People v. Taylor CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 10/31/24 P. v. Taylor CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082410
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI902692 )
FORREST CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, John Peter Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
James M. Toohey and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Forrest Christopher Taylor appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (former
§ 1170.95).1 He claims the trial court improperly denied as successive his
petition at the prima facie stage and it failed to follow the procedural
requirements under section 1172.6. Taylor further contends the jury
instructions at his trial allowed a conviction based on imputed malice,
and his counsel during the section 1172.6 proceeding was ineffective both
for failing to raise that issue and to ensure the court complied with
section 1172.6.
Independently reviewing the matter as we must (People v. Burns (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 862, 866), we find Taylor ineligible for resentencing relief as a
matter of law. Because the denial of his section 1172.6 petition was legally
correct, we affirm it regardless of the trial court’s reasoning. (People v.
Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124.) We therefore do not address issue
preclusion or the alleged procedural deficiencies, and instead focus on
Taylor’s claims regarding the merits of his petition.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2011, the Office of the San Bernardino County Attorney charged
Taylor, William Anthony Jacobs, Jospeh Bowen, James Dawntay Ellis, and
Sandra Marvette Smith with two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and one
count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). Both murder counts included
gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53,
subds. (d), (e)(1)). The People also alleged four special circumstances for the
murders: multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), lying- in-wait (§ 190.2,
1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. Section
1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6, without substantive change,
effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we will refer
to the section by its current numbering.
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subd. (a)(15)), felony-murder robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and criminal
street gang participation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)).
At his trial in 2013, the People sought to convict Taylor of first degree
murder under three theories: (1) willful, deliberate, and premediated murder;
(2) lying-in-wait murder; and (3) felony murder. The People alleged Ellis was
the shooter, and the trial court instructed the jury that Taylor could be liable
for the killing based on the former version of the felony-murder rule, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and aiding and abetting.
The jury convicted Taylor of all three counts, finding the murder to be
first degree, but without specifying the theory on which it relied.2 The jury
also found each special circumstance and enhancement true. Pursuant to the
felony-murder-robbery special circumstance, the jury determined Ellis was
the actual killer. By finding the lying-in-wait, criminal street gang
participation, and multiple-murder special circumstances true, the jury
determined Taylor acted with intent to kill. (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416.)
The trial court sentenced Taylor to 11 years for the street terrorism,
plus 50 years to life for the firearm enhancements, plus two terms of life
without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions. On direct appeal,
we stayed the sentence for the street terrorism and struck a parole revocation
fine, but otherwise affirmed the conviction. (People v. Taylor (Nov. 30, 2015,
No. D068487 [nonpub. opn.].)
2 “[I]n a prosecution for first degree murder it is not necessary that all
jurors agree on one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution; it
is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of first degree murder.” (People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d
185, 195.)
3
On January 22, 2019, Taylor filed his first petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition on February 21,
2020.
On August 15, 2022, Taylor filed a second section 1172.6 petition. The
trial court denied that petition on April 28, 2023, finding it barred by issue
preclusion. Taylor appeals from that ruling.
III. DISCUSSION
Taylor argues he is eligible for resentencing because several of the
instructions given to his jury allowed for a murder conviction based on
imputed malice. He relies on the fact that the trial court instructed the jury
using the no longer valid natural and probable consequence and felony-
murder instructions, as well as the aiding and abetting instruction’s general
reference to “a crime.” He also asserts the jury’s findings of intent to kill
were insufficient by themselves to conclusively negate his eligibility for
relief.3
When the trial court conducts its prima facie inquiry, a relevant jury
finding is not necessarily dispositive because a section 1172.6 petition puts at
issue all elements of murder based on a still-valid theory. (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462–463.) A jury finding of intent to kill only
addresses one element of murder and does not by itself establish any valid
3 Taylor also relies on People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257,
but that case it distinguishable because it involved first degree lying-in-wait
murder, which does not require intent to kill. For an aider and abettor, the
lying-in-wait special circumstance found true in this case requires an intent
to kill (§ 190.2, subd. (c)). More importantly, this court has declined to follow
Maldonado because the instructional error it identified was based on
preexisting law not changed by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).
(People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.)
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theory of liability. (Id. at p. 463.) As such, the trial court must look to other
aspects of the record, such as additional jury findings, and compare them to
the elements of murder under a current lawful theory. (Id. at pp. 464–465.)
One theory of liability still valid after lawmakers amended sections 188
and 189 is direct aiding and abetting of murder. (People v. Medrano (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 177, 183.) “[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires
proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a
crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens
rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to
assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus
reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of
the crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) Additionally, “[a]
lying-in-wait special circumstance can apply to a defendant who, intending
that the victim would be killed, aids and abets an intentional murder
committed by means of lying in wait.” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th
600, 630.)
As noted above, Ellis was the actual killer. The trial court instructed
the jury that Taylor could nonetheless be liable for murder based on the
former version of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or aiding and abetting.
Under the felony-murder and natural and probable consequence
instructions, Taylor could have been guilty of murder for killings during a
robbery that were “likely to happen if nothing unusual intervene[d],” or if
they were “unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” As for aiding and
abetting, the trial court stated, “the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the
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commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or
conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
The trial court further instructed that for the jury to find the lying-in-
wait special circumstance true, “the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendants intentionally killed [the victims]; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendants
committed the murder by means of lying in wait. [¶] A person commits a
murder by means of lying in wait if: [¶] 1. He or she concealed his or her
purpose from the person killed; [¶] 2. He or she waited and watched for an
opportunity to act; [¶] 3. Then he or she made a surprise attack on the person
killed from a position of advantage; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He or she intended to kill
the person by taking the person by surprise.”
Viewing these instructions together with the jury’s findings shows that
the jury did not rely on the derivative liability theories in the felony-murder
and natural and probable consequence instructions. By finding the lying-in-
wait special circumstance true, the jury determined that Taylor
“intentionally killed” the victims by “a surprise attack.”4 The only way for
the jury to reach that finding was to conclude that Taylor aided and abetted
the target offenses of murder. In other words, the jury could not have found
the lying-in-wait special circumstance true unless it interpreted the “crime”
in the aiding and abetting instruction to be murder.
Consequently, the jury’s findings in this case went farther than the
bare intent to kill found insufficient in Curiel. Instead, the jury necessarily
determined that Ellis committed surprise attack killings, Taylor was aware
4 We disagree that the lying-in-wait special circumstance instruction’s
use of “defendants” in the plural requires a different result as Taylor
contends.
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of Ellis’s intentions and intended to help Ellis murder the victims, and Taylor
assisted those crimes. This meets the requirements of the still valid murder
theory of direct aiding and abetting, precluding Taylor from relief under
section 1172.6. Because the order denying Taylor’s second section 1172.6
petition is valid on this ground, we affirm it.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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