberto Juarez of first degree
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), conspiracy to commit
murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), and three counts of attempted
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), all committed when
he was 17 years old. The jury further found Juarez personally
used a firearm in the commission of the offenses (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), (d)) and committed them for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced
Juarez to 70 years to life in prison.
In 2023, Juarez filed a petition for recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)). That
statute permits “a defendant who was under 18 years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole” (LWOP) and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15
years, . . . [to] submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall
and resentencing.” (§ 1170(d)(1)(A).)2 Juarez’s resentencing
petition asserted he had served more than 15 years of a sentence
functionally equivalent to LWOP and met three of the four
criteria under section 1170(d)(2) for resentencing: he did not have
any prior juvenile adjudications for felony crimes with a
significant potential for personal harm to victims
(§ 1170(d)(2)(B)); he committed the offenses at issue with an
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defendants convicted of homicide offenses where they
tortured their victim, or where the victim was a public safety
official, another law enforcement officer, or a firefighter are
ineligible. (§ 1170(d)(1)(B).) It is undisputed these exclusions do
not apply to Juarez.
2
adult codefendant (§ 1170(d)(2)(C)); and he had performed post-
conviction rehabilitative acts including participation in programs,
vocational training, and earning his GED, and was remorseful for
his actions (§ 1170(d)(2)(D)). Juarez contended he was eligible for
relief because the court had meted out the functional equivalent
of an LWOP sentence, and to the extent section 1170(d) was
limited only to explicit LWOP sentences it violated his right to
equal protection.
The trial court denied the petition. The trial court did not
examine or weigh the evidence submitted by Juarez, finding him
statutorily ineligible for relief because he was not given an
explicit LWOP sentence. The court further held that limiting
section 1170(d) to explicit LWOP sentences did not violate
Juarez’s right to equal protection.
Juarez now appeals. He first argues section 1170(d)’s
language stating that it applies to offenses “for which the
defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole” (id., subd. (d)(1)(A)) includes not only
juveniles sentenced to an explicitly designated LWOP term but
also juveniles sentenced to multiple terms that in the aggregate
constitute the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence.
Juarez provides no persuasive basis for us to disagree with the
conclusion in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 that
“section 1170[(d)(1)(A)] limits eligibility to petition for recall and
resentencing to juvenile offenders sentenced to an explicitly
designated life without parole term.” (Id. at p. 626.) We
accordingly adopt Heard’s reasoning on the scope of what
sentences are eligible for relief under section 1170(d) as written.
Juarez further argues section 1170(d) violates equal
protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the
3
functional equivalent of LWOP. The Courts of Appeal to consider
this equal protection argument have agreed with Juarez’s
position. (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435; People v.
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608). After Sorto was decided, the
Attorney General withdrew its arguments in this appeal that
Heard was wrongly decided, that section 1170(d) does not violate
equal protection by limiting relief to offenders sentenced to
express LWOP terms, and that Juarez’s sentence of 70 years to
life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.
We agree that Juarez’s sentence of 70 years to life is the
functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d).
(See People v. Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447-448;
People v. Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) Further, “like
the court[s] in Heard [and Sorto], we can conceive of no rational
basis for section 1170(d)’s disparate treatment of explicit LWOP
offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP offenders.
[Citation.] Therefore, we agree with the Heard [and Sorto]
court[s] that section 1170(d) violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders
sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms. . . . [¶]
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by denying
[Juarez]’s section 1170(d) petition . . . . We express no opinion on
whether [Juarez] has met section 1170(d)’s other requirements.
Nor do we express an opinion on what relief the court should
grant if it concludes [Juarez] is eligible for recall and
resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall consider those
issues for the first time.” (People v. Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 454.)
4
DISPOSITION
The order finding Rigoberto Juarez ineligible for relief
under section 1170, subdivision (d) is reversed. On remand, the
court shall reconsider Juarez’s petition in accordance with this
opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
KLINE, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
5