Rejuvi Laboratory, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 In re: Case No. 19-cv-08422-MMC Bankruptcy Case No. 18-31069-DM 8 REJUVI LABORATORY, INC., ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S 9 Debtor MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL 10 Re: Doc. No. 2 11 12 13 Before the Court is appellant Rejuvi Laboratory, Inc.'s ("Rejuvi") "Motion for Leave 14 to Appeal," filed in the bankruptcy court on December 23, 2019, and transmitted to the 15 district court on December 24, 2019.1 Having read and considered the motion,2 the Court 16 rules as follows. 17 On September 27, 2018, Rejuvi filed a petition for bankruptcy. On January 9, 18 2019, Maria Corso ("Corso") filed a Proof of Claim in the amount of $1,242,240, and 19 stated the basis for the claim was a "Personal Injury Judgment in Australia." (See Bankr. 20 Case No. 18-31069, Doc. 57 Part 2.) In response, Rejuvi filed an Objection, in which it 21 acknowledged an Australian court had entered a default judgment against it, but asserted 22 Corso's claim should be disallowed on the ground that, inter alia, "[t]he Australian court 23 did not have personal jurisdiction over Rejuvi." (See Bankr. Case No. 18-31069, Doc. 57 24 Part 1.) Thereafter, on August 12, 2019, Rejuvi filed a "Brief Regarding Jurisdiction of 25 Australian Court," whereby it requested an order disallowing Corso's claim on such 26 1The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on January 13, 2020. 27 1 ground, and Corso filed opposition to such request. 2 On September 12, 2019, the bankruptcy judge conducted a hearing on Rejuvi's 3 request for disallowance, and, on December 9, 2019, following additional briefing by the 4 parties, issued an order finding the Australian court had personal jurisdiction over Rejuvi. 5 In particular, the bankruptcy judge found Rejuvi had purposefully directed its activities 6 toward Australia, that the claim Corso filed in Australia arose out of or related to those 7 activities, and that the exercise of jurisdiction in Australia was reasonable. 8 The bankruptcy judge's order did not, however, find the claim should be allowed. 9 Rather, the bankruptcy judge has set a January 23, 2020, status conference for purposes 10 of determining how to resolve the outstanding issues presented by the claim and 11 objection. (See Bankr. Case No. 18-31069, Doc. 159.) Consequently, the order finding 12 the Australian court had personal jurisdiction over Rejuvi is interlocutory in nature. 13 By the instant motion, Rejuvi seeks leave to appeal that interlocutory order. Leave 14 of court is required to appeal an interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. 15 § 158(a)(3).3 Leave to appeal is appropriately granted where an interlocutory order 16 "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 17 difference of opinion" and "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 18 the ultimate termination of the litigation." See In re Bertain, 215 B.R. 438, 441 (B.A.P. 9th 19 Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Horowitz v. Sulla, 2017 WL 1352211, at *7 (D. Haw. April 11, 20 2017) (denying leave to appeal interlocutory order that did not involve "controlling issue 21 of law"). 22 Here, to the extent Rejuvi refers to any argument it seeks to raise on appeal, it 23 states "the default judgment cannot be recognized by a United States court" because 24 Rejuvi's "contacts with Australia are too attenuated to confer personal jurisdiction in [an 25 Australian] forum" (see Mot. at 2:12-14), and, in support of the instant motion, relies on 26 3The one exception to such rule is inapplicable here. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) 27 (allowing appeal without leave of court as to interlocutory orders issued pursuant to 11 1 the declaration of its president, who discusses therein the nature of Rejuvi's operations 2 and the types of contacts it has had with Australia. (See Cheng Decl., filed December 3 || 23, 2019.) Under such circumstances, it appears Rejuvi's position is that there are 4 || insufficient facts to support the findings made by the bankruptcy judge. A challenge toa 5 || judge's application of law to the facts presented, however, is not the type of challenge 6 || appropriate for interlocutory appeal. See Novatel Wireless Securities Litig., 2013 WL 7 12247558, at 2 (November 19, 2013) (observing interlocutory appeals are reserved for 8 || "pure, controlling issues of law," not challenges to "the application of law to a particular 9 || set of facts"). Indeed, Rejuvi has not shown the order it seeks to appeal involves a 10 || controlling issue of law, much less that any such issue is one as to which there is 11 substantial ground for difference of opinion. g 12 Consequently, even assuming an immediate appeal at this time may materially s 13 || advance the resolution of Corso's claim,* Rejuvi has failed to show leave to appeal at this 14 || time is appropriate. 2 15 Accordingly, the motion for leave to appeal is hereby DENIED. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. g 17 18 || Dated: January 15, 2020 Lfall Chat INE M. CHESNEY 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 “Rejuvi states "the issue of personal jurisdiction is the dominant issue with respect 2g || to the allowance or disallowance of Corso's claim." (See Mot. at 5:17-18.)