In re Adam S. CA2/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/31/24 In re Adam S. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re ADAM S. et al., Persons B334088
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 18CCJP03032B-E)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ISAMAR M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lucia Murillo, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
In over 100 pages of briefing in this dependency case, a
mother challenges nearly every order the juvenile court issued in
exerting dependency jurisdiction over her four children. All of
her arguments lack merit, and many frivolously ignore the record
or the governing law. We accordingly affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Isamar M. (mother) has four children at issue in this
appeal—Adam S. (born April 2015), Ruben G. (born April 2018),
Matthew G. (born April 2019), and Samara G. (born July 2023).
Adam’s father is Javier S.; the father of the younger three
children is Eriverto G. (father). Mother’s fifth child, Carly M.
(born October 2011), is not at issue in this appeal because a
juvenile court previously terminated mother’s parental rights
over her.
B. Mother’s physical abuse of Adam, Ruben, and
Matthew
Mother “smacks” and “hits” Adam, Ruben, and Matthew
nearly every day, causing bruises and marks on their bodies.
Mother does this when she “gets mad” or when the children do
not follow her household rule to “be quiet as a mouse.” She has
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used her hands, a belt, a broom and other items lying around the
house. When mother has lashed Ruben with a belt, she used the
“golden” part (that is, the buckle). Mother has also pushed Adam
to the floor and held his face down to the ground; smacked Adam,
Ruben and Matthew on the mouth; hit Adam with a broom
because his hair was unkempt; struck Adam, Ruben and
Matthew with a sandal; and slammed a tablet on Adam’s knee
hard enough to break the screen protector. These injuries often
cause bruising. When mother strikes Ruben, he “cries bad” and
the blows “hurt[] really much.” When mother strikes Matthew,
he cries. When mother struck Ruben in the mouth in September
2023, Adam finally “got sick of it” and snuck out of the house
with Ruben because “he did not want [them] to get hit anymore.”
The two young boys walked to a relative’s house a half mile away
in the pre-dawn darkness.
When confronted about these beatings, mother’s responses
have been inconsistent. Initially, she denied ever striking the
boys under any circumstances, and “rant[ed]” that Adam is a
“liar” who “lies to everyone” and “mak[es] stuff up all the time.”
Later, mother admitted that she would (1) “spank[]” the children
on “the behind” with an open hand, but only as a last resort when
they are behaving “inappropriate[ly],” and (2) threaten to smack
them on the mouth or to hit them with her sandal but never
followed through.
Although Adam reported the physical abuse to family
members, his therapist, and the police, Adam temporarily denied
some of the abuse to the Los Angeles Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department), stating his conduct in running
away (which was verified by the relative) was all a dream; the
recantation occurred after mother reminded him that “[w]hatever
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happens, stays in the house.” Adam subsequently reaffirmed to
the Department that the abuse occurred. Ruben never recanted
in interviews with the Department, despite mother telling him
that he and his siblings will be taken away if he tells the truth.
C. Mother’s emotional abuse of Adam
Mother believes that “everything [Adam] touches becomes a
disaster.” She singles him out as a “problem child” and blames
him for being “a bad influence” on his siblings. Mother
repeatedly tells Adam he is “stupid” and “dumb.”
This conduct has adversely affected Adam. Adam has a
therapist who treats him for the “reactions” he experiences to
“severe stress.” Whenever the therapist tries to discuss these
issues with mother, mother pulls him out of therapy because she
believes Adam is too young for a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder. Adam also is behind in school and fights with
classmates. He acts “nervous and anxious” at school when he
believes he will get into trouble for a mistake. Adam has walked
to school by himself, while ill, simply because he did not want to
stay home.
Mother is “sick of [Adam’s] behavior,” and has offered to
“sign” away her parental rights over him.
D. History of domestic violence
Mother and father regularly yell and curse at one another,
and this verbal aggression has repeatedly escalated into physical
violence. In 2020, father slammed a door on mother’s finger and
broke it. In June 2022, father grabbed and pushed mother.
Around the same time, mother jammed a Q-tip into father’s ear,
causing it to bleed. In December 2022, father chucked Matthew’s
baby bottle at mother’s head and hit her. In June or July 2023,
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father hit mother while she was at least eight months pregnant
with Samara.
This conduct is consistent with mother’s and father’s prior
conduct. Mother regularly engaged in “violent altercations” and
“assaultive behavior” with Adam’s father in front of Adam and
Carly. Father has criminal convictions for battering the paternal
grandmother and paternal aunt.
When questioned about this domestic violence, mother says
she does not recall any incidents and prefers to not “live in the
past.”
II. Procedural Background
A. Petition
In October 2023, the Department filed a petition asking the
juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over the four children on the
grounds that (1) mother’s “physical abuse” of Adam, Ruben, and
Matthew was “excessive” and caused the children “unreasonable
pain and suffering,” thereby placing them as well as Samara at
risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and abuse
(rendering jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j)),1 (2)
mother’s “ongoing emotional abuse” of Adam places him “at
substantial risk of suffering serious damage” (rendering
jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, subdivision (c)), and
(3) mother’s and father’s “history of engaging in violent
altercations” and mother’s failure to protect the children
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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endanger their physical health and safety (rending jurisdiction
appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)).2
B. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
The juvenile court held a combined jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing on December 14, 2023. Mother continued to
deny “ever abusing her children, whether verbally or physically.”
The court sustained the allegations, removed all four children
from mother, and granted mother monitored visitation of three
hours, three times per week. The court ordered the Department
to provide mother reunification services, and defined mother’s
case plan to include (1) completing a domestic violence support
program, (2) completing an anger management program, (3)
completing a parenting class focused on special needs children,
and (4) participating in conjoint counseling with Adam as well as
individual counseling to address parenting a child with special
needs and the effects on children of excessive discipline and
domestic violence.
C. Appeal
Mother filed this timely appeal.
2 The Department further alleged that the domestic violence
ground supported jurisdiction under subdivision (a) of section
300, but the juvenile court dismissed that allegation.
As against father, the Department alleged the domestic
violence ground and a separate physical abuse ground as to
Adam. Father pleaded no contest to the domestic violence
ground, and the juvenile court dismissed the physical abuse
ground. Father did not appeal.
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D. Post-appeal developments3
While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court on June
13, 2024 placed Ruben, Matthew, and Samara back in mother’s
custody.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother attacks (1) the substantiality of the
evidence supporting each ground on which the juvenile court
exerted dependency jurisdiction over her four children; (2) nearly
every aspect of the court’s dispositional orders, including (a) the
order removing the children from her custody, (b) the order
restricting her to monitored visitation, and (c) the order defining
her case plan to include completing a domestic violence program,
parenting class, and individual counseling; and (3) the
Department’s compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224 et seq.).
I. Exertion of Dependency Jurisdiction
We review a juvenile court’s finding of dependency
jurisdiction for substantial evidence, asking whether the record—
when viewed as a whole and drawing all inferences in support of
the court’s findings—contains “‘sufficient facts to support’” the
court’s jurisdictional findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773 (I.J.).) Where, as here, the court’s exertion of dependency
jurisdiction rests on several grounds, we need only find
substantial evidence to support one ground. (In re Alexis E.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451; I.J., at p. 773.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the exertion of
jurisdiction over all four children based on mother’s physical
3 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the
orders documenting these post-appeal developments. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
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abuse of Adam, Ruben and Matthew and the resulting danger to
Samara.
Dependency jurisdiction is appropriate when (1) a parent
engages in inappropriate physical discipline that (2) gives rise to
a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm.
(§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1); In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814,
820 (Rocco M.), overruled on other grounds in In re R.T. (2017) 3
Cal.5th 622 (R.T.).) Because parents in California have “‘“a right
to reasonably discipline [their] child and may administer
reasonable punishment”’” (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634,
640-641 (D.M.)), the juvenile court must assess whether the
discipline at issue has crossed the line separating reasonable and
appropriate parental discipline (which will not support
dependency jurisdiction) from inappropriate “parental discipline”
(which will). (Id. at p. 641.) Whether that line has been crossed
in a particular case “turns on three considerations: (1) whether
the parent's conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the
punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was
‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of
punishment was reasonable or excessive.’” (Ibid.) Dependency
jurisdiction is appropriate over the child’s sibling if the child “has
been abused or neglected” under, as pertinent here, subdivisions
(a) or (b) of section 300 and “there is a substantial risk that the
[sibling] will be abused or neglected” under that same provision.
(§ 300, subd. (j); I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Adam, Ruben, and Matthew were physically beaten.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
these beatings were not a product of appropriate parental
discipline because mother was often “mad” when she beat the
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children (which tends to refute a thoughtful, disciplinary reason
for administering the beatings), and the frequency and degree of
punishments—which employed everything from belt buckles to
brooms, and caused bruising and pain—was unreasonable and
excessive. (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438
[parent’s use of a belt on a three year old’s body that left marks
on one occasion; jurisdiction appropriate]; see also In re A.E.
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [“[s]mall children are not to be hit
with hard objects, especially to the point of leaving black and blue
bruises”].) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that all three children—and hence their sibling Samara—
are at substantial risk of similar harm in the future because
mother has a long history of administering these beatings, has
been less than forthright in admitting that they happen, and has
encouraged the children to lie about whether they have occurred.
Mother responds with three arguments.
First, she contends that she engaged in no more than age-
appropriate spanking beyond the jurisdictional reach of the
juvenile court. Construed in favor of the juvenile court’s order,
the record is squarely to the contrary and we decline to revisit the
juvenile court’s implicit finding that the children were more
credible than mother. (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633 [“‘issues of
. . . credibility are the province of the [juvenile] court’”].) Mother
relatedly asserts that she was justified in beating Adam because
he is “an unruly child.” Mother provides no support for her
frankly offensive assertion that special needs children should be
accorded a different—and, indeed, lesser—level of protection from
parental beating than other children.
Second, mother argues that the juvenile court based its
jurisdictional finding on the impermissible “categorical view” that
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hitting children is inappropriate physical discipline. (See D.M.,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 [juvenile court may not base
jurisdiction on “categorical view that ‘hitting children with shoes’
is ‘physical abuse’ and ‘not a proper form of discipline’”].) This
argument is contradicted by the record. The juvenile court
explicitly considered mother’s reasons for striking the children
(namely, that she was “mad”), which is only relevant when
balancing the pertinent factors.
Third, mother argues that her physical discipline did not
cause “serious physical harm” to the children. This is wrong for
two reasons. To begin, there was serious physical harm,
including bruising and pain sufficient to induce crying. More
broadly, the imposition of serious physical harm is not required;
the risk of such is sufficient (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773
[“‘The court need not wait until a child is . . . injured to assume
jurisdiction’”]; In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 [same]),
and here there was substantial evidence of such risk.
Because there is one sufficient basis for jurisdiction, we
need not consider the parties’ arguments regarding the other
bases.
II. Dispositional Orders
A. Removal of children from mother’s custody
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order removing all
four children from her custody.
This challenge is moot as to Ruben, Matthew, and Samara.
Because the juvenile court subsequently placed those three
children back in mother’s custody, the court effectively negated
its earlier removal order as to those three children and her
challenge is, to that extent, moot. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276 (D.P.).)
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The challenge lacks merit as to Adam.
Once a juvenile court exerts dependency jurisdiction over a
child, the court may remove the child from his parent if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were
returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable means” short of
removal “by which the [child]’s physical health can be protected.”
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(c)(1).) We
review a removal order for substantial evidence. (R.T., supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Adam would be in substantial danger to his physical or
emotional well-being if returned to mother. The substantial
evidence that supports the juvenile court’s exercise of dependency
jurisdiction—namely, the evidence that mother regularly
engaged in physical violence against Adam—also, on the facts of
this case, supports the finding by clear and convincing evidence
that Adam faces a substantial danger of harm if left in mother’s
custody. (See Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 826 [“[s]ince
the evidence warranted a finding of substantial risk of serious
physical injury, it also appears to have supported a finding under
section 361 . . . of a substantial danger to the minor’s physical
health”].) What is more, the risk of mother continuing to engage
in such conduct and to encourage Adam not to report it is
substantial in light of her repeated refusals to acknowledge that
violence and her insistence that the children not tell others what
she is doing. Minimization and denial of conduct are evidence of
continued risk. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036,
1044.) Mother insists that she is a “good mom” and that Adam
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felt “safe at home,” but neither a parent’s estimation of her
parenting skills nor a child’s subjective feelings of safety negate
or even undermine the otherwise substantial evidence that Adam
faces risk of continued physical violence if left in mother’s
custody.
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
finding that no reasonable means short of removal can protect
Adam. Mother’s denial of any violence and willingness to
encourage Adam not to report violence mean that the lesser
alternatives mother proposes—leaving Adam in her custody but
offering her wraparound services or therapy—will not suffice to
protect Adam because any further violence will go unreported by
mother and Adam.
B. Monitored visitation
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s requirement that her
visitation with the children be monitored. As noted above, this
challenge is moot as to Ruben, Matthew, and Samara because
those children are now back in mother’s custody (and hence no
longer subject to any visitation order). (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 276.)
The challenge lacks merit as to Adam.
When a juvenile court removes a child from his parent with
the eventual goal of reunification, the court should provide for
visitation between the parent and child “consistent with the well-
being of the child” unless doing so will “jeopardize the safety of
the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1).) We review a trial court’s order
regarding visitation for an abuse of discretion. (In re J.P. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
that mother’s visitation with Adam be monitored. In light of the
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evidence that mother repeatedly inflicted physical violence on
Adam, repeatedly belittled and ostracized him, repeatedly denied
doing so or minimized her conduct, and repeatedly urged Adam
not to report any of her actions, the court did not act
unreasonably in concluding that it was necessary for a monitor to
be present during mother’s visits with Adam. Mother used to hit
Adam during his unmonitored visits with her during the
pendency of a prior dependency case; the juvenile court was
within its rights to believe that past might be prologue. (In re
T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is
a good predictor of future behavior”].) Indeed, mother seems to
implicitly acknowledge the propriety of monitored visits with
Adam when she concedes, in her brief, that the need for
monitoring might be greater for Adam than for her other
children.
C. Elements of case plan
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s case plan ordering
her to complete a domestic violence program, to complete a
parenting class, and to attend individual counseling addressing
how to parent a child with special needs and the effects on
children of excessive discipline and domestic violence.
As a threshold matter, mother has forfeited her challenge.
Before the juvenile court, mother “submit[ted] to the case plan”
without objection, indicating that she was already enrolled in a
domestic violence support group, an anger management class,
and a parenting class. All mother requested, to “make the case
plan less burdensome” on her, is to not be required to attend
individual counseling and the domestic violence and anger
management classes; she expressed a preference to remain in the
classes and not participate in individual counseling. By not
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challenging the parenting classes at all, and by requesting an
“either/or” disposition as to the domestic violence program and
individual counseling components of her case plan, mother has
forfeited her right to challenge the outright imposition of the
domestic violence program, parenting class, and individual
counseling. (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672; see
also In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886.)
Further, and even if we overlook mother’s forfeiture, the
juvenile court’s case plan was appropriate. A juvenile court “‘has
broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect
the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order
accordingly.’” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311
(Briana V.).) In that vein, the court may make “all reasonable
orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance,
and support of the child.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) Thus, a court’s
decision to require a parent to participate in court-ordered
services will not be reversed unless that decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd. (Briana V., at p. 311; In re L.W.
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
mother to participate in a domestic violence support group for
victims, to attend parenting classes, or to participate in
individual counseling aimed at addressing parenting and use of
discipline with special needs children like Adam. Each of these
requirements is tied to an aspect of mother’s conduct that poses a
potential danger to the children: The domestic violence support
group was aimed at teaching mother how to deal with the
violence she suffered and not to carry it forward; the parenting
classes and individual counseling worked hand in hand to teach
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mother how to constructively address disciplinary issues with the
children without resorting to violence.
Mother’s challenges to these elements of her case plan boil
down to two arguments. First, mother asserts that there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s underlying
jurisdictional findings for domestic violence, physical abuse, or
emotional abuse. As explained above, this is incorrect as to the
physical abuse finding we have affirmed. But more to the point,
it is irrelevant because elements of a case plan need not be
tethered to a specific jurisdictional allegation and need only
promote the children’s welfare when viewing “the evidence as a
whole.” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311; In re K.T.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) Here, the evidence as a whole is
sufficient to warrant the three elements of the case plan mother
challenges. Second, mother argues that individual counseling is
categorically inappropriate because she is “not suffering from
mental health issues.” Although individual counseling may be
ordered for a parent with mental illness, a parent’s mental illness
is not a prerequisite for individual counseling. Because the
individual counseling was tailored to the issues pertinent to the
children’s best interests, requiring such counseling was not an
abuse of discretion.
III. ICWA
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders must be reversed due to its noncompliance
with ICWA. This argument fails because (1) the remedy for
ICWA noncompliance in an ongoing dependency case is at most
vacation of the ICWA finding (rather than vacation of the
jurisdictional and dispositional orders) (e.g., In re Dominick D.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567-568), and (2) mother’s argument
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as to why there was noncompliance misreads the record, and thus
lacks merit.
A. Pertinent facts
The Department asked mother, father, and Javier G.
whether they had any Native American heritage; all of them said
no. All three also filed written forms denying any such heritage.
In response to questioning by the juvenile court at the very first
hearing in this case, mother and father again denied any
heritage. The Department and/or the juvenile court also inquired
of the children’s possible Native American heritage with both
parental grandmothers, the paternal aunt, the maternal
grandmother, the maternal great aunt, and each child’s
schoolteacher; all of them reported no Native American heritage.
As a consequence, the court found, at the detention hearing and
again at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, that ICWA did
not apply.
B. Analysis
ICWA and the corresponding California statutes that our
Legislature enacted to implement ICWA assign the juvenile court
and the Department three distinct duties aimed at assessing
whether a child in a dependency action is an “Indian child,” and
hence a child who should not be separated from their tribal
family through adoption or foster care placement. (§§ 224.2,
224.3; In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131-1134; Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32.)
Only the first duty is at issue here—namely, the initial “duty” of
the Department and juvenile court “to inquire whether [a] child
is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The
Department discharges this duty by “asking” family members
“whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).)
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For these purposes, an “Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a
member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b).) The
Department’s duty to inquire extends not only to the child’s
parents, but also to others, “includ[ing] . . . extended family
members.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b); In re Dezi C., at pp. 1131-1132.)
For its part, the juvenile court is required, “[a]t the first
appearance” in a dependency case, to “ask each party to the
proceeding and all other interested persons present . . . whether
they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c); In re Dezi C., at pp. 1129-1130.) We
review a juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply—and,
implicitly, that the Department discharged its initial duty of
inquiry under ICWA—for either substantial evidence or a
“hybrid” of substantial evidence and an abuse of discretion. (In re
Dezi. C., at p. 1134.)
The juvenile court’s findings, at the detention and
jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, that ICWA does not apply
was not erroneous because it was supported by substantive
evidence and/or not an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court
discharged its initial duty of inquiry by asking mother and father
(and other relatives who attended the proceedings) whether the
children had any Native American heritage. The Department
also discharged its duty by asking available family members who
might know—as well as the children’s teachers—if the children
had any such heritage.
Mother urges that the Department erred in not inquiring of
the maternal grandmother and maternal great aunt. Mother’s
argument rests on a misreading of the record. The record
17
indicates that the Department did ask the maternal grandmother
about the children’s possible Native American heritage. The
record also indicates that the Department asked the maternal
great aunt, although the Department’s report mislabeled her as
the maternal aunt; however, the Department’s reports make
clear that the Department is referring to the same person.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, P. J.
LUI
_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
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