Lockhart v. Alameda County Court ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL A. LOCKHART, Case No. 19-cv-04055-WHO (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 13 14 ALAMEDA COUNTY COURT, et al., Dkt. Nos. 15 and 16 Defendants. 15 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Michael Lockhart is a California state prisoner serving a sentence of 25 19 years to life, imposed following his convictions for drug offenses. In this 42 U.S.C. § 20 1983 federal civil rights action, he asks this federal court to intervene in the state’s 21 handling of his current resentencing proceedings.1 I am obligated to conduct a preliminary 22 screening of this case to insure that a plausible claim is stated, and it is clear that none is. 23 24 1 The original complaint speaks of a “Prop 36 hearing,” (Compl., Dkt. No. 12 at 1), while the amended complaint mentions Proposition 57, (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 15 at 3). 25 Proposition 36, now codified as Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126, is the “Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012,” which “seeks to remedy the harshness of the Three Strikes Law both 26 prospectively and retroactively.” Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2017). Simply put, the third strike must be, except for some minor exceptions, a serious or violent 27 felony. For those sentenced prior to enactment, there is a provision entitling prisoners with 1 Federal courts must abstain from interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state 2 court, such as Lockhart’s state resentencing hearing. Accordingly, this matter will be 3 dismissed.2 4 DISCUSSION 5 A. Standard of Review 6 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 7 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 8 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 9 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 10 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 11 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 12 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 14 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 15 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 16 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 17 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 19 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 20 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 21 (9th Cir. 1994). 22 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 23 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 24 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 25 26 2 This is not Lockhart’s first challenge to such proceedings. In 2017, he asked this Court to remove his attorney (from what appears to have been another resentencing proceeding) and 27 transfer his state proceedings to another venue. Lockhart v, Sherrer, 17-cv-03668-JCS. 1 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 2 B. Legal Claims 3 In his original complaint, Lockhart asked that I remove the Alameda District 4 Attorney from his resentencing proceedings or change the venue of his resentencing, or 5 both. (Compl., Dkt. No. 12 at 3-4.) He alleges that the district attorney has engaged in 6 “misconduct” and “obstruction of justice.” (Id. at 3.) In his amended complaint, his 7 allegations are much the same: the district attorney is allegedly engaging in misconduct. 8 Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with 9 ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances (such as bad faith 10 or harassment). Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Younger abstention is 11 appropriate when (1) there is “an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) those 12 “proceedings implicate important state interests,” and (3) there is “an adequate opportunity 13 in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. 14 v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). 15 Abstention is appropriate here because all the elements of Younger are present. The 16 record demonstrates that Lockhart’s state court proceedings are ongoing, which satisfies 17 the first Younger requirement. The second Younger element is also present: the Supreme 18 Court has held that “a proper respect for state functions,” such as ongoing criminal 19 proceedings, is an important issue of state interest. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 20 475, 491-92 (1973) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). As to the third prong of Younger, 21 there is no reason that Lockhart cannot pursue his constitutional claims in state court. 22 In addition, any interference by this court in the state court proceedings would 23 enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining state proceedings, results disapproved of by 24 Younger. SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). Nothing 25 in the complaint suggests there are extraordinary circumstances requiring my interference 26 in state court proceedings. Younger abstention is applicable, requiring me to dismiss 27 Lockhart’s case. 1 MOTIONS 2 Lockhart filed two pending motions in addition to the complaint. His motion for an 3 |) injunction “compelling DA from case” is DENIED as moot. (Dkt. No. 15.) His motion to 4 || proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is also DENIED as moot (Dkt. No. 16.); L already granted 5 || his prior IFP motion. (Dkt. No. 8.) 6 CONCLUSION 7 Lockhart’s federal civil rights suit is DISMISSED. Lockhart’s motions for an 8 || injunction and to proceed IFP are DENIED as moot. 9 If Lockhart wishes to challenge the result of his state proceedings in federal court, 10 || he may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus after he has exhausted his state court 11 || remedies. 2 The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of 5 13 defendants, and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. || Dated: January 8, 2020 | ( ° \ 16 = VA om LLIAM H. ORRICK 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28