Flynn v. Informatica, LLC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSEPH FLYNN, Case No. 19-cv-06192-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO 9 v. TRANSFER 10 INFORMATICA, LLC, Re: Dkt. No. 22 11 Defendant. 12 13 Presently before the Court is Defendant Informatica, LLC’s motion to transfer venue to the 14 Western District of Texas. Dkt. Nos. 22, 22-1 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff Joseph Flynn does not oppose 15 the transfer. Dkt. No. 27. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to transfer and 16 TRANSFERS this action to the Western District of Texas. 17 I. LEGAL STANDARD 18 “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 19 may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . 20 .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The transfer statute exists “to prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and 21 money’ and ‘to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and 22 expense.’” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (citation omitted). The moving party 23 bears the burden of showing that the transferee district is a “more appropriate forum.” See Jones 24 v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). And the district court has broad 25 discretion in deciding whether or not to transfer an action. See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 26 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court’s decision to change venue is reviewed for 27 abuse of discretion. Weighing of the factors for and against transfer involves subtle considerations 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff filed this collective action complaint against Defendant for failure to pay overtime 3 compensation in violation of the FLSA. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff is a citizen of Texas and 4 worked for Defendant in its Austin, Texas location. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. Defendant is a Delaware 5 limited liability company with its headquarters in Redwood City, California. Dkt. No. 22-3 at ¶ 3. 6 The putative FLSA collective is defined as: 7 [A]ll inside all inside sales employees (including Business Development Managers, Inside Sales Representatives, Sales 8 Development Representatives, or other positions with similar job titles and/or duties) (collectively “Inside Sales Representatives”) 9 who work or have worked for Informatica anytime from three years prior to the filing of this action through the present (the “Collective 10 Period”). 11 Compl. ¶ 2. At the time of the filing of this motion, there were two opt-in Plaintiffs: Alison 12 Blakely, who worked in Defendant’s Austin location, and Thomas Chard, who worked in the 13 Redwood City location. Dkt. No. 22-3 at ¶¶ 13, 15. 14 In its unopposed motion, Defendant claims that the case could have been brought in the 15 Western District of Texas. Mot. at 10–11. The transferee district has federal question subject 16 matter jurisdiction because the complaint alleges a violation of the FLSA Id. at 11. According to 17 Defendant, that court has specific personal jurisdiction over it because Defendant “actually 18 conducts business and maintains offices in Texas,” and “employed Plaintiff, Opt-In Plaintiff 19 Blakley and the vast majority of the other putative collective members in Texas.” Id. at 11. And 20 venue properly lies in the Western District because Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in 21 that district. Id. 22 With respect to whether the considerations of convenience and fairness favor transfer, 23 Defendant represents that the convenience of all parties and non-party witnesses favors 24 transferring this action because it is the “situs of the material events giving rise to this lawsuit.” 25 Id. at 15. Specifically, Defendant claims that the inside sales efforts were predominately run out 26 of the Austin, Texas office, id. at 9; the “vast majority of the other putative collective members” 27 are in Texas, id. at 11; during the relevant period, Defendant employed only six inside sales 1 terminated or transferred “just one week into the potential statutory period,” id. at 9; the 2 supervisors are all in Texas and decisions concerning compensation and classification were made 3 || from the Texas office, id. at 14; and employee witnesses “critical to this matter” reside in and 4 around Austin, id. at 16. Further, Defendant contends that because “Austin, Texas is the place 5 where decisions concerning the alleged wrongdoing concerning job classifications and pay were 6 made,” the Western District of Texas has a substantial interest in the case. Mot. at 19. 7 Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, and the Court finds transfer is warranted. 8 Wl. CONCLUSION 9 The Court GRANTS the unopposed motion to transfer. Dkt. No. 22. The Clerk of Court 10 shall TRANSFER this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 11 and close the file. The Court also TERMINATES AS MOOT the parties’ stipulation to cancel 12 || the case management conference. Dkt. No. 32. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 || Dated: 1/6/2020 16 /Matpureed 3 Shy ah 5 HAYWOOD S, GILLIAM, JR. nited States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28