Swain v. Director of Corrections ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARIUS SWAIN, Case No. 19-cv-03882-EMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 9 v. Docket No. 10-1 10 DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, 11 Defendant. 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Darius Swain, an inmate at the California State Prison in Lancaster, commenced this pro se 15 prisoner’s civil action by filing a “writ of replevin complaint.” Docket No. 1. The Court 16 dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because the complaint (a) failed to allege facts 17 establishing jurisdiction (e.g., diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction); (b) had too 18 many conclusory allegations and failed to allege a short and plain statement of the claim showing 19 that Mr. Swain was entitled to relief; (c) failed to link defendants to the claims; and (d) could not 20 assert claims that would call into question his conviction or sentence. 21 Mr. Swain then filed an “writ of replevin first amended complaint.” Docket No. 10-1. 22 That first amended complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 25 seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 27 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 1 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 2 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 3 Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint borrows concepts from the 4 Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in an attempt to secure Mr. Swain’s release from prison. The 5 first amended complaint makes little sense, but alleges the following: Mr. Swain is the secured 6 party creditor, the authorized representative of the debtor, and the debt itself, as he holds a secured 7 interest in himself in the amount of $100,000. Docket No. 10-1 at 3. He incurred a “debt to the 8 State of California” (apparently referring to his conviction and prison sentence) that he “did not 9 have the opportunity to accept the charges and return them for full value.” Id. As a result, “an 10 unlawful lien” (apparently, his prison sentence) was placed against his “property” (i.e., Mr. Swain) 11 that is now in the possession of the California Department of Corrections. Id. His first amended 12 complaint is “presentment acceptance for value” which, in turn, should secure the lien on his 13 “property” (i.e., himself) and result in “closure of case number H26381 and release of lien [on his] 14 personal property” (i.e., himself) from state prison. Id. at 5-6. He alleges that the failure to grant 15 him relief on his “presentment acceptance for value” violates due process. Id. at 5. Among the 16 exhibits attach to the first amended complaint are a U.C.C. Financing Statement1 signed by Mr. 17 Swain that purports to cover, among other things, his birth certificate and variations on his name, 18 id. at 8; a “non-negotiable bill of exchange” regarding a “‘chargeback’ of personal U.C.C. contract 19 trust account” signed by Mr. Swain, id. at 11; and a “conditional acceptance – request for proof of 20 claim as to the status of monetary conditions within the state of California to pay debts at law” 21 signed by Mr. Swain, id. at 14-19. 22 The allegation of a due process violation gives the Court jurisdiction over the action, as it 23 raises a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Mr. Swain’s due process claim, like 24 the rest of his first amended complaint, is legally meritless. 25 There appear to be several sorts of abuses of the U.C.C. favored by prisoners, who try to 26 27 1 A U.C.C.-1 Financing Statement “is a standardized legal form filed by a creditor giving notice of 1 take advantage of the fact that the U.C.C. “grants little authority to filing offices to refuse to accept 2 fraudulent or invalid filings.” United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2015).2 One sort 3 of abuse is the use of liens and encumbrances against the real or personal property of government 4 officials to harass them. Such efforts can lead to criminal convictions. See, e.g., Neal, 776 F.3d at 5 655 (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, which prohibits the filing, attempt to file, or 6 conspiracy to file a false document of the sort regularly used to create liens or encumbrances 7 against the real or personal property of a federal officer or employee)). Another sort of abuse is 8 the use of U.C.C. documents to pursue the “Redemptionist” theory (or other similar theory) to try 9 to obtain release from custody. 10 [T]he “Redemptionist” theory . . . propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the 11 “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 1993, and, instead, 12 pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only 13 over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, 14 thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of 15 money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are 16 encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of 17 this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public 18 records such as indictments or court papers. 19 Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). 20 Mr. Swain’s first amended complaint and attachments thereto appear to be an effort to 21 pursue the Redemptionist theory to support his release from custody. The theory that he has a 22 right to release as a result of the U.C.C. documents he prepared and filed is legally meritless. Cf. 23 24 2 The seriousness of the problem of prisoners filings illegitimate liens has led to a number of prison systems imposing outright bans on the possession of U.C.C. materials. See, e.g., Torres v. 25 Florida Dept. of Corr., 742 F. App’x 403, 406-07 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to rule permitting confiscation of prisoner’s U.C.C. forms because it was reasonably 26 related to legitimate penological interest in preventing prisoners from filing fraudulent U.C.C. liens); Edmonds v. Sobina, 296 F. App’x 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding prison’s policy of 27 restricting inmates possession of U.C.C.-related materials); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3rd 1 Carter v. Wands, 431 F. App’x 628, 629 (10th Cir. 2011) (the U.C.C. does not “provide a basis to 2 challenge the conditions of [plaintiff’s] imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); United States v. 3 Nero, 2013 WL 12156673, *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2013) (defendant’s arguments that his criminal 4 judgment is void due to his U.C.C. filings as a “secured party creditor” are among the “claims in 5 his various filings [that] have no basis in law and are patently frivolous and/or malicious”); id. 6 (collecting cases that have rejected inmate efforts to file unsubstantiated liens and U.C.C. 7 financing statements in connection with their incarceration). The U.C.C. does not apply to the 8 facts alleged in the first amended complaint. Mr. Swain offers no legal authority for his 9 outlandish idea that a prison sentence or a conviction is a secured or unsecured debt under the 10 U.C.C. And he offers no legal authority for his equally absurd proposition that a prisoner or the 11 state gains a secured interest under the U.C.C. in the prisoner by virtue of the prisoner’s conviction 12 or prison sentence. In a nutshell, nothing in the U.C.C. will unlock the prison gate for Mr. Swain. 13 Attaching a due process label to the minimal facts alleged in the first amended complaint 14 does not help Mr. Swain because the due process theory, like the underlying U.C.C. theory, is 15 legally meritless. Mr. Swain had no due process right to release from custody upon his 16 presentation of his “presentment acceptance for value,” Docket No. 10-1 at 5, to this Court or to 17 prison officials. 18 Moreover, as the Court previously explained, a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action 19 for damages or equitable relief for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 20 caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that 21 conviction or sentence already has been determined to be wrongful. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 22 477, 486-87 (1994). A conviction or sentence may be determined to be wrongful by, for example, 23 being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court issues a writ of habeas 24 corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an action that -- even if it 25 does not directly challenge the conviction or sentence -- would imply that the conviction or 26 sentence was invalid. The practical importance of this rule is that a plaintiff cannot attack his 27 conviction or sentence in a civil rights action for damages or declaratory relief; the conviction or 1 If Mr. Swain wants to challenge the lawfulness of his current custody, the exclusive method by 2 || which he may do so in federal court is by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. 3 || Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 4 The first amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 5 Further leave to amend will not be granted because it would be futile. The Court already 6 || explained in the order of dismissal with leave to amend what Mr. Swain needed to do to state a 7 claim for relief, but he was unwilling or unable to do so in his first amended complaint. 8 Il. CONCLUSION 9 This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 10 || Clerk shall close the file. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: December 20, 2019 16 Sy 5 ED M. CHEN nited States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28